The research presented here was commissioned by Peaceworkers
as part of the research phase of Nonviolent Peaceforce. The task was to
conduct and co-ordinate extensive research into the feasibility of organised,
larger-scale nonviolent intervention by an international, civilian organisation. Although
some points dealt with in this study are of a rather general nature, the
starting point of the study is the mission statement formulated by Nonviolent
Peaceforce (hereafter NP):
"To mobilize and train an international nonviolent,
standing peace force. The Peace Force will be sent to conflict areas to
prevent death and destruction and protect human rights, thus creating the
space for local groups to struggle nonviolently, enter into dialogue, and
seek peaceful resolution".
This research focuses on questions of the usefulness and
implementation of such a force. Therefore, we did not ask such questions
as "What may be the best strategies to deal with violent conflict?",
or: "What are the best means of intervention?". It needs to be
emphasised for the sake of honesty that neither of these questions might
necessarily lead to "NP" as the answer. Perhaps other approaches,
like strengthening local peacemakers and peacebuilders, building local
zones of peace and similar measures would gain predominance over the international
intervention approach taken by NP. The purpose of this study is also not
to better describe and understand the many nonviolent struggles for justice
and peace that can be found in so many countries of the world. Instead,
the guiding questions are: Is there a role NP could play in conflict intervention?
What could be its niche, its unique contribution? How could it - as an
external party - support nonviolent struggles? What strategies, what tactics
have been proven to work? How could NP establish and maintain field relationships
(local partners, working in teams etc.)? How would NP organise recruitment
and training?
Our approach has been to learn from the practice of existing
organisations and past projects. Much of the information has been taken
from existing studies on conflict interventions. Interviews have provided
information where the literature failed us.
The bulk of the research presented here was done within
nine months, between October 2000 and July 2001. A draft version of the
results was presented to a Research Review Seminar organised by Nonviolent
Peaceforce at the end of July 2001 in St. Paul/USA. The results of the
debate there have been partly incorporated in the study in its present
form.
In addition to the study presented here, there has been
other research conducted that led to independent papers not included here:
Kent Shifferd, retired peace researcher, studied logistical questions as
well as a possible structural model for NP; Lt. Col. Piers Wood was commissioned
to write a paper on "An ill-fated mismatch: Peacekeeping and the (US)
military"; David Hartsough, Chris Beckman, David Grant and Jan Passion
travelled extensively to different parts of the world in order to find
out about possible needs and support for NP in the Southern hemisphere;
and Richard Taylor, Pat Keefe and Brad Grabs looked into organisational
questions.
The research team is: Donna Howard, a nonviolent activist
and Catholic Worker based in Duluth/US; Tim Wallis and Mareike Junge, employees
of Peaceworkers UK in London and representatives of NP in Europe; Carl
Stieren, the Chair of Nonviolent Peaceforce Canada; Corey Levine, a Canadian
who has worked for many years both for NGOs and state organisations in
Eastern Europe; and Christine Schweitzer, the German Research Director.
We have to give thanks to many people who have contributed
to the study. Although they are too many to name them all, I would like
to at least identify some key persons: Mohammed Abu-Nimer, Steven Bennett,
Hagen Berndt, Claire Evans, Eckehart Fricke, Pete Hämmerle, John Heid,
Robert Poen, Jill Sternberg, Stella Tamang, Phyllis Taylor, Sandra Van
den Bosse, Christa Weber and Stefan Willmutz have donated their time to
be interviewed; Liam Mahony, Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Orion Kriegman, N.
Radakrishnan and Arno Truger travelled long distances to participate as
resource persons in the research review seminar; Elise Boulding, Bart Horeman,
Barbara Müller, Michael Nagler and Helga Tempel, to mention only a few,
commented in written on the papers or some of them; Pat Keefe from the
St. Paul office, Marian Sinn, Sandra Hoenle, Judith Coates and Daphne Davey
spend days proof-reading; Mel Duncan, David Hartsough, Donna Howard, Tim
Wallis, Michael Nagler, Mary Lou Ott, Janne Poort van Eeden, N. Radhakrishnan,
Claudia Samayo and Hans Sinn were the members of NP's Interim Steering
Committee at the July meeting where the research was being presented, and
last but not least, the lead staff with David Hartsough and especially
Mel Duncan need to be mentioned - without their commitment and support
nothing of this would have been accomplished.
Although this research has been a corporate effort, the
opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in the
publication are those of the author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect
the views of Nonviolent Peaceforce or, of course, that of its funder, the
United States Institute of Peace.
And to finish with an apology: Much of the study has been
written by a non-native English speaker. And although the text has been
proof-read once, there were corrections made after that proof-reading.
I hope that the Germanisms, grammatical and spelling mistakes will not
tamper with the intended meanings, and I ask for forgiveness from everyone
whose sense of expression and grammar might be hurt reading these texts.
An overview of what is to follow:
The first chapter of the study introduces some key concepts
related to nonviolence, conflict, conflict escalation, intervention and
peace strategies. The purpose here is to provide some definitions and thereby
avoid misunderstandings, which arise easily because central terms like
intervention or peace-building, to give just two examples, are used with
very different meanings in the relevant literature. It then raises the
question of legitimisation of conflict intervention. The chapter concludes
with a short, and certainly not complete overview, of the history and experiences
of civil/nonviolent conflict interventions.
The second chapter aims at describing and identifying successful
types of nonviolent or civilian intervention. Short listing the whole range
of activities described in Chapter 1, we concentrated on a few types of
actors: Peace teams and peace services, humanitarian and development organisations,
international civilian missions of a larger scale, and military intervenors.
This chapter also deals with the question of whether nonviolent intervention
could replace military intervention, and reminds us of cases when nonviolence
has failed in the past.
The third chapter looks into implementation questions,
especially on how to create and organise positive and efficient relationships
- within the team itself, with other governmental and non-governmental
organisations, and with members of Nonviolent Peaceforce governance. The
chapter attempts to draw some conclusions from: 1) field relationships
of peace teams which share a proximate mission but are too small to transpose
directly to the work of NP’s large-scale intervention; and 2) relationships
of organisations of equal or greater size but less similar in aims and
history.
Chapter 4 deals with personnel issues, namely how to define
best practises for human resource management in this field.
The last chapter (5) deals with training, comparing different
training models that are in use, and makes some recommendations for Nonviolent
Peaceforce, e.g. separating training and assessment, and conducting both
general training and mission preparation training.
Christine Schweitzer,
Hamburg, in September 2001
Christine Schweitzer
Nonviolence is not a very exact term. It not only describes
a whole class of activities, but also describes attitudes and life-style.
The debate among nonviolent activists is whether the latter are preconditions
to the first, or whether nonviolence is a principle or a technique. Both approaches hold nonviolence as an efficient instrument and an
ethical means for dealing with conflict and political strife because it
tries to minimise damages and casualties. Both also agree that nonviolence
might be used for reformist or for revolutionary purposes, and that it may be used to promote social change (nonviolent action,
nonviolent uprisings etc.) and to prevent unwelcome changes (social defence or civilian-based
defense). The biggest differences between the two approaches lie in the nature
of commitment, the assumed relationship between means and ends, the approach to
conflict in general, the attitude towards the opponent with the assumed
way of how nonviolence "works", and the mentioned issue of nonviolence
as a way of life.
It is certainly possible that the difference between both
approaches might be an ideological rather than an empirical question. On
the one hand, elements of coercing the opponent can be found in campaigns
of principled nonviolent leaders like Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Any action has an impact on the opponent. The effect of this action,
whether coercive or persuasive, may depend on the opponent’s perception
and the cost he is willing to incur. For example: Gandhi's death fast
in 1948 made his opponents give in, not because they were convinced, but
because they felt that the political costs of Gandhi's death would be too
high. This same action carried out by unknown and widely despised Kurdish
prisoners in Turkey led to more than twenty deaths (May 2001). On the
other hand, many defenders of the pragmatic approach might profess an ethical
foundation for themselves, but believe that they should not impose their
convictions on others, and that they might better win support by using
rational-pragmatic arguments. Certainly, if the activists manage to convey to their opponent that
they do not hate him, that they are concerned about his well being, and
that they are ready to consider his interests, this might produce a positive
dynamic in the conflict situation, which could not have happened otherwise.
However, there might still be an element of coercion involved: "Clearly,
life is not a choice between violence and no violence. It is a choice between
violence and less violence; the latter sometimes expressed through the
medium of nonviolence."
1.1.2.1 Some definitions
There are many definitions of social conflict, and this
study is not the place to investigate the theory of conflict in depth.
Friedrich Glasl’s definition has been chosen because it has the advantage
of being broad and neutral enough to allow an all-encompassing view of
social conflict. Friedrich Glasl’s (1994) handbook on conflict resolution
will play a role again later on when talking about conflict stages. He
says:
"Social conflict is an interaction between actors
(individuals, groups, organisations and so on), where at least one actor
sees incompatibilities in the thinking/ imagination/ perception, and/ or
feeling, and/or wanting with another actor (other actors) in a way, that
in the realisation there is impairment by another actor (the other actors)."
Conflicts may be categorised according to:
Different objects (e.g. strategic conflicts, issue conflicts).
For the international field, Kumar Rupesinghe distinguishes resource-based
conflicts, conflicts over governance and authority, ideological conflicts
and identity conflicts.
Visibility (latent-manifest conflicts)
Characteristics of the conflict parties, their position
and relationship to each other (e.g. individuals-groups, rulers-ruled),
Level of escalation (see below)
Means used to carry the conflict out.
1.1.2.2 Violent conflicts
Conflicts become a special issue for attention when and
if they are carried out by violent means. Peace researchers have reserved
the term "war" for violent conflicts that fulfil certain criteria.
Usually there has to be a minimum number of casualties (1000 per year or
per conflict), and some kind of regular army and central organisation on
one side of the conflict at least . Violent conflicts that do not fulfil these criteria are called armed
conflicts.
Since World War II there have been about 200 wars. The
number of wars taking place each year has increased every year to a total
of 51 wars in 1992. The decline in the following years to 29 wars in 1997
has again been reversed, and the number of wars has risen to 34 in 1999.
Almost 75 % of them have taken place in Africa (14) and Asia (11). Others were in the Middle East (6), Latin America (2) and Europe (1). In 1999 alone seven new wars
started.
Today the majority of wars are internal wars - the number of international wars has been falling drastically to
almost zero in recent years. (In 1999 AKUF counted 3, with three more wars
with a strong international component.) But while this is certainly reason enough to concentrate on internal
wars when dealing with the issue of conflict intervention, it would be
too soon to conclude that the danger of new major international wars has
been eliminated.
There are many different ways to categorise armed conflicts. For the purpose of this study it is sufficient to find categories
that are meaningful for conflict intervention. As a working conflict typology,
the one proposed by Miall et. al. (1999) will be freely combined with the one used by AKUF. If in the course
of the research, further distinction will prove useful, the typology might
be refined. It is based on a combination of actors and issues:
International/interstate conflicts
Internal conflicts
2.1 anti-regime (Miall et al: "revolution/ideology")
conflicts/wars
2.2 autonomy and secession (Miall et al: "identity/secession")
conflicts
2.3 factional conflicts (AKUF: "other internal wars" or "unrests" depending
on if there is central organisation of the fighting on both sides, regular
forces at least on one side involved, and some continuity of the fighting)
2.4 decolonising wars.
Further distinctive categories are:
If at least on one side the fighting is done by regular
forces (military, police, paramilitary units) of the government or not (distinction probably only relevant in internal conflicts.
If there is violence carried out only by one side, and
the other side is using only nonviolent means (distinction at least theoretical both applicable for international
and internal conflicts),
If there is direct military involvement by an external
party (military intervention)
The fact that civil wars are the predominant kind of organised
violence today has had a significant impact on the problems faced by those
who deal with them. Often there are many actors, and just as often across
the boundaries of one state - with very different interests. Recently,
the category of those who profit from the continuation of a war has gained
special attention (the recent UN report on peacekeeping calls them simply "spoilers"); Mary Anderson distinguishes "thugs", "irreconcilables", "arms
merchants and other profiteers". The wars are highly privatised, fought with small weapons, and civilians
easily might become part-time warriors, extinguishing the clear distinction
between combatants and non-combatants. International Humanitarian Law is
heeded less and less. Civilians and those trying to help have often been
made the target of violent attacks, as are civilian installations such
as hospitals, schools, refugee centres and cultural sites.
1.1.2.3 Causes of (armed) conflict
The research on causes of armed conflict so far has not
produced a consistent theory acceptable to most scholars working in the
field. However, It is very likely that there is one consensus: that conflict
cannot be reduced to a single cause, or a single explanation. It is obvious
that there are "very few necessary conditions" which need to
be fulfilled in order for a war to develop, and "very many sufficient
conditions, of which only a few of these may apply, in any single conflict.
War is possible as soon as weapons are available with which to fight it
and as long as there is a dispute between two or more parties. What makes
war probable, however, is a far more complicated question."
There are different categories of explanations: genetic
and evolutionary/biologist theories (aggression as a genetic function,
maximisation of survival chances), behaviourist theories (war as learned
behaviour), cost-benefit theories (maximisation of benefit), ecological
(war for scarce resources), social/cultural theories (ethnicity and/or
religion as conflict causes), and cognitive (attitudes) explanations.
Before the early 1990s most scholars concentrated on international
war. Only recently have the causes for internal conflict come into consideration.
These are: the role of power imbalances (a concept known since Roman domination),
of economic growth and free trade, of relative deprivation (difference
between expected and real access to well-being and power), of deterioration
of the environment, of the state as such and the ideology of nationalism,
of specific forms of political organisation (democracy, authoritarian regimes,
transitional regimes), of the existence of a monopoly of power, and of
the connection between internal cohesion and external aggression. Remarkably
there are theories that say that an existing monopoly of power and internal
cohesion are supportive for peace, and theories that say the opposite. Clearly the state of the research on conflict causes is inconclusive.
The role of ethnic diversity is controversial as well.
In the eyes of many researchers about conflict, it is not a cause per se
although parties in conflict do tend to identify themselves ethnically.
Ethnicity is a powerful factor in mobilising people against each other
because ethnicity is easy to ascribe, touches upon fundamental values,
and seems to be non negotiable. Still, it should be regarded as an instrument,
and an ideological base, rather than as a cause.
The different, and often popular, psychological and biological
theories try to explain why people are willing to support and participate
in war, but they cannot give a sufficient explanation of why there is modern
war. Individual aggression cannot explain armament, arms industry and the
modern military.
Agreement seems to exist on these three important factors
for the development of war:
Bad economic conditions seem to be a main cause for internal
conflicts.
Repressive political systems, especially if they are in
a state of transition, are war-prone
Degradation of renewable resources (erosion, deforestation,
scarcity of water) may contribute to the possibility of armed conflict.
On the other hand, empirically, it seems that democratic
states do not go to war against each other. This observation has led to
much comment, and is the rationale for many conflict interventions, specifically
the democratisation programs undertaken by OSCE, UN and others.
Proponents of nonviolent action tend to emphasize individualistic
theories of conflict as well, probably because most of the supporters are
rooted in individualistic Western culture. Special mention needs to be
made of the human needs approach which has been propagated by John Burton and others. It is the theoretical basis of many conflict resolution
projects, and specifically, so-called conflict-solving workshops. Burton sees three types of human motivation:
needs, values and interests. The basic needs are "universal and primordial",
and they are about avoiding three primary emotions (fear, anger and depression)
in order to permit the fourth emotion, the positive emotional state of
satisfaction/happiness. Because human beings are being driven by these
emotions, humans have a corresponding set of needs for conditions of life
that give them satisfaction. There is no general agreement on what these
secondary needs might be; most often mentioned are identity, freedom, recognition,
stimulation, distributive justice, participation, rationality, and control. Because these basic needs absolutely must be fulfilled, people are
ready to go to war for them, or so the argument goes. But this theory does
not take into account structural or cultural factors that allow some groups
to satisfy their secondary needs at the expense of other groups, over a
long time, and without being challenged.
Perhaps much of the more fruitless parts of the discussion
could be avoided if there was agreement on Smith's proposal to distinguish
four types of causes of conflict:
Background causes (basic elements of social and political
structure, e.g. that certain groups are excluded from power, or that there
are regional economic differences);
Mobilisation Strategies (objectives of key political actors
and the way they go about fulfilling these objectives;
Triggers (factors that affect the timing of the onset of
the armed conflict);
Catalysts (factors that influence the intensity and duration
of a conflict, including external factors like an international intervention).
1.1.3.1 Conflict stages
Conflicts may be either latent or manifest, and tend to
escalate if not dealt with in time. Usually escalation means that communication
between the parties breaks down, and the readiness to use violence (first
usually verbal, then physical) grows. Many social scientists have attempted
to define this development by describing typical stages of conflict escalation.
Friedrich Glasl deals mainly with conflict in business,
but his set of nine stages can easily be used for political large-scale
conflicts.
Glasl shows how parties in conflict loose the ability to
co-operate in a constructive manner as their successive and mutual experiences
are break down. He identifies several "points of no return" which
contribute decisively to the escalation. In stage 1, there is a hardening of the positions. It is the content of the
conflict that is the centre of attention, and the parties trust that it
will be possible to solve the problem. In the second stage, polarisation
and debate take place. The conflicted parties unite within themselves
(cohesion), and stereotypes develop. When they reach the point where they
feel that talking to one another is not productive, they "create facts" (stage
3: "deeds instead of words"). From there the relationship to
the opposing party becomes a central part of the content of the conflict
itself. "There's no use in talking to them," is the experience, "now
we have to act!" From now on behaviour towards one another becomes
more clearly negative, as do the notions the opponents have of each other.
As the conflict constellation deteriorates, the parties slide into a situation
where each feels threatened and endangered by the actions of the other
(stages 4-6). In stage 4 the relationship becomes the problem. Stereotypes,
and "win-lose" situations arise. In stage 5 direct attacks on
the position of the opponent begin, and each party seeks to "expose" the "true
character" of its opponent causing him to loose face. In stage 6 the
threatening begins, and isolated violent acts might happen.
The next decisive threshold is crossed when threats and
ultimatums are superseded by (still limited) actions directed against the
power base of the organisation or group concerned (stage 7). From this
moment on the parties no longer see each other in human terms but see only
objects that they want to be rid of (stages 7-9). From now on the violence
directed toward each other becomes the predominant issue of the conflict.
In stage 8 the basis of power and existence of the opponent are targets,
and mutual destruction takes place. In the 9th and final stage there is
total confrontation even at the price of one's own destruction. The only
goal is to eliminate the opponent.
Ronald J. Fisher has transferred Glasl's model from its original context of social
conflicts, mostly in or between organisations, to the context of political
conflicts. He simplifies Glasl's nine stages to four: stage 1: communication,
stage 2: polarisation, stage 3: segregation, stage 4: destruction.
All models of conflict that describe stages are of course
a gross simplification of any given real-life conflict, as Leatherman et
al. point out. Conflict processes are usually multidimensional, and unfold
in a disjunctive manner. There are usually multiple levels in each conflict
(e.g. the individual, the intra-societal, the international), as well as
multiple issues. Escalation may take place, both vertically (behaviours,
choice of means) and horizontally (expansion of issues, goals, actors,
geographical scope).
1.1.3.2 Nonviolent conflict escalation
The model developed by Glasl and Fisher does not recognise
the possibility of a nonviolent conflict escalation. In fact, this aspect
is missing in almost all studies on conflict and conflict resolution except
for a few which deal specifically with nonviolent resistance and/or nonviolent
action.
One exception is John Paul Lederach who has created the
term "conflict transformation". Conflict transformation is the
development from a static situation with very unequal distribution of political
power, and a problem that hasn't yet become a conflict issue, to a dynamic
situation with better balance of power and the possibility of dealing with
the problem. This includes the conflict stages from the latency stage to
the articulation of protest. To end the static situation, protest needs
to be organised and articulated. When this has happens, counter power may
develop. A new distribution of power is both a condition for clarifying
the conflict issues, and an expression of a new relationship between the
conflict parties in conflict. Lederach emphasises that conflict transformation
is a long-term process taking 20 years or more, and must not be confused
with short-term crisis intervention alone, which is the most immediate
activity in the process of transformation.
The contribution of nonviolent action to this transformation
is obvious: it makes the conflict visible, and tries to change the balance
of power by using nonviolent means of protest and resistance.
Theodor Ebert has defined three stages of escalation in
nonviolent action; each stage has both subversive and constructive elements:
1. Protest as subversive action and 'functional demonstrations'
as constructive action;
2. Legal non-cooperation and legal innovation of roles;
3. Civil disobedience and civil usurpation;
Generally speaking, escalation is achieved by:
Broadening the scope of the activities (geographically
or time-wise);
Growth of the number of the activists;
Increased actions of civil disobedience and other direct
actions.
Hildegard Goss-Mayr puts the analysis of the conflict at the beginning of her discussion.
Then groups are formed and trained in nonviolence. As they come in contact
with each other they start to cooperate, chose tactics and begin their
activities to weaken and eventually neutralise the pillars that support
the injustice. The more pillars of injustice are uprooted, and the more
institutions and other important actors change sides, the closer the moment
comes when the status quo can no longer be maintained. This is the moment
to develop alternatives and to create a new distribution of power. Everyone,
including the former opponents, is part of this process.
1.1.3.3 Taking a closer look at conflict transformation
Conflict resolution, conflict settlement, conflict handling,
conflict management, conflict regulation or conflict transformation are
terms which are often used indiscriminately although there are certain
nuances of meanings. Conflict resolution implies that "the deep-routed
sources of conflict are addressed, and resolved". Conflict settlement
refers to the "reaching of an agreement between the parties which
enables them to end an armed conflict. It puts to an end the violent stage
of conflict behaviour." Conflict regulation and conflict management
are "sometimes used as a generic term to cover the whole gamut of
positive conflict handling".
Conflict transformation puts an emphasis on the process
of dealing with conflict, and is therefore, in my eyes, preferable to the
other terms. It touches all three corners of the famous conflict triangle
that Johan Galtung has defined. The process of dealing with the conflict
then moves around the triangle.
At this point it should be very clearly pointed out that
conflict transformation is not synonymous with what external parties do,
nor is it synonymous with conflict intervention. The importance of local
peace builders, of peace constituencies and of local zones of peace has
gained more and more recognition in the last few years.
Müller/Büttner (1998) have proposed making the triangle a pyramid in order to include
the dimension of conflict escalation. They argue that in the first three
stages of Glasl's conflict escalation scheme the content is in the centre
of the conflict. Then the attitudes of the opponents become the major factor,
and as soon as the conflict becomes violent, the behaviour itself is the
main problem.
A pyramid diagram would look like this:
Table 1.4: Conflict pyramid and escalation track
Müller/Büttner 1998:19
De-escalation of a conflict then may be seen as the reversal
of this process. First the emphasis would be on the behaviour. That is, stopping
the violence through a cease-fire, and then monitoring the cease-fire. Now
work on attitudes can begin. Only when attitudes change for the better
will it be possible to deal with the original conflict and to attempt to
find a solution. (Then it would be time to work on attitudes, and probably
only when there is a change for the better in these, there is a chance
to deal with the original conflict and its content, and to attempt finding
a solution for it.)
While most experts would agree with the first assumption,
the order of the second and the third might be questionable. In fact, very
often there is some peace agreement (conflict settlement in the meaning
defined above) before any substantial work on the relationship of the actors
has been done. The chapter on Peace Strategies will argue that all three
dimensions need to be tackled simultaneously.
The conflict intervention discussion is a rather recent
phenomenon, which rapidly grew after the end of the East-West-confrontation
in 1989, though of course intervention in conflict is something that has
always taken place. Intervention is "Any influencing of a system
of rule from the outside, no matter if the influencing is done by nonviolent
or by violent means".
The term ‘conflict intervention’ will be used for such
involvements that are undertaken to influence a conflict in another ‘system
of rule’. This definition leaves the means (military, diplomacy etc.),
the type of conflict, the interveners (states, international state organisations,
NGOs etc.) and the purpose/objectives of the intervention open.
1.1.4.1 Objectives and motives of conflict intervention
There are at least 13 categories of objectives or motives
for conflict intervention. Often more than one is at work in any given case at any given time.
With a few exceptions, most objectives and motives can be found in both
state and non-state situations. The examples of objectives and motives
given here are arbitrarily chosen.
Change the attitude and/or the behaviour of one or all
of the conflict parties (e.g. by conflict resolution workshops or by sanctions
against a government);
Change the distribution of power within one conflict party
(e.g. by sanctions meant to build up so much pressure against the government
that it gets overthrown);
Support one conflict party with the goal to help it win
the conflict (e.g. the Latin American solidarity movement);
Change the means by which the conflict is carried out (e.g.
by giving training in nonviolent resistance techniques);
Protect human rights (e.g. by building international public
pressure like Amnesty International does);
Help the victims of violence and war (shelter, medicine,
clothing);
Guarantee agreements made (e.g. by sending peacekeeping
troops);
Support civil society (many international NGOs concentrate
on that field while it is a rather recent discovery with governments);
Influence powerful external parties so that they change
their behaviour, and/or intervene in the conflict (social movements and
NGOs);
Protect one’s own citizens (governments only, e.g. by evacuating
their own citizens when a violent conflict flares up);
Defend own strategic or economic interests;
Find supporters/members for the own cause, promote own
cause (e.g. missionaries);
Facilitate social or economic change (e.g. development
aid).
These are only motives and objectives as they relate to
the conflict for the interveners usually have many organisational motives
of their own. For example, to satisfy lobbyists and voters who expect
certain behaviour from a government, to win public credibility by sponsoring
a popular project, and to get new funds from sponsors and so on.
1.1.4.2 Actors
There are a multitude of possible interveners. The well-established
differentiation between governments on the one side and all the others (to
be found under track 2 diplomacy) does not give an adequate picture of
what is actually going on in conflict transformation by external parties. Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald have therefore introduced
the concept of Multi-track Diplomacy which distinguishes 9 tracks: governmental;
professional conflict resolution; business; private citizen; research,
training and education; activism; religious; funding; and public opinion.
Building on their concept, I would like to propose that there are two main
types of actors with several subtypes each:
a. States/governments with two broad categories:
individual states
international organisations and interest-based coalitions
(UN and its bodies and regional organisations, e.g. the OSCE or the OAS,
other regional governmental organisations; World bank, NATO etc.
b. Non-state actors with four broad categories:
NGOs, social movements, and
political parties
religious bodies.
corporate sector (business)
media
This is an ideal picture; in reality many non-state actors
have very clear connections and even dependencies to the state in which
they live and work. In the table below, this relationship is only marked
for two of them (media and parties) because the relationship is especially
remarkable.
1.1.4.3 Tactics/means
It is probably impossible to draw up a complete list of
means and tactics of conflict intervention (such as attempted by Gene Sharp) for the broad field of nonviolent action. Sharp distinguishes psychological, physical, social, economic and
political tactics.
1.1.4.4 Civil Intervention and nonviolent intervention
If the main criteria which distinguishes different forms
of conflict intervention is whether direct deadly violence is being used
or not, then the distinction between military and civil interventions becomes
meaningful.
Consequently civil interventions are all those interventions
which are being carried out by civilians (in opposition to military personnel),
and which refrain from the use of personal deadly violence.
But there is another way to distinguish between conflict
interventions: those using coercive means and those that do not. There are coercive means included in the category of civil interventions, e.g. economic sanctions
or mediation with muscle. Some of them might actually cause a high rate
of casualties - the economic sanctions against Iraq have, according to
official figures by the UN, cost the lives of almost 600,000 children alone
between 1991 and 1996, which is an outcome as bad or worse than those of
many military actions.
Therefore I agree with those authors who find it necessary to distinguish between civil interventions
and nonviolent interventions, the latter being a sub-category of the first.
I would like to propose the following definition of nonviolent intervention:
Conflict intervention can be called nonviolent, when
1. the objective is conflict transformation, and the when
the intervener, (either as a non-partisan external party taking the interests
of all conflict parties into consideration, or as a partisan party supporting
one side in the conflict), engages in conflict transformation and/or human
rights and justice, and when
2. there is no use of direct or indirect deadly violence.
This definition has two consequences that might be controversial:
First, it is nonviolent intervention may take place either
at home of the interveners or at the home of those people where the conflict
takes place.
Second, nonviolent intervention may be partisan. This topic has already been touched upon in the paragraph on nonviolent
conflict escalation above. The argument goes like this: If there is a strong
imbalance of power between the parties in conflict, (perhaps even to the
degree that structural violence is so high that the conflict is latent
and the underdog hasn't even started to organise himself), then nonviolent
intervention must mean strengthening the underdog. This is not a new argument.
Johan Galtung made it early in the 1980s. But still in the bulk of the literature on conflict intervention
the non-partisan character is automatically, and by definition, assumed.
Up to now, conflict interventions have been categorised
according to different aspects: objectives, actors, methods and strategy.
Three more aspects that are very relevant when either planning or evaluating
a nonviolent intervention has yet to be introduced: time, horizontal geographical
scope and the level of society the intervention addresses.
1.1.5.1 Time
Everybody distinguishes short, middle and long-term goals
and activities. But it should not be taken for granted that any two persons
mean the same thing when they use these terms. Orienting ourselves to the
time dimension proposed by John Paul Lederach will be beneficial here. The
proposal has the advantage of not being guided by funding directives that
describe every project that is longer than one year as long-term just because
funds are dispersed annually.
Lederach distinguishes
immediate action (2-6 months) as crisis intervention;
short-range planning (1-2 years) mainly used for preparation
and training (capacity building);
the middle-range decade thinking (5-10 years) for developing
a design of social change; and
the long-range generational vision (20+ years) for developing
a "vision of what we are trying to achieve in order to build toward
and reach that vision".
1.1.5.2 Levels of society
John Paul Lederach's goes on to distinguishes between
three levels of society (top, middle and grassroots), and attributes certain
approaches to peace building to each of them.
Most authors dealing with the levels of society in relationship
to conflict intervention agree that it is of paramount importance for interveners
to reach all three levels. This does not mean that it is necessary for
each intervener to have contact with all levels, but intervention needs
to reach all of them. An agreement made between top leaders is likely to
fail if it does not have the support of the masses - the grassroots level.
And vice versa, small grassroots initiatives might find themselves run
over by violence, outlawed or simply pushed to the side if the top leaders
are not reached as well. Therefore, the middle-range actors play a special
role. They may co-ordinate top-level decisions with grassroots realities.
Table 1.7 Actors and approaches to peacebuilding
1.1.5.3 Geographical scope
It is known that some projects will only reach one local
community or even only one part of that community, others will have an
impact on the whole country and/or on the conflict as a whole.
In recent years more and more notice has been given to
the development of local peace zones. These are single communities or a
number of communities where violence does not take root, which remain peaceful
in a violent surrounding, sometimes against all odds. There is little knowledge
about what is needed in order to have a local project impact on the conflict
as a whole.
Not all interventions involve going to the place where
the conflict is. As has been mentioned before, influencing other external
parties to get involved, or working on unjust structures might well take
place far away from the actual conflict (in the powerful countries).
1.1.6.1 Some definitions
Terms like "strategy" and "tactics" have
spilled over from the military jargon not only to common language, but
also to thinkers about nonviolence. Because there are different, some times contradictory usages of these terms, it is necessary to define what they mean. I will
follow Burrowes’ (1996) example and first go back to the military terminology
as developed by Clausewitz and Liddell Hart (1967). Liddell Hart defined
strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to
fulfil the ends of policy", policy being what "governs the object of war". Military
means can also be called tactics - activities taken within the framework
of a strategy. Gene Sharp defines grand strategy, strategy and tactics
without referring to its military origin:
"Grand strategy is the broader conception which serves
to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of the struggle group toward
the attainment of the objectives of the conflict. Strategy, a more narrow
term, is the broad plan of action for the overall struggle, including the
development of an advantageous situation, the decision of when to fight,
and the broad plan for utilising various specific actions in the general
conflict. Tactics refers to plans for more limited conflicts within the
selected strategic plan."
Jean-Marie Muller puts it more simply:
"Strategy concerns the conception and execution which
regulates and co-ordinates the different activities of an intervention;
tactics concerns the conception and execution of each of these activities."
In this paper the terms “strategy” and “tactics” will be
used as Sharp and Muller defined them.
1.1.6.2 Strategies of conflict intervention
Since the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros
Boutros Ghali, published the Agenda for Peace, the terms peacekeeping, peacemaking
and peacebuilding have become well known. But it wasn't Boutros-Ghali who
invented them, nor were they originally meant to function in a strict sequential
order as Boutros-Ghali puts them. Johan Galtung - who called them “approaches
to peace” 20 years before Boutros-Ghali, first described these three peace
strategies.Since then these terms have been refined by other authors such as
the social anthropologist Stephen Ryan (1995). When referred to in this
study, they are used within the broad civilian tradition, and not in the
tradition of reserved for the UN. Together, these three strategies (or
rather "grand strategies") formulate a general theory of maintaining
peace: "keeping the opponents apart, negotiating a political solution
and finally, tying the adversaries into something that one could call a
peace system."
Johan Galtung defines peacekeeping as (to): "control
the actors so that they at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves".
Peacemaking "is concerned with the search for a negotiated
resolution of the perceived conflicts of interests between the parties".
