1. Putting Nonviolent Peaceforce in
the picture
Christine Schweitzer
1.1.1 Nonviolence
Nonviolence is not a very exact term. It
not only describes a whole class of activities,
but also describes attitudes and life-style.
The debate among nonviolent activists is whether
the latter are preconditions to the first, or
whether nonviolence is
a principle or a technique. Both
approaches hold nonviolence as
an efficient instrument and an ethical means
for dealing with conflict and political strife
because it tries to minimise damages and casualties.
Both also agree that nonviolence might be used for reformist
or for revolutionary purposes,
and that it may be used to promote social change
(nonviolent action, nonviolent uprisings etc.)
and to prevent unwelcome changes (social defence
or civilian-based defense).
The biggest differences between the two approaches
lie in the nature of commitment,
the assumed relationship between means and ends,
the approach to conflict in general, the attitude
towards the opponent with the assumed way of
how nonviolence "works",
and the mentioned issue of nonviolence as a way of life.
It is certainly possible that
the difference between both approaches might
be an ideological rather than an empirical question.
On the one hand, elements of coercing the opponent
can be found in campaigns of principled nonviolent leaders
like Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Any
action has an impact on the opponent. The effect
of this action, whether coercive or persuasive,
may depend on the opponent’s perception and the
cost he is willing to incur. For example: Gandhi's
death fast in 1948 made
his opponents give in, not because they were
convinced, but because they felt that the political
costs of Gandhi's death would be too high. This
same action carried out by unknown and widely
despised Kurdish prisoners in Turkey led to more
than twenty deaths (May 2001). On the other
hand, many defenders of the pragmatic approach
might profess an ethical foundation for themselves,
but believe that they should not impose their
convictions on others, and that they might better
win support by using rational-pragmatic arguments. Certainly,
if the activists manage to convey to their opponent
that they do not hate him, that they are concerned
about his well being, and that they are ready
to consider his interests, this might produce
a positive dynamic in the conflict situation,
which could not have happened otherwise. However,
there might still be an element of coercion involved: "Clearly,
life is not a choice between violence and no
violence. It is a choice between violence and
less violence; the latter sometimes expressed
through the medium of nonviolence."
1.1.2.1
Some definitions
There are many definitions
of social conflict, and this study is not the
place to investigate the theory of conflict in
depth. Friedrich Glasl’s definition
has been chosen because it has the advantage
of being broad and neutral enough to allow an
all-encompassing view of social conflict. Friedrich Glasl’s (1994)
handbook on conflict resolution will play a role
again later on when talking about conflict stages.
He says:
"Social conflict
is an interaction between actors (individuals,
groups, organisations and so on), where at least
one actor sees incompatibilities in the thinking/
imagination/ perception, and/ or feeling, and/or
wanting with another actor (other actors) in
a way, that in the realisation there is impairment
by another actor (the other actors)."
Conflicts may be categorised according
to:
Different
objects (e.g. strategic conflicts, issue conflicts).
For the international field, Kumar Rupesinghe distinguishes
resource-based conflicts, conflicts over governance
and authority, ideological conflicts and identity
conflicts.
Visibility
(latent-manifest conflicts)
Characteristics
of the conflict parties, their position and relationship
to each other (e.g. individuals-groups, rulers-ruled),
Level
of escalation (see below)
Means
used to carry the conflict out.
1.1.2.2
Violent conflicts
Conflicts become a special
issue for attention when and if they are carried
out by violent means. Peace researchers have
reserved the term "war" for violent
conflicts that fulfil certain criteria. Usually
there has to be a minimum number of casualties
(1000 per year or per conflict), and some kind
of regular army and central organisation on one
side of the conflict at least .
Violent conflicts that do not fulfil these criteria
are called armed conflicts.
Since World War II there have
been about 200 wars. The number of wars taking
place each year has increased every year to a
total of 51 wars in 1992. The decline in the
following years to 29 wars in 1997 has again
been reversed, and the number of wars has risen
to 34 in 1999. Almost 75 % of them have taken
place in Africa (14) and Asia (11). Others were
in the Middle East (6), Latin America (2) and
Europe (1). In 1999 alone seven new wars started.
Today the majority of wars
are internal wars -
the number of international wars has been falling
drastically to almost zero in recent years. (In
1999 AKUF counted 3, with three more wars with
a strong international component.)
But while this is certainly reason enough to
concentrate on internal wars when dealing with
the issue of conflict intervention, it would
be too soon to conclude that the danger of new
major international wars has been eliminated.
There are many different ways
to categorise armed conflicts.
For the purpose of this study it is sufficient
to find categories that are meaningful for conflict
intervention. As a working conflict typology,
the one proposed by Miall et.
al. (1999) will
be freely combined with the one used by AKUF.
If in the course of the research, further distinction
will prove useful, the typology might be refined. It
is based on a combination of actors and issues:
1. International/interstate
conflicts
2. Internal
conflicts
2.1 anti-regime (Miall et
al: "revolution/ideology") conflicts/wars
2.2 autonomy and secession
(Miall et al: "identity/secession")
conflicts
2.3 factional conflicts (AKUF: "other
internal wars" or "unrests" depending
on if there is central organisation of the fighting
on both sides, regular forces at least on one
side involved, and some continuity of the fighting)
2.4 decolonising wars.
Further distinctive categories
are:
1. If
at least on one side the fighting is done by
regular forces (military, police, paramilitary
units) of the government or
not (distinction probably only relevant in internal
conflicts.
2. If
there is violence carried out only by one side,
and the other side is using only nonviolent means (distinction
at least theoretical both applicable for international
and internal conflicts),
3. If
there is direct military involvement by an external
party (military intervention)
The fact that civil wars are
the predominant kind of organised violence today
has had a significant impact on the problems
faced by those who deal with them. Often there
are many actors, and just as often across the
boundaries of one state - with very different
interests. Recently, the category of those who
profit from the continuation of a war has gained
special attention (the recent UN report on peacekeeping calls
them simply "spoilers"); Mary Anderson
distinguishes "thugs", "irreconcilables", "arms
merchants and other profiteers". The
wars are highly privatised, fought with small
weapons, and civilians easily might become part-time
warriors, extinguishing the clear distinction
between combatants and non-combatants. International
Humanitarian Law is heeded less and less. Civilians
and those trying to help have often been made
the target of violent attacks, as are civilian
installations such as hospitals, schools, refugee
centres and cultural sites.
1.1.2.3
Causes of (armed) conflict
The research on causes of
armed conflict so far has not produced a consistent
theory acceptable to most scholars working in
the field. However, It is very likely that there
is one consensus: that conflict cannot be reduced
to a single cause, or a single explanation. It
is obvious that there are "very few necessary
conditions" which need to be fulfilled in
order for a war to develop, and "very many
sufficient conditions, of which only a few of
these may apply, in any single conflict. War
is possible as soon as weapons are available
with which to fight it and as long as there is
a dispute between two or more parties. What makes
war probable, however, is a far more complicated
question."
There are different categories
of explanations: genetic and evolutionary/biologist
theories (aggression as a genetic function, maximisation
of survival chances), behaviourist theories (war
as learned behaviour), cost-benefit theories
(maximisation of benefit), ecological (war for
scarce resources), social/cultural theories (ethnicity
and/or religion as conflict causes), and cognitive
(attitudes) explanations.
Before the early 1990s most
scholars concentrated on international war. Only
recently have the causes for internal conflict
come into consideration. These are: the role
of power imbalances (a concept known since Roman
domination), of economic growth and free trade,
of relative deprivation (difference between expected
and real access to well-being and power), of
deterioration of the environment, of the state
as such and the ideology of nationalism, of specific
forms of political organisation (democracy, authoritarian
regimes, transitional regimes), of the existence
of a monopoly of power, and of the connection
between internal cohesion and external aggression.
Remarkably there are theories that say that an
existing monopoly of power and internal cohesion
are supportive for peace, and theories that say
the opposite.
Clearly the state of the research on conflict
causes is inconclusive.
The role of ethnic diversity
is controversial as well. In the eyes of many
researchers about conflict, it is not a cause
per se although parties in conflict do tend to
identify themselves ethnically. Ethnicity is
a powerful factor in mobilising people against
each other because ethnicity is easy to ascribe,
touches upon fundamental values, and seems to
be non negotiable. Still, it should be regarded
as an instrument, and an ideological base, rather
than as a cause.
The
different, and often popular, psychological and
biological theories try to explain why people
are willing to support and participate in war,
but they cannot give a sufficient explanation
of why there is modern war. Individual aggression
cannot explain armament, arms industry and the
modern military.
Agreement seems to exist on
these three important factors for the development
of war:
Bad
economic conditions seem to be a main cause for
internal conflicts.
Repressive
political systems, especially if they are in
a state of transition, are war-prone
Degradation
of renewable resources (erosion, deforestation,
scarcity of water) may contribute to the possibility
of armed conflict.
On the other hand, empirically,
it seems that democratic states do not go to
war against each other. This observation has
led to much comment, and is the rationale for
many conflict interventions, specifically the
democratisation programs undertaken by OSCE,
UN and others.
Proponents of nonviolent action
tend to emphasize individualistic theories of
conflict as well, probably because most of the
supporters are rooted in individualistic Western
culture. Special mention needs to be made of
the human needs approach which has been propagated
by John Burton and
others. It is the theoretical basis of many conflict
resolution projects, and specifically, so-called
conflict-solving workshops. Burton sees three
types of human motivation: needs, values and
interests. The basic needs are "universal
and primordial", and they are about avoiding
three primary emotions (fear, anger and depression)
in order to permit the fourth emotion, the positive
emotional state of satisfaction/happiness. Because
human beings are being driven by these emotions,
humans have a corresponding set of needs for
conditions of life that give them satisfaction.
There is no general agreement on what these secondary
needs might be; most often mentioned are identity,
freedom, recognition, stimulation, distributive
justice, participation, rationality, and control. Because
these basic needs absolutely must be fulfilled,
people are ready to go to war for them, or so
the argument goes. But this theory does not take
into account structural or cultural factors that
allow some groups to satisfy their secondary
needs at the expense of other groups, over a
long time, and without being challenged.
Perhaps much of the more fruitless
parts of the discussion could be avoided if there
was agreement on Smith's proposal to distinguish
four types of causes of
conflict:
Background
causes (basic elements of social and political
structure, e.g. that certain groups are excluded
from power, or that there are regional economic
differences);
Mobilisation
Strategies (objectives of key political actors
and the way they go about fulfilling these objectives;
Triggers
(factors that affect the timing of the onset
of the armed conflict);
Catalysts
(factors that influence the intensity and duration
of a conflict, including external factors like
an international intervention).
1.1.3.1
Conflict stages
Conflicts may be either latent
or manifest, and tend to escalate if not dealt
with in time. Usually escalation means that communication
between the parties breaks down, and the readiness
to use violence (first usually verbal, then physical)
grows. Many social scientists have attempted
to define this development by describing typical
stages of conflict escalation.
Friedrich Glasl deals
mainly with conflict in business, but his set
of nine stages can easily be used for political
large-scale conflicts.
Glasl shows how parties in conflict
loose the ability to co-operate in a constructive
manner as their successive and mutual experiences
are break down. He identifies several "points
of no return" which contribute decisively
to the escalation. In
stage 1,
there is a hardening of the positions. It is
the content of the conflict that is the centre
of attention, and the parties trust that it will
be possible to solve the problem. In the second
stage, polarisation and debate take place. The
conflicted parties unite within themselves (cohesion),
and stereotypes develop. When they reach the
point where they feel that talking to one another
is not productive, they "create facts" (stage
3: "deeds instead of words"). From
there the relationship to the opposing party
becomes a central part of the content of the
conflict itself. "There's no use in talking
to them," is the experience, "now we
have to act!" From now on behaviour towards
one another becomes more clearly negative, as
do the notions the opponents have of each other.
As the conflict constellation deteriorates, the
parties slide into a situation where each feels
threatened and endangered by the actions of the
other (stages 4-6). In stage 4 the relationship
becomes the problem. Stereotypes, and "win-lose" situations
arise. In stage 5 direct attacks on the position
of the opponent begin, and each party seeks to "expose" the "true
character" of its opponent causing him to
loose face. In stage 6 the threatening begins,
and isolated violent acts might happen.
The next decisive threshold
is crossed when threats and ultimatums are superseded
by (still limited) actions directed against the
power base of the organisation or group concerned
(stage 7). From this moment on the parties no
longer see each other in human terms but see
only objects that they want to be rid of (stages
7-9). From now on the violence directed toward
each other becomes the predominant issue of the
conflict. In stage 8 the basis of power and existence
of the opponent are targets, and mutual destruction
takes place. In the 9th and final stage there
is total confrontation even at the price of one's
own destruction. The only goal is to eliminate
the opponent.
Ronald J. Fisher has
transferred Glasl's model
from its original context of social conflicts,
mostly in or between organisations, to the context
of political conflicts. He simplifies Glasl's nine
stages to four: stage 1: communication, stage
2: polarisation, stage 3: segregation, stage
4: destruction.
All models of conflict that
describe stages are of course a gross simplification
of any given real-life conflict, as Leatherman et al. point
out. Conflict processes are usually multidimensional,
and unfold in a disjunctive manner. There are
usually multiple levels in each conflict (e.g.
the individual, the intra-societal, the international),
as well as multiple issues. Escalation may take
place, both vertically (behaviours, choice of
means) and horizontally (expansion of issues,
goals, actors, geographical scope).
1.1.3.2 Nonviolent conflict
escalation
The model developed by Glasl and
Fisher does not recognise the possibility of
a nonviolent conflict
escalation. In fact, this aspect is missing in
almost all studies on conflict and conflict resolution
except for a few which
deal specifically with nonviolent resistance
and/or nonviolent action.
One exception
is John Paul Lederach who
has created the term "conflict transformation".
Conflict transformation is the development from
a static situation with very unequal distribution
of political power, and a problem that hasn't
yet become a conflict issue, to a dynamic situation
with better balance of power and the possibility
of dealing with the problem. This includes the
conflict stages from the latency stage to the
articulation of protest. To end the static situation,
protest needs to be organised and articulated.
When this has happens, counter power may develop.
A new distribution of power is both a condition
for clarifying the conflict issues, and an expression
of a new relationship between the conflict parties
in conflict. Lederach emphasises
that conflict transformation is a long-term process
taking 20 years or more, and must not be confused
with short-term crisis intervention alone, which
is the most immediate activity in the process
of transformation.
The contribution of nonviolent action to this transformation
is obvious: it makes the conflict visible, and
tries to change the balance of power by using nonviolent means of protest and
resistance.
Theodor Ebert has defined
three stages of escalation in nonviolent action;
each stage has both subversive and constructive
elements:
1. Protest
as subversive action and 'functional demonstrations'
as constructive action;
2. Legal
non-cooperation and legal innovation of roles;
3. Civil
disobedience and civil usurpation;
Generally
speaking, escalation is achieved by:
Broadening the
scope of the activities (geographically or time-wise);
Growth of the number
of the activists;
Increased actions
of civil disobedience and other direct actions.
Hildegard
Goss-Mayr puts
the analysis of the conflict at the beginning
of her discussion. Then groups are formed and
trained in nonviolence.
As they come in contact with each other they
start to cooperate, chose tactics and begin their
activities to weaken and eventually neutralise
the pillars that support the injustice. The more
pillars of injustice are uprooted, and the more
institutions and other important actors change
sides, the closer the moment comes when the
status quo can no longer be maintained. This
is the moment to develop alternatives and to
create a new distribution of power. Everyone,
including the former opponents, is part of this
process.
1.1.3.3
Taking a closer look at conflict transformation
Conflict resolution, conflict
settlement, conflict handling, conflict management,
conflict regulation or conflict transformation
are terms which are often used indiscriminately
although there are certain nuances of meanings.
Conflict resolution implies that "the deep-routed
sources of conflict are addressed, and resolved".
Conflict settlement refers to the "reaching
of an agreement between the parties which enables
them to end an armed conflict. It puts to an
end the violent stage of conflict behaviour." Conflict
regulation and conflict management are "sometimes
used as a generic term to cover the whole gamut
of positive conflict handling".
Conflict transformation puts
an emphasis on the process of dealing with conflict,
and is therefore, in my eyes, preferable to the
other terms. It touches all three corners of
the famous conflict triangle that Johan Galtung has
defined. The process of dealing with the conflict
then moves around the triangle.
At this point it should be
very clearly pointed out that conflict transformation
is not synonymous with what external parties
do, nor is it synonymous with conflict intervention.
The importance of local peace builders, of peace
constituencies and of local zones of peace has
gained more and more recognition in the last
few years.
Müller/Büttner (1998) have proposed
making the triangle a pyramid in order to include
the dimension of conflict escalation. They argue
that in the first three stages of Glasl's conflict
escalation scheme the content is in the centre
of the conflict. Then the attitudes of the opponents
become the major factor, and as soon as the conflict
becomes violent, the behaviour itself is the
main problem.
A pyramid diagram
would look like this:
Table 1.4: Conflict pyramid
and escalation track
De-escalation of a conflict
then may be seen as the reversal of this process. First
the emphasis would be on the behaviour. That
is, stopping the violence through a cease-fire,
and then monitoring the cease-fire. Now work
on attitudes can begin. Only when attitudes
change for the better will it be possible to
deal with the original conflict and to attempt
to find a solution. (Then it would be time to
work on attitudes, and probably only when there
is a change for the better in these, there is
a chance to deal with the original conflict and
its content, and to attempt finding a solution
for it.)
While most experts would agree
with the first assumption, the order of the second
and the third might be questionable. In fact,
very often there is some peace agreement (conflict
settlement in the meaning defined above) before
any substantial work on the relationship of the
actors has been done. The chapter on Peace Strategies
will argue that all three dimensions need to
be tackled simultaneously.
The conflict intervention
discussion is a rather recent phenomenon,
which rapidly grew after the end of the East-West-confrontation
in 1989, though of course intervention in conflict
is something that has always taken place. Intervention
is "Any influencing of a system of rule
from the outside, no matter if the influencing
is done by nonviolent or
by violent means".
The term ‘conflict intervention’
will be used for such involvements that are undertaken
to influence a conflict in another ‘system of
rule’. This definition leaves the means (military,
diplomacy etc.), the type of conflict, the interveners
(states, international state organisations, NGOs
etc.) and the purpose/objectives of the intervention
open.
1.1.4.1
Objectives and motives of conflict intervention
There are at least 13 categories
of objectives or motives for conflict intervention. Often
more than one is at work in any given case at
any given time. With a few exceptions, most objectives
and motives can be found in both state and non-state
situations. The examples of objectives and motives
given here are arbitrarily chosen.
Change the attitude
and/or the behaviour of one or all of the conflict
parties (e.g. by conflict resolution workshops
or by sanctions against a government);
Change the distribution
of power within one conflict party (e.g. by sanctions
meant to build up so much pressure against the
government that it gets overthrown);
Support one conflict
party with the goal to help it win the conflict
(e.g. the Latin American solidarity movement);
Change the means
by which the conflict is carried out (e.g. by
giving training in nonviolent resistance
techniques);
Protect human rights
(e.g. by building international public pressure
like Amnesty International does);
Help the victims
of violence and war (shelter, medicine, clothing);
Guarantee agreements
made (e.g. by sending peacekeeping troops);
Support civil society
(many international NGOs concentrate on that
field while it is a rather recent discovery with
governments);
Influence powerful
external parties so that they change their behaviour,
and/or intervene in the conflict (social movements
and NGOs);
Protect one’s own
citizens (governments only, e.g. by evacuating
their own citizens when a violent conflict flares
up);
Defend own strategic
or economic interests;
Find supporters/members
for the own cause, promote own cause (e.g. missionaries);
Facilitate social
or economic change (e.g. development aid).
These
are only motives and objectives as they relate
to the conflict for the interveners usually have
many organisational motives of their own. For
example, to satisfy lobbyists and voters who
expect certain behaviour from a government, to
win public credibility by sponsoring a popular
project, and to get new funds from sponsors and
so on.
1.1.4.2
Actors
There
are a multitude of possible interveners. The
well-established differentiation between governments
on the one side and all the others (to be found
under track 2 diplomacy) does not give an adequate
picture of what is actually going on in conflict
transformation by external parties.
Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald have
therefore introduced the concept of Multi-track
Diplomacy which distinguishes 9 tracks: governmental;
professional conflict resolution; business; private
citizen; research, training and education; activism;
religious; funding; and public opinion. Building
on their concept, I would like to propose that
there are two main types of actors with several
subtypes each:
a. States/governments
with two broad categories:
individual states
international organisations
and interest-based coalitions (UN and its bodies
and regional organisations, e.g. the OSCE or
the OAS, other regional governmental organisations;
World bank, NATO etc.
b. Non-state
actors with four broad categories:
NGOs,
social movements,
and
political parties
religious bodies.
corporate sector
(business)
media
This is an ideal picture;
in reality many non-state actors have very clear
connections and even dependencies to the state
in which they live and work. In the table below,
this relationship is only marked for two of them
(media and parties) because the relationship
is especially remarkable.
1.1.4.3
Tactics/means
It is
probably impossible to draw up a complete list
of means and tactics of conflict intervention (such
as attempted by Gene Sharp) for
the broad field of nonviolent action. Sharp
distinguishes psychological, physical, social,
economic and political tactics.
1.1.4.4
Civil Intervention and nonviolent intervention
If the main criteria which
distinguishes different forms of conflict intervention
is whether direct deadly violence is being used
or not, then the distinction between military
and civil interventions becomes meaningful.
Consequently civil
interventions are all those interventions which
are being carried out by civilians (in opposition
to military personnel), and which refrain from
the use of personal deadly violence.
But there is another way to
distinguish between conflict interventions: those
using coercive means and those that do not.
There are coercive means included
in the category of civil interventions, e.g.
economic sanctions or mediation with muscle.
Some of them might actually cause a high rate
of casualties - the economic sanctions against
Iraq have, according to official figures by the
UN, cost the lives of almost 600,000 children
alone between 1991 and 1996, which is an outcome
as bad or worse than those of many military actions.
Therefore I agree with those
authors who
find it necessary to distinguish between civil
interventions and nonviolent interventions, the latter
being a sub-category of the first. I would like
to propose the
following definition of nonviolent intervention:
Conflict
intervention can be called nonviolent,
when
1.
the objective is conflict transformation, and
the when the intervener, (either as a non-partisan
external party taking the interests of all
conflict parties into consideration, or as
a partisan party supporting one side in the
conflict), engages in conflict transformation
and/or human rights and justice, and when
2.
there is no use of direct or indirect deadly
violence.
This definition has two consequences
that might be controversial:
First, it is nonviolent intervention
may take place either at home of the interveners
or at the home of those people where the conflict
takes place.
Second, nonviolent intervention
may be partisan.
This topic has already been touched upon in the
paragraph on nonviolent conflict escalation
above. The argument goes like this: If there
is a strong imbalance of power between the parties
in conflict, (perhaps even to the degree that
structural violence is so high that the conflict
is latent and the underdog hasn't even started
to organise himself), then nonviolent intervention
must mean strengthening the underdog. This is
not a new argument. Johan Galtung made
it early in the 1980s.
But still in the bulk of the literature on conflict
intervention the non-partisan character is automatically,
and by definition, assumed.
Up to now, conflict interventions
have been categorised according to different
aspects: objectives, actors, methods and strategy.
Three more aspects that are very relevant when
either planning or evaluating a nonviolent intervention has yet
to be introduced: time, horizontal geographical
scope and the level of society the intervention
addresses.
1.1.5.1
Time
Everybody
distinguishes short, middle and long-term goals and activities. But it
should not be taken for granted that any two
persons mean the same thing when they use these
terms. Orienting ourselves to the time dimension
proposed by John Paul Lederach will be beneficial here. The
proposal has the advantage of not being guided
by funding directives that describe every project
that is longer than one year as long-term just
because funds are dispersed annually.
Lederach distinguishes
immediate
action (2-6 months) as crisis intervention;
short-range
planning (1-2 years) mainly used for preparation
and training (capacity building);
the
middle-range decade thinking (5-10 years) for
developing a design of social change; and
the
long-range generational vision (20+ years) for
developing a "vision of what we are trying
to achieve in order to build toward and reach
that vision".
1.1.5.2
Levels of society
John Paul Lederach's goes
on to distinguishes between three levels of
society (top, middle and grassroots), and attributes
certain approaches to peace building to
each of them.
Most authors dealing with
the levels of society in relationship to conflict
intervention agree that it is of paramount importance
for interveners to reach all three levels. This
does not mean that it is necessary for each intervener
to have contact with all levels, but intervention
needs to reach all of them. An agreement made
between top leaders is likely to fail if it does
not have the support of the masses - the grassroots
level. And vice versa, small grassroots initiatives
might find themselves run over by violence, outlawed
or simply pushed to the side if the top leaders
are not reached as well. Therefore, the middle-range
actors play a special role. They may co-ordinate
top-level decisions with grassroots realities.
Table 1.7 Actors and
approaches to peacebuilding
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Lederach 1997:39
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1.1.5.3
Geographical scope
It is known that some projects
will only reach one local community or even only
one part of that community, others will have
an impact on the whole country and/or on the
conflict as a whole.
In recent years more and more
notice has been given to the development of local
peace zones. These are single communities or
a number of communities where violence does not
take root, which remain peaceful in a violent
surrounding, sometimes against all odds. There
is little knowledge about what is needed in order
to have a local project impact on the conflict
as a whole.
Not all interventions involve
going to the place where the conflict is. As
has been mentioned before, influencing other
external parties to get involved, or working
on unjust structures might well take place far
away from the actual conflict (in the powerful
countries).
1.1.6.1
Some definitions
Terms
like "strategy" and "tactics" have
spilled over from the military jargon not only
to common language, but also to thinkers about nonviolence.
Because there are different, some times contradictory
usages of
these terms, it is necessary to define what they
mean. I will follow Burrowes’ (1996) example and first
go back to the military terminology as developed
by Clausewitz and Liddell
Hart (1967). Liddell Hart defined strategy as "the
art of distributing and applying military means
to fulfil the ends of policy",
policy being what "governs the object of
war". Military means can also be called tactics
- activities taken within the framework of a
strategy. Gene Sharp defines grand strategy,
strategy and tactics without referring to its
military origin:
"Grand strategy
is the broader conception which serves to co-ordinate
and direct all the resources of the struggle
group toward the attainment of the objectives
of the conflict. Strategy, a more narrow term,
is the broad plan of action for the overall struggle,
including the development of an advantageous
situation, the decision of when to fight, and
the broad plan for utilising various specific
actions in the general conflict. Tactics refers
to plans for more limited conflicts within the
selected strategic plan."
Jean-Marie Muller puts it more simply:
"Strategy concerns the
conception and execution which regulates and
co-ordinates the different activities of an intervention;
tactics concerns the conception and execution
of each of these activities."
In this
paper the terms ”strategy” and ”tactics” will
be used as Sharp and Muller defined them.
1.1.6.2
Strategies of conflict intervention
Since the Secretary General
of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali, published
the Agenda for Peace, the terms peacekeeping,
peacemaking and peacebuilding have become well
known. But it wasn't Boutros-Ghali who invented
them, nor were they originally meant to function
in a strict sequential order as Boutros-Ghali
puts them. Johan Galtung -
who called them ”approaches to peace” 20 years
before Boutros-Ghali, first described these three
peace strategies.Since
then these terms have been refined by other authors
such as the social anthropologist Stephen Ryan
(1995). When referred to in this study, they
are used within the broad civilian tradition,
and not in the tradition of reserved for the
UN. Together, these three strategies (or rather "grand
strategies") formulate a general theory
of maintaining peace: "keeping the opponents
apart, negotiating a political solution and finally,
tying the adversaries into something that one
could call a peace system."
Johan Galtung defines peacekeeping as
(to): "control the actors so that they
at least stop destroying things, others, and
themselves".
Peacemaking "is concerned with the
search for a negotiated resolution of the perceived
conflicts of interests between the parties". Activities shall
be called peacemaking activities if they bring
together groups or individuals in dialogue
about possible resolution of the conflict.
Contrary to Ryan’s notion, this can occur at
the diplomatic level or between ordinary citizens
that are caught in the conflict.
Peacebuilding "is the strategy
which most directly tries to reverse those
destructive processes that accompany violence".
These strategies must not
be confused with certain activities. For example: "dialogue" might
be used both to find a solution to the conflict
and to foster understanding between two groups
in conflict. The former usage puts it in the
realm of peacemaking, and the later in the realm
of peacebuilding. This
shows that many activities include aspects of
at least two, if not all three strategies. Nevertheless,
I believe that it makes sense to distinguish
between them because they highlight different
functions and problems.
The three strategies need
to be applied at the same time. Peacekeeping
without peacemaking and peacebuilding would be very difficult
because the violence might overwhelm the process,
and any group wishing to sabotage a peace initiative
would find it easy to provoke armed clashes.
If peacebuilding is
ineffective, the decision-makers might lose the
support of their communities, and if peacemaking
is ineffective, the perceived disagreement that
caused the conflict will remain unresolved, and
the probability that violence would start again
soon is high.
The three strategies are not
per se nonviolent strategies. As has been
shown before, they may include coercion - like
mediation with muscle or military peacekeeping.
But on the other side, all nonviolent tactics/methods
can easily be related to one, or sometimes to
more then one of the strategies.
The peace strategies are usually
presented as strategies to be used after a conflict
has escalated to violence. Ryan and Galtung as well as Butros-Gali seem
to assume this although the first two reject
the idea of a sequential order for their application.
It shall be argued here that
the same strategies are also used before the
violence takes place. They are usually covered
by the term prevention, but looking closely at
what activities (tactics) fall under prevention,
it is obvious that they are broadly the same.
Therefore, although prevention is an important
concept when looking at any given conflict, the
peace strategies used are the same no matter
if the conflict is pre-violent or post-violent,
only some of the tactics (means) used might differ.
The difference is that prevention deals with
the formation of the conflict while the three
peace strategies deal with violent conflict,
conflict transformation and social change. Prevention
includes what otherwise is called peacemaking
such as diplomacy and peacemaking efforts by
local actors. There has been preventive peacekeeping
(UN peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, for example). The
most sustainable tactics of prevention have to
do with socio-economic change, good governance
and the like.
1.1.6.3
Looking at the peace strategies in detail
Peacekeeping is a primarily dissociative approach. Galtung points
out that the idea of keeping the opponents apart
is also the underlying philosophy of the politics
of balance of power.
Peacekeeping, "is often the most urgent
and necessary of all peace strategies because
it is the only one which deals directly with
the warriors on all sides who are engaged in
mutual destruction." It
is traditionally considered a task of the military
and perhaps the police. The practice developed
by the UN of sending peacekeeping troops, so-called
blue helmets, gave the strategy of peacekeeping
a classical instrument; strategy and instrument
often are considered synonymous. There is no
logical reason why unarmed civilians could not
carry out the same task, and there have been
some cases of larger-scale civilian peacekeeping
actions (see 2.4).
Authors who are mainly
interested in nonviolent intervention
have broadened the concept of peacekeeping to
include other, smaller-scale activities like
(unarmed) accompaniment of activists threatened
by death squads. Since these activities are also
about control of violence by using a dissociative approach,
it makes sense to include them in the peacekeeping
strategy, only with a more limited scope than
the violence of a conflict as a whole. Lisa Schirch describes four approaches
of separating the parties involved in a conflict:
Buffer zones
("demilitarised and unpatrolled areas")
Peace zones ("civilian-occupied
spaces where no fighting takes place")
interposition
peacekeeping ("peacekeepers placing themselves
physically between groups engaged in violent
conflict in an impartial stance to all parties")
antirecessionary
peacekeeping (which "maintains unequal distance
between the parties” and is used when the parties
in conflict are not easily separated
Generally, two
main tactics of peacekeeping can be distinguished:
accompaniment of individuals and groups, and
monitoring of situations.
Ryan distinguishes three methods
of peacemaking as
the imposition of a solution through either:
- Violence
and power
- Law
3. Negotiation
(classical mediation or second-track diplomacy)
Much of the literature on
conflict resolution deals with negotiation and
related methods. In fact, often conflict resolution
is used interchangeably with peacemaking, because
peacemaking is the strategy that deals with the
contents of a conflict. Many different tactics
and methods have been proposed. Again, the terminology
varies widely among the different authors. I
would like to make mention of two issues in this
context:
First, there is usually a
continuum defined between third-party negotiators
who use considerable pressure to bring the parties
in conflict to an agreement (examples: the Dayton
agreement after the NATO bombing in Bosnia 1995,
and the Rambouillet negotiations
carried out under the threat of military intervention
in 1999), and third-party negotiators who act
as facilitators helping the parties in conflict
to find their own solution. How these different
negotiating techniques are named, differs. Perhaps
the major confusion stems from the fact that
in international politics mediation is often
used for the more coercive forms of negotiation,
while in the intra-societal projects (family
mediation, community mediation) mediation means
exactly the opposite viz. not making one’s own
proposals.
Kumar Rupesinghe proposes
some rather fundamental differences between state
versus non-state diplomacy. State-based
diplomacy is, he says, based on perceived self-interests,
state-to-state relations, the principle of sovereignty
and non-interference in internal affairs. It
relies on UN, international organisations and
bilateral governmental relations, and is a short-term
approach. Non-state diplomacy, in contrast, is
based on people-to-people relations, concentrates
on trust building, networking and solidarity,
has a long-term commitment, is flexible and creative
and is low-profile foundation building.
Finally, Peacebuilding, more
than peacekeeping and peace making, is the grand
strategy because the ordinary people are included
in the peace process. There are many examples
of peace processes that have failed because there
was no peacebuilding.
The recent escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict is a good example of this problem.
Peacebuilding activities include
many very different tasks.
One
major sector of peacebuilding is
those tactics, which concentrate on encounter
between the opponents, having as a goal the removal
of distrust and hatred, and making it possible
for former enemies to live together. Ryan emphasises
that encounters per se are usually not helpful
because interaction alone might not reduce prejudice
and tension. He distinguishes seven sub-strategies
of peacebuilding that
combine contact with something else:
1. Contact plus forgiveness
is the religious approach of Gandhi, Martin Luther
King and others. The question is, is it pragmatic
enough to reach a sufficient number of persons?
2. Contact plus the pursuit
of superordinate goals
(joint sports, inclusion in a state umbrella
like the EU etc);
3. Contact plus economic development,
as soon as there is subjective economic justice
for both sides;
4. Contact plus confidence
building (e.g. law reforms);
5. Contact plus education
for mutual understanding (e.g. multi-ethnic schools);
6. Prejudice reduction;
7. Exploring cultures.
There are other psycho/social
tactics as well, for example, psychological aid
for traumatised people.
Peacebuilding activities in
the social/economic field include resettlement
of refugees, development co-operation, rebuilding
of infrastructure and the revitalisation of the
economy etc.
Among political measures are
the organisation of elections, establishment
of democratic rules and rule of law, development
of civil society, free media, respect for human
rights and the like.
1.1.6.4
On dissociative and
associative characteristics
At the end of the day, all
non-violent conflict transformation is about
bringing the parties in conflict together in
a new relationship, and probably in a new context.
This is what the nonviolent approach distinguishes
from other approaches: Nonviolence always is searching
for a future for all parties to the conflict,
while other approaches might be content to have
pacified and silenced one side, or in the extreme
case even aim at their extinction.
The peace strategies described
above have been characterised either as associative
or as dissociative,
with peacekeeping being the strategy that is
considered primarily dissociative. This means that it
is mostly intended to keep the parties in conflict
apart, by being a buffer that cannot be passed
over without sanctions (blue helmets monitoring
ceasefire lines and buffer zones, civilian peace
monitors interpositioning themselves
between demonstrators and the police etc.). It
is what Mahony/Eguren call
a strategy of deterrence where the potential
aggressor is kept from attacking because he fears
the consequences. These can be anything from
international pressure and sanctions to losing
face or relapse into general war. But behind
this dissociative character
there is an eventual associative element, even
if it is an indirect one. Peacekeeping or creating
the precondition necessary for allowing other
work of bringing the parties together, fighting
for justice and for political change is the reason
why a dissociative strategy has a place
in conflict transformation.
Two aspect regarding association
need to be mentioned as well:
The first is that association
may be easier for some social groups than for
others. A primary example is the experience of
women who often find it easier to relate to each
other than to men. Because women are not as involved
in direct fighting as men and because women are
politically low-key having and no public leadership
roles in most societies, and because they may
find it easier to identify with each other across
conflict lines since they share many common life
experiences and interests. This fact has even
been recognised by the United Nations Security
Council Resolution on Women,
and by the theme "Women, Peace and Security:
Women Managing Conflict” of 2001's International
Women’s Day.
Furthermore, in other conflicts
young people and seniors may be exploited for peacebuilding efforts
(see the activities of different Civil Peace
Services in Bosnia).
The second is what Johan Galtung has
named the "Great Chain of Nonviolence",
where at first the association is at least an
indirect one. There are conflicts where the two
sides are socio-psychologically so distant from
each other, one side having de-humanised the
other, that no direct communication is possible.
In that case external parties may step in and
create an indirect link. One example is the occupation
of the American continent by the Europeans in
the 15th century. At the beginning, the occupiers
denied any humanity to the Indians, believing
them to be mere animals. Only when some courageous
members of the Catholic Church intervened was
this view changed. These church representatives
clearly belonged to one of the parties in the
conflict - the party of the occupiers. But exactly
because they did, they managed to get a hearing.
Another example is the event in Berlin, Germany
1944 where the Jewish husbands of German-Arian
women were arrested and were to be deported to
concentration camps, the women protested in front
of the police headquarters, and eventually achieved
the release of their husbands.
Sometimes more than one intermediary
might be needed; some intermediaries will share
social characteristics with the oppressed, others
will be socially closer to the oppressors.
The question of if and when
conflict intervention is legitimate has been
discussed rather intensively over the last ten
years. But the debate usually mixes questions
of the general right to intervene with the question
of the legitimisation of the use of force. Without
denying that the use of deadly force deserves
special treatment in any discussion, it nevertheless
is necessary to put the question of legitimisation
of intervention much more generally. What right
does anyone have to involve himself/herself in
someone else’s conflict? There are two approaches
to this question: a legal one, referring to international
law, and an ethical one referring
to different issues which are of a purely ethical
and political nature.
International
law, as it has been developed specially after
World War II, and codified in the UN Charter
and the different Covenants drafted and ratified
since then, are mainly concerned with the relationship
between states. Important in the context of conflict
intervention are the still up-held principle
of the sovereignty of all states, and the consequent
rule of non-interference into the affairs of
another state (chapter I, article 2/7 of the
UN Charter). To see a state as an individual
actor that is considering it to be a legitimate
person, in international relations, is an old
tradition in international relations, often tracked
back to Jean Bodin and Alberico Gentili in
the 16th century, and
put into practice from the time of the Peace
of Westphalia, which ended the 30-year-war. New
for the time after WW II are the general prohibition
of war (chapter I, article 2/4 of the UN Charter),
and the prescription of peaceful procedures of
settling disputes (Chapter VI of the UN Charter). There
are two generally accepted exceptions to this
prohibition:
1. Self-defence
against an attack is considered allowed as long
as the UN does not take measures (Art 51 of UN
Charter);
2. If
there is a threat to international peace or security,
the UN Security Council may decide to use "all
means necessary" including force (Chapter
VII; specially article 39 and 42). It may delegate
the implementation of its decision to some of
its individual members (article 48) as it did
in the case of Rwanda in 1994 (France and the
US), to a military alliance (NATO in Bosnia 1992-5
and Yugoslavia 1999), or have the decision carried
out by a UN-led mission (like Somalia 1993).
The
possibilities of the UN to enforce its decisions
against the will of the member concerned, and
to persecute breaches of international law, are
limited. If diplomacy fails, its means are sanctions,
setting up intervention operations (usually with
a strong military element) if the five permanent
members of the Security Council agree, and in
the future hopefully a War Crimes Court which
has been designed on the model of the two War
Crimes Tribunals on Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but
which is not yet ratified by a sufficient number
of states. Not
having a police of its own, the UN is reliant
on its member states to provide the means, be
it civil police to arrest a war criminal or military
troops to intervene in a conflict.
After
the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, a new
dynamic entered hitherto frozen international
relations. The so-called realist school of international
law and politics, which emphasises the sovereignty
of states as the best guaranty of international
peace, lost ground to the so-called idealistic
school that aims at world governance with a monopoly
of violence of the United Nations. Certain
decisions of the UN Security Council, specifically
Resolutions 687 and 688 from the 5.4.1991 on
North Iraq and Resolution 794 from 3.12.1992
on Somalia, are considered examples of the UN
going beyond the non-interference rule. Generally
new is that the UN after 1989 has concerned itself
with internal wars in a measure it usually was
not able to do before 1989 because the veto has
been used more sparingly in the Security Council
recently than in the years of the Cold War. In
a recent resolution (1296/2000) the Security
Council established that the targeting of civilians
in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian
access to civilian populations affected by war
themselves constitute threats to international
peace and security, and thus can be triggers
for Security Action Council.
Another
important development in this context is the
growing realisation that many problems, specifically
ecological ones, can only be solved on a global
basis. The creation of International Environmental
Law and international agreements in this and
other fields, often made at or in connection
with World Conferences (Rio, Beijing), is sometimes
seen as a positive sign for globalisation of
responsibility.
But
it seems that the tendency to strengthen the
rule of international law is facing a counter-move,
at least in regard to the respect of the UN and
its Security Council as the only body being able
to establish a threat to international peace.
The new NATO Alliance's Strategic Concept adopted
on April 24, 1999 does
not say so explicitly, but may be interpreted
as mandating NATO to get active with the UN Security
Council if possible, and without it if necessary, claiming
to have to play "an indispensable role...in
consolidating and preserving the positive changes
of the recent past, and in meeting current and
future security challenges". The
NATO attack on Yugoslavia in winter/spring 1999,
which was not mandated by the UN, is the first
example of the so-called "New World Order" -
what some observers have considered a relapse
into the time even before the League of Nation
Treaty - a time when the powerful states decided
by themselves when to go to war.
The
second important aspect of international law
important for conflict intervention is the definition
of human rights as formulated in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and further developed
in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights (both from 1966) and other later
declarations. Unlike the regulations considered
so far, human rights are rights an individual
has against his (or her) own state. In
the preamble of the mentioned Covenants it is
said explicitly that every individual does not
only have the right, but also the responsibility
for ensuring the promotion of human rights. This
right and responsibility is not limited to activity
within an individual’s own state. A certain right
to intervene on behalf of human rights anywhere
could be deducted from this responsibility. Of
course, this interpretation until
now would not be accepted by most governments
in the world, and there is as yet no way to legally
enforce it. On practical terms, human rights
activists getting involved in human rights affairs
outside their own country, depend on the protection
of the laws of the country they work in gives
them, plus the means they have available to alert
international pressure and support from their
embassies. In 1998, the UN Commission on Human
Rights has presented a draft for a declaration
on the protection of human right defenders. The
draft asserts the right of any individual to
work, alone or in co-operation with others, for
the protection and the realisation of human rights
in a national and international framework. If
this declaration is ever passed and ratified,
it would give individuals and NGOs a much better
standing in regard to international activities.
As a
third factor the International Humanitarian Law
needs to be named which governs the protection
of non-combatants in war. The work of the International
Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
deserves special mention here because the ICRC
has status which resembles more that of an official
organisation than a NGO in regard to its rights
to be active in zones of war.
To sum
up: Any conflict intervention implemented by
states or international governmental organisations
against the will of all or one of the parties
in conflict, is
strictly limited by the UN Charter. Enforcement
of decisions of the UN Security Council is only
allowed in cases when international peace and
security are threatened, a rule which has been
open to some interpretation lately. This provision
is equally valid for an un-armed intervention
force as it is for military forces.
These
provisions are not valid for NGO interventions.
NGOs may intervene whenever they want to without
breaking international law. On the other hand,
they are not per se (yet) protected by international
law, and therefore depend on the acceptance of
the government of the country in which they get
active.
The ethical issue is even more complex than
the question of international law, since it is
inseparable from political issues. I would like
to distinguish five strands of arguments: the
argumentation derived from the Christian principles
of "Just War",
the argument of at least doing no harm Mary Anderson's
project put into the core of its work, political
arguments around hegemonialism and
neo-colonialism (whose interests, whose values?),
ethical considerations proposed by principled nonviolent theoreticians
and practitioners, and last not least the customary
right to action in solidarity as defended by
actors of civil society all over the world. Most
of these strands combine the basic question of
the conditions under which intervention is permitted
(if at all) with the questions of the how. In
fact, since the first is often seen to depend
on the second (like in the teaching of Just War),
these two are very difficult to separate.
It has often been pointed out that the principles
of Just War (bellum iustum) that specify the conditions
to be met if a war is counted as a just war, have
been used rather to justify war, not to limit
it. Nevertheless,
it is obvious that the criteria of bellum iustum are
very much alive still, in spite of being said
to be out of date in the time of assured mutual
destruction by nuclear weapons. Not only politicians,
philosophers and political scientists refer to
them again and again when discussing war and
humanitarian interventions,
also much of the pacifist debate refers to criteria
like "not all other means have been tested" / "there
would have been alternatives to military intervention" (principle
of last resort), "you are fighting only
for your preserve your own" (principle of
just cause), or "look at what atrocities
you have committed/how you have escalated the
conflict and not done any good" (principles
of just means).
The British political scientists Lewer and Ramsbotham have
proposed ten framework principles for humanitarian
intervention drawing both from the bellum iustum criteria
and several codes of conducts developed by humanitarian
aid agencies. They mean these principles to be
of equal validity for military and non-military
interventions:
"1. The Principle of Minimum Humanitarian
Standards (Just Cause)
'Where there is unacceptable denial or violation
of human rights, actual or threatened, the international
community has a duty to attempt redress and a prima
facie right to intervene, subject to the condition
laid down in principle nine.'
2. The Principle of Human Flourishing (Just
Ends)
'The aim of such intervention should be the impartial
promotion of sustained human flourishing throughout
the affected region'.
3. The Principle of Appropriate Means
'The means employed should be appropriate - that
is, they should be a) necessary, b) sufficient,
c) proportional, and d) legitimate.'
4. The Principle of Local Enablement
'The intervention should be conducted in terms
understood and accepted within the region and
in such a way as to strengthen and support
those working locally to resolve conflict and
build peace.'
5. The Principle of Consistency
'Intervention should be consistent across different
conflict situations and relevant experience
should be cumulatively transferred.'
6. The Principle of Reflexivity
'Interveners' motives and previous behaviour should
be compatible with the professed purpose of
their intervention.'
7. The Principle of Complementarity
'Interveners actions should be mutually complementary.'
8. The Principle of Accountability
'Interveners should hold themselves accountable
to the international community for their intervention,
since it is from the international community
that they derive the authority to intervene.'
9. The Principle of Contingency and Graduated
Response
'Where possible, intervention should be preventive, nonviolent and
with the consent of all parties. Where this is
not possible, additional criteria should be met
as appropriate at the relevant decision-points,
without prejudice as to the outcome.'
10. The Principle of Universality
'The principles which govern just humanitarian
intervention should be endorsed by the international
community."
Having
the question of the right to intervene as a starting
point, these criteria also include proposed rules
on the how an intervention should be carried
out in order to be legitimate. This how may be
found in many codes of conducts and other publications
on NGO interventions. Specifically, principles
of becoming active only on invitation, of putting
local actors first, and of being guided by the
principles of international human rights may
be considered as consensus in the conflict intervention
community today. There
is the growing acknowledgement of the fact that
only those who have the conflict are can solve
it, and that the role of international intervention is
to support the local actors in finding this solution.
More
unassuming in comparison to these codes, as proposed
by Lewer/Ramsbotham and
others, is the doing no harm approach of Mary
Anderson's Local Capacities for Peace Project
proposes. What she outlines for humanitarian
and development aid, may be translated directly
to conflict intervention in general: Anderson
argues that the minimum objective should be what
medical doctors pledge: "First, do no harm". Given
the fact of how much harm such projects may do
(the case studies commissioned by Anderson's
project give ample examples), this rule should
not be taken lightly. Often It is not so easy to
do no harm, and it is much less easy to speak
of positive outcomes and attempted effects.
On the
other side there is what has been called the "Droit d'ingérence" as the ultimate
legitimating of humanitarian action: "Humanitarian
action is by definition universal. Humanitarian
responsibility has no frontiers. Wherever in
the world there is manifest distress, the humanitarian,
by vocation, must respond." The "duty
to intervene" is considered an ethic, and
it has its consequences, for example at least
in the eyes of Doctors Without Borders the abandonment
of neutrality if necessary.
The
fourth line of arguments around the legitimacy
of conflict intervention concentrates on political
interests the interveners might have. There is
the term peace colonialism and
the accusation not to deal with the real causes
of conflict that lie in our (Western/Northern)
societies with which advocates of nonviolent intervention
find themselves confronted. Specifically anti-imperialist
analysts and activists argue that those who then
intervene in them first cause most interventions
in war. Therefore,
legitimate activity against such wars should
rather take place in the hegemonies of Northern
countries, and targeted against the governments
and international business.
It is
true that the majority of nonviolent interventions
took place in settings of immense international
publicity and interest. Lacking statistics it
has to remain an unproven assumption that there
is a direct relationship between NGO projects
of conflict intervention, and the attention the
conflict finds in the international media, and
on the level of governments/international community.
But the connection jumps to the mind if you compare
cases like Yugoslavia and let's say Liberia or
Congo - one with immense attention and one with
only limited, regional attention. The reason
why some cases find more official attention has
of course as much to do with the influence of
mass media as of political interests. As long
as nonviolent conflict
interveners set their priorities the same way,
they leave themselves open to the accusation
of being led by mass media rather then by serious
analysis.
On the
other side there are the political goals of nonviolent interveners
that have to be taken into consideration making
a decision on when and if to intervene. I am
referring to the issue of co-operation or non-cooperation
with military intervention forces. While this
is not a problem for the majority of NGOs being
involved in what is coming to be called complex
peace operations (see Chapter 2.5), it is a problem
for those groups and organisations with an explicit nonviolent approach.
For those who reject all use of force, and whose
goal it is to abolish war and the military, it
may present an ethical dilemma to find themselves
working hand in hand with military peace-keepers,
accepting their protection, joining in the task
to rebuilding after war. There are three views:
One is that strengthening the civil part of such
operations might eventually lead to making the
military unnecessary at all. The other is that
co-operation legitimises the military and the
use of force, and therefore must be avoided. The
German Forum Civil Peace Service has taken a
third stance in that debate: It simply refuses
to compare Civil Peace Service to the military,
because civil conflict resolution in their eyes
follows another logic, and cannot be compared
to military operations. Any comparison with military
interventions would only lead to the legitimisation
of the military..
A fifth
element to look at when discussing ethical implications
of conflict intervention is what principled Gandhians have
to say. The debate on international (military)
interventions often went along the lines "We
have to do something", and the accusation
directed at pacifists that they preferred to "do
nothing", being interested only in keeping
their own hands clean instead of assuming responsibility
for the whole. The
answer from Gandhi and
those influenced by him always has been that
non-violence is a third way beyond the choice
between violence and doing nothing. That is nothing
else than an ethical justification for acting,
and therefore also for nonviolent intervention.
Nevertheless, there has been, specifically from
the side of Gandhians, strong criticism of
interventionism. Weber mentions Vinoba Bhave who
believed that "the citizens of a country
which maintains an army have no right to conduct satyagraha in
another country". This
is a radical statement, but in my eyes one which
should not be dismissed too easily as being irrelevant.
There is at least the issue of credibility at
stake when NGOs concentrate rather on problems
far away from their own country than trying to
do something about those problems they are closest
to, and therefore might have the most possibilities
to influence.
As sixth
and last point in this discussion I would like
to mention something which in my observation
has often been referred to, but to my knowledge
has not made entry into any more theoretical
works yet: It is what I would like to call the
customary right to action in solidarity as defended
by actors of civil society all over the world.
For example, in the discussions the Council and
Triennial Conferences of War Resisters' International has
had over the last eight or nine years on conflict
intervention, very often intervention was contrasted
with solidarity. The
role of nonviolent activists,
so runs this argument, would be to support those
groups and individuals having the same goals
in other places, and fight together for justice
and peace. In if not identical but similar wordings
these are the objectives of most activists' networks
around the world, or, in other words, to be asked
as the basic legitimisation for doing something.
The right of citizens to work together over borders
for the same objectives, and often in spite of
their governments who do not want them to do
so, is something rarely questioned by the activists
themselves, and which may be one of the fundamental
principles of international true democracy.
Where
do these different arguments leave us in terms
of ethical legitimisation of conflict intervention?
I think the first thing which has become clear
is that there is no easy, ready-available recipe,
because while some of the thoughts outlined above
fit together, others do not: To start with those
which have some consistency: There is, as a minimum,
the rule of doing no harm. Then there are different
criteria that might have to be fulfilled in order
to decide if an intervention is appropriate at
all. Lewer/Rambotham tried
to phrase these criteria into ten principles
based on the principles of bellum iustum.
Some of these principles define criteria about
the how of an intervention, as do several codes
of conducts, which have been developed by humanitarian
and conflict resolution organisations. The political
question if an intervention undertaken by nonviolent activists might in fact
support the political, strategic or economic
vested interests their country (countries) have
in a conflict, could be seen as an elaboration
of the principles of just cause and ends.
But
the two last points raised above are rather thorns
in the flesh of this picture: Neither Vinoba Bhave's statement
about having the right to work somewhere else,
nor the question of actions in solidarity are
easily dealt with in the framework of general
criteria. The outcome of the weighing of these
different arguments is something beyond research.
Only those sharing common values will be able
to agree on any ethical statement. Being asked
certainly should be considered a necessary but
not sufficient condition for intervention, because
given the diverse interests of civil society
(and state) actors in any country of the world,
it is usually easy to find someone to invite
you. But this alone does not exclude that the
intervention might be harmful, unjust or just
useless.
