2. Strategies, Tactics and Activities in Intervention

by Donna Howard, Christine Schweitzer, Carl Stieren
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## 2. Strategies, Tactics and Activities in Intervention

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The research was done by Peaceworkers as part of the research phase of Nonviolent Peaceforce with the support of USIP. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in the publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Nonviolent Peaceforce or the United States Institute of Peace.

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2. Strategies, Tactics and Activities in Intervention

Donna Howard, Christine Schweitzer and Carl Stieren

2.1 Introduction

The following chapter aims at describing and identifying successful types of nonviolent or civilian intervention. Shortlisting the whole range of activities described in Chapter 1, we here concentrated on a few types of actors:

1. Peace teams and Civil Peace Services.

Here a handful of nongovernmental organizations were examined as precedent for the Global Nonviolent Peace Force. Those selected practice third party nonviolent intervention by placing teams in situations of conflict and instability for more than a short-term visit, march or demonstration. These team-sending organizations have built reputations for maintaining a principled and courageous presence with people who are at risk in conflict. They have additionally analyzed their own work and thus increased our understanding of nonviolent intervention.

Included here are Balkan Peace Team, Christian Peacemaker Teams, Peace Brigades International, SIPAZ, Osijek Peace Teams and Witness for Peace.

As examples for European Civil Peace Services are examples of the German, the Austrian and the Italian Services, because the other projects have either not yet nor are planning to deploy personnel to the field. Interviews with several key organizers have complemented data taken from publication of the CPS organisations.

2. Development and humanitarian aid organisations. Interviews with a few representatives of such organisations have also here complemented data taken from publications.

3. Civilian governmental missions: Here are five examples of different types of larger-scale missions presented: different NGO (and one UN) election monitoring missions in South Africa in 1994 and 1995, the Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville being there since 1997, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1998/99, and UN missions in El Salvador and East Timor. The information for this and the following sub-chapter has been taken mainly from publications on these missions, complemented by reports of the missions which they tend to make available on the internet.

4. Military-based interventions are, as explained elsewhere, being considered under two aspects: first, there are lessons learned from these missions which might also hold true for unarmed missions. And secondly, there is the issue of replacing their functions by civilian activities, one of the professed goals of GNPF. The latter question is dealt with in an extra subchapter, 2.6.

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The research was done by Peaceworkers as part of the research phase of Nonviolent Peaceforce with the support of USIP. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in the publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace.
For all these examples we have looked into their character and goals, their activities, the outcomes and impact\(^2\), and tried to formulate as lessons learned conditions for successful complex projects or missions of the respective type. After looking into the different examples and precedents, we have tackled two more questions: Section 6 asks the question under what circumstances non-violent large-scale intervention is capable of replacing military intervention, and section 7 deals with the issue of When nonviolence failed.

In the concluding chapter we then have tried to formulate some more general lessons for GNPF.

This chapter is the product of a co-operation between three persons:
- Donna Howard who delved deeply into the experience of peace teams,
- Carl Stieren who dealt with those cases when nonviolence did not work,
- and Christine Schweitzer who researched the various other cases, and having looked into Civil Peace Services, co-operated with Donna Howard on Chapter 2.

\(^2\) The separation of outcomes and impact is taken from the Impact Assessment methodology as it has been developed in recent years by developmental organisations (Oxfam, GTZ). Impact is defined here as "significant or lasting changes in people's lives, brought about by a given action or series of action". (Roche 1999:21). Outcomes are the immediate effects of activities, independently of their sustainability. For example: A legal rights awareness training course (activity) might lead to people being aware of their rights (outcome). Impact then is if people successfully claim rights, and enjoy increased quality of life as a result. (Roche 99:22)
2.2 Peace Teams and Civil Peace Services

Donna Howard and Christine Schweitzer

2.2.1 Introduction

Hope can only be kindled where there is solidarity. It is much easier to throw yourself into any commitment when you have someone with you, protecting you... I can throw myself from a high place, if I know that there is someone there to make sure I am not destroyed by the fall. You give us the force to be able to throw ourselves into our work. You have been expelled. You have suffered some of the same problems as those whom you have helped... Do not forget that it is precisely because you have suffered with the people that you have been able to support them in building their resistance.

Lutheran Bishop Medardo Gomez,
accompanied by Peace Brigades International in El Salvador

Peace Teams and Civil Peace Services are both umbrella terms describing a wide range of activities carried out by civilians in conflict areas, which aim at broadening the scope of local activists by accompaniment and presence, resolving conflicts nonviolently, building peace and reconstructing society. They include training of peace workers, raising awareness of the importance of nonviolent conflict resolution, sending out peace teams and co-operating with the local populations in conflict areas.4 That we have treated them separately in two subchapters is more due to division of work between the two researchers,5 than it is well founded in conceptual differences. If there is a difference, then it is a difference between those projects that concentrate on peacekeeping activities (accompaniment, presence, interpositioning), and those groups that concentrate on peacebuilding. But while there is presently no Civil Peace Service focussing solely on accompaniment (though there are other forms of peacekeeping practised), there are a few groups calling themselves Peace Teams that have been more focussed on peacebuilding than on peacekeeping tasks (BPT). That means that neither Civil Peace Service nor Peace Team is a clear-cut concept that separates the two clearly from each other on the one hand, or from other volunteer services on the other. If there is a proprium to the European CPS, then it may be that the term Civil Peace Service expresses a new political movement generally characterised by the following elements or goals:6

_____________________

4 This definition is based on one by Janne Poort - van Eeden for Civil Peace Services (e-mail communication June 18, 2001), but we have added the part on accompaniment.
5 Donna Howard is responsible for 2.2.1, Peace Teams, Christine Schweitzer for 2.2.2, Civil Peace Services. This introduction and the conclusions (2.2.4) were written together.
6 In some countries, specially in Germany, CPS tries to distinguish itself from all these other types of civil intervenors by emphasising its professional structure, but their concept has not generally been accepted by the projects in the other countries.
2. Strategies, Tactics and Activities 2.2 Peace Teams and CPS

- Institutionalise peace services/peace teams and have corresponding legal provisions in place, or making use of already existing ones,\(^7\)
- Access public funding for grass-roots work for conflict transformation and building up civil society,\(^8\) and
- Strong emphasis on the necessity of preparatory training that in some cases (not all) goes hand in hand with the objective of professionalising peace services.

Lacking a more specific definition, for the purpose of this study, all those volunteer and training organisations that are members of the European Network for Civil Peace Services (see below) will be called Civil Peace Services (CPS),\(^9\) all the others Peace Teams.\(^10\)

In our survey, we have not aimed at covering the activities of all organisations active in that field. Rather, we have chosen a handful of these nongovernmental organisations, and examined them as being precedent in many aspects for the Nonviolent Peaceforce.\(^11\)

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\(^7\) For example volunteer laws like those in France, have provisions for COs to do their alternative service abroad (Austria, Italy).

\(^8\) The leaflet of the European Network states: "CPS is building up a civil society in which conflicts are resolved in a nonviolent way," and further on: "CPSs are operating at grass-roots and civil society level."

\(^9\) In the appendix, projects in the following countries are described: Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria, France, Italy and at the European Parliament. The fact that developments in Germany are described in more detail than those in other countries is due to the bias of the author, who has intensive first-hand knowledge of the German CPS and the on-going discussions in that country. Christine has to give thanks to Helga Tempel from the ForumCPS who read the section on CPS in December 2000 and made some very valuable additions and corrections to it.

\(^10\) Those selected practice third party nonviolent intervention by placing teams in situations of conflict and instability for more than a short-term visit, march or demonstration. They have additionally analysed their own work and thus increased our understanding of nonviolent intervention. Included here are Peace Brigades International, Christian Peacemaker Teams, Witness for Peace, SIPAZ and Balkan Peace Team. Peace Team Websites are:
  - http://www.balkanpeaceteam.org
  - http://www.peacebrigades.org
  - http://www.prairienet.org/cpt
  - http://www.sipaz.org
  - http://www.witnessforpeace.org

\(^11\) The goals of the Nonviolent Peaceforce are drafted as follows in the Draft Proposal: To work with others, including existing peace teams and peace service organisations to develop the theory and practice of third party nonviolent intervention, in order to significantly improve its effectiveness. To significantly increase the pool of people worldwide who are trained and available for third party nonviolent intervention. To build the support needed to create and maintain a standing force of at least 200 active members, 400 reserves and 500 supporters. To deploy large-scale third party nonviolent intervention teams in conflict situations. The first three goals are not stated by the other peace team organisations - if they are shared, it is implied or internal. Unique to NP’s goals is the mention of large size, the development of theory and practice, an increase in world citizens trained for such work, and explicit cooperation with other peace team organisations. The fourth goal statement is common to all teams studied here, but differentiated by size.
2.2.2 Peace teams

Donna Howard

Hope can only be kindled where there is solidarity. It is much easier to throw yourself into any commitment when you have someone with you, protecting you... I can throw myself from a high place, if I know that there is someone there to make sure I am not destroyed by the fall. You give us the force to be able to throw ourselves into our work. You have been expelled. You have suffered some of the same problems as those whom you have helped... Do not forget that it is precisely because you have suffered with the people that you have been able to support them in building their resistance.

Lutheran Bishop Medardo Gomez, accompanied by Peace Brigades International in El Salvador

2.2.2.1 Introduction

Organisations that send peace teams into areas of conflict do so hoping to increase the odds that local peacemakers will be able to take greater risks in their work but not with their lives. Local individuals and organisations that report human rights abuse or expose injustice, for example, are usually "working without a net." Peace teams take risks themselves in order to be that net.

A handful of these nongovernmental organisations were examined as precedent for the Nonviolent Peaceforce. Those selected practice third party nonviolent intervention by placing teams in situations of conflict and instability for more than a short-term visit, march or demonstration. They have additionally analysed their own work and thus increased our understanding of nonviolent intervention. Included here, are Peace Brigades International, Christian Peacemaker Teams, Witness for Peace, Servicio Internacional para la Paz, Osijek Peace Teams and Balkan Peace Team.

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13Examples are used, when relevant, from other organisations or events, though they were not studied as such. Brief descriptions of these follow.

The Cyprus Resettlement Project (CRP) in 1975 placed three trained teams of internationals in the field to respond to the needs of people displaced by fighting between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

The Gulf Peace Team (GPT) was a spontaneous effort to stop war; 70 people camped on the Iraqi/Saudi border in 1990.

Cry for Justice (CfJ) was an ad hoc coalition of more than 20 US-based peace groups in a response to the political crisis in Haiti in 1993.

Michigan Peace Team placed teams in Chiapas and has sent peacemakers into Guatemala, Hebron, Bosnia, Haiti, Chiapas and the Western Shoshone Nation in Nevada. At present, they are recruiting for other peace team organisations rather than sending teams of their own.

Mir Sada/We Share One Peace was an attempt, in 1993, to establish peace camps in three cities in Bosnia that were under the control of different parties in the war. Suffering from grievous internal problems, a single group of 65 did manage a caravan to Sarajevo to deliver messages of solidarity.
2.2.2.2 Character and goals

"The existence of a third party at the scene of events makes it easier for the conflict parties to take a more constructive approach to behaviour and problem-solving. A reversal of the escalation becomes possible because the conflict parties question their own conflict behaviour and are supported in their search for a different approach to the problem."\(^{14}\)

The team-sending peace organisations examined here\(^{15}\) differ in many ways, but all might be described as having a goal derived from the quote above: to reverse escalation in conflict and support parties in evaluating and altering behaviour that may have contributed to the escalation. Or as stated by Müller and Büttner, "to influence the conflict parties using less and less threat and violence in order that they develop a productive treatment of their problems, that is, an increasingly civil peace strategy."\(^{16}\)

All the teams studied sprang from an urgent need to "do something" about a particular conflict or crisis. For Peace Brigades International (PBI) it was Guatemala; for Witness for Peace (WfP), Nicaragua; for Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT), grassroots wars in Central America and North America in which U.S. was identified with elite groups; for Servicio Internacional Para La Paz (SIPAZ), Chiapas; and for both Balkan Peace Team (BPT) and Osijek Peace Teams, it was Croatia and Serbia/Kosovo/a.

PBI and WfP are the forerunners in this studied group, both founded in 1981 and created new peace team specialities from the precedents of Shanti Sena, World Peace Brigade, Peaceworkers and A Quaker Action Group. A look at the founding of each organisation will give us an idea of their character.

PBI was formed by activists who were international as a group, experienced in the field, and primarily former members of World Peace Brigade, International Fellowship of Reconciliation and War Resisters International. WfP was the response of outraged clergy and lay people in the U.S. to the Reagan Administration’s policy of "low intensity warfare" directed toward Nicaragua’s civilian population. CPT (1986) was formed by Mennonite Churches, Church of the Brethren, Friends United Meeting and other Christians as a way for these churches to express their faith. BPT (1993) formed when

\(^{14}\)Müller/Büttner 1998: 56.
\(^{15}\)Examples are used, when relevant, from other organisations or events, though they were not studied as such. Brief descriptions of these follow.

The Cyprus Resettlement Project (CRP) in 1975 placed three trained teams of internationals in the field to respond to the needs of people displaced by fighting between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.

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organisations, including International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Peace Brigades International and War Resisters International, received requests from Croatia and Kosovo/a for an international presence. SIPAZ (1995) arose in response to an invitation from the Mexican church and human rights groups, who hoped an international presence in the state of Chiapas might benefit the peace process there. Osijek Peace Teams (1998) began as a project called "Building a Democratic Society based on a Culture of Nonviolence" as a joint effort of the Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights Osijek, and the Life and Peace Institute in Upsala, as well as their partner organisations The Face of Peace in Slavonski Brod and Austrian Peace Service.

There are strong relationships between some groups. PBI, in addition to developing its own structure and work in the field, went on to be a part of the coalitional founding of BPT and SIPAZ. War Resisters International and International Fellowship of Reconciliation were co-founders of PBI, SIPAZ and BPT. These three, plus Osijek, are the organisations that are founded and structured as coalitions: PBI with sections in 17 countries, BPT with 11 member organisations and SIPAZ with over 50 member groups.

The work of SIPAZ, WfP and CPT springs explicitly from the Christian faith; the mission of WfP and CPT is grounded in opposition to US policies that create injustice for citizens in other countries.

All claim some form of neutrality or non-partisanship, but there is quite a range to how the term is used and applied. Osijek, BPT and SIPAZ demonstrate the most easily defined form of non-partisanship. The peacebuilding done by BPT and Osijek is offered to all, Osijek teams always have both Serbian and Croatian members, and every effort is made to build communication between conflicting parties and to serve all populations. WfP claims non-partisanship in the field, choosing not to be involved in the internal struggles of any country or group. But their opposition to U.S. impact on that country might position them with one faction and not another. PBI has worked very hard, over the years, to define accompaniment as non-partisan, even if they accompany only persons of one group within the conflict. They do this by detachment from the work of that group (or person), but this position will always have to be defended. CPT’s partisanship or non-partisanship is even more confusing. They live with, train and defend the houses of Palestinians in Jewish Settlements, e.g., but claim that since they would defend anyone who was threatened in this way, the work is still not partisan.

The goals of these team-sending organisations range from peacekeeping through peacemaking to peacebuilding. PBI’s goal "to create space for local activists to work for social justice and human rights"17 emphasises the work of locals and involves violence reduction. CPT’s intent to "get in the way"18 implies the intervention of peacekeeping, but supporting peacemakers and affecting U.S. and world policies places their work also in the range of peacemaking. The emphasis of WfP is on peacemaking - to support peace, justice and sustainable economies in the Americas "by changing U.S. policies and corporate practices which contribute to poverty and oppression. We stand with people who seek justice."19 This is peacemaking as it lobbies for change in the politics of war.

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17 http://www.igc.org/pbi
16 http://www.prairienet.org/cpt/
What they describe as maintaining a presence in these countries has often been the work of peacekeeping, however, and their intent to assist in the building of stable societies is peacebuilding. SIPAZ began its work in Chiapas with a goal of keeping peace - to "forestall or reduce violence and to protect and expand the precious political space in which dialogue [between the Zapatistas and the Mexican government] is possible" and has since pursued peacebuilding goals. BPT and Osijek, of the organisations represented here, are the ones whose goals and work fall most within peacebuilding. The Osijek project sought to assist "reconstruction of a normal society with tolerance and acceptance of all people living peacefully together," with the words "empowerment, reconciliation, co-operation, democracy" in their mission statement. The goal with which BPT identified itself was "to work for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and to demonstrate an international commitment to peace."

2.2.2.3 Activities of peace teams

I will use, here, the three overarching strategies of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding, showing the activities of the peace teams in each.

Peacekeeping strategy aims to reduce violence in areas of conflict. Peace teams can effectively utilise tactics intended to keep individuals or groups safe by the "creation of buffer zones or human chains; observation of cease-fires; observation of conflict events to reduce the incidence of violence; escorting of or presence near threatened persons or organisations; appeals." Some of the many nonviolent tactics used by civilian intervention teams are discussed below.

Interpositioning is the physical placement of peacekeepers between groups engaged in violent conflict in an impartial stance toward all parties. As conflicts do not necessarily have a separation of parties and often have more than two contending sides, interpositioning is not always even remotely possible. Interpositioners may do other peacekeeping activity while occupying the space between parties. WfP is the only team studied which has attempted large-scale interposition.

In 1983, after the Grenada invasion, Witness for Peace was founded by Christian activists in the U.S. to send teams of volunteers to Nicaragua to deter attacks on the Nicaraguan people by U.S.-sponsored Contras. In the event of an invasion, they committed themselves to "assemble as many North American Christians as we can to join us and go immediately to Nicaragua to stand unarmed as a loving barrier in the path of any attempted invasion, sharing the danger posed to the Nicaraguan people." Volunteers lived in villages along the northern border until their strategy had to be changed because fighting occurred more randomly across the Nicaraguan countryside rather than having a clear border between parties. WfP volunteer Doug Spence says of their interposition: "We perceived ourselves as a presence that would make the U.S.

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20http://www.sipaz.org/index.htm
21Hämmerle, Pete, interview with Christine Schweitzer.
22Müller/Büttner 1998
government think twice before attacking. If it didn’t stop them, they would at least have
to take responsibility for whatever happened.”

Interpositioning may at times refer to smaller groups of people.

In 1986, as Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM) women held a demonstration at Guatemala’s
National Palace, the riot police began to beat the demonstrators. PBI quickly formed a
human chain between the two groups. This act, effective as it was and non-partisan as
we know interposition to be, was politically powerful enough to result in the threat of
expulsion of PBI. PBI called for international support and published a public statement
clarifying its nonparticipatory role.

The most single-minded effort at interpositionary peacekeeping was known as the Gulf
Peace Team. The idea was to send a team to the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia
as part of the struggle to prevent war in the Persian Gulf in 1991. Established well in
advance of the UN Security Council deadline, there were 73 people from 15 different
countries in the camp at the onset of war; ten days later they were evacuated and taken
to Baghdad.

The fact that this interposition effort happened at all has nonviolent historical
significance. And because it has significance, the problems incurred in the project merit
evaluation. One of those problems had to do with non-partisanship, which is essential to
this kind of interpositioning. The group sought permission for their camp from both sides
of the border, but got no response from Saudi Arabia and therefore established camp
only on the Iraqi side. In addition, they depended on Iraqi tankers to supply water. The
Gulf Peace Team Constitution stated, “We as a team do not take sides in this dispute
and we distance ourselves from all the parties involved, none of whom we consider
blameless.” But without a response from the Saudi Arabian government, with a camp
only in Iraq and relying on Iraq for water, GPT’s non-partisanship was compromised.

Accompaniment of persons who are at risk is the physical counterpart of international
advocacy. In order to deter or report violence, one must be physically there, in the right
place at the right time. “In most instances death squads and other human rights violators
do not want their actions exposed to the outside world. Thus the physical presence of
a… volunteer, backed by an emergency response network, deters violence directed
against local activists.”

Peace Brigades researchers and team veterans Liam Mahony and Enrique Eguren say
that accompaniers need “to be as obvious and visible as possible to the outside world,
and yet as unobtrusive as possible in the lives and activities of those being
accompanied.” This accompaniment of activists, refugees and communities threatened
with violence requires 24-hour a day presence, while the individual accommodator might
be reading a book during a meeting, travelling with individuals or community, or being

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29http://www.peacebrigades.org
present at a demonstration.\textsuperscript{31} Canadian volunteer, Sel Burroughs, puts it this way: "Escorting is difficult. It involves being ready to move at someone else’s schedule, hours of waiting and intermittent exclusion and inclusion in the lives of the person you are responsible for."\textsuperscript{32}

PBI has done by far the most accompaniment work in the past two decades and has additionally analysed what does and does not make it effective. Their mission statement avows specifically: "The aim of PBI’s international presence is to accompany both political and social processes through a joint strategy of deterring violence and promoting active nonviolence... PBI, where possible, initiates contacts with all the parties to a conflict in order to establish and inform of our presence."\textsuperscript{33}

The formulation of effective accompaniment work took place in the 80’s, as PBI experimented with tools for keeping civilian activists safe from military dictatorship and guerrilla resistance in Guatemala. As they began accompanying women of the Committee of Mothers of the Disappeared and Assassinated (COMADRES) and the Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM), they opened the PBI house for meetings and participated in the organising and strategy-planning of these organisations. It was later that PBI developed principles of non-involvement and non-partisanship as central to safe accompaniment practice. In Guatemala, El Salvador, Sri Lanka and Colombia, PBI teams have accompanied clergy, union leaders, campesino leaders, human rights activists and returning exiles. To increase effectiveness, PBI forges links with the diplomatic community locally and with media and human rights networks globally.\textsuperscript{34}

PBI’s accompaniment takes these forms: escorting an individual 24 hours a day, being present at the office of a threatened organisation, accompanying refugees returning to their home communities, serving as international observers at elections and demonstrations.\textsuperscript{35} They will not accompany anyone who is armed and they will not participate in the work of that activist or group no matter how needed or worthy. Because of this, they are able to claim that their accompaniment is non-partisan, even if they are protecting only parties who have a particular position in the conflict.

**Presence** is akin to accompaniment but expanded to an entire community. It is appropriate when violence is one-sided and/or parties are impossible to separate and it seeks to reduce the risk of violence rather than to protect the social change work of any particular individual or group.\textsuperscript{36} All teams studied could be said to provide presence in the communities where they work.

Presence might include the following activities:\textsuperscript{37}

a) patrol or occupy certain areas to prevent their falling into the hands of one party or the other in violation of law or stipulation

b) patrol a demarcation line

\textsuperscript{31}Schirch 1995: 103.
\textsuperscript{32}Mahony/Eguren 1997: 50.
\textsuperscript{33}Peace Brigades International Annual Review 2000.
\textsuperscript{34}http://www.peacebrigades.org
\textsuperscript{35}http://www.peacebrigades.org
\textsuperscript{36}Schirch 1995: 29.
\textsuperscript{37}Schirch integrates these five tactics from Walker 1981: 19
c) maintain a demarcation line free of violations and incidents

d) maintain open access to certain areas or routes

e) deny access to certain areas buildings or facilities.

Presence assumes that teams or team members may be spread out among the villages that need protection when it is not possible to interposition between conflicting sides, and that thus spread out they will still be a deterrent to violence. It does not rely on any particular activity but on certainty that one’s presence is known.

In fact, team members may be doing the unexpected. Asking one’s hostess, “Show me how to make a tortilla” and allowing one’s ineptness to be a source of amusement is, according to Phyllis Taylor, a day well spent being present. Other activities of WfP in Nicaragua included observing and listening to stories (particularly of victims), sending health delegations, writing materials to educate people in the U.S. “The nonviolent presence came to include symbolic marches and vigils, accompaniment of individuals and communities in danger, fasting, work projects, peace flotillas, and a host of other actions.” Short and long-term WfP delegations and teams lived and worked with the Nicaraguan people, met with religious, political and media leaders, stood with the grieving, documented atrocities, recorded stories, harvested coffee and perhaps most importantly did all they could to fulfil their goal of changing U.S. policy.

The Cry For Justice coalition in Haiti (1993 and 1994) provided the presence of foreigners where human rights abuses were most severe. Volunteers walked the streets of St. Helene getting to know people and writing reports for churches and the Haitian solidarity movement. Objectives of the project were to diminish violence; educate people in the U.S.; show solidarity and offer hope to Haitian activists; pressure and embarrass the UN, OAS, and the diplomatic community into taking stronger actions against de facto military government.

Kathleen Kern describes what CPT members did during a typical day of being a presence in Haiti:

We began every morning with devotions and a meeting, then separated to go visiting throughout the community of St. Helene. We accumulated a great deal of information about military and paramilitary activity in this way and would make a point of visiting the areas in which this activity occurred. When told about human rights abuses, we wrote reports and sent them to contacts in Port-au-Prince, who in turn disseminated them to various human rights agencies. Afternoons were spent on language study and naps. Rounds were made again in early evening. Meetings with the Democratic underground or friends in hiding took place at night.

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38 Taylor, Phyllis, 4/01 interview with author.
41 CFJ was a nine-member coalition initiated by Pax Christi in 1992.
43 The CFJ Coalition existed for three months; CPT was in Haiti for four years.
And the daily presence for CPT in Hebron, according to Ms. Kern, goes like this:

Morning devotions in the park in front of the mosque. Pick up trash, fix broken benches in park, or play with children. Separate and visit people - some journalist friends to pick up news, some friends or families near settlements. Twice a week, two members taught English classes to Palestinian highschool students, which became discussions on the theory and practice of nonviolence. Afternoon: writing, visiting in late afternoon and early evening, write more in the evening. Saturday: Afternoon and early evening on Dubboya Street (scene of many violent encounters between settlers and Palestinian residents and shopkeepers) to serve as violence deterring presence.  

SIPAZ has been placing teams in Chiapas, Mexico, since 1995 to "forestall or reduce violence and to protect and expand the precious political space in which dialogue [between the Zapatistas and the Mexican government] is possible." SIPAZ makes persistent efforts to maintain communication with all the key actors in the conflict and seeks to deter human rights violations and promote tolerance and dialogue while monitoring the conflict. 

**Observing/documenting/monitoring** activities have potential for both reporting and deterrence. Team members can put into effect a string of consequences for an abuser of human rights by channelling information to the outside through emergency response networks with people ready to send messages to protest the violation. But the more immediate goal of observing is deterrence.

The teams studied all use the tactics of observation, documentation and monitoring. However, Witness for Peace is very distinct from the others by documenting and reporting only those policies and practices of the US government or US government-funded multilateral institutions insofar as these policies and practices lead to rights violations.

A camera and notebook are the main human rights observation tools. CPT team members in Hebron report the effectiveness of making notes at an army check-point while telling the soldier that they are sure U.S. Congressmen will be interested in what they are doing while using money from their country. And PBI team members posit that the act of taking a picture is perhaps more important than the picture itself. Upon seeing the camera, police or military become conscious of themselves. It is a distraction from their potential brutality and requires taking time to turn attention to the volunteer, make an arrest, seize the camera, or expose film. Meanwhile, they saved face and tension abated.

Observation and reporting are an integral part of almost every other tactic or activity. Nonviolent peace team members who are interpositioning, accompanying or being a presence are at best utilising their ability to observe, document and report the violence

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46http://www.sipaz.org/index.htm
47“SIPAZ, Five Years of Peacebuilding in Chiapas” brochure.
48Bennett, Steven, 6/01 interview with author.
49Evans, Claire, 4/01 interview with author.
50Mahony/Eguren 1997: 245.
and other human rights abuse they observe. Thus while being a presence in Nicaraguan villages, Witness for Peace volunteers interviewed survivors of Contra attacks to document the stories and report them in the U.S. to advocate for Nicaraguans, educate U.S. citizens, and lobby Congress to stop funding the Contras.\(^{51}\)

"Armed only with a camera, PBI volunteers are a walking embodiment of the pressure the international human rights community is ready to apply in the event of abuse. As potential perpetrators know, our exposure of such abuse may adversely affect a regime's foreign aid allocation."\(^{52}\) The Balkan Peace Team in Croatia undertook considerable monitoring in the mid to late 1990's: the return of the Serb population, the trial of Mr. Mirko Graorac, accused of war crimes, in the Split County (Zupanijski) Court, rental violations, etc.\(^{53}\) Observation and reporting is undertaken by WfP specifically to document the results of U.S. and corporate injustice. They use collected evidence to change U.S. policies of economic violence.

**Advocacy with the International Community** involves alerting those in other places to the conflict violence, injustice and human rights abuse and is nearly inseparable from the other tactics of peace teams. Civilian peacekeepers are often very deliberate and energetic in seeking media attention in order to draw world attention to the conflict. The attention in and of itself has potential to decrease violence if parties in the conflict are concerned about their international image. Secondarily, well-directed advocacy engages those who can apply political pressure that increases safety and causes positive change in the nature of the conflict itself. The five teams studied all undertake advocacy, but again a distinction must be made about Witness for Peace, which advocates for change only in the U.S. and with multi-national corporations.

PBI has built and utilised an exemplary rapid-response network to mobilise international concern and pressure in response to emergencies. What began as a safety feature for both themselves and the Central American citizens they accompanied was developed over the years into a telephone tree of thousands of people around the world. Within a few hours, the PBI network had the capability to generate hundreds of phone calls and faxes protesting imminent or occurring danger. (And that was before electronic communication!)

Initially, the target of these messages would be the Guatemalan government or military. Later it was sometimes members of congress or parliament in the callers’ own countries, urging these politicians to put pressure on Guatemala. The goal was to multiply the protective power of the accompaniment while giving thousands of citizens around the world a way to learn about Guatemala and take effective action.\(^{54}\)

In November of 1989, at least 60 foreign citizens were officially detained in El Salvador. The group included five PBI volunteers. Canadian team member Karen Ridd asked to make a telephone call and was able to reach the Canadian honorary consul and through them a U.S. PBI volunteer who activated the PBI international emergency response network before the captives could even be led away from the scene. Karen and Marcela

\(^{51}\)Schirch 1995:104.

\(^{52}\)http://www.peacebrigades.org

\(^{53}\)http://www.BalkanPeaceTeam.org

\(^{54}\)Mahony/Eguren 1997: 54.
Rodriguez (PBI Colombia) were mildly tortured, Karen was released but went back in to accompany Marcela, and both were released that same night and handed over to Canadian embassy officials.\textsuperscript{55}

CPT uses their 2000-subscriber Urgent Response Network sparingly, in order not to decrease its effectiveness as a crisis intervention tool. Subscribers should feel compelled to take what measures they can upon receipt of the information.\textsuperscript{56} BPT had a written policy on appropriate reasons to use their alert network:

1. Physical attacks on citizens or nonviolent activists in the country
2. Arrest/disappearance of citizens or nonviolent activists
3. Direct threats to citizens or nonviolent activists
4. A threatening public atmosphere short of direct threats
5. Other human rights violations announced
6. Other human rights violations occur
7. Physical attack on team members
8. Arrest/disappearance of team members
9. Direct threats to the team
10. Threatening public atmosphere concerning the team.\textsuperscript{57}

The sending of delegations has been a successful activity of both WfP and CPT. "CPT attempts to send several, short term delegations each year to project areas. These delegations are an important short-term encouragement to local people who are often overworked or face a crisis. In Haiti, the Middle East and Mexico, these delegations have led to long-term projects. Short-term delegations can sometimes engage in important dialogue or provide nonviolent witness, which might be difficult or impossible for a long-term team to do. Finally, delegates provide important advice for ongoing program activities because of the fresh eyes and ears that participants bring to the situation. When they tell their stories back home they augment the voices for justice."\textsuperscript{58}

Particularly for WfP, with its emphasis on giving witness in the U.S. against harmful U.S. policy, the sending of delegations is a high priority. Long term team members host the delegations, which are usually from 10 to 20 people who stay for two or three weeks. Since 1983, WfP has sent over 7,000 U.S. citizens to Central America, Cuba, Mexico, Haiti, and Colombia.\textsuperscript{59}

Activism might be chosen as a tactic of either peacekeeping or peacemaking by peace team members who feel the strongest, most personal, and most immediate statement must be made. Nonviolent direct action can be used by intervenors to raise awareness of a particular manifestation of the destructiveness of a conflict. There is no doubt from the history of nonviolence that it may exponentially increase the bargaining power of the

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid: 174ff.
\textsuperscript{56}Evans, Claire, 4/01 interview with author.
\textsuperscript{57}Schirch 1995: 90. The BPT policy continues with recommendations of actions to be taken and criteria for decision. It can be found in its entirety in section 2.2.2.4.
\textsuperscript{58}http://www.prairienet.org/cpt
\textsuperscript{59}http://www.witnessforpeace.org
oppressed party. The question here, is whether that direct activism can be undertaken by a third party intervenor.

Of the teams studied, CPT is the only one that embraces nonviolent direct action, including civil disobedience, as a tactic in the field. Their mandate includes the statement, "We believe a renewed commitment to the gospel of peace calls us to new forms of public witness which may include nonviolent direct action." They see it as essential to their civilian conflict interventions and faith based stance with the oppressed. Additionally, they provide training in nonviolent direct action as a means to address conflict.

In 1995, CPT team members used sledgehammers on a locked gate at Hebron University because it was an unjust barrier to students from Hebron. Three team members and one member of the Hebron Solidarity Committee were arrested and spent the night in jail before having bond posted by an Israeli friend. In March of this year, team members Rick Polhamus and Pierre Shantz were arrested while attempting to clear the entrance to the town of Rantis, which had been blocked by the military with debris. In early April, Shantz climbed to the roof of a Palestinian home just as the Israeli military approached with a bulldozer to demolish it. He was kicked, slapped and pushed down the stairs. Also in April, Greg Rollins and Bob Holmes attempted another clearing of a road and sat down when the soldiers arrived; they were then dragged away. In these three cases, the individuals were released later without charges.

CPT believes climbing to the roof of a house is effective. "I don’t think many had heard about home demolitions on the West Bank until we went there," says Claire Evans.

Direct action may compromise legal status inside a country and will most likely violate a principle of impartiality. (Direct action undertaken by peace teams is often described as partisan third-party intervention. PBI "will not plan, participate actively in, or carry out direct actions." Non-partisanship, a cornerstone of PBI work, is not something they will compromise. But PBI has a second reason for ruling out all direct action: they believe foreigners should not intervene in internal politics.

WfP members are certainly not shy of direct action, but they keep it in the U.S., where they wish to make a passionate plea for change.

**Peacemaking**

For the purposes of this paper, peacemaking is defined as bringing together groups or individuals to dialogue about possible resolution of conflict. This can occur at the diplomatic level or between ordinary citizens who are caught up in conflict. This calls for "mediation between the conflict parties through forms of dialogue: e.g. house to house visits, appeals, assemblies, delegations, fact finding, negotiation, creation of publicity

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60 Christian Peacemaker Teams Mandate.
63 Evans, Claire, 4/01 interview with author.
64 Schirch 1995: 36.
between the parties and to the outside." Robert J. Burrowes calls it nonviolent reconciliation and development. The intention is to facilitate conflict resolution, community reconciliation and/or community development by participating in projects that encourage conflicting parties to work together to achieve shared aims in defiance of the legal, political, economic and/or military constraints imposed by elites.

CPT has tried to combine mediation and reconciliation efforts with intercessionary peacekeeping. Some, however, insist that the same organisation cannot do both reconciliation and peacekeeping work.

BPT also was involved in both actively facilitating bringing parties together and being present in a conflict region. Their roles included: a) seeking to identify possibilities for dialogue between different groups, b) serving as channel of independent and non-partisan information from regions, c) contributing through contacts and networking to promote communication, d) dialogue and mutual understanding between different ethnic or peace groups and Croatian people and international community, and e) contributing team-members’ skills for benefit of all citizens (workshops in mediation, language classes, etc).

A June 1999 report from BPT team members in the field reads, "In a recent exploratory trip to the region, the BPT-Yugoslavia team heard from some of the people they met that reconciliation between Serbs and Albanians will now be impossible. From many others, however, they heard that future dialogue and communication is not only possible, but absolutely essential. BPT was given strong encouragement to continue filling our unique role as networkers at the grassroots level, visiting and communicating with NGOs in both communities."

Sandra van den Bosse says that her objectives on the Balkan Peace Team were to support the people that were interested in a nonviolent solution to the Serb-Albanian conflict by helping to strengthen their organisations and to encourage dialogue with the other side.

Though SIPAZ uses the word peacebuilding to describe its work, most of their activity falls under the definition of peacemaking used in this paper. They have coalition members who are experienced in international non-governmental conflict resolution. "SIPAZ seeks to play a facilitative role, enhancing the context in which Mexicans are working to solve largely Mexican problems." It encourages the international community to examine its relationship with Mexico and its role in creating greater political, economic and social justice.

As a faith-based organisation, they have put considerable effort into ecumenical reconciliation - reducing tension between evangelicals and Catholics. They offer peacebuilding workshops to strengthen local peacebuilding capacities for participants who are NGO, community and church workers.

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69 Ibid.
71 http://www.BalkanPeaceTeam.org
72 van den Bosse, Sandra, 4/01 interview with author.
73 SIPAZ, Five years of Peacebuilding in Chiapas."
Their list of activities in Mexico and in international witness between November 2000 and January 2001 shows a balance of peacemaking and peacebuilding:

**Contacts and Visits:**
- Participation in gathering of base communities in the northern region of Chiapas on the theme of community reconciliation.
- Meetings with a variety of political and religious contacts in the northern region to discuss the implications of the new state and federal governments.
- Meetings with several North American delegations to brief them on the political situation in Chiapas and the work of SIPAZ.
- Organisation of a visit to rural areas in Chiapas for the Under-secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of Great Britain.

**Information:**
- Continuation of the tour by a SIPAZ team member in Germany, Belgium and Switzerland, with ... speaking tour in Europe.
- Publication of article on indigenous women in conflict area.
- Publication of two articles in Dutch periodicals.
- Meetings with three international academics studying role of SIPAZ & other NGO in Chiapas.

**Inter-religious**
- Meetings w/ church contacts
- Participation in strategic planning
- Initiate series of meetings

**Education**
- Facilitation of workshops on Conflict Transformation
- Convene reflection process on processes of community reconciliation

Most of WfP’s work falls directly under the strategy of peacemaking. One of the organisation’s greatest successes, according to Executive Director Steven Bennett, was participating in the process that ultimately resulted in the re-integration of CPRs into Guatemalan society. We played an accompanying and facilitating role in this process, our presence providing a sense of security for the CPR population feeling directly threatened. The same went for the Guatemalan refugees in exile in Mexico. WfP’s lobby against the oppression of the U.S. and multi-national corporations is peacemaking as well. They act as channels of information from the victims to the policy-makers and from U.S. citizens who care back to the people who suffer.

**Peacebuilding**

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75 Communities of Population in Resistance.
76 Bennett, Steven, 6/01 interview with author.
Peacebuilding involves the work of relief and development. Lisa Schirch describes it as "social, political, and economic development projects to address structural violence and prevent destructive conflicts from occurring or recurring."77

The Balkan Peace Team made peacebuilding a major part of its work in Croatia and Kosovo/a. "Facilitating peacebuilding is a process requiring a long-term commitment and a respect for the time that traumatised people need for healing. This is especially apparent in the war-torn society of Kosovo/a, where the memories of repression are still vivid, the wounds of recent atrocities still festering, and inter-ethnic violence still rampant... the BPT team in Kosovo/a hopes to continue to listen to and work with all communities in the region. In this way, they seek to contribute meaningfully and responsibly to the construction of peace and tolerance - so that no one will be made to feel that their home is no longer a place where they belong."78

After the return of Albanian refugees into Kosovo/a, BPT staff together with local Albanian activists elicited and recorded stories of Albanians receiving unexpected assistance from Serbian people during their recent trauma. "The goal of such a project is to counter what some local activists fear is becoming the homogenisation of the war experience." 79 BPT members helped to establish a youth centre in the remote community of Dragash where both Albanian and Slavic Muslim youth could have access to locally identified services such as computer training and English language lessons. 80

BPT-Yugoslavia, working in Serbia and Kosovo/a since 1994, described its primary focus there as building bridges between Serbs and Albanians. The team's daily work was predominately networking: visiting regularly with local NGOs; learning about their situations and needs; offering information on international resources. A highlight was a dialogue and discussion, which BPT helped to bring about in 1998 between Serbian and Albanian university students. Another example was BPT's work with a Serbian peace group who asked for help in building links with like-minded Albanians.81

The Osijek Peace Teams82 pursue an impressive list of peacebuilding activities, all of which became possible after the war in Croatia. Their explicit peacebuilding goal is the "slow reduction of prejudices." They offer counselling through psychosocial workshops for children, women and war veterans, and education in the form of computer and language courses and seminars on democracy, election monitoring, de-mining, etc. They facilitate communication between people, communities and ethnic groups, specifically interreligious dialogue through ecumenical services attended by Catholics, Orthodox and Adventists with clerics from all denominations. They assist with the founding of associations, encouraging multi-ethnicity (e.g. the creation of youth clubs and a hiking association and the organisation of concerts and readings). They support and monitor the re-integration of returnees or disadvantaged groups, accompany citizens to the authorities and offering legal counselling. The Peace teams even pitch in

77 Schirch 1995: 23.
80 Sautter, Robert, spring qtly report 2000 www.BalkanPeaceTeam.org
82 ÖFD article in Friedensdienste, 1998/99 and Schweitzer interview with Pete Hämmerle.
on rehabilitation projects, notably the repair of libraries and sports centres and ecological co-operation on an idea for a peace park involving Croatia, Hungary and Yugoslavia.

**Training in nonviolence** is offered by all teams studied as some form of peace education in the field, except for WfP, whose teams offer educational events only for the WfP delegations they host.

CPT includes training others in nonviolent direct action and seeks to provide a nonviolent perspective to media, interested groups, congregations, or organisations through speaking and writing. PBI offers education and training in nonviolence and human rights, and nurtures indigenous versions of nonviolence.\(^{83}\) In Haiti, PBI worked alongside local conflict resolution trainers to organise workshops about nonviolent methods of resolving conflicts. In Guatemala and El Salvador, they offered a broad range of workshops on conflict resolution, negotiation methods, group process and political analysis, as well as on specialised topics such as "community responses to fear and torture." Paolo Frere's techniques and methods became a regular feature of the teams' work. BPT staff offered workshops and training in nonviolence, conflict in Kosovo/a, stereotyping, gender, etc. Skills of the team members determined what was offered.\(^{84}\)

**Humanitarian Assistance** as a form of peacebuilding is not offered by any of the team-sending organisations studied except Witness for Peace. It is not a priority for the organisation, but they occasionally make it part of their work.\(^{85}\) Christian Peacemaker Teams have a policy against giving monetary or material aid, which includes the following statement: "CPT's ability to work effectively within its mandate in local settings depends on developing healthy, honest relationships that are not based on gifts or financial assistance." Team members have reported finding this challenging when living in places of deep poverty.\(^{87}\) PBI also stresses that they are not a development organisation, believing that "communities need space and freedom to carry out their own development in ways that create self-empowerment rather than dependency. When we become aware of a development opportunity we try to pass it along to an organisation set up specifically for that work."\(^{88}\)

In the beginning, people expected humanitarian aid from Osijek Peace Teams: "We sent them home with empty hands."\(^{89}\) The Osijek project does, however, direct aid to the region and people where it is needed. SIPAZ similarly assists by accompanying INGO caravans of humanitarian aid.

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84 van den Bosse, Sandra, 4/01 interview with author.
85 Bennett, Steven, 6/01 interview with author.
86 CPT Guidelines Regarding the Giving of Financial or Material Assistance, 11/11/98.
87 The provision of humanitarian assistance can also be an act of intervention in and of itself. Note Pastors for Peace violation of the U.S. trade embargo of Cuba to deliver donations. The trips are high visibility civil disobedience, peacebuilding, international advocacy and humanitarian aid. (Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber, p103). Voices in the Wilderness offers citizen intervention in U.S. hostility toward Iraq in a similar way. Volunteers travel to Iraq in violation of U.S. foreign policy, usually delivering humanitarian aid forbidden under sanctions.
88 http://www.peacebrigades.org
89 Quote from an organiser of the teams.
Visibility in the field

All teams find visibility desirable in the field, but to a greater or lesser extent depending on the activity undertaken and the security factors.

PBI found it necessary to go for the highest visibility when the situation in Guatemala was treacherous for both them and those to whom they offered protective accompaniment. After three volunteers were knifed in Guatemala City, PBI published an ad defending its work in every major Guatemalan newspaper. It was signed by dozens of members of the U.S. Congress, members of parliaments from Canada and Europe, international church leaders, and other well-known international figures. Simultaneous ads were placed by Guatemalan organisations condemning the attack on the volunteers. After the team moved into a more secure house, they held another reception for the diplomatic and press corps. U.S. military aid to Guatemala had been directly threatened because of attacks on U.S. citizens. PBI frequented government offices, and ambassadors visited the team house. The violent attacks stopped.

CPT volunteers wear red armbands for visibility while monitoring checkpoints. They actively seek media attention by learning the names of local journalists and cultivating relationships. They write press releases and do high profile public actions. Learning how to talk to media is part of the training for new team members. In addition, their e-mail outreach goes to around 2,000 households and their newsletter to 7,000. And of course public protest and direct action exercised by team members is meant to achieve the highest visibility.

WFp was the first international group to hold public witness in front of the U.S. embassy in Colombia, which resulted in headline news there. "We seek this kind of news... We want Colombians to know that not all people in the US support US funding for Plan Colombia," explains Director Bennett. WFp team members continue the witness in front of the embassy every Friday now, seeking visibility in asking forgiveness from Colombian people.

Additionally, WFp’s mission requires a great deal of visibility back in the U.S. A commissioning service was held in 1983 for the first short-term delegates going to Nicaragua. They held it in Washington, DC, with Vincent Harding as speaker, all as visible as possible. Carefully cultivating a profile of "ordinary people" taking "extraordinary risk," the press release stated: "The aim of the witness is to provide...a protective shield between the Nicaraguan people and the U.S.-sponsored Contras... The group hopes that the constant presence of North American church people in the war zone will hamper the operations of the Contras." The event and its advocacy were widely successful and "drew media like flies to honey."

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90Mahony/Eguren 1997: 111.
91Evans, Claire, 4/01 interview with author.
92Bennett, Steven, 6/01 interview with author.
2.2.2.4 Outcomes and impact

Actually, I think things are just a mixed bag.95 How does one measure outcomes of nonviolent work? All who expend their effort to reduce violence struggle with this question. Did we succeed?

"A farmer couldn’t harvest his wheat [because of Israeli harassment]; so we went and worked in the fields with him. He was able to work with us there, but the harvest was burned later and we couldn’t save it. Did we help?... Sadly, the houses in Hebron have been destroyed again. What did we accomplish?"96 These questions are asked by the CPT team in Hebron. Outcomes are illusive.

Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping does little to create lasting peace. Its function is simply to stop the violence and open out the possibility of peacemaking. Presumably it will be possible to measure the outcome of large-scale nonviolent peacekeeping when it occurs, but it has not.

Interposition

The encampment of the Gulf Peace Team symbolised the idea that a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis was possible. Was its outcome merely symbolic, or did it actually have potential for real intervention? Was the aim of the camp simple physical interposition or was it political, designed to help build a global consensus against war? The Gulf Peace Camp did manage, for the first time, to place a sizeable group of peace campaigners between belligerents in a time of war—a peace camp was in place on the border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia when the hostilities of Operation Desert Storm commenced.97

Müller and Büttner’s analysis of the Gulf Peace Camp outcome is that "the willingness showed [sic] by the top-level to escalate the conflict does not face a serious challenge. For this there is a lack of numbers and too little visible neutrality. Because only one camp can be set up in Iraq it is not difficult for war propaganda to doubt the neutrality and moral legitimacy. Whether a larger number of people would actually be able to achieve a de-escalating effect remains an unanswered question." 98

Accompaniment

Without international accompaniment, the people are like worms the army can just step on...”
- Guatemalan refugee in Mexico awaiting return to the Peten.99

95Evans, Claire, interview with author.
96Evans, interview with author.
Cry for Justice accompaniment did, in fact, result in the release of a man abducted by FRAPH (Front for Advancement of Haiti, paramilitary) through the influence of a prominent local pastor. "It is one of the only instances in our case studies of an accompaniment intervention freeing someone from a paramilitary abduction" and illustrates the potential of accompaniment as moral-political persuasion rather than as direct deterrence.\(^{100}\)

In some cases, the life-saving outcome of accompaniment is beyond question, like the intervention of two accompaniers in what would have been the abduction in 1997 of Mario Calixto, President of the Sabana de Torres Human Rights Committee in Colombia. As two armed men pointed a gun at Mr. Calixto’s head, the accompaniers stepped between and defused the situation; the gunmen left without doing harm.\(^{101}\)

According to Bradman Weerakoon, Presidential Assistant in Sri Lanka, the "government certainly paid attention to accompaniment... a local policeman or soldier would also pay attention, even if he had no grasp of international politics. This local official is most concerned about what his superiors might hear about his behaviour, and he naturally assumes that a foreigner has some power--or he wouldn’t be there. The presence will make him cautious." Weerakoon suggested a moral angle as well: "These men who commit these acts, they know they are doing a bad thing, and they would prefer to do it in secret."\(^{102}\)

Müller and Büttner rate the PBI Guatemala project as demonstrating "sustainable control of violence in civil society where PBI is active."\(^{103}\)

"In numerous cases PBI are able to protect persons from the grassroots and middle levels and organisations of civil society from the threat or use of violence. This is done through presence and escorting, by establishing relations to all sides, through an offer of dialogue to the government and through informing the international community about the oppression and violence in the country.... The international alert network mobilises in critical situations international publicity, which has de facto the power of sanctions at the top-level in Guatemala. The control of violence is supported in this case through the ability to sanction exercised by the intervening groups contacts."\(^{104}\)

One hoped-for outcome of accompaniment is the enabling of local activists to overcome fear. This requires solidarity with others in their organisations, but the very act of forming such organisations may be dangerous. Without them, fear must be confronted alone, but once they exist, they are inevitably delegitimised and demonised by the state, which further inhibits participation. "Accompaniment can lower the fear threshold, enabling people to overcome the early hurdles of democratic political activity, thereby promoting the growth of the group."\(^{105}\)

Accompaniment expands the space of political action available to activists.

\(^{100}\)Mahony/Eguren 1997: 222.
\(^{101}\)PBI brochure "1981 - 2001: 20 years of promoting nonviolence and protecting human rights."
\(^{102}\)Mahony/Eguren 1997: 200, 201.
\(^{103}\)Müller/Büttner 1998: 48, Table 10.
\(^{104}\)Müller/Büttner 1998: 35.
\(^{105}\)Ibid.
"If the activists can carry out significant political activities that they otherwise would have avoided, then that accompaniment has contributed to the strength and growth of a nonviolent civil society." Or as Randy Kohan of Project Accompaniment put it: "The greatest impact made by international accompaniment is our contribution to the breathing space we provide Guatemalans who struggle to bring about justice in their own country."

**Presence**

CPT Corps member Claire Evans offers both evidence and questions about the project in Beit Jala. "A team of two was in place in early December 2000 to respond to Israeli shelling of a Palestinian neighbourhood in Beit Jala (near Bethlehem). Shelling was occurring almost nightly. Our team got some press, some of it focusing on the team member who is a 70 year old Roman Catholic nun, and also kept U.S. and Canadian embassies aware of our presence. By mid-January the shelling had discontinued. Was our team’s presence a factor?"

"To quote from the concluding project report: ‘In conclusion, the question becomes did we help to stop the bombing. It seems that we will never know exactly how successful we were in actually stopping or reducing attacks. Certainly, our press work was a P.R. headache for the army. It doesn’t look good for them to bomb nuns during the Christmas season. But, the bombings in this neighbourhood increased briefly right after the first media accounts of our presence appeared. Was that the army trying to convince us to leave?’"

"Another question is whether we emboldened Palestinian gunmen to shoot from this neighbourhood, thinking that our presence would protect them? On one occasion after a story about us appeared, the gunfire came from right next to our house. On both of these questions our local contacts give mixed opinions."

"However, the bombing has stopped (in Beit Jala, at least [as of the Jan 17, 2001 writing]). Were we directly related to the halt? The most realistic answer is that we were one factor among several. But we certainly were a factor."

This story is clear about one thing: the value of visibility through media work in a conflict area. Being there has little impact if people don’t know the team is there and feel concern about how their behaviour will look if it gets in print. It is not clear whether their presence caused: a) the cessation of firing by mid-January, b) the brief increase of shelling in their neighbourhood following media coverage, or c) the firing by Palestinian gunmen from the neighbourhood. The outcome seems only definable as a moral victory and the experiential certainty that CPT presence was "one factor among several" which ended the bombing.

Some participants thought the outcome of WfP presence in Nicaragua was symbolic only. "Some of them came with the idea that their presence alone would be enough to stop the war," mused soldier Francisco Machado, "but they quickly learned." Sixto Ulloa, a member of WfP’s Nicaraguan partner organisation, believed, "Witness for Peace...

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106 Ibid: 94.
108 CPT also tried to make sure the Israeli commanders knew of their presence.
109 Evans, interview with author.
made the counterrevolution move away [from Jalapa]," and by visiting the resettlement communities, Witness extended a certain amount of protection to those areas as well. On the chance that visitors from the United States might be in the community, he believes, the Contras had to avoid attacking.\footnote{Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber 2000: 294.}

Displaced villagers in the highlands of Chiapas believe so strongly that an international presence is protective that they told CPT members, "The Actual Massacre would not have happened if you had been here."\footnote{Evans, 4/01 interview with author.}

**Emergency response network and international pressure**

The effectiveness of accompaniment and presence is reliant on the use of a well-developed emergency response network and applied international pressure. PBI has developed this tactic extensively and uses it with demonstrable outcome. Two examples follow.

"With each arrest of a volunteer, PBI activated its international emergency response network, and in several cases, evidence shows that this external pressure helped bring about the release not only of the PBI volunteer but sometimes also of the Salvadorans arrested with them."\footnote{Mahony/Eguren 1997: 180.}

After avoiding an ambush set for them, a PBI team embarked immediately on a series of interviews with embassies and government officials. PBI chapters around the world called their own governments and their embassies in Colombia. Representatives of three European embassies came and met with regional civilian and military authorities in support for PBI’s work. Clearly there was a political consequence for any attack on PBI. This incident increased PBI’s safety as well as their locally perceived clout.\footnote{Mahony/Eguren 1997: 229.}

**Observation**

Observation and monitoring of human rights is known to be an effective deterrent tactic, though only by anecdote. It seems conclusive, however, to the volunteer who speaks to the soldier at a checkpoint about reporting what is going on and the behaviour subsequently stops. Actual documentation and reporting, as is carried out by Amnesty International, has a quantifiable effect. But again, these activities can only be as effective as the international response network through which the information must be funnelled.

This work sometimes involves risk. CPT and PBI have many stories of seized cameras and exposed film, and in one case, the arrest of volunteers who tried to keep the cameras. PBI wonders if the taking of flash photographs might have endangered the civilians who demonstrated at the Lunifil factory in Guatemala.\footnote{Mahony/Eguren 1997: 245.} As has been said of accompaniment, the risks do not negate but rather prove that the activity is effective.
Peacebuilding and combined strategy
The Müller and Büttner study rates BPT’s combined strategies as having had considerable effect on top leaders as dialogue partners and on middle and grassroots leaders in civil society, and some effect on the control of violence in the segments of civil society where the team was active. "The team’s ability to network between different groups was apparent. Each group they visited was eager for information about the others, and trusted BPT as the source. One activist put it directly to them: "You are in a very unique position to do this because you have a history of working with both Serbs and Albanians at the grassroots."115 The BPT [International] project plays a strongly supportive role in civil society’s development of articulation and conflict resolution abilities (peacebuilding: empowerment through seminars and networking). Presence in situations of direct conflict protects against political repression. Reporting on an (inter)national level on violence and human rights abuses increases to a certain extent pressure on state authorities... During the military offensives the BPTI assumes the role of monitor, in individual cases also the protection of threatened persons..."116

Training and peace education
In addition to the formal training that peace teams offer, team members have ongoing opportunities to teach very personally, and perhaps very effectively, in their conversations with local people. There is a moving story about CPT presence in a Mexican Army civic action camp in Chiapas during Lent. They fasted, prayed, had conversations with the soldiers, and eventually converted a military helicopter landing pad into a giant peace symbol. On two separate occasions they later met individual young men who had been soldiers at that camp and were now civilians. Asking the men why they had stopped being soldiers, they received the same reply from both, "You told us to."117

2.2.2.5 Conditions for successful work in the field
Accompaniment
Mahony and Eguren provide a valuable examination of deterrence in general and of accompaniment as deterrence118 specifically in Unarmed Bodyguards. Here, I include their ideas of the necessary conditions for successful accompaniment.119

"Accompaniment cannot directly threaten very much. Its presence is more of a hint - a suggestion that consequences may occur." A series of conditions must be met:
1) The accompaniment and the activist have to communicate clearly to the aggressor what types of actions are unacceptable. If the message is complex or refers to

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117Evans, 4/01 interview with author.
118See Mahony/Eguren 1997 p. 85, for the distinction between general deterrence and immediate deterrence.
documents, the accompaniment must know that the aggressor understands the content of the documents. Subtleties must be articulated. "Deterrence cannot work if the aggressor does not know which actions will provoke a response."

2) Deterrence commitment must be articulated: the aggressor must know in advance that an activist is accompanied and that there will be consequences to an attack. The problem here is that those giving the order may know but not inform the death squad carrying it out.

3) The aggressor must believe that an organisation is capable of carrying out its resolution. The chain of communication from the accompaniment to the international community to governmental pressure must be clear and effective. In practice, each link is uncertain and results cannot be guaranteed.

4) The aggressor must seriously consider an attack and then decide not to carry it out because its perceived costs are higher than its benefits. Usually it is impossible to find evidence of this.

One additional condition is that the accompaniment must know who the aggressor is. Death threats are often anonymous or the identity of an attacker must be deduced from little evidence. International reaction, in this case, may be mistargeted. Or an accused government may claim it has no control over a specific aggressor, which is difficult to disprove. Deterrence is demonstrably effective only if the potential attacker knows who the accompaniment group is, what it will do and what the consequences of an attack will be. Deterrence strategy requires access to information - clear analysis of who the attacker is and what political pressures will influence him or her.\textsuperscript{120}

Some aggressors may not care about international pressure. There may even be a faction within the state apparatus, which politically opposes the ruling party and would attack human rights activists or international observers to discredit the seated government. [For example, PBI experienced that CERJ\textsuperscript{121} members out in isolated villages were facing local thugs who seemed impervious to pressure, and that Civil Patrols which patrols, who attacked unarmed GAM members in front of the press and blatantly threatened even police and government representatives, were unaffected by foreign presence.\textsuperscript{122}]

Deterrence fails when the aggressor decides that the attack is worth it, because other benefits outweigh the political costs. All that is left is to apply the threatened consequences as firmly as possible after the attack, in the hope of changing the calculation next time around.\textsuperscript{123}

Additionally, the activist must not need to be in hiding for any reason. "Semiclandestinity and accompaniment are both valid security strategies when used separately, but the combination is somewhat problematic. The mere presence of the foreigner makes hiding more difficult, and the protective function of the accompaniment is lost if the potential attacker is unaware of it."\textsuperscript{124}

\textsuperscript{120}Ibid: 225.
\textsuperscript{121}Council of Ethnic Communities "Runujél Junám."
\textsuperscript{122}Mahony/Eguren 1997: 64.
\textsuperscript{123}end Mahony/Eguren quote
\textsuperscript{124}Mahony/Eguren1997:162.
Accompaniment cannot be used without a strong Emergency Response Network and/or other means of informing and swaying the international community. The stronger the international interest in a particular region, country, organisation, or individual, the more likely it is that accompaniment can deter an attack.

It is a condition for all teams that the accompanied person is an activist and is unarmed. PBI has set conditions on themselves too: "PBI would not do political organising or form groups, would not initiate activities that Guatemalans themselves could initiate, would not attempt to cover the entire national territory, and would at all costs avoid any indiscretion or disclosure of information that might put others in jeopardy."\(^{125}\)

Accompaniment must continue uninterrupted as long as the threat exists to the person or group, provided that it is wanted. According to Labour organiser Sergio Guzman, Guatemala, "It's not that the threats necessarily stop when you have accompaniment. Accompaniment questions the threat... You call off the accompaniment when you feel you've reached a politically different situation. It doesn't mean the systematic violence is over. It's more subjective when the accompaniment has fulfilled its task of calling the violence into question."\(^{126}\)

PBI closed its accompaniment project in El Salvador in 1992 after five "precarious years." "The war was over, and although violence and inequality continued in many forms, protective accompaniment was no longer the service Salvadorans wanted from foreign NGOs."\(^{127}\)

Each organisation must set conditions regarding safety and risks, knowing that accompaniment involves risks as described in the following examples. In El Salvador between 1987 and 1989, PBI members "were inside movement offices while the army surrounded them... death squads set off bombs at night while accompaniment was inside. On 14 different occasions, PBI volunteers were detained, interrogated and invited to leave the country. In hundreds of other instances they were stopped by soldiers on the street, interrogated and intimidated. Yet the more the government harassed foreign volunteers, the more the Salvadoran civilian movement valued the accompaniment."\(^{128}\)

Grenades were thrown into the Peace Brigades house in Guatemala, and three team members were knifed\(^{129}\) by an unknown assailant.\(^{130}\)

A last condition involves having other activities in place. "Accompaniment is much more than an immediate tactic... It required substrategies for communicating with the army, building political clout, making diplomatic contacts, recruiting and training adequate volunteers, finding funding, and developing an emergency response network. These substrategies are conditioned by basic principles but are also designed to alleviate resource limitations and actively change the political context."\(^{131}\)

\(^{125}\)Ibid: 15.
\(^{126}\)Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber 2000:143.
\(^{127}\)Mahony/Eguren 1996: 181.
\(^{129}\)All recovered.
\(^{130}\)Mahony in Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber 2000:144,145
Presence
High visibility is not necessarily a condition for effective presence. The parties whom one deems potentially violent must absolutely be aware that peace team internationals are among the citizen population but they need not know where those individuals are at any particular time. The Michigan Peace Team in Chiapas used this factor quite uniquely. Team members were asked to enter the country unobtrusively on a tourist visa. Further, they were required to travel at night as they entered the villages that invited them and thereafter to remain indoors during the daytime so as not to be seen. The Chiapan host villages believe that only if the internationals are not seen but known to be in the area can they protect more than a few.

In most cases, however, teams have made their presence and position known to as many parties as possible, for example Cry for Justice participants strolling through the streets of Haiti.

Emergency response network
A list of 10 occurrences, which BPT felt necessitated the use of their Alert Network, is given in section 2.2.2.2. Questions developed by them regarding conditions for use are below:

1. Are other organisations/agencies working on case?
2. Is it possible to co-ordinate actions with them?
3. Is event in question a single case or repeat? Is it an exemplary case? Are people involved in the events known to you? Exemplary cases or cases indicating a worsening of the situation should have priority.
4. How serious is the case? Is there a danger for life or health? Threats to life or health have priority over other human rights violations.
5. Did you double-check the information? Did you witness the event yourself? Are there at least 2 independent sources? How reliable are sources?
6. Who wants the team to activate the network? Do persons or groups concerned want the team to take action? Do they want the case to be made public? Never act against the will of the people concerned. Co-ordinate with them which facts might be made known.
7. Would taking action on the case be an additional danger to the people concerned? To third parties? To the team? Never endanger people, even if it is only a slight possibility, without having asked them. If the safety of the team is concerned, consult with the co-ordinator.
8. How often has the alarm been triggered? Alarms cannot be triggered too often. Their effect and the willingness of people to take action wear off easily.

Peacebuilding

132MPT ended its team-sending project to Chiapas in 2000.
133Heid, John, 4/01 interview with author.
BPT member Erik Torch itemised conditions for peacebuilding in Kosovo/a: "In working on peacebuilding there are several points that we need to bear in mind. First and foremost, building peace needs to be focused on the relationship. To do this will require personal time spent with people as well as planning and implementing projects... It also means that when designing such projects a lot of listening must be done with interested community leaders, activists and NGO’s to make it something that they see as worthwhile and not simply imported and forced upon them. Secondly the work has to be looked at through the lens of sustainability... Thirdly it must be done within three contexts or spheres: locally (Kosovo/a), sub-regionally (the South Balkans) and regionally (Europe) since the war involved all three."\(^{135}\)

**Strategy**

In their empirical analysis, Müller and Büttner make the observation that nonviolent interventions "do not automatically combine the peace strategies." [Peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding.] Most are "action-based" and use one of the strategies. The study shows interventions to have greater de-escalating effect if they are "process-oriented," aiming to affect the conflict dynamic while developing methods during the project itself, usually applying a combination of the three peace strategies.\(^{136}\) All three strategies are necessary in severely escalated conflicts and must be parts of an integrated process of conflict resolution.

Higher-level goals such as prevention do not seem achievable through the sole approach of having teams of volunteers in crisis regions. If NGOs working for peace do not want to lose sight of these higher-level goals, team activities need to be integrated into a broad-based approach involving activities by a number of different actors.\(^{137}\)

**Clear goals**

An internal condition for measurable or successful peace intervention is the presence of concrete and clear goals, which match the activities that are planned and possible. This was a painful issue in 1995 in Croatia and in 1997 in Serbia, when BPT experienced at first hand the run-up to surges in escalation. In Croatia, the volunteers thought it a defeat not to have secured a foothold from which they could exert some influence. By contrast, the organisers had never even expected this of the project. In the deliberations about how to react to a possible escalation in Kosovo/a, the question of the possibilities for achieving prevention was not even discussed—it was so far beyond perceived capacities.\(^{138}\)

BPT’s peacebuilding work also suffered from the lack of a comprehensive plan that would have focused its work more systematically. Guiding notions such as human rights, non-violent conflict resolution, the channelling of information, and the provision of skills

\(^{135}\)E-mail from the field, 8/1999.
\(^{136}\)Müller/Büttner 1998: 5.
\(^{137}\)Müller/Büttner 1999: 5.
\(^{138}\)Müller/Büttner 1999: 2.
grew out of ideas about possible helpful roles and the subsequent practical realisation of these based on team experience.\textsuperscript{139}

Other examples of poorly formulated goals would be the Gulf Peace Team and Mir Sada. GPT lacked refined goals, had not formulated their strategic objectives on a reasonable projection of the numbers they could mobilise, and had estimated the impact they could have on sheer optimism. Likewise, imprecision about the goals was one reason for the failure of the Mir Sada intervention. Christine Schweitzer suggests that the vagueness of goal formulation is obvious in the original appeals of Beati and Equilibre as well as the common Mir Sada appeal:

- To stop the war, starting with a "cease fire" during the Mir Sada period.
- To be in solidarity with each person suffering from this war, regardless of his/her ideology, sex, religion or ethnic origin.
- To represent civil interposition against violence.
- To support and encourage a multi-ethnic population to live together in Bosnia.
- To implement negotiations that will go beyond armed conquest and will impose both respect for, and the safeguard of, human rights under international law.

Nowhere was the aim of stopping the war elaborated.\textsuperscript{140}

Without goal specificity, activities will be vague in focus and morale will suffer from uncertainty about even small successes and an undermining sense of failure.

Clarity of concepts and principles

Serious flaws in the Mir Sada plan are also found in a lack of agreement about neutrality, no agreement about the appropriateness of talking to Serbian and Croatian leaders, a vague understanding or agreement about the term nonviolent interposition, and even what to do when they arrived in Sarajevo. Lack of clarity about neutrality and how to achieve it usually means there will be none. In the case of Mir Sada, Schweitzer describes the results thus: "During our stay in Prozor there was the lasting rumour that the Bosnian troops did not attack Prozor because of our camping there. But we did not actually do anything for the Bosnian side, which was shelled every day with grenades from a place about two miles from our camping site. A half interposition is not a successful example of interposition, but taking sides in a war!"\textsuperscript{141}

Non-partisanship rests on good communication with both or all sides in a conflict and on a carefully selected physical position of the intervention. The Gulf Peace Team succeeded at neither.

Non-interference

Essential to conscionable intervention is the condition that locals welcome the team and have autonomy in creating their own solutions to problems. Galtung warns that intervention must not be left entirely to the outside: the broader the role defined for a

\textsuperscript{139}Müller/Büttner 1999: 7.
\textsuperscript{140}Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber 2000: 271.
\textsuperscript{141}Schweitzer, Christine in Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber 2000: 272.
third party the more it does to turn the local population into clients, taking away what might have served them in building a conflict resolution capacity, leaving them with solutions rather than challenges. \(^{142}\)

"Colombians need to decide Colombian issues by themselves," \(^{143}\) says Bennett of WfP. "We don’t advise Mexicans on what to do," \(^{144}\) says Poen of SIPAZ. "We support them in working out their own problems."

**Communication with all parties**

PBI has demonstrated again and again how absolutely essential it is that peacekeeping activities include communication with authorities involved in the conflict. "An effective deterrence strategy can be hindered by an inability to communicate with the state. Salvadoran officials dismissed accompaniment groups as subversives; thus PBI and others were hesitant to identify themselves publicly. Likewise, it took years in Sri Lanka and Guatemala for PBI to build up a relationship with the government.\(^{145}\)

Director Robert Poen says of SIPAZ, "We have what would be called collegial relations with local organisations. We try to connect with all groups: human rights, civic, Zapatistas, paradistas... We have contacts with the paramilitary... We try to reach out to all points of view without discrimination. It’s risky and complicated to talk to one group and then go to the next group and find that they won’t talk to you. The tendency is for people to assume that we’re pro-Zapatista. We’re trying to overcome that."

"The effectiveness of nonviolent peacekeeping is probably to a decisive extent dependent on how constructive the relations to the individual parties are, which further forms of pressure can be activated, and how far and how effectively pressure from civil society is exerted on the conflict parties." These activities require "reliable, long-term work and cannot be achieved though short... actions\(^{147}\) One difficulty in this is that beyond a certain stage of escalation, conflict parties view outsiders only as "friend or foe." Social relations are often what enable teams of nonviolent intervenors to monitor or go between mutually threatening groups to prevent renewed escalation.\(^{148}\)

**Attitude of aggressor**

There are groups who impede work toward peace and may take direct action to prevent it. Individuals or groups perpetuate war even without obvious gain. "Rejectionists" become so strongly identified with a cause and make such sacrifices for it that its end is a threat to their identity. "Irreconcilables" are willing to suffer in order to inflict pain on others in return for pain experienced. An end to war represents their undoing; perhaps they’ll be tried for their actions. War is the only means by which they can survive.

\(^{142}\) Galtung, J., "Participants in peacekeeping forces" cited in Schirch 1995: 47.

\(^{143}\) Bennett, 6/01 interview with author.

\(^{144}\) Poen, 5/01 interview with author.

\(^{145}\) Mahony/Eguren 1997: 225.

\(^{146}\) Poen, interview with author.


\(^{148}\) Ibid: 25.
"Too often... peacemakers appear surprised by rejectionists’ irreconcilable violence and allow it to interrupt steps that have been carefully constructed to bring the majority to agreement. When they do so, the actions succeed. When peacemakers signal rejectionists that their disruptions will undermine momentum toward peace, they reinforce rejectionists’ resolve to carry out such acts."

An aggressor might not fear international condemnation or repercussions of actions. Further, when a military group is threatened, it may become even less responsive to the need for a good relationship with the international community.

"The processes of nonviolent conflict management, resolution, and transformation work best where state systems are democratic and/or have high levels of political, economic, and social legitimacy. Where regimes are controlled by military and paramilitary groups, they tend to believe that it is more efficient to rule by terror rather than persuasion. In these circumstances the opportunities for normal adversarial politics, played according to widely accepted rules of the game, are minimal. State-sponsored terror and political repression force individuals, interest groups, and political parties to either withdraw from the political system or to engage in violent or nonviolent resistance.

...The problem facing those seeking alternatives to the politics of terror is how to generate safe political action spaces while minimising the risk of arbitrary arrest, torture, disappearance, or death. The construction of such action spaces is a prerequisite to nonviolent problem solving. A number of problems are associated with generating creative resistance to terror:

- How to turn victims into protagonists
- How to overcome individual and collective fear
- How to develop deterrents to political and military threats
- How to promote a political system that enhances the positive consequences of political activity while minimising the negative."

"Relevant to all human rights pressure is the principle that it is about power as well as justice... in postwar or postterror transitions, there is a strong tendency for governments to respond to such pressure not by doing the right thing but by doing something. That something often involves throwing the least costly scapegoats to the wolves."

Any role chosen by NP will fail if the conflict is not carefully evaluated by careful assessment of the attitude of the belligerents

**Emergency response network**

As has been said, the strength of other tactics depends upon the breadth, speed and reliability of an emergency response network, which "mobilises in the shortest possible time relevant international publicity which cannot be ignored... Here use is made of repressive power, which third parties can exert on a particular conflict party. However, this power must first be activated and be prepared to let itself be mobilised to act for

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150 Schirch 1995: 46.
151 Mahony/Eguren 1996: iii.
particular values, such as human rights against weapons export. The use of this power is hence not always available ...but rather somewhat precarious.\textsuperscript{153} The network and its reliability must be functional before entrance into a conflict area.

**Timing**

PBI has the following thoughts on timing for intervention:

1. Intervenors need credibility in order to gain access. This can be built through long-term relationships or through the reputation of intervenors via past work or position.
2. Is there hope of success given the resources of intervenors?
3. Is the conflict divisible to enable intervention in only one segment? Or is there a possibility of doing test intervention in one area?
4. Is peace desired by all parties? Are the parties motivated to resolve conflict? Are the parties hurting enough to welcome intervention?
5. Is doing nothing worse than the prospects for intervention?
6. Are domestic factors conducive to intervention?\textsuperscript{154}

**Visibility in the Field**

There are multiple issues involved in deciding how much visibility is advantageous in the field. One is the practical matter of legal standing within the country. If team members have entered the country on tourist or religious visas, visibility of their peace work might give a non-welcoming government the opportunity to deport them. But if the government has agreed to the team’s presence, visibility has proved helpful.\textsuperscript{155} Strategies of deterrence depend on high visibility of the accompanier or interpositioner.

Still other questions have to do with the effect of this spotlight on third party internationals. Does it detract from the credibility and confidence of local peacemakers or does it reinforce them?

The opinion of Michael Beer, Nonviolence International staff, is that third parties should strive for the minimum visibility necessary to get the job done. Over-exposure might bring on a political attack or a slide into dependency. Under-exposure nullifies the benefits of intervenors\textsuperscript{156} and may decrease credibility.

\textsuperscript{153}Müller/Büttner 1998: 26.
\textsuperscript{154}Mahony/Eguren 1997: 46.
\textsuperscript{155}Schirch 1995: 89.
\textsuperscript{156}Schirch 1995: 89.
2.2.3 Civil Peace Services

2.2.3.1 Character and goals

As mentioned in the introduction to 2.2, Civil Peace Services\(^{157}\) is not a straightforward category that is clearly distinct from peace teams on the one hand, and other volunteer services on the other. Lacking a more specific definition, for the purpose of this study, all those volunteer and training organisations that are members of the European Network for Civil Peace Services (see below) will be called Civil Peace Services (CPS). Some of them are closely related to other, older versions of volunteer services that were founded after World War I or World War II.\(^{158}\)

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\(^{157}\) In the appendix, projects in the following countries are described: Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria, France, Italy, Britain and the Peace Corps Initiative at the European Parliament. The fact that developments in Germany are described in more detail than those in other countries is due to the bias of the author, who has intensive first-hand knowledge of the German CPS and the on-going discussions in that country.

I wish to thank Helga Tempel, ForumCPS, who read the section on CPS in December 2000, and made some very valuable additions and corrections to it, and Janne Poort-van Eeden who did the same with the second draft.

\(^{158}\) World War I was probably the first war during which there were people in most of the involved countries who refused to take part in the war (Brock/Young 1999:17-70). The demand for a civil alternative to military service (which was non-existent at that time) led to the foundation of the first peace service, the Service Civile International (SCI), which still exists today (Brock/Young 1999:105, Büttner 1995:17f, Petry 1996:17). The Swiss Quakers, Pierre Ceresole and Hélène Monastier, founded it in 1920. It was intended to be a prototype for alternative national civilian service, although soon after, its largest section, the British one, tried to dissociate SCI from any relationship with the state and conscription. In practical terms, SCI's main activity is shorter-term volunteer services (usually work camps) doing manual labour - reconstruction, building etc. In addition, it offers some places for longer-term volunteers (6 months to two years) in development projects, intercultural encounters and other similar projects. SCI today has branches in more than 25 countries.

While SCI remained the only service of this type (the two large pacifist and antimilitarist umbrella groups founded in this era, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and War Resisters' International, did not engage in this kind of work at that time) in Europe and North America between the wars, there was a wave of probably dozens of comparable organisations starting up in the first twenty years after the second World War, most of them under the umbrella of Christian churches. As they were created when the impressions of fascism and genocide were still fresh, their objective has been more to contribute to reconciliation and further the understanding between peoples than to be an alternative for military service, although in some countries legal provision has been made for conscientious objectors wanting to do their alternative service abroad. Many thousands of young people perform such volunteer services every year. The number of volunteers performing the services organised within one Protestant German umbrella organisation alone was more than 4,100 in 1992 (Frey 1994:26).

Peace Services typically work between a few weeks and a few months in the maintenance of anti-fascist sites (former concentration camps turned to museums) or in Israeli Kibbutzim. They also perform social/educational work in another country with children, seniors, the disabled and refugees (see Ruez 1994). Before 1989 they worked on encounters and projects between East and West. There are also a large number of projects in the realm of human rights work, peace and reconciliation, for example, international encounters between young people from (former) enemy states. Petry, who evaluated four peace services in 1996 (Aktion Sühnezeichen, Brethren Service, SCI and Eirene), found that almost one third of the total projects were such 'political' projects, as she calls them (Petry 1996:35). Other volunteer services, like Eirene (founded in 1957) and the US Peace Corps (founded 1961), usually offer longer-term
The 1990’s saw a new wave of interest in nonviolent intervention by peace teams and peace services in conflict situations. Several volunteer projects, which used volunteers from abroad as well as recruited local volunteers, were created alone in the area of what was Yugoslavia until 1991. Many of the projects concentrated on refugee camps, offering social activities to the refugees and the displaced. Probably the largest of these initiatives was Sunflower (Suncokret) in Croatia, which became a Croatian humanitarian organisation that is still active today. Its founder, a Dutch activist, has meanwhile set up a follow-up project for refugees from Kosovo (Balkan Sunflower). Several projects engaged in what they called "social reconstruction work" (see below), combining physical reconstruction aid with social activities in divided towns. The first of these was a project in Pakrac in Western Slavonia that then was copied or adapted for several places both in Bosnia and Kosovo. Typically these projects work with short-term and middle-term volunteers who are usually young people, and who go with only little preparation (a weekend course or something comparable). Their goals are generally to give support to children, young people, elderly or other needy groups by offering them social activities, and thereby helping them overcome the traumas of war, and find a safe space for reconnecting with each other across conflict lines.\(^{159}\)

The conceptualisation of what is called Civil Peace Services in (predominantly Western) Europe is a special development of the 1990s. The impetus was probably a reaction to the war in former Yugoslavia, plus in a renewed (related) interest in developing alternatives to the military. Conceptually, the projects vary widely between different countries, and also sometimes have seen different developmental stages within one country. Since 1997, there has been a European Network of Civil Peace Services (called EN.CPS) - a network of participants\(^{160}\) and co-operating groups with which they are in contact.

The main countries where Civil Peace Services can be found today are Germany, Austria, France, the Netherlands, Britain and - as a somewhat special case - Italy. There are a few other initiatives in Europe that do not, or only partially, participate in Civil Peace Service efforts, especially in Sweden (Swedish Peace Team Forum) and Belgium (Field Diplomacy Initiative); also in Spain there are COs doing work abroad that has some similarity to the Italian White Helmet approach. In Germany there are at least two other organisations that provide training of several weeks and months as well as send people into projects, which do not count themselves among Civil Peace Services, but which are more comparable to them than to other volunteer projects.\(^{161}\) And, to make deployments and are active in development work. Eirene is a special case because it combines development work in Africa and Latin America, peace services in Europe and the US, and information work in the countries where it is based. Eirene was founded by a coalition of Mennonites, Brethren and IFOR (Petry 1996:14). The US Peace Corps combined, in the words of Evers (1997:58) "the appeal to idealism of young people with economic development optimism and a missionary anti-communism which did not shy away from being used by secret services." Nevertheless, it was the model for similar organisations founded in Germany and Norway in the early 60s (Büttner 1995:27f).

\(^{159}\) In addition, two peace team projects have been founded specifically for the conflict in the Balkans: the international Balkan Peace Team and the Croatian-based Osijek Peace Teams.

\(^{160}\) See the appendix on Civil Peace Services.

\(^{161}\) Oekumenischer Dienst im Konziliaren Prozess (Ecumenical Service in the Conciliatory Process), a Christian-based initiative, offers several months' training and accompanies the participants in later
things even more complicated, development services in Germany have started to send people abroad under a budget line in the Ministry of Development called Civil Peace Service. These latter projects are included in the following chapter on humanitarian aid and development organisations, and will not be considered in this chapter.

Some of the CPS projects concentrate solely on training, leaving the question of deployment aside (the Netherlands, Britain). In Austria and Italy the CPS is based primarily on Conscientious Objectors doing their alternative service in the CPS. Others use paid staff called peace experts, or aim at training such experts (Germany, the Netherlands, Britain). Some of the projects explicitly plan for conflict transformation work in their home country as well as abroad. In practical terms, almost all projects that have been implemented are cross-border projects, the majority of them in the European "near abroad", the countries of former Yugoslavia.

At least some of the CPS groups started out as projects of large-scale intervention. This is specifically true of the German CPS, and to earlier discussions in the Netherlands. In the period between the first conceptualisations and their realisation, they all became small-scale, sending out teams or even individuals. (If not, they started to change their focus to education and training volunteers.)

The lists of goals of the different CPSs today greatly resemble each other. Generally, they aim at violence prevention, the search for possibilities for ending violent conflicts, and for sustainable solutions for all parties in conflict, (re)constitution of peaceful situations (material and social reconstruction, a functioning community and society, reconciliation), and support of civil society or for those groups which work toward these goals at the place of conflict. Some also mention human rights protection as one of their goals.

In regard to principles to be found within the CPS organisations, many people in Europe nowadays prefer to use the term civil conflict transformation rather than nonviolent conflict transformation. As far as I know, none of the volunteer or CPS projects claims that its work constitutes an alternative to military missions. If the issue is raised at all, then the expectation is expressed that CPS and civil conflict transformation in general deployments in projects at home or abroad. 'Kurve Wustrow', a training institute that, among other projects, set up a CPS project in Bosnia staffed with local nonviolence trainers, is going to send another person to Macedonia. It has also helped to set up a more independent volunteer project with a small war resisters' organisation in Izmir, Turkey, where two 'peace experts' are placed for two-year terms to help with networking, offer training, and generally provide an international presence.

162 In Germany, there was a heated debate on the relationship between CPS and conscription. Some people originally wanting to include CPS in a general conscription system in which young people of both genders might choose between CPS and military service, but in the end the decision was made to build up a professional service rather than a mass service. (However, there are provisions for COs doing alternative service abroad, for example with development organisations like Eirene.)

163 Although there is a tendency to professionalise peace work abroad going with the movement for CPS, in my eyes the groups are far from agreeing on a professional service as the distinctive criterion.

164 Related work also goes on in Sweden, where a coalition of peace, humanitarian and development groups calling themselves 'Swedish Peace Team Forum' co-operates in doing international work. One of their major projects was finding and sending people as monitors to the first free elections in South Africa - a mission that will be described in more detail in 2.4.

165 This list is taken from an Austrian program paper ("Ziviler Friedendienst"). The German and French ones are very similar.
will become the dominant way of dealing with conflict in future, and by means of well
timed preventive work, will make military conflict interventions unnecessary. Primarily,
but not only, in the case of the Italian "White Helmets" there is usually some co-
operation on the practical level with international military forces in those countries where
military interventions took place. The people in the field make use of their facilities and
prerogatives (passes, communication services), put themselves on evacuation lists of
the UN/NATO forces, and generally accept being part of the complex, multi-facettted
reconstruction missions led by the UN in Bosnia and Kosovo (see 2.5 for a discussion of
the role of civilians in complex missions). For example, one organisation working in
Bosnia said clearly in the interview that they want to make a contribution to the
implementation of the Dayton agreement.

With regard to non-partisanship and working with local partners, the picture is not very
homogeneous. While the principle of non-partisanship is highly held by some
organisations - specifically the more professional Civil Peace Services - others like
Austrian Peace Services place their volunteers with local groups with the mandate to
support their work. Ethnic tensions in the region was the reason given in two cases for
the decision not to have a real local partner: In the absence of mulitiethnic local partners,
choosing a local partner would mean aligning oneself with one side of the conflict (in
Bosnia), the interview partner from Pax Christi Germany emphasised. One other project
in Bosnia, the Centre for Antiwar Action, resolved the issue by choosing its staff from all
three ethnic backgrounds, thereby maintaining an all-partisan stance.

In recent years, in some European countries a distinction has been made between
learning services mainly for young people, with an emphasis on personal growth of the
participants of the service, and expert services having their emphasis on the outcome of
the service work for third parties. The voluntary services mentioned above are such
learning services. This is considered, at least in the German debate, as being also true
for some long-term services in the South. There is the category of "Learning Services
in Solidarity" as, for example, Eirene offers. Their goal is to further contacts between
people and initiatives in the North and the South. The volunteers have to be supported
by a local group at home, and work with a grassroots' organisation abroad, thereby
creating ties between the two groups which continue after the service of the individual
volunteers ends.

Peace Expert Service is used to describe the conflict transformation work of
professionals (both in the meaning of being paid rather then being volunteers, and
having specific qualifications) working with NGOs in conflict regions, be it in one’s own country or abroad. In some countries, peace expert service is seen as the element typical of Civil Peace Services, and those countries - particularly the Germans - try to push this element. But it seems that this view is not shared by many of the other associations involved in Civil Peace Services today.

### 2.2.3.2 Activities of Civil Peace Services

There are not many Civil Peace Services that have already sent people to the field, and only a few of them have more than two years’ experience (Austria, Germany).

Depending on the character of the services, the number of people sent to the field varies when the volunteer project of the Swiss group and the Italian White Helmets are included, but most organisations (all German organisations and Austrian Peace Services) usually have only one to three people in one project at the same time.

One remarkable speciality of the German CPS is that there are a few local peace experts trained, placed or financed in addition to international ones, or even as the only ones in a project. The Austrian Peace Services co-operate with the Centre for Nonviolence in Osijek, which provides them with international volunteers for their otherwise Croatian-staffed project.

On the basis of 15 projects that have people in the field, the following list of activities has emerged in regard to dealing with conflict. In addition, there were other activities reported, such as PR work and reporting back to their organisation or funders, but this was done only in an internal, organisational context. (None of the organisations interviewed uses public reporting as a tactic to influence the conflict, as some peace teams do.)

#### Peacekeeping activities

1. Monitoring, presence, and accompaniment:

Some activities in the realm of monitoring and presence, as well as the occasional accompaniment, can be found specifically in several projects both in Croatia and Bosnia:

- Maintaining a presence: Having an international person in the office of a local (Croatian) human rights organisation, and going with the activists or alone to visit

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172 For a definition, see Brinkmann 2000:41.

173 Pax Christi Zenica: 1 expert plus 1-2 long-term volunteers; Pax Christi Banja Luka: 2 experts; Living Without Armament in Vojvodina and Belgrade: 1 each; ForumCPS in Kosovo: 2, in Hercegovina: 2, in Belgrade and in the future in Montenegro: 1 each. The Austrians usually send individuals, but there are also a few projects with 2-3 volunteers in each.

174 ÖFD: Mostar, Independent Zênica, Schools in Albania, Osijek, Gorski Kotar, Novi Sad, Refugee Camps in Croatia; Centar za nenasilnu akciju (CNA) in Sarajevo; Pax Christi in Benkovac (HR), in Zenica (BiH) and Banja Luka (BiH); Friedenskreis Halle in Jaice (BiH); Living Without Armament in Vojvodina and Belgrade; GSoA in Vushtrri (Kosovo). Sources used: Interviews with representatives of Pax Christi Germany, ForumCPS Germany, and Austrian Peace Services; and the following publications: FriedensDienste 98/99, Rüssmann 1999 a, b and c, Meyer 2000, Kurschat 1998 and 2000; PR material of the organisations; more informal talks and reports at the meeting of EN.CPS in May 2001 and at a conference of the European Platform for Conflict Prevention in Sarajevo in April 2001.
villagers are reported to have a protective function both for the Serbian minority and the activists.175

- Monitoring is reportedly used mainly in the context of evacuating occupied houses that are in the process of being returned to their original (usually Serbian) owners. "When you are present, it is calmer", one bailiff reportedly said to a team member in Bosnia.
- Accompaniment might occur occasionally in the context of support for returnees (for example, going with a refugee to her house that is to be evacuated), but has not been developed into a tactic as PBI or WFP have done.

2. Protesting with local or international authorities, or generally alerting international attention, also documentation and reporting:

These activities may have a protective function as well, depending on the issue of the protests. Several organisations working in Bosnia and Kosovo regularly or occasionally address local authorities as well as international organisations and authorities (UNHCR, OSCE, OHR, IPTF) in order to alert them to issues, mainly those concerning the return of refugees and the displaced. Pax Christi Banja Luka (Serbian Republic in Bosnia), for example, collected information on 600 homeless displaced persons, and gave that information to OSCE and IPTF with the request that they should act on it. Their sister team in Benkovac in Croatia alerted international organisations both in Croatia and internationally to threats and attacks committed by radical groups in that area.

**Peacemaking activities:**

Peacemaking activities, meaning bringing individuals or groups together in dialogue, usually occur, if at all, at the local level. Civil Peace Services generally profess the objective of working at the grassroots and middle level, and not attempting mediation etc. at the level of political leaders. In the examples studied, there have been few cases of such activities, and almost all of them could also be considered to fall into the category of peacebuilding without stretching either concept too far:

- Supporting dialogue: One of the Pax Christi teams (Benkovac) has been supporting dialogue between the Lutheran and Orthodox Churches.176
- Examples of mediation described were activities at the micro level, e.g. mediation between a returning displaced family and people currently living in their house,177 or between two youth groups in a divided town.

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175 The Serbian minority that remained in Croatia after the re-occupation of Serbian-controlled Krajina has been faced with much harassment both by neighbours and the authorities. In the first two years after the re-occupation by Croatia in 1995, arson and murder also occurred, usually going unpunished by disinterested - or allegedly even involved - police. By now, it is mainly returning Serbs who are in danger of their houses being mined or set on fire before, or even after, their return. Though the violence has de-escalated quite drastically, there is still a feeling of being unsafe and threatened, mainly on the side of the returnees. Activists might have received anonymous threats, but there have been no recent cases of violent attacks. Unlike Latin America and other places, in former Yugoslavia activists have almost never been victims of 'disappearances' or murder, Kosovo being the only exception.

176 Pax Christi Germany is generally involved in interreligious dialogue in the area of former Yugoslavia.

177 In one case (Pax Christi Benkovac) the solution found was that both share the house for the time being.
- Offering meeting space, be it the flat/house where the volunteers live or the Youth Centre they have helped to create, is a function that seems to be common to almost all projects.

- Opening doors to authorities and international agencies: \textsuperscript{178} Networking and linking functions between NGOs and internationals, accompanying activists or regular citizens to such bodies, and being an advocate for local groups are important functions played by many CPS projects. Specifically in those areas of former Yugoslavia where a large number of international actors are present, local NGOs often have found it difficult to be accepted as equal partners, or even to be listened to at all. International volunteers setting up meetings with such international organisations, or insisting in the participation of local NGOs in co-ordination forums (e.g. what the ForumCPS team did in Prizren), play an important role for these local groups. CPS volunteers have also served the same function from time to time in communication with local authorities. For example, Pax Christi Benkovac managed to get their local partner organisation in contact with their mayor who had previously chosen to ignore that group.

**Peacebuilding activities:**
Several categories of peacebuilding activities were found:

1. Multi-ethnic or multi-communal social work

This term is used in a thesis written by a German social worker, Ruben Kurschat, \textsuperscript{179} who worked as a CPS volunteer in Jaice/Bosnia. He describes a multitude of activities that are typical activities of social workers but have the implicit function of bringing people together across ethnic or other perceived lines of conflict. This kind of social work creates a neutral space or protected area in which people, independent of their ethnic or religious identities, come together and do things together, such as attending a computer course or playing football. The objective of furthering reconciliation is rarely made explicit because of the fear that work concentrating on the ethnic lines of conflict might strengthen those lines and thereby deepen the conflict. \textsuperscript{180} The social worker or peace expert might insist on participation from all sides and would try to stop all attempts to close one project or activity (e.g. language course) to members of the other groups. But rather then making "the conflict" the issue to meet about, the activities are used to reflect on group processes and one’s own behaviour, and thereby deal with the conflict indirectly.

In detail, such activities might be:

- Found and run youth centres
- Organise social activities for different groups, for example courses and circles (knitting and senior groups) in refugee camps

\textsuperscript{178} Large (1996:75) considers this to be an activity in the realm of mediation.

\textsuperscript{179} Kurschat 1998 and 2000.

\textsuperscript{180} Kurschat 2000:59.
2. Strategies, Tactics and Activities 2.2 Peace Teams and CPS

- Organise community-building projects: Pax Christi Benkovac (Croatia) has been interviewing citizens in order to find out their interests and special resources, thus encouraging the consequent formation of groups according to purpose, not ethnicity.
- Organise youth camps: Several organisations have occasionally organised international youth camps in addition to their daily work, in order to give children and young people a chance to leave their daily life behind for a while.
- Organise/facilitate cultural activities: Several local groups that are partners of Austrian Peace Service organise cultural activities, from theatre plays to rave parties, with the support of the Austrian volunteers.
- Offer meeting space: This function sometimes develops almost without planning when the flat or house of the volunteers becomes a protected meeting space. Youth centres, of course, fulfil the same function.
- Visit citizens: This is an activity reported by most CPS projects. It is both a by-product of other activities and a conscious effort to support isolated people in the countryside.

2. Support for local groups and civil society development

Supporting local groups and civil society development is one of the objectives of most CPSs, and one for which many related activities can be found:

- Advising: The Austrian Peace Services placed volunteers with an Albanian Education Development Project where they gave advice on where to get materials, did some budget writing, edited a project newsletter, and generally were responsible for co-ordination and evaluation. Pax Christi Benkovac helped a humanitarian women’s association establish itself as an NGO, and also initiated biweekly meetings of village representatives to discuss upcoming issues and problems in village development.
- Supporting local activists in their activities: Volunteers provide translations, facilitate meetings, serve in the office, take care of administrative and organisational tasks, drive people around, produce project newsletters and engage in other similar activities specifically in projects where volunteers were placed with local NGOs (as specifically the Austrians do). Of special importance here seems to be fund-raising support that the German ForumCPS team in Kosovo offered to a local group.
- Networking activities: Most projects are involved in networking in one way or another, for example by furnishing international contacts and/or by bringing the partner organisation in contact with other local groups.
- Co-organising public activities: Some CPSs have been doing this, for example Pax Christi Benkovac together with Balkan Peace Team helped several local humanitarian and human rights groups organise a Croatian-Bosnian Round Table on the return of refugees from Bosnia to Croatia.

3. Training and education in conflict-related skills

Although they belong to the realm of civil society building, training and education in areas such as conflict transformation, dealing with violence, and democratic decision-making skills should be considered in a category of their own because of their predominance in some projects. There is even one project supported under the German CPS scheme that concentrates solely on training: A Yugoslav expatriate who had worked with a German training organisation, together with (by now) six other trainers
from all parts of former Yugoslavia set up a training centre (Centre for Nonviolent Action) in Sarajevo/Bosnia. There they offer training in conflict transformation and civil society building for all parts of Bosnia.

The research survey showed that NGOs, young people and women, teachers, police and OSCE staff are the primary target groups for workshops and training.

4. Psycho-social support

Psycho-social support for war victims and otherwise traumatised target groups has become an important activity in the realm of peacebuilding in many parts of the world, not only in former Yugoslavia.\(^{181}\) The Civil Peace Services surveyed have displayed two kinds of activities in this field:

- Active listening (Austrian Peace Services);
- Trauma counselling with groups (ForumCPS and Pax Christi Benkovac), and self-help groups for those with chronic illnesses (ForumCPS in Vojvodina).

5. "Social Reconstruction" projects

Social Reconstruction describes a concept that is closely related to multi-communal social but combines physical reconstruction, rather than social work, with peace work in a broader sense. The first project of this type in the area of former Yugoslavia was a reconstruction project in a divided town (Pakrac) in Western Slavonia. The project was started by a Croatian organisation (Anti-war Campaign) in co-operation with the UN Office in Vienna (UNOV), and used short-term and middle-term volunteers from abroad. The international volunteers came to help with the physical reconstruction of houses, and on the side joined or organised social activities. While the Croatian and international volunteers could work only on the Croatian side of the town, UNOV together with Austrian Peace Services ran a parallel project for some time. Its Austrian members had UN passes and were therefore allowed to work on both sides of the border.

A project started recently by the group Switzerland Without an Army in Kosovo is based on the same concept.

6. Emergency and rehabilitation aid

Material aid of this sort has been more a by-product than a central purpose of the CPS projects in the survey (with the exception of the above-mentioned projects of social reconstruction). There has been both direct distribution of humanitarian aid and financing of projects (for building houses for needy families in Bosnia by Pax Christi), and indirect aid by linking needy persons to other humanitarian agencies that would then support them. In one case, volunteers took over advertising and selling products refugees had produced in their camps (Austrian Peace Services).

### 2.2.3.3 Outcomes and impact

The CPS projects are too young to have undergone an impact assessment.\(^{182}\) It should also be remembered that peacebuilding - the peace strategy most commonly used by

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\(^{181}\) For a general overview, see van der Merwe/Vienings 2001.

\(^{182}\) Impact Assessment is a recent tool, developed originally for development organisations (Oxfam and Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit). Reychler (2001) has introduced "Conflict Impact Assessment" to assess the positive and/or negative impact of different kinds of intervention on the
CPS so far - is the most under-researched aspect of conflict transformation, and that, as Large points out, "grass-roots peacebuilding will not have immediate dramatic effects on conflict situations".\(^{183}\) An additional difficulty in judging impact is that most CPS projects are placed in the area of former Yugoslavia where a multitude of players has been working on the conflict since the beginning of the war in 1991: Starting with local and international grassroots groups, media support projects, mediation trainers, humanitarian and development organisations with their own conflict-related programs (Oxfam, for example, has been organising dialogue meetings, supporting women’s groups etc.), and ending with the different intergovernmental bodies, European Union, OSCE and United Nations. Attribution of outcomes and impact on the conflict to one specific intervenor would only be possible if all intervenors in one town, for example, were researched at the same time.

Therefore, lacking independent sources, the only indicators for positive outcomes and impact are what the projects themselves report on their activities. Judging from their reports and the interviews, it seems that especially the training work and the social work approach described above - an approach also used by other kinds of intervening agencies, specifically development organisations - find positive resonance with their clients. But it is an open question under which conditions this approach of "contact plus superordinate goal," which Ryan\(^ {184}\) already describes in his book on dealing with ethnic conflict, will have a positive impact in the long run. The same is of course true for the different kinds of training offered. Currently (May/June 2001) in Macedonia it has become obvious once more that even groups and organisations working for multi-ethnic understanding might be split apart along ethnic lines when the ethnic conflict escalates. However, experience in Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo has shown that links once formed between activists may be taken up later again in spite of the conflict. Although this is knowledge with which everyone conversant with this conflict would probably agree, there is a lack of quotable research data confirming these impressions of the validity of peacebuilding approaches under circumstances of war.

Concerning the two other categories, support of local groups and psycho-social work, it may be assumed that both are of immediate use to the groups and individuals with the privilege of having such international helpers around or being able to attend such group therapy sessions.\(^ {185}\) But again, the question of long-term impact remains open.

With regard to peacekeeping, it seems that presence and monitoring are considered to be useful and important by local groups and individual citizens that profit from the support of CPS volunteers. It has been reported that the number of attacks on ethnic minorities as well as threats against human rights activists (and the CPS team itself) in dynamics of the conflict over time. See also the related Do-no-Harm-Approach Mary B. Anderson developed.

The German Ministry for Development plans such an assessment as a second step in its evaluation (Ministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit 2001).

\(^{183}\) Large 1996:151.

\(^{184}\) Ryan 1985:131.

\(^{185}\) Unfortunately, in the area of former Yugoslavia there has been little done yet to help whole societies overcome the traumas of war - neither on the symbolic level of recognising guilt, nor nationally initiated truth and justice approaches. The International War Crime Tribunal in The Hague seems to be the only body currently offering that kind of collective healing.
Benkovac, Croatia, was reduced due to the presence of the CPS team and its ability to mobilise international pressure through influential organisations in Germany and Croatia. Pax Christi in Banja Luka, in co-operation with local and international authorities (IPTF), has been successful in helping displaced persons and refugees return home. It should be noted for future reference that in the area of former Yugoslavia these protective functions are carried out in a different way than PBI or Witness for Peace practice them in other parts of the world. Protection as a function of presence rather than of individual accompaniment is a tactic that has not been used much, if at all, and certainly has not become as refined a tactic as it has with PBI. It seems much more important that internationals are able to open doors and serve as intermediaries between local groups and citizens and the powerful international community.

With regard to peacemaking activities, it already has been mentioned that this is something Civil Peace Services have undertaken only at the very local level, often as the necessity arises during the course of their peacebuilding work. (For example, a CPS volunteer working in a youth club in West Mostar needs equipment for a party, and convinces the youth club on the other side of the town to lend that equipment to them, and then also drives a few young people from that youth club in her/his car over to attend the party.)

2.2.3.4 Conditions for successful work in the field

Generally it is difficult to judge whether the region (former Yugoslavia) in which CPS predominantly works or a particular approach used by the project organisations is responsible for the observed outcomes.

1. There are only very few projects that give the overall goals of conflict transformation and civil society building as reasons for their presence in the field. Rather, access to the field is sought and gained by means of more tangible projects, be it youth work, work with refugees, reconstruction, psycho-social help, or by stepping into the role of supporting members of local groups (like Austrian Peace Services usually do). In some conflict situations that approach might be necessary in order to obtain acceptance by local players.

2. Bringing people together in dialogue about the conflict requires clear-cut and professed identities, and the readiness of people to meet on the basis of these identities to talk about their conflict.\textsuperscript{186} In the former Yugoslavia - perhaps with the exception of Kosovo - this approach seems to be rarely advisable, because it might strengthen rather than weaken the conflict lines. There, approaches like bringing people together regardless of their identity to pursue other common goals (what Korschat has called multi-communal social work, and which can also be found in training and other initiatives) seem to work better. The reason is probably that alignment along ethnic identities happened very recently and was very much connected to the experience of war itself, and many people, especially those more likely to participate in multi-ethnic enterprises, would much prefer to push these identities into the background once more.

\textsuperscript{186} See for example Philipps-Heck (1991) on the experiences of the peace school Neve Shalom(Wahat al-Salam in Israel.)
3. While some CPSs place their volunteers with partner organisations, others prefer to set up independent teams with only a loose connection to a formal local partner if the funders required such a connection. There are no indicators that one approach is better or more likely to succeed. It seems to be more a question of the conflict situation in the particular area, of the presence of partners that aim at working over the conflict lines, and whether having a steady local partner organisation would make crossing the lines more difficult or impossible.

4. Building up good field relationships with both local authorities and international players already present seems to be very important in order to fulfil the functions of protection and opening doors to other agencies and authorities.

5. Questions concerning training, preparation, and the qualifications of people working in peace services will be dealt with in the chapters on personnel and training. The range of people in regard to both age and qualifications seems to be rather broad, and the length of training attended before going to the field varies between a few weeks and several months. There is no clear indication that field projects were more successful or had more impact because of certain kinds of training or skills, other than a general emphasis on personal maturity and the ability to communicate with and to adapt to another culture. Sometimes it seems to have been the other way around: The broad and open character of most CPS projects has allowed many volunteers to make use of their specific skills and knowledge (such as being a psychologist or suffering from a rare chronic sickness) in order to start matching projects in the field (trauma therapy or a self-help group for people with that sickness).
2.2.4 Consequences for Nonviolent Peaceforce

Donna Howard and Christine Schweitzer

1. Peacekeeping tactics: The examples of different peace team and civil peace service organisations have shown a rather wide range of peacekeeping tactics, including different varieties of accompaniment as well as presence and interpositioning. The lesson learned for NP might be that there are different approaches, and that depending on the conflict situation and the goals, different tactics might be chosen:

- There are projects that concentrate on giving protection to local activists, acting as un-armed bodyguards with a strong international network behind them, and that derive their power from the threat of international pressure (accompaniment as deterrence, PBI as example).

- Then there are projects that concentrate on giving protection to a larger group or even a ‘category’ (e.g. ethnic minority) of people. Here accompaniment might take the form of a few internationals being present with such a group (e.g. accompanying returning refugees), or accompanying individuals on critical missions (e.g. WfP accompaniment of banana workers to their trial in Guatemala, BPT and Pax Christi volunteers going with ethnic Serbs to Croatian authorities to apply for papers).

- And thirdly there have been projects that direct their deterrence primarily not at one of the conflict parties on the ground, but at a third power threatening to intervene (Gulf Peace Team, Witness for Peace in Nicaragua). Here the deterrence is not a result of caring about international pressure but caring about pressure at home (killing ones own citizens as collateral damage is not received well with voters in many countries).

- Interpositioning to stop a war: The projects tried so far have all been rather spontaneous and small-scale, and have failed to reach their aims. We will come back to the question of how much that is due to the size of the projects (being too small), logistical shortcomings, and insufficient conflict analysis, after having looked at other kinds of missions in the conclusions of this chapter (2.8). In contrast to the spontaneous projects, peace teams and Civil Peace Services usually have not been about stopping wars, though some of them might have started out with such a goal.

2. The success of all these tactics depends on the perpetrator caring about pressure and not being self-sufficient. Accompaniment is not a tactic that works universally - careful conflict analysis is needed to determine if it has chances of succeeding or not.

3. There is one example in the survey of mixed local-international teams (Osijek Peace Teams, also PBI in Columbia has had local volunteers). It is an example in which the

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187 A single exception is the World Peace Brigade, which was founded in 1961. WPB dissolved after three not very successful actions a few years after its creation.

188 For example, in its earliest mission drafts, the Balkan Peace Team, founded in 1993, spoke of 100 people to be sent to Kosovo to prevent a war there. (Invitation letter to a founding meeting, May 1993)
mandate goes beyond mere peacekeeping tasks. The function of internationals in these teams is to provide a link to the outside world, sometimes to increase political clout with the local authorities, and sometimes also to bring in special skills useful to the project (like newsletter editing in the case of Osijek Peace Teams). An open question so far is whether mixed teams work also in projects where peacekeeping is the main objective. Some incidents in the history of PBI teams have shown that (white) Northern volunteers are not only safer themselves, but may be able to protect their Latin American team-mates as well. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that protection has many sources and being a foreigner from a powerful country of the Northern hemisphere is only one. For instance, the Indian Shanti Sena proved that peacekeeping by local activists is not only possible, but may be very effective. In our sample we found insufficient information on mixed local-international teams in which the international participants came from not-so-powerful countries of the Southern hemisphere.

4. All imaginable activities NP might decide to undertake - be they accompaniment, presence, observation and monitoring, interpositioning, or peacebuilding tasks - will be effective and safe depending upon the strength of its communication with both (or all) contending parties and with the international community. This aspect of the strategy must be in place before a team enters the field.

5. Most, if not all, peace teams have engaged in peacemaking on a local or sectoral level, which means that negotiation/mediation skills are important, as is the readiness to engage in such activities.

6. Peacebuilding: Here the survey has shown a very diverse picture of different approaches and views.

- Some peace teams and most CPSs have peacebuilding as their main objective.
- Some argue that development and relief activities provide an entree into situations and increase an intervenor’s credibility.
- There is, in contrast, the argument that relief and development work should be separate from peacebuilding. This view is held by four out of five peace teams studied. The reasons given are that it: a) takes too much of team’s time, b) is being done by many other organisations, c) does not directly reduce violence or

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189 Besides the obvious functions of networking and PR work, the assumption that having international volunteers might have been attractive to the international sponsors should be considered.

190 1. Some groups invite civilian intervenors to participate in both peacekeeping and peacebuilding, e.g. Guatemalan CPR (communities of returned refugees).
2. CPT Gene Stolzfus says parties wonder ‘how do we know you’re serious if you don’t help us?’ Shanti Sena argues that civilian intervenors should do ‘constructive’ work to help give a concrete moral basis for their intervention. Source: interview with Donna Howard.
3. Lisa Clark and Don Albino Bizotto of the Italian peace group Beati I Construttori di Pace found that development work was a way of keeping and developing contacts in Sarajevo - an entree to peacekeeping work.
4. David Radcliffe, Church of the Brethren, in Sudan: development aspects of work were less contentious and gained support from the church constituency more readily than the more politicised activities of accompaniment and public education about the conflict.

191 WfP provides humanitarian assistance in conjunction with other activities.
challenge the "powers that be," and c) is a form of colonialism - Western outsiders invade a region with their ideas of what local people should do in order to progress.

- Still, other peacebuilding tasks such as training in non-violence, setting up workshops and public events, activities of civil society building etc. are undertaken by most organisations - even those like PBI that concentrate on peacekeeping.

7. According to these findings, the decision whether to engage mainly in peacebuilding or in peacekeeping, or to combine both strategies, seems to be a policy decision to be made at the planning stage, and which depends on needs, conflict analysis, organisational interests and know-how (niches).

8. All the examples show how important it is for a project to define clear goals and strategies.

9. Another difficult issue is the question of non-partisanship. Not all peace team organisations are non-partisan in character and by claim. Some of them, like Christian Peacemaker Teams, are explicitly not, and found having a strong common link (i.e. a religious base to help communicate with devout Catholics of St Helene, and devout Muslims and Jews in Hebron) to be a major help for their work. In some other cases, the question whether the claim of non-partisanship can be confirmed by looking at the work of the organisations from a more independent point of view is still under discussion. This question specially has arisen again and again around accompaniment of local activists if that is the main activity of an organisation (like PBI). The decision of some CPS projects to forego the requirement of having a local partner because any partner would position the project on one side or the other of the perceived conflict shows that there is a possible tension between having one local partner and non-partisanship. One solution might be to choose local partners that welcome the nonviolent intervention on both (or all) sides of the conflict.

10. Many of the CPS organisations have sought support from their governments, and all seek some kind of recognition by the state. Therefore, there are experiences and lessons learned which might be relevant for NP, specially the experience of how lobbying for state support influences the shape and contents of the projects. This can be observed both in Germany and the Netherlands where the CPS-projects looked very different in the beginning then what they are now.

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192 Gene Stolzfuss, interview with Donna Howard.
194 Kern 2000 (interview).
195 This question will be pursued further in a later chapter of the research.
196 In contrast, the mission of WfP requires complete freedom to stand in opposition to the government in order to condemn unjust policy and global economy.
2.3 Humanitarian aid and development organisations

Christine Schweitzer

2.3.1 Introduction

There has been an increasing recognition of the relationship of both humanitarian aid and development aid with conflict and conflict transformation. This is partly\(^\text{197}\) due to the growing number of humanitarian catastrophes in the last 10 years, creating an enormous challenge for both humanitarian aid and development aid. Most of these catastrophes were human-made, caused by civil wars or protracted\(^\text{198}\), stale-mate conflicts. As a result, many resources that formerly went to longer-term development aid must now be diverted to first aid measures; and, in consequence, efforts of longer-term development projects have been destroyed.

In the case of humanitarian aid, the discussion centres mainly on the negative and positive impacts which humanitarian aid may have as a by-product of conflicts.\(^\text{199}\)

In development co-operation, the issue is more complex.\(^\text{200}\) Though many organisations in this field have always seen peace and development as two sides of the same coin\(^\text{201}\), in practice dealing with conflict did not play a major role until perhaps 10 years ago. Now more and more development and aid organisations recognise that the sustainability of their efforts depends on a safe environment.\(^\text{202}\) While some of them see conflict as part of the environment to be taken into account when planning a project, others have started projects concentrating on conflict transformation itself. Conflict Impact Assessment research, a new branch of peace research, evaluates the impact of these kinds of projects on conflict.\(^\text{203}\)

Though neither approach is probably directly transferable to what NP is aiming at, there are many lessons to be learned from humanitarian aid and development work. These concern mainly the Do No Harm approach and other issues of impact by presence in the field; the question of partiality and impartiality; and several issues concerning

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\(^{197}\) One other factor may be the transformation of Eastern Europe, which has made necessary political strategies that combine development with conflict prevention or transformation. Another contributing factor may be the general growing consciousness of the possibilities and necessities of conflict resolution. Ropers 1999:8.


\(^{200}\) The question of doing harm is of course as valid for development co-operation as for humanitarian aid. Development aid has long been accused of cultural hegemonialism. While organisations try to transfer Northern values and technologies to the South, it is becoming more and more clear that the Northern way leads to an impasse, that development aid often has negative impact on local economies, and that it inhibits rather than supports self-reliance. (Freise 1994:48, Evers 1997:59).

\(^{201}\) Fricke 1997:98.

\(^{202}\) A comparative study of the relationship between development co-operation and conflict in six countries has shown that development projects may increase conflict potential as well as decrease it. (Diringer 2001:18)

\(^{203}\) Reychler 1998.
organisational structures and activities, e.g. combining conflict transformation work with material support.

2.3.2 Character and goals

Many different organisations are working in the field of development, aid and conflict transformation. These include:

1. International/intergovernmental agencies such as the UN agencies (e.g. UNDP, UNHCR, World Food Program, UNICEF), and the World Bank.
2. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Crescent are in their own category due to their special status in International Humanitarian Law.
3. International NGOs (e.g. Médecins sans Frontières; Oxfam), NGOs based in one country (e.g. Norwegian Refugee Council), and church/religious-based NGOs (e.g. Caritas or Catholic Relief Services in the Catholic Church);
4. State institutions and organisations in the target countries;
5. NGOs in the target countries.

A growing number of organisations world-wide are concentrating on humanitarian aid. In addition to the older ICRC, Save the Children Fund, Oxfam, etc., new organisations were founded in the 1970s and 1980s, many due the impact of the Biafra war 1967-1971. Though it would be wrong to generalise, at least some of these have broken with the ethical and behavioural codes of their older siblings in regard to absolute neutrality in the field. They do not hesitate to confront local actors with criticism of human rights violations, and define a right or even duty to intervene. Organisations like Médecins sans Frontières publish regularly on human rights issues, and base their decisions on active involvement in a crisis area more on a day-by-day risk analysis, than on the formal invitation or permission of the government of the respective country in which they want to work.

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204 For example, several organisations have a larger number of personnel standing by for emergency deployment. For example, the Norwegian Refugee Council has an emergency stand-by force of 600 men and women in Norway and Africa, ready to reach an area of crisis with 72 hours. (See Web site of NRC: www.nrc.no/NRC/nrc.htm. See Chapter (6) on personnel.
205 The information digested here was partly taken out of published and grey material from humanitarian aid and development organisations, partly from two interviews with a representative of EIRENE International and a former staff member of a German development organisation, AGEH.
206 The importance of NGOs in target countries is often forgotten in discussions on humanitarian aid and development co-operation, or they are merely mentioned as the famous local partners. However, they do not only implement the projects which are designed in the North as the term local partner sometimes seems to infer, but in many, if not most countries, play an important role of their own as well. In Bangladesh e.g. there is one development NGO that claims that it reaches 2.5 Mil rural people living in poverty (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, see Roche 1999:12).
207 For example Médecins sans frontières, Médecins du monde, Komitee Kap Anamur.
208 Also the older organisations were usually founded under the impression of a specific war. The ICRC was a response to - the battle of Solferino. Save the Children Fund began after WW I and the Russian civil war. Oxfam and CARE were founded after WW II. See Slim 1997:123.
Many of these organisations also run development programs. In addition, there are various other types of organisations that do not deal with emergency aid at all. Some of the development services mentioned in chapter 1 under Peace Services belong in this category.

Humanitarian aid organisations base their work on international law, in particular the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the various covenants and conventions on civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights; the status of refugees; discrimination against women, etc.; and the four Geneva conventions of 1949. International development organisations often refer nowadays to Agenda 21 formulated at the UN Rio Conference 1992, and Christian-based development services (which many are) to the Ecumenical Conciliatory Process. Both share aspects in common: the unity and interdependency of all parts of the world and the responsibility of all citizens of the world to counteract the destructive processes currently under way in the context of industrialisation and globalisation.

At the same time, the number of personnel the organisations maintain in the field varies substantially. The large international NGOs easily reach numbers in the hundreds if not thousands. One typical difference between aid and development organisations is that the former works in larger, specialised teams, while the latter often send single experts to work as consultants in a local environment. These single experts are typically Northerners sent to the South, although some organisations (e.g. United Nations Volunteers) try successfully to avoid such a relationship that prompts images of colonial times.

The borders between humanitarian aid and development work tend to dissolve increasingly as the same organisations engage in both. There is growing agreement among the organisations that aid and development are more an issue of emphasis than two absolutely separate activities. Some even speak of a "continuum concept": Development Co-operation - Emergency Relief - Rehabilitation - Development Co-operation, with the principal focus on the use of emergency relief and rehabilitation to

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211 See Global Trends 2000, 1999
212 Even those based only in one country, like the German Dienste in Übersee, have more then 260 development workers in the field.
213 United Nations Volunteers are a small UN organisation founded in 1970, and administered under the auspices of the UN Development Programme (UNDP). UNV serves as an operational partner in developmental, humanitarian and peace operations at the request of any UN member state or UN system agency. Each year there are about 4,000 (paid) volunteers in the field, each having a contract of 2 years. Perhaps one third of the projects in which UNV places its volunteers are projects carried out by international organisations (mostly UN-organisations), and almost two thirds of them work in the UNV’s own projects. Additionally, there are also UN volunteers in projects carried out by particular governments (UNV auf einen Blick - die wichtigsten Statistiken für 1994. Ed: undp) The volunteers are professionals coming from more than 125 countries in the world, almost 75% being citizens of developing countries. They work in development and reform projects, sometimes also in their own countries. Besides development projects they also support human rights work, monitor elections, help with the resettlement of refugees, and do training in political science and human rights.
214 See Adams/Bradbury 1995:43, quoting ACORD.
support development of local structures and capacities capable of sustainable development.\textsuperscript{215}

Many humanitarian and development organisations have developed codes of conduct\textsuperscript{216} which outline principles of approach as well as more pragmatic do's and don'ts.

### 2.3.3 Activities

Emergency aid provides relief to victims who are unable to deal on their own with the emergency situation - food, medical aid, shelter, etc. In a later stage, it might mean assistance with physical reconstruction, resettlement of refugees and reintegration of former combatants. Some of these activities have a direct bearing on conflict—for example, the two last activities. But reconstruction work in general may also be important for dealing with conflict, as shown in the examples of activities of the Civil Peace Services in the last chapter.

In some cases the presence of humanitarian aid and development organisations may play a more general protective function: Mahony/Eguren give the example of Sri Lanka where "according to one confidential source who had worked with both the UN and large international humanitarian NGOs in Sri Lanka, this sort of implicit protection was an even more important service to Sri Lanka than the actual material aid offered by either the UN or the NGOs. In his opinion, humanitarian aid is acceptable in the eyes of the authorities, whereas protection is politically controversial; most massive NGOs are aware that they are providing protection with their presence but do not make this claim publicly."\textsuperscript{217}

Development co-operation entails many activities, for example: technological support, rural development, livelihood support projects and the like, which may have only an indirect impact on conflict. In regard to conflict and peace, some fields of activities for development organisations have been described by the OECD in their recommendations on conflict, peace and development co-operation.\textsuperscript{218} According to these recommendations, development co-operation might contribute to good governance, respect of human rights, and the reform of police and juridical apparatus, by training personnel and counselling those responsible for such reforms. Secondly, it might contribute to the support of civil society and the civilising of attitudes, values and institutions. To this field belongs the support of traditional mechanisms of dealing with conflict, of NGO networks and peace constituencies, education and independent media.

Fields of conflict-related activities in development co-operation are identified in greater detail below:

\textsuperscript{215} Concept of the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit-GTZ. See Gass/van Dok 2000:56, and also Diringer 2001:19

\textsuperscript{216} For example the Code of Conduct that the ICRC and the Red Crescent Movement formulated together with other NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes, see: Humanitarian Charter 2000:314 pp.; and the Code of Conduct of International Alert (which is really a conflict transformation, not a development organisation).

\textsuperscript{217} Mahony/Eguren 1997:207

1. Cultural work/media, e.g. support of independent journalism, of cultural activities (e.g. theatre, music) and of ethnic pluralism in the media;

2. Demilitarisation (e.g. arms buy-back programs), demobilisation and reintegration programs for soldiers, non-violence training for police and army;

3. Support of civil society, including election monitoring, education of voters, support of national conferences, support of NGOs working on conflict resolution, support of human rights organisations, support of ethnically or socially marginalised groups to articulate their interests;

4. Support of judicial system, e.g. development of mediation programs on local level, support of marginalised groups to gain access to justice, support of truth commissions;

5. Education, including non-violence training, work with youth on prejudice reduction, and help to come to grips with the past.\(^{219}\)

6. Another fairly typical service offered by development agencies as well as by the Civil Peace Services is trauma counselling for children and refugees.\(^{220}\)

7. In some cases, development organisations have also engaged in peacekeeping activities. The German Dienste in Übersee (Services Overseas), for example, accompanied a threatened bishop in Guatemala.\(^{221}\) Another organisation (AGEH) sent a development worker to support the landless movement in Brazil where his presence clearly served the additional function of deterring armed attacks.\(^{222}\)

### 2.3.4 Outcomes and impact

An elaborate project entitled Local Capacities for Peace has been carried out by a coalition of aid and development organisations under the leadership of the US-based Collaborative for Development Action. It has dealt with the question of what impact humanitarian aid might have on conflict, and eventually formulated a set of issues for awareness, based on a number of case studies--usually known as the Do No Harm approach.\(^{223}\) According to this approach there are two ways by which aid may affect conflict: first, through resource transfers and, second, through implicit ethical messages. The challenge for humanitarian aid is to plan and carry out its missions so as to avoid these negative by-products.

Resource transfers may feed into, prolong and worsen conflict in the following ways:

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\(^{219}\) Fricke 1997:98 for the first five elements, referring to Corinna Kreidler 1996 but without giving the complete source. These activities can be found in most of the work descriptions of development agencies - e.g. in the not yet published and not-quotable case studies of the Reflecting on Peace Practices-Project, the interviews I conducted with representatives of development agencies and different other publications, e.g. Roche 2000.

\(^{220}\) Services Overseas in Mexico and Mozambique. See Schwieger 2000.

\(^{221}\) Schwieger 2000.

\(^{222}\) Source: Interview.

1. Theft: Very often aid goods are stolen by armies to support the war effort either directly (as when food is stolen to feed fighters), or indirectly (as when food is stolen and sold in order to raise money to buy weapons).

2. Distributional effects: Aid is usually targeted to certain groups which means that other people do not receive it, thereby tending to reinforce the conflict, especially if one of the groups is identifiable with pre-formed sides in the conflict. On the other hand, aid that is given across subgroups can serve to lessen the division between groups.

3. Market effects: Aid affects prices, wages and profits, and can either reinforce the war economy (enriching activities and people that are war-related) or the peace economy (reinforcing “normal” civilian production, consumption and exchange). 224

4. Substitution effects: When aid agencies assume responsibility for civilian survival in war zones, the aid they give frees up whatever internal resources exist for the pursuit of warfare.

5. Legitimisation effects: Aid legitimises some people and some actions, and de-legitimises others. It can support either those people and actions that pursue war, or those that pursue and maintain non-war. 225

The implicit ethical messages conveyed through aid may include: carrying the message of acceptance of the terms of war by negotiating passage with warring parties or hiring armed guards to protect the delivery; bestowing legitimacy on warriors and undermining peace-time values (when, for example, it becomes obvious that the aid organisation values the life of its own international staff higher than that of local people); and reinforcing animosity by making atrocities committed in the course of the war public in their fundraising campaigns. 226

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224 By importing goods for relief and distributing them free of charge, donors can bring about the collapse of the local economy, and/or of informal networks of people helping each other. (Gass/van Dok 2000:59).

225 When humanitarian aid satisfies basis needs, then the political elites are free of their responsibility, and need no longer justify their actions to civil society. (Gass/van Dok 2000:59).

226 In detail:

Arms: When aid agencies hire armed guards to protect their goods from theft or their staff from harm, the implicit ethical messages is that it is legitimate for arms to determine who gets access to food and medical supplies and that security and safety derive from weapons. On the other side, if the use of armed guards is avoided, the message may be that law and order may rule and people can be safe.

Collaboration: When aid agencies refuse to co-operate with each other, and even worse, "bad-mouth" one another (e.g. saying things such as "we don’t work the way they work; we are better and they get it wrong…), the message received by those in the area is that if you do not agree with someone, you do not have to work with them or respect them - which is another message of warfare.

Impunity: When aid workers use the goods and support systems provided as aid to people who suffer for their own pleasures and purposes (such as taking a vehicle to the mountains for a weekend holiday - even when petrol is scarce), the message is that if one has control over resources, it is permissible to use them for personal benefit without being accountable to anyone else who may have a claim on these resources.

Different value for different lives: When there is danger and aid agency policies allow for the evacuation of expatriate staff, but not for local staff, or even worse, when plans call for the removal of vehicles, radios and expatriates while local staff, food and other supplies are left behind, the message is that some lives (and even some goods) are more valuable than other lives.

Powerlessness: When field-based aid staff disclaim responsibility for the impacts of their aid programs, referring to their headquarters, or the donor, the message received is that individuals need not accept accountability for the impacts of their actions - which people in war zones tend to believe anyway.
Development co-operation includes a long list of possible negative impacts, some of which have been raised for more than 30 years now as general criticism of development aid. Issues include that development projects: have cemented local inequities instead of alleviating poverty; have fostered conflicts over resources instead of protecting them; have supported authoritarian regimes; have called cultural values into question; and have created and inflated an NGO market, where NGOs are being founded only to reserve donations from abroad.

More specifically, research is currently being carried out on the outcomes and impact resulting from development co-operation through dealing with conflict. However, to my knowledge only a few generalisations can be made so far. Larger lessons-learned projects such as Reflecting on Peace Processes by the same group of organisations which developed the Do No Harm approach, or the comparable project by the European Platform on Conflict Prevention, are still under way and have yet to publish their results. On the other hand, impact analyses of single projects may show what worked in a certain case, but are of limited use in formulating general lessons on how to achieve positive impact.

2.3.5 Conditions for successfully dealing with conflict in humanitarian aid and development projects

1. One essential precondition would appear to be a good and ongoing conflict analysis, such as by using the methodology proposed by Anderson. This asks what are the dividers and the connectors in a given conflict, and then seeks to strengthen the latter, for example by giving aid across lines of conflict, using multiethnic staff, and

Belligerence: When international staff approach every encounter with local authority exhibiting an air of belligerence, suspicion and the implicit threat of invoking their power (threatening to withdraw aid, for example), then the message transmitted is that relationships are rightly based on power, suspicion and toughness.

Publicity: Finally, when NGO headquarters makes use of pictures of atrocities in order to raise funds, they may reinforce the demonisation of one side in a war and, thus, reinforce the sense that one side is evil and the other good. This is not only never correct but reinforces existing stereotypes and thereby warfare.

Some critics of humanitarian aid do not content themselves with criticising negative by-products but question the legitimacy of humanitarian aid as a whole. In their eyes, development co-operation and humanitarian aid is just the other side of a new colonialism: "...Much of the influence of foreign NGOs in Africa derives from the power of their governments, embassies and companies. Some of the most powerful NGOs get the vast majority of their money from their own governments, whether from emergency operations or for development projects. In effect these NGOs are the civil arm of their government’s policies and the ideological cousins of the IMF and World Bank. One slaps us in the face; the other offers us handkerchiefs to wipe the tears." (Abdul-Raheem 2001. He is the General Secretary of the Pan-African movement.)

In Mozambique approximately 70% of the country’s gross domestic product in 1988 was development aid, and education and health care in the hand of NGOs instead of the government. See Gass/van Dok 2000:52.

See Roche 1999 for some published examples. The interesting case studies produced in the context of the RPP project are unfortunately not available for quotation.
seeing that host communities benefit from assistance to internally displaced persons.

2. Avoid everything that might support war, be it materially or immaterially, through ethical messages transferred through one’s own actions.

3. The Do No Harm approach emphasises that setting an example by one’s own standard of behaviour is very important for making a positive impact.

4. Combining conflict transformation approaches with material aid or consultancy in other fields seems to work, both because it might tackle causes of conflict (poverty, imbalances of access to income), and because it gives the staff a chance to build up trust.

5. Special conflict resolution skills are considered very useful. For example, in Germany the development services have now added such skills to the regular training program of staff being sent to projects dealing with conflict.

6. The longer-term character of development approaches seems to be favourable to projects because it allows the staff to see and influence changes over a longer period of time.

7. The partner approach is usually considered an absolute must by development organisations, in contrast to earlier experiences when, 30 or 40 years ago, the partner approach was not the general rule. With regard to Civil Peace Services which sometimes do not obey this rule, the danger of peace colonialism has been explicitly mentioned in interviews. Though this might not mean that the development organisation per se is partisan in a given conflict, the partnership itself is something which other non-partisan organisations would reject as unsuitable to their work.  

On the other hand, Africa provides an example of a regional conflict about which one interviewed person stressed that the matter of non-partisanship grew in importance at the time his organisation started to get involved in the local conflict. To sum up: although the experience of development organisations seems to confirm that a non-partisan approach is important when one deals with conflict, what is meant by non-partisanship seems to depend on the situation and cannot be generalised, as for example choosing not to have formal local partners.

2.3.6 Consequences for Nonviolent Peaceforce

Though NP probably will not engage either in humanitarian emergency aid nor in development projects, it should carefully consider which of the lessons learned by these types of projects and organisations may be transferred to future NP work. This applies

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230 Anderson 2000. Dividers are sources for tension. For example, they may be contending over versions of history, real and perceived disparities between communities in resource allocations, presence of troops etc. Connectors on the other hand are things like a shared past, numbers of intermarriages, shared religious holidays and the like.

231 Like PBI in general or the above-mentioned CPS project in Bosnia. Both have argued that choosing a local partner would mean choosing one side in the conflict, and therefore would jeopardise the non-partisan approach of the work.
especially to the warnings and recommendations developed by the Do No Harm approach. Most of the implicit ethical messages are directly transferable, starting with use of resources and ending with evacuation provisions. In addition, however, issues concerning direct support of war have to be considered. Consider questions from two examples of short-term peace army-type missions (see Chapter 1.4 and appendix for details):

a) The Gulf Peace Team allowed itself to be used by one side of the conflict, in the name of stopping a larger war. Did it thereby implicitly accept the attack on Kuwait, on the Shiite and Kurdish minority in Iraq, and the production and use of poison gas?

b) During the Mir Sada Peace Caravan a discussion broke out among the participants when a rumour started that the USA might want to bomb Serbian positions around Sarajevo. The question was: If we go there, this bombing will not happen. Do we want to prevent it, given the fact that these same positions shell Sarajevo every day?
2.4 Larger-scale civilian missions

Christine Schweitzer

2.4.1 Introduction

In addition to the UN-led complex missions with a strong civilian element as described in the next section, there have been a few larger-scale international missions based on military force. I will present here five examples with different characteristics, leaving aside those UN Monitoring missions that were staffed mainly by military observers, as well as OSCE long-term missions consisting of only a small number of diplomats.232 Three of the examples may be considered successes; two were not able to prevent the outbreak of violence.

- In South Africa several election monitoring programs were organised by churches (Ecumenical Monitoring Program in South Africa), NGOs and intergovernmental bodies around the first free elections in 1994, and later in preparation for communal elections in KwaZulu/Natal. The various South African NGO monitoring programs are the only examples in this survey of larger-scale civilian missions, where the organisation of the missions lay in the hands of local organisations that co-operated with international sending organisations, and who deployed mixed local-international teams.

- In Bougainville (South Pacific) the Truce Monitoring Group/Peace Monitoring Group (TMG/PMG) started working at the end of 1997 to monitor the peace agreements between Papua New Guinea and the warring parties in Bougainville. TMG/PMG are organised by the militaries of four neighbouring countries, but the teams do not carry weapons and include additionally civilians from these countries.

- In Kosovo, the Kosovo Verification Mission of the OSCE 1998-99, was deployed to verify a cease-fire agreement between Yugoslavia and the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army. The KVM was staffed by a mixture of internationals from all OSCE member states and included local staff mainly as interpreters, drivers and aides.

- UN missions in El Salvador and East Timor were mandated with both preparation of elections /a referendum and monitoring violence. They were staffed by civilians, police and (unarmed) military observers provided by the United Nations.

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232 These examples do not exhaust the list of civilian missions. Since 1997, there is, for example, the "Temporary International Presence in Hebron", a civil observation mission in the West Bank town of Hebron. It consists of members from six countries (Denmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey), and is the result of negotiations conducted between 1994 and 1997 between Israel and the PLO. Its main task is "to monitor and report the effort to maintain normal life in the city of Hebron and thus creating a feeling of security among the Palestinian residents..." See the Web page of this mission, http://www.tiph.org/
2.4.2 Character and goals

2.4.2.1 Election monitoring in South Africa

The process of transition from the racist apartheid regime to a multiethnic and democratic South Africa led up to the first non-racist and free elections in 1994. The period before the elections was marked by much violence in different regions of the country. After the elections violence continued, specifically in KwaZulu/Natal where followers of the ANC and Inkatha were fighting each other, leading to the postponement of local elections in that province from November 1995 to the end of June 1996. This development provided the impetus for another monitoring project.

During the elections in 1994 both NGOs and intergovernmental organisations sent civilian monitors. The NGO mission with the largest number of monitors was the Ecumenical Monitoring Programme (EMPSA)\(^{233}\) organised by the South African Catholic Bishops Conference and South African Council of Churches with the World Council of Churches. It ran from 1992 to 1994, with a total of 443 participants, about two thirds of them operating in the year of the elections. Three types of monitors were used: an Eminent Persons Group that was supposed to stay up to one week; a group of experts that stayed up to two weeks; and field monitors who served in small teams of two to four persons\(^{234}\) for a period of six weeks. These time periods included preparation and debriefing at the beginning and the end of the mission.\(^{235}\) The mandate of the EMPSA monitors included monitoring of politically motivated violence; investigating its causes and, if possible, preventing it from breaking out; monitoring and reporting on the negotiation process; and monitoring and reporting on the election process in its entirety.

Another larger monitoring program was set up by the Network of Independent Monitors (NIM), a South African umbrella organisation of some 40 NGOs. They deployed local and international monitors in teams who worked together an average of five months per monitor in 1994, the year of the elections. The mandate of the monitors took four main forms:

- Basic monitoring, by presence at political meetings, funerals etc., and partly by short-term investigation (, collecting witness accounts);
- Crisis intervention and, for example, when a train of demonstrators threatened to detour from the agreed route; and mediation between actors in conflict;
- Investigative monitoring, e.g. investigation of the background of political murders, or mapping of illegal armed activities;
- Long-term mediation to solve conflicts on a long-term basis.\(^{236}\)

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\(^{233}\) All information on EMPSA and NIM was taken from Ewald/Thörn 1994 who evaluated the Swedish contribution to those two (and another third) project.

\(^{234}\) The teams in their entirety were exchanged after 6 weeks; there was no overlap.

\(^{235}\) There were various reasons given for the short time of service. One consideration was that the field monitors were recruited on a non-profit basis. Another point was to have as many international participants as possible. Furthermore, monitors would be traumatised and/or too emotionally involved and thereby risk losing their neutrality if they stayed too long. (Ewald/Thörn 1994:69)

\(^{236}\) Ewald/Thörn 1994:74p. There are no real examples of that part of the mandate.
In addition, several other observation and monitoring programs and organisations were present before and at the time of the National Elections\textsuperscript{237}, including several intergovernmental missions:\textsuperscript{238}

- The United Nations sent an Observation Mission (UNOMSA) of about 500 observers who were deployed by the end of March 1994. Their number was strengthened in April by an additional 1,485 election observers.
- The Organization of African Unity (OAU) sent 102 observers
- The Commonwealth sent 118 observers
- The European Union sent 322 observers.

The mandate of UNOMSA included monitoring and reporting on voter education; monitoring the distribution of temporary voter cards; and observing the Independent Electoral Commission in its selection of sites and establishment of balloting and counting stations. It also monitored compliance by the security forces with the requirements of the law relating to the electoral process, and equitable access to the media. UNOMSA also co-ordinated with South African and foreign NGOs on issues related to monitoring and observation.

The total number of observers deployed by intergovernmental observer missions and co-operating under the umbrella of the UN Mission was 2,527 persons:

In 1996, a coalition of local churches in KwaZulu/Natal (the KwaZulu Natal-Church Leaders Group- KCLG) organised a program called "Ecumenical Peacemakers Programme\textsuperscript{239} in relation to the upcoming local elections in that province. The mandate of the peacemakers was not only to monitor and report, but to intervene actively and mediate between conflict parties. The volunteers--20 internationals and 80 South Africans--were deployed in five regions of KwaZulu/Natal for a period of three months per person. Each region was headed by a regional co-ordinator. The internationals received a one-week training in South Africa before beginning to work in teams of three internationals. One of their first tasks was to recruit 15 local peacemakers each, and train them with the help of experts.

\subsection*{2.4.2.2 Peace monitoring in Bougainville}

Since 1988 Bougainville\textsuperscript{240}, an island that belonged to Papua New Guinea through colonial times, has gone through a serious civil war between the "Bougainville

\textsuperscript{237} For example, there was a small number of international experts (e.g. on radio communication) working with the Wits Vaal Regional Peace Secretariat, recruited by the Swedish coalition PEMSA that also recruited and sent Swedish participants to EMPSA and NIM (Ewald/Thörn 1994:79 pp).
\textsuperscript{238} According to Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:229.
\textsuperscript{239} See Schmidt 1997 for all information given here on that program.
\textsuperscript{240} The sources of information on the mission in Bougainville are Böge 1999, Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999, and the report of a seminar "Monitoring Peace in Bougainville" that was held at the Australian National University on the 8th of September 1999. The talks of different participants of the monitoring mission can be found in the report that is available on Internet (http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia).
Revolutionary Army" fighting for independence of the island from Papua New Guinea (PNG), and the PNG defence forces. Papua New Guinea was supported by Australia through training, equipment, and for some time even through "military counsellors" allegedly spending their "holidays" flying four Australian army helicopters. In the course of the war so-called "resistance forces" established themselves in Bougainville that fought on the side of PNG against the Revolutionary Army. The war had been triggered by intensive economic exploitation (copper mining) of the island by PNG. The 10 years of war cost the lives of about 20,000 people--more than 10 % of the population of 180,000. More than 50% became displaced. The infrastructure broke down completely; whole villages were burned to the ground. Massive human rights violations--murder, torture, rape, disappearances, etc.--became daily occurrences.

The war was brought to an end by two agreements concluded in October 1997 (Burnham II Agreement), and the "Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville" (Lincoln Agreement) in January 1998. The negotiations started when both sides realised that they could not win the war, and were made possible by the arrangement of a neutral location (Burnham, a New Zealand military base), covered travel and transport, and guaranteed security of the participants. In the negotiations political and military leaders of Bougainville were joined by civil society leaders (clan chiefs, leaders of women’s organisations, etc.).

An unarmed Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) was established in Bougainville as part of these cease-fire agreements. Under the leadership of the New Zealand military, in 1997 approximately 370 soldiers and civilians from New Zealand, Australia, Fiji and Vanuatu were sent to Bougainville to monitor the cease-fire and the implementation of the agreement. All members of the TMG had to be unarmed and wear civilian clothes, because an armed peacekeeping force would have been refused by the parties in conflict. The operation was set up according to military standards and rules, using a military infrastructure and approach. Most of the staff today are based in one location, in a tent camp set up in a building in Loloho. Headquarters staff are quartered in a number of houses in another town (Arawa). From there they go out to patrols in the villages.

After a third round of negotiations--this time in Canberra in March 1998--and with the beginning of the permanent cease-fire at the end of April, the character of TMG changed. New Zealand stepped back from its role as co-ordinator of the peacekeeping

241 Böge 1999:12.
243 Because of elections in PNG, the PNG government joined the negotiation process only after the first round. (Böge 1999:10)
244 According to Ramsbotham/Woodhouse (1999:196) the forces consisted of 260 persons that were to be rotated so that 150 monitors were on the island at any time. I follow here the numbers of Böge (1999:12) who speaks of 370 persons in the original TMG: New Zealand 220, Australia 100, and the rest from the other participating nations.
force and reduced its staff from 220 to 30\textsuperscript{247} in what was then called the "Peace Monitoring Group." Australia took over the leadership, with the agreement of all parties, in spite of the reservations against Australia that still existed because of its role in the war. In addition to monitoring the cease-fire, the mandate of PMG now includes facilitation of the peace process. The PMG still operates, although its numbers were reduced in the year 2000. \textsuperscript{248}

In addition, the United Nations has sent a small Monitoring Mission consisting of five persons. Their mandate includes monitoring and verification of the agreement, but their real worth is seen in the symbolic inclusion of the United Nations in the peace process, a sign that the world cares about what happens in Bougainville. \textsuperscript{249}

\textbf{2.4.2.3 Kosovo Verification Mission}

After almost nine years of non-violent resistance\textsuperscript{250} against direct Serbian rule in Kosovo, a province that was inhabited by almost 90\% ethnic Albanians\textsuperscript{251}, radical Albanian groups voted for armed struggle and founded the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK).\textsuperscript{252} The massive repression that followed on the part of the Serbian/Yugoslav police and military forces, especially in 1998, turned most parts of Kosovo into a war area, with hundreds of thousands of people becoming temporarily displaced.\textsuperscript{253} Under the threat of NATO intervention in Kosovo in the autumn of 1998 (the activation order had even been given already)\textsuperscript{254}, the Yugoslav government under Milosevic agreed\textsuperscript{255} at the last minute to the

\textsuperscript{247} The PMG consisted of 306 women and men: 247 from Australia, 30 from New Zealand, 15 from Fiji and 14 from Vanuatu. (Böge 1999:17) Later, it was reduced. Currently there are 15 civilians (all Australians), 156 Australians soldiers, 20 New Zealanders, 6 Fijians and 6 Ni Vans. This Information was taken from the Australian Ministry of Defence, www.defence.gov.au/bougainville/news.htm.


\textsuperscript{249} Böge 1999:17 p.

\textsuperscript{250} See Clark 2000.

\textsuperscript{251} This is an approximate number since all the censuses were boycotted over the last ten years. After the NATO war, most Serbs and many members of other ethnic minorities have left Kosovo.

\textsuperscript{252} In contrast to the description of the other civilian missions, I have referenced this part very carefully instead of only naming the main sources at the beginning. This is due to the fact that the events that lead up eventually to the NATO war against Yugoslavia in March 1999 are discussed in a highly controversial manner. There are many statements by politicians and NATO leaders that can be proven to not correspond to the field reports of the observer missions on the ground. One of the main sources quoted here is Heinz Loquai; a high-ranking retired military of the German army who served with OSCE in Kosovo and whose critical report led to his dismissal soon after his book was published.

\textsuperscript{253} At that stage of the war, there were no indicators that the Yugoslav government aimed at ethnic cleansing in Kosovo as had the Bosnian Serbs in large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina. See Schweitzer 1999 c, Loquai 2000:26 pp.

\textsuperscript{254} Loquai 2000:31 pp. Durward (2000:31) says: "In Ambassador Holbrooke's words, it was the credible threat of imminent NATO air strikes that induced Milosevic to comply." Also after the signing of the agreement, the NATO activation order remained standing and it was quite clear for all actors on the ground that to resume fighting would lead to NATO intervention. See Schweitzer 1999 c

\textsuperscript{255} "Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission", October 16, 1998, between Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE.
deployment of an unarmed "Kosovo Verification Mission" under the umbrella of OSCE. In contrast to an armed mission, an OSCE mission was acceptable to both sides, although the Kosovo-Albanians would have preferred an armed NATO peacekeeping force.

The OSCE started to deploy about 2000 unarmed monitors in November 1998, but not having the personnel (or equipment) ready, the Mission never reached the agreed number before it was withdrawn on March 20, 1999. The KVM replaced the "Kosovo Diplomatic Observation Mission-KDOM" that preceded it, and whose personnel was integrated into the KVM.

The security of the OSCE verifiers--the term “verifier” instead of “monitor” was used to express their active role--was to be guaranteed by the Yugoslav/Serbian police. But a "NATO Extraction Force" was deployed to Macedonia to stand ready in case OSCE personnel were taken hostage (a scenario looming large in the imagination of the Europeans after the hostage-taking that occurred in Bosnia in 1995) or were otherwise endangered. NATO also took charge of monitoring all movements in the air.

The mandate of the KVM included:

- Establishment of a permanent presence throughout Kosovo;
- Monitoring of the cease-fire (UN resolution 1199) as agreed between OSCE and FRY on 16.10.1998;
- Maintaining close liaison with the parties and other organisations in Kosovo;
- Supervising later elections in Kosovo;
- Reporting and making recommendations to the OSCE Permanent Council and to the United Nations.

They were also charged with accompanying Serbian police forces if they requested it; supporting UNHCR, ICRC and other international organisations in the return of displaced persons and delivering of humanitarian aid; monitoring the support given to the humanitarian organisations by the Yugoslav authorities; and supporting the implementation of an agreement on the self-administration of Kosovo as soon as that agreement was made.

The Mission headquarters was established in the capital of Kosovo, Prishtina. In addition, five regional centres were opened, plus field offices and co-ordination centres in smaller towns and communities. Teams of verifiers were to operate from the field offices. An OSCE training centre was also opened to prepare the verifiers for their tasks.

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256 The OSCE had become marginalised at the beginning of the wars in former Yugoslavia, when first the EU and then the UN assumed the role of the main international players. By 1992, the OSCE had only established an observer mission in Macedonia and a long-term mission in Yugoslavia. However, due to the OSCE banning Yugoslavia, that mission had to be withdrawn as early as the end of July 1993. After the Dayton agreement, the OSCE has been trusted with the organisation of elections in Bosnia, the protection of human rights, and trust-building measures in the political-military sphere. (Giersch 1998, OSCE-Handbooks)
From the beginning\textsuperscript{257} the Mission was faced with many problems, although for the first two months violence decreased as the Serbian forces returned to their barracks. But by the end of December fighting had already resumed, mainly at first from the side of the Kosovo Liberation Army which had filtered back into the areas abandoned by the Yugoslav forces. The OSCE mission held out until March although their work became more and more difficult, until it was withdrawn a few days before the NATO bombing started. It is difficult to assess the degree of risk for the verifiers. Most who are critical of the NATO military intervention maintain that the withdrawal was not really necessary, and the number of incidents involving KVM personnel was rather small compared to the total number of encounters experienced daily by the personnel.\textsuperscript{258} The fact that the withdrawal was not impeded in any way, as OSCE and NATO feared it might, could be seen as an indicator that the Mission might still have had a chance.

Many questions have been asked about the role of NATO and specifically of the United States. It can be proven by KVM reports that the UCK, not the Serb side, was to blame for the breaking of the cease-fire in December and January 1998/99. However, a rather dubious incident, the so-called “Racak massacre,”\textsuperscript{259} was used by the USA and other NATO leaders (Germany and Britain distinguished themselves here in particular) to build up a case for military intervention. That intervention\textsuperscript{260}--a bombing campaign of Yugoslav

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{257} Communication was difficult with Yugoslav authorities, as well as with the Albanian leadership. There were internal co-ordination problems and limited freedom of movement by the Serbian authorities. See "Monitoring and Verification of Peace Agreements".
\textsuperscript{258} Loquai 2000:64 says that only 0,5 % of all activities were impeded, and that this means that there was no sign of a planned policy by the FRY government to prevent OSCE from carrying out its work. This view has been questioned by some verifiers with whom I personally have had the chance to speak. These people explained that a larger number of incidents never made it into official reports.
\textsuperscript{259} William Walker, the leader of the OSCE mission, arrived at the scene in Racak accompanied by 30 journalists (Loquai 2000:46), immediately spoke of a massacre committed by Serbian forces to which the 45 dead they found fell victim. But, the final report of the Finnish commission charged to examine the bodies was hushed up. (See Scheffran 1999:62 p, Loquai 2000:45 pp.) According to the reports of independent journalists (among them a team of the German Westdeutscher Rundfunk) the victims probably were killed in the course of an attack on the village, and then collected and brought to the point where they were found. That would mean that the accusation of a planned massacre or execution was not only premature, but became a conscious lie because Racak still figures high in the legitimisation of the NATO attack.
\textsuperscript{260} There is also the suspicion that the OSCE mission was used to prepare the military intervention by planting observers spying for NATO in it. Unfortunately, this allegation is hard to prove because OSCE monitors only confirm it off record, and officially both NATO and OSCE of course deny it. As argument in favour of this misuse of the mission, often the fact is quoted that the USA established Ambassador William Walker as head of the mission against the wishes of the Europeans.

Ambassador Walker is a US diplomat with a record for doubtful activities in Latin America at the beginning of the 1980s. He served as Ambassador in several states of Middle and Latin America. In Honduras he was involved in the Iran-Contra affair. In El Salvador, where he had been Ambassador during the civil war, he, according to a report of a UN truth commission, supported the man responsible for the murder of Archbishop Romero, and impeded in 1989 the investigation into the murder of a woman, her daughter and six Jesuits by soldiers of the government. (Scheffran 199:63).

There are also other indicators pointing in the same direction. For example: General Clark accused Yugoslavia of bringing two battalions into Kosovo around Christmas time, and that movement was not announced to OSCE. According to Loquai the general’s accusation was false: The troops - companies not
forces in Kosovo, and infrastructure in Serbia and Montenegro--eventually took place from March to June 1999, after a new round of negotiations in Rambouillet (France) had failed. The war was not sanctioned by the Security Council of the United Nations but was a unilateral decision of the NATO-allied states. The war ended when Yugoslavia capitulated in June 1999, and a transitional international rule (now based on UN Security Council resolutions) was established in Kosovo, with NATO taking care of peacekeeping, and the United Nations, OSCE and European Union sharing a multitude of civilian tasks.

2.4.2.4 UN missions in El Salvador and East Timor

UN Observer missions are generally small (at maximum, a few hundred), staffed predominantly by military personnel. They obey the same principles and rules regarding final approval of their constitution as for the conflict parties, including equitable geographic representation, and carrying arms only for self-defence (see next section 2.5) according to classical peacekeeping missions. But a few observation missions have been staffed differently and with different tasks of these will be considered in this chapter:

ONUSAL in El Salvador (1991-1995) was set up at a time when cease-fire negotiations between the Salvadorian government and the guerrilla army, FMLN, which were intended to end a civil war of more than 10 years' duration, were well under way but were not yet concluded. Thus, ONUSAL was one of the first UN missions deployed prior to a cease-fire agreement. ONUSAL's mandate since its deployment in June 1991 has changed several times. At first, it was to verify compliance by the parties with the July 1990 Agreement on Human Rights. At this point its mandate included monitoring of the human rights situation, investigating alleged human rights violations, promoting human rights, and making recommendations on eliminating violations. It had power to visit any place without notice, could receive communications from anyone, conduct direct investigations, and even use the media for the fulfilment of its mission.

After the signing of the Peace Accords in January 1992, ONUSAL had additionally to verify and monitor the agreement. After the demobilisation of the FMLN, the mandate was again enlarged to monitor the elections planned for 1994. ONUSAL was to verify that the provisions made by all electoral authorities were impartial and consistent with the holding of free and fair elections; that registration of voters would be inclusive; that

battalions - were already in Kosovo and their movement had been announced to OSCE in compliance with the agreement (Loquai 2000:36p)

And was therefore a blatant breach of international law.

Until 1996 there have been about 20 such missions. Their main objective is to report on conditions vis-à-vis the political agreement that the observers have come to monitor - usually either the withdrawal of forces, a cease-fire, borders or demilitarisation zones. See Hillen 1998:33 or Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 1999.


The FMLN was founded in 1980, but there had been violence from right wing as well as left wing groups before that date. By 1992 more than 80,000 people had died, 550,000 displaced and 500,000 had fled the country. (Stuart 1994:60)
effective mechanisms were established to prevent duplicate voting; that voters had unrestricted freedom of assembly, expression of movement and organisation; and that voters were educated so that they could effectively participate.

ONUSAL was originally comprised of 135 international staff but was later increased to 450, a number to which 900 election observers were added in 1993. In the course of enlargement of its mandate, ONUSAL had three divisions added to the original Human Rights Division: a Police Division with an authorised strength of 631 (a number it never reached), to assist in the formation of the National Civil Police; a Military Division consisting of 380 military liaison officers and observers; and an Electoral Division of 36 professionals, established in September 1993.

The longer-term conflict in **East Timor**, where the majority of the population sought independence from Indonesia265 seemed to come to an end when, at the beginning of 1999, the President of Indonesia, Habibie, indicated that his government might be prepared to consider independence for East Timor.266 Negotiations were taken up which included the former colonial power, Portugal, and ended in April 1999 with an agreement between the United Nations, Indonesia and Portugal to allow a referendum, (called “consultation”) in East Timor on the question of the future status of the island.267 In the May 5 Agreements, the parties agreed to the security arrangements for the implementation of the consultation. Indonesia guaranteed that it would take care of law and order, and the protection of all civilians. This meant that the issue of security was left in the hands of the Indonesian police, although it was clear that their neutrality was anything but a given. At the beginning of June the Security Council established the observation mission, UNAMET, to cover the time period until the consultation slated for August 30, which was later extended until end of September. UNAMET consisted of 280 civilian police officers to advise the Indonesian Police, as well as 50 military liaison officers to maintain contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces. As well, a larger number of additional personnel from other UN organisations (e.g. UNHCR), including 460 UN Volunteers (50 of them as polling supervisors), and more then 1,700 other observers were present before the referendum day.268 Supporters and opponents of the autonomy proposal signed a Code of Conduct for the campaigning period.269 But in the last two weeks before the referendum violence escalated again after a period of relative quiet; militias tried to intimidate local people, and UNAMET staff were threatened again.

While voting on the referendum day took place with only a few incidents (one of them the fatal stabbing of a local UN staff member), on the night after the referendum, August 30, violence resumed, mainly on the part of pro-Indonesian militia that had not withdrawn from East Timor as had been stipulated in the Agreement. They attacked pro-independence supporters, burning homes and attacking residents of villages. The

265 A small rebel group had taken up arms in this cause, and pro-Indonesian militia fought against them.


267 The choices in the consultation were autonomy or independence.

268 1,600 international and local observers were officially accredited. There were also 50 Indonesian and 50 Portuguese official observers to monitor the vote. (UN chronology, see above)

269 There was also a Code of Conduct governing the activities of international and local observers once the referendum was concluded, and the observers officially registered.
observers were unable to stop the violence, and all remonstrations with Indonesia to
provide adequate security failed. Only in the capital, Dili, a small group of 92
international staff with 163 local staff, 23 journalists, nine international observers and two
UN medical volunteers remained in the UNAMET headquarters, in order to provide
some protection to about 2,000 displaced East Timorese who had sought refuge in the
compound. In the end the compound was not stormed by the rioting militias and, after
two weeks, the beleaguered occupants eventually evacuated to Australia. On
September 15, one day later, the UN Security Council decided to deploy an armed
Chapter VII-peacekeeping mission, the Transitional Administration of East Timor
(UNTAET), which took place within a few days without meeting much armed resistance.
This is the present state of affairs in East Timor.

2.4.3 Activities

2.4.3.1 Election monitoring in South Africa
The first and foremost activity of all NGO monitoring teams was to make their presence
known by visits to political actors and authorities, and to build contact networks. This
was the background against which both their peacekeeping and their peacemaking
efforts took place.

Peacekeeping Activities
1. Basic monitoring and presence:
   • Monitoring and presence at public meetings, demonstrations, occupations,
     strikes, compulsory transfers of illegal settlers, allocation of plots of land for
     homeless people, funerals, etc. The mission in KwaZulu/Natal also offered
     accompaniment of participants in political meetings on their way to and from
     these events.
   • Monitoring the actions of the security forces was seen as a very important
     function. NIM made sure (e.g. by phone calls ahead of time) that the police
     were present at public meetings, reminding them of the Code of Conduct agreed
     upon, and observing their behaviour.
   • Monitoring the elections: The EMPSA election team (that arrived only two weeks
     before the elections) monitored the preparations (registration and training of the
     monitors, the establishment of polling stations, and training of election monitors)
     as well as mounting a presence at polling stations on election day. The UN
     observers who came into the country for only a few weeks before and during the

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270 Resolution 1256 (1999).
272 For example when 400 pupils, who demonstrated against the arrest of one of their fellows for bringing
a weapon into the school, met with police on a sports field to discuss the issue. (Ecumenical Peacemaker
Programme, See Schmidt 1997)
elections also concentrated their monitoring\textsuperscript{274} efforts on activities related to the elections (such as the establishment of polling and counting stations).

2. Direct interpositioning played a larger part with NIM and the Ecumenical Peacemaker Programme than with EMPSA\textsuperscript{275} NIM monitors intervened in possible crisis situations, e.g. when a train of demonstrators threatened to leave the agreed route and enter the area of its opponents; and contributed in creating links between the local population and the authorities/security forces. But EMPSA also reported interpositioning between different groups at public political meetings, demonstrations and funerals.

3. Investigative monitoring: NIM monitors especially investigated cases of violence, took witness statements, followed up on police investigations, investigated and refuted rumours, mapped areas of conflict, wrote reports, mapped illegal armed activities, etc. Also EMPSA monitors participated during police investigations and identification parades.

\textbf{Peacemaking activities}

Peacemaking activities mainly took place on a local/regional or sectional (work conflicts) basis. They included:

- Creating contacts between rival political actors (EMPSA);
- Supporting the local inhabitants’ contacts with the authorities and with the security forces (EMPSA);
- Mediation attempts such as in taxi wars and strikes (EMPSA);
- NIM monitors actively took part in different types of confidence-creating measures, participated in meetings between disputing parties, organised meetings in areas affected by conflict, and implemented mediation in some individual cases.\textsuperscript{276}

\textbf{Peacebuilding activities}

Peacebuilding was not an activity that loomed high in the descriptions of the South African missions, but there have been certain activities in this field:

1. Civil Society Building

- The monitors working with NIM were involved in some organisational work such as the establishment of functioning offices, discussions with and training of recipient organisations on how to structure their work, etc.
- Networking: The peace monitors contributed to improving information exchange between different organisations.
- Support: The monitors supported different local initiatives to stop violence (EMPSA).

\textsuperscript{274} But, like the others, they were also present at political meetings and funerals.

\textsuperscript{275} This is explained the short length of their stay. See Ewald/Thörn 1994:89.

\textsuperscript{276} Ewald/Thörn 1994:74 p., and 99p. say that there were such cases, but do not describe them.
2. Humanitarian Aid

- There were a few activities related to supporting victims of violence, visiting homes of the families of victims of violence (KwaZulu/Natal), and contributing to the contact between victims and the authorities or aid organisations (EMPSA);

- Giving first aid, calling ambulances or transporting wounded people to hospitals which saved the lives of several people (EMPSA).

Also most missions engaged in report writing, but it is unclear what happened to these reports and how they were used (if at all).

The short length of stay of EMPSA monitors has been criticised. The monitors themselves felt the time was too short. The locals complained that the quick turn-over meant that, as soon as they got used to people they disappeared and new ones had to be introduced.

EMPSA started working before it had the infrastructure in place. Specifically, local support in South Africa was not a given. Other shortcomings related to administration and organisation were also reported--for example, that the program was too centralised, with the national office reserving all important decisions to itself. 277 Also, the report of a participant in the 1996 Ecumenical Peacemakers Programme states that internationals were a great help but their integration also caused many questions and problems for the locals. 278 NIM monitors faced many problems at the start because their local recipient groups did not have the infrastructure and equipment (housing, cars, fax, phones, radio communication) in place. This limited their work, and/or increased the risk (lack of radio communication). 279

2.4.3.2 Peace monitoring in Bougainville

The basic task280 of the Truce Monitoring Group and its successor, the Peace Monitoring Group, was to patrol the area and investigate breaches of the cease-fire agreement. In addition to peacekeeping several activities were combined with these patrols that may be considered as falling more into the realm of peacebuilding:

- Monitors initially went out to the villages usually accompanied by an interpreter,
distributed printed material on the peace process, and held so-called “peace awareness meetings” where they read the Peace Agreement and gave talks on peace-related issues.  

- In addition they conducted village infrastructure assessments, and
- set up sporting competitions (volleyball, soccer) in mixed teams, with members of TM/PPG participating as well.
- Several other activities were carried out with the objective of breaking the ice and building up trust. The monitors organised and attended events which included music, singing and dancing; they learned to convene meetings around lunch or dinner times and shared food with villagers; and the Operations officer made attendance at church services compulsory for all team members, because he considered this to be an essential element in the success of the team considering the very religious setting of Bougainville.

**TM/PPG supported a medical facility that also treats Bougainvilleans who are critically ill.**

However, they did not fulfil requests for material aid although this was often requested and, according to the reports, they brought patrols into difficult situations.

There are not many indicators in the reports on peacemaking activities other than what is referred to as “facilitation.” Facilitation included providing ideas, information, communications and transport. At the start this occurred mainly at the grass-roots level, but as the peace process progressed, facilitation shifted to assisting the Bougainvillean leaders at all levels with attending meetings and the passage of information from these meetings back to the people.  

In terms of organisation and structure, it seems that at least initially the Mission faced many problems. Many things improved over time, especially when predeployment training was introduced (one-week training). Breen reports that a real learning process had set in, and the concentration on military mechanics was reduced. Criticism includes:

- Commanders feeling left alone with the problems once the Mission had started;
- No real selection process of personnel;
- Non-military staff having problems adapting to military culture; military having difficulty adjusting to the civilian monitors;

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281 The patrol within which Parry participated they talked, for example, about the dangers of home brew drinking. Later, Parry heard through the women that consumption was reduced and this made life for the women much easier because it reduced the level of domestic violence. See Trina Parry a.a.O.


283 The training was given by an Australian military regiment in a hot zone close to an indigenous Australian community with whom participants had a chance to interact. The participants had already bonded into teams by the time that the training started. There was also language training in Tok Pisin (Pidgin English), and they became familiarised with the culture of other nations participating in the mission. Colonel Bob Breen from the Australian Defence Force, Contribution to the Seminar Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/breen.htm.
• Cultural sensitivity conflicts between Fijians and Vanuatuans on the one side, and Australians/New Zealanders on the other. Australians thought Vanuatuans badly prepared, while the latter found that some New Zealand and most ADF personnel treated them as interpreters, and seemed condescending about their lack of military experience and skills;

• Partly as a result of concentration on force protection, and partly because the exact nature of monitoring operations was not well practised or understood, there was strong emphasis on military mechanics, but weak effort on political and cultural engagement with the factions and groups in Bougainville;

Gender awareness was obviously very low. One (female) monitor stated: "Many of the women's issues are considered to be only for the female PMG patrol members to be aware of... In fact, a directive that came out from the Headquarters was that patrols should not become "over burdened" by women's issues. I never quite understood that. Perhaps if I had known how not [to] become over burdened with men's issues and how they differed from those of women, I could have reached an appropriate balance." 284 Another adds: "As the only woman in our teamsite, I was sometimes mistaken as being the teamsite cook, or as being there to provide other services (I won't elaborate!) to the team." 285

2.4.3.3 Kosovo Verification Mission

The objective was to spread the verifiers all over Kosovo but because of the low build-up of the Mission that objective was only partly reached. Instead, the verifiers often concentrated on those areas from which disturbances were reported. 286 The KVM concentrated on peacekeeping tasks, with some elements of peacemaking and also a few peacebuilding/emergency aid elements included.

Peacekeeping activities

1. Patrolling by car.

2. Intervening if possible if they came across violent incidents. Sometimes their presence was enough to stop violence—for example, on arrival in one place the Serbian police stopped harassing a group of Albanian young men. 287

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287 Kosovo Update 27.1.99 by the Bureau of European Affairs of the US Department of State, www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_990127_kdom.html
3. Monitoring a possible outbreak of violence before it occurred, in order to at least determine who had started the shooting if there was any. To do that, in at least one case the KVM established verifiers in command posts on opposite sides.  

4. Accompanying Serbian police and Serbian investigators to places controlled by the UCK\(^{289}\), and/or in order to reassure the Albanian population who had reason to fear harassment by Serbian police. In one case, the escorts were cancelled when the UCK informed the KVM that they could not guarantee the safety of the verifiers.  

5. Establishing permanent outposts in crisis areas, e.g. in Malisevo, a small town originally controlled by the UCK, then taken over by the Yugoslav military, in order to encourage return to that town.  

6. Visiting sites of violence where fighting took place or dead bodies were found, or alleged mass grave sites. They usually documented the scene and reported on it.  

7. Monitoring several court trials.  

8. Their work also included weapons verification inspections in Yugoslav army barracks, and inspections of company positions.  

9. Reporting was another important part of the Mission’s tasks, including reports on the situation of refugees and displaced persons.  

**Peacemaking activities**

Peacemaking activities were usually closely linked to the peacekeeping functions of the KVM—for example, when agreements were negotiated between the UCK and Yugoslav army and police to separate the parties in a place like Malisevo.  

Another activity in this field not included in the original mandate was negotiation for the release of hostages and war prisoners. For example, the KVM negotiated the release of five civilians taken hostage by the UCK whom they then picked up and brought back into safety, and the release of eight Yugoslav soldiers.  

**Peacebuilding activities**


\(^{290}\) Loquai 2000:60  

\(^{291}\) Actually, it was the KDOM that first established that outpost, and the KVM that took it over.  

\(^{292}\) OSCE report "Tense Christmas in Kosovo" (www.osce.org/news/kvm-nl12.htm); OSCE press release No 02/99 (www.osce.org/inst/secret/presrel/kpr02-99.htm); Loquai 2000:42  

\(^{293}\) Loquai 2000:62  


\(^{295}\) Loquai 2000:62  


At that point in time the KVM did not engage in peacebuilding in the sense of longer-term activities, but there were some KVM and KDOM activities related to the return of refugees and displaced persons, and reconstruction work:

- Liaison with local and international NGOs on the situation of refugees and displaced persons; 299
- The KVM with the KDOM, USAID, UNHCR and NGOs undertook the rebuilding of facilities in Malisevo. 300 Similar activities also occurred in other places, e.g. repairing electricity in an area, or reconstruction of school buildings. 

### 2.4.3.4 UN missions in El Salvador and East Timor

ONUSAL, the UN mission in El Salvador, was engaged in all three peace strategies. The monitors spread throughout the country, established regional offices and creating a very wide range of contacts with all sides to the conflict. Their activities included peacekeeping tasks also found in other missions, such as:

- Monitoring and verifying human rights violations by reporting on abuses (after they occurred);
- Monitoring of reduction of armed forces (completed by end of January 1993);

After the conclusion of the Peace Accord, ONUSAL played an active role assisting in negotiations, e.g. on demobilization of the FMLN and more equitable distribution of land by the government, broad political participation, and wide recruitment into the new National Civil Police force.

In addition they engaged in a wide range of activities that would fall under the category of peacebuilding:

- Offering human rights education to the military and the general public;
- Monitoring the introduction of a new Armed Forces Reserve System;
- Assisting the restructuring of the police;
- Supervising the clearing of minefields;
- Monitoring the situation affecting ex-combatants.

The observers of UNAMET in East Timor were also deployed throughout the country. 302 But apparently their main activity concentrated on preparations for the elections and not on controlling the violence, other than monitoring the registration and voting stations, and collecting weapons on a voluntary basis from militia members. Their main task was

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299 For example, the KDOM had a meeting with representatives of the Mother Theresa Society and Albanian leaders to discuss the situation of IDPs who fled their homes in reaction to fighting. (Kosovo Update 2.2.99 by the Bureau of European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov./www/regions/eur/rpt_990202_kdom.html).


302 UN chronology (see above)
to educate the population on the referendum through the production and distribution of voter education material.

Registration for the referendum was postponed twice because of the security situation, but eventually commenced in the middle of July. The registration centres were managed and monitored by UNAMET, and turn-out was very good in spite of the still-unsecured situation (451,792 voters, whereas the UN originally expected only 400,000 eligible voters).

When UNAMET staff themselves became victims of violent attacks or threats, they reported on these threats and complained to the Indonesian security forces.  

2.4.4 Outcomes and impact

2.4.4.1 Election Monitoring in South Africa

Two of the NGO monitoring missions (EMPSA and NIM) have been evaluated by a Swedish team, looking at the missions from the Swedish sending organisation’s viewpoint but containing a lot of general information on outcomes and impacts of those two missions, as well as comparing them to some extent with the UN mission. There is no information of that quality on the later program in KwaZulu/Natal, but from the report it appears that, regarding outcomes, there were no substantial differences from the earlier reports. The following immediate (positive) outcomes were listed:

1. All monitoring missions managed to reduce the level of violence by their presence, monitoring and interpositioning at different events. This was associated with the fact that the various actors knew the peace monitors’ presence meant a risk of sanctions.

2. Providing encouragement and a link to the so-called wider world, both for citizens in general and for the churches with which the monitors worked.

3. The peace monitors contributed to improving the exchange of information between different organisations and, in the case of NIM, the monitors felt they had been able to contribute to strengthening NIM’s capacity and its legitimacy (civil society building).

4. They also contributed to the formation of public opinion through their use of mass media both in their countries of origin (Sweden, but this could probably be generalised to include other countries as well), and the South African press.

The short-term success of the monitoring was dependent on the degree to which the monitors managed to make contacts with all sides, and a good knowledge of the local actors. Where this was missing, either because of the monitors’ short stay or because they had to cover too wide an area, their capacity to intervene was effectively reduced.

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303 Around the end of June, a regional officer, a humanitarian convoy accompanied by an UNAMET officer and a local representative of UNHCR were attacked. Furthermore, UNAMET staff in another place received threats.


Because of this lack of anchorage, doubts have been raised about the longer-term impact of the monitoring missions on work for peace in general. Some church leaders interviewed by Ewald/Thörn believe they failed to build long-term competence in local societies.  

Nevertheless, the Swedish evaluators compare EMPSA monitors positively to the UN election monitors, and relate this to two aspects:

1. Time: the EMPSA monitors were present for at least five weeks, the UN for only two weeks. This gave the NGO monitors more time to make themselves known in a local context, and create continuity in the monitoring work.

2. Space: The UN election monitors lacked the local anchorage gained by the peace monitors through the recipient organisations and their co-ordinators. This criticism was echoed by interviewed Inkatha members who were very critical of the UN mission, saying that they came to "have nice vacation and to live a life of luxury at nice hotels."

2.4.4.2 Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville

The monitoring mission in Bougainville seems generally to have been considered successful. Böge says that the TMG quickly managed to win the trust of all sides, specifically of populations in the villages, thereby contributing in a high degree to the development of a peace-friendly climate. The Commander of the Mission Osborn says the same: "In my view the TMG and the PMG have been outstanding successes whatever criteria you apply to measure their performances."  

2.4.4.3 Kosovo Verification Mission

The KVM is an example of very mixed outcomes. On the one hand, it undoubtedly managed to reduce violence by talking to both sides and convincing them to contain localised outbreaks of violence. In addition, their mere presence obviously played a role.  

Specifically at the beginning of the mission the cease-fire was respected. Both the Serbs and the more moderate commanders of the UCK were willing to stop fighting, which gave a chance for stabilisation of the situation. Refugees and displaced persons returned in greater numbers as the fighting calmed down. Loquai: "When looking from the present perspective back to the beginning of the KVM, one could imagine what could have been reached if the KVM had arrive quickly, spread densely and covered the whole..."
of Kosovo." Even in January/February 1999 when the situation became tense again, their arrival on the scene usually had a de-escalating effect.

But the verifiers did not manage to contain all violence. There were attacks on police and civilians all the time in varying degrees. The cease-fire was also used by the UCK to move back into its strongholds as soon as the Yugoslavs withdrew. At the beginning of February they controlled more or less the areas they had controlled before the Serbian offensive in the summer of 1998, but this time they were better organised and armed. There were warnings of a spring offensive by the UCK.

In January and February the security situation also deteriorated for the verifiers themselves. In mid-January two verifiers were wounded when their vehicles came under small arms fire. Their movements and activities became restricted. At the end of February eight cars were refused permission to enter FRY from Macedonia, and a Russian verifier was shoved back into his vehicle; two verifiers were stopped at gunpoint by Serbian police and hit by them. There had already been attacks in January, e.g. on KDOM personnel eating in a restaurant.

But did the KVM have any chance to succeed? The mission was agreed to by the Yugoslav side only under the threat of war, and that threat was kept up during the time of the Mission by the presence of NATO planes monitoring air movements, the NATO extraction force waiting in Macedonia, and the fact that the Activation Order was not cancelled. On the other hand, the Kosovo-Albanian side wanted a military intervention because they had always (in fact since 1991) anticipated the internationalisation of the conflict, and especially an international military presence. They saw this as the way to reach their political goal of independence, so NATO’s continuing threat to intervene was just what they wanted. Under these circumstances the KVM basically stood no chance, so it is rather surprising how successful they actually were in the field given this very negative framework in which they had to operate.

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310 The German original: "Blickt man aus heutiger Perspektive auf diesen Beginn der KVM zurück, so kann man sich vorstellen, was mit einer raschen, dichten und flächendeckenden Präsenz der OSZE hätte erreicht werden können." Loquai 2000:61 p.
315 Kosovo Update 22.2.99 by the Bureau of European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov./www/regions/eur/rpt_990222_kdom.html
316 Kosovo Update 26.2.99 by the Bureau of European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov./www/regions/eur/rpt_990226_kdom.html
317 Kosovo Update 23.2.99 by the Bureau of European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov./www/regions/eur/rpt_990223_kdom.html
318 Kosovo Update 27.1.99 by the Bureau of European Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, www.state.gov./www/regions/eur/rpt_990127_kdom.html
319 Clark 2000
2.4.4.4 UN missions in El Salvador and East Timor

Onusal has been considered a success, despite many problems related to ongoing human rights violations\(^{321}\) and hesitant disarmament—especially from the FMLN side, culminating in the discovery of an illegal arms cache in Nicaragua. The Peace Accords were ultimately implemented; FMLN was eventually disarmed and transformed into a political party; former combatants were re-integrated; and elections took place as planned. Participation in the elections was much lower than expected (only 55%) due to logistical and structural problems, and a number of irregularities were reported. Nevertheless, the election results were accepted by all sides, and there was no relapse into war.

Although the Mission’s mandate did not include direct preventive action against human rights abuses,\(^{322}\) its very visible presence alone seems to have represented an important symbol for all sides. It is also worth noting that the pursuit of a human rights agenda did not damage the neutrality of ONUSAL to the point where it would have become ineffective.\(^{323}\) ONUSAL’s success in El Salvador is also attributed to the fact that the intense mutual suspicion and lack of trust between the two sides in conflict allowed the UN to play the role of arbiter and guarantor to both sides.

The disastrous failure of the mission in East Timor may be attributed at least partly to bad conflict analysis and misjudgement of the situation. It was not apparently recognised that the Indonesian side, especially the militias in East Timor, were not ready to accept the more likely outcome of the referendum, the decision for independence.\(^{324}\)

Secondly, despite all the violent incidents, neither the UN nor NGO monitors were apparently really prepared to deal with the violence. Unlike the other examples in this survey, there was no real systematic attempt at dealing with it. Instead, everyone concentrated on the preparation and conduct of the referendum. The international monitors did not manage to invoke the threat of serious consequences in the case of a renewed outbreak of civil war—though the eventual deployment of a military mission (see Chapter VII) shows, in hindsight, that they would have had impressive sticks—if no carrots—at their disposal.

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\(^{321}\) See White 1994:72.

\(^{322}\) Mahony/Eguren (1997:208) speak of “hundreds of easily identified vehicles in populated areas and travelling around the countryside ‘ostentatiously’ in white helicopters”.

\(^{323}\) Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:86.

\(^{324}\) There was also miscalculation from their side: They obviously did not expect an international military intervention.
2.4.5 Conditions for successful larger-scale civilian missions, and for Nonviolent Peaceforce

1. Success with these missions seems to rely on one condition: that both sides in the conflict really want peace, with a stake in international support and in retaining some minimum respectability (as in El Salvador). Only when this condition is present can the civilian intervenors use available incentives and threats. In South Africa, there was the possibility of reports to the international world and of sanctions in the case of undue violence. On the situation in Bougainville one Mission commander stated: "I was always confident that the Bougainvillean leaders were aware that contributing governments could be expected to withdraw their personnel if the security situation deteriorated." It has been argued above that the lack of this element was one factor for the failure of the KVM, and of UNAMET in East Timor.

2. The character of a mission changes when it has to rely on the local people for security. All civilian missions had to rely on this protection to some degree; therefore it was important to establish good contact, and win trust and acceptance. Instead of just keeping people apart, civilian peacekeepers seem to have to bring them together, at least by making themselves the link between the parties. "Relying on the Bougainville people to ensure the safety of peace monitors reinforces the realisation that peace on Bougainville is the responsibility of the Bougainville people. They are only too aware that, should the safety of the PMG be placed at risk, there is a very real danger that the peace process will falter. This was emphasised on a number of occasions when Bougainvillians assisted patrols in difficult circumstances." The decision to go to Bougainville unarmed caused some angst ... at the time, but it was the right one--there were at least two occasions I encountered which may have gone

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325 Because NP aims at setting up larger-scale civilian missions, in this section it seemed appropriate to combine the lessons learned with conclusions for NP.

326 Depending on the good will of the local parties is also an important factor for normal UN Observation Missions. Even if they are staffed by soldiers carrying side arms, they also rely on their symbolic presence. Hillen states. "The ration of force to space in UN observer missions would be considered completely impractical by any military standards. As a rule, UN observers themselves could not fulfil their observation mandate because of their small force and the large amount of space under their control. This reinforced the UN role as an impartial and limited force - an honest brother and secondary player in the conflict... As a result of these features, the chief operational imperative of these missions was that they relied entirely on the co-operation and goodwill of the belligerents... The consent and co-operation of the belligerents toward the UN force was reinforced by the unquestioned neutrality and impartiality shown by the UN observers during the mission." Hillen 1998:34 p.


328 "Monitoring and Verification of Peace Agreements", 2000.


2. Strategies, Tactics and Activities

2.4 Larger-Scale Civilian Missions

In the case of the KVM, there seems to have been a lack of understanding of the character of an unarmed mission. To contrast a quote from Mission head Walker with the quote of his colleague above: "It's a dangerous place; it's very risky. I think that people who are coming there, coming in unarmed under the agreement--and all of our people are unarmed--makes a very dangerous situation, as I've said. And the quote in the paper as recently as today, we're probably the only people in Kosovo who do not carry side arms of some sort, if not bigger weapons. So, we're hoping that is somehow going to protect us from those with weapons." 333

3. Combining peace strategies: Civil peacekeeping always seems to imply a peacemaking component as well, both on the higher levels in order to create the framework and lead the peace process onward (El Salvador, Bougainville, South Africa), and on the ground to negotiate in the case of local/regional or sectoral occurrences. Ample examples of such activities have been given above. Both need to go hand in hand, although perhaps not carried out by the same persons. 334

With regard to peacebuilding activities, the missions apparently engaged in them to varying degrees, depending on their mandate and the overall framework (e.g. partner organisations) of their situation. Some activities were obviously undertaken to win trust and acceptance, while others were part of the mandate (e.g. reconstruction work in the context of supporting returning refugees).

4. Knowledge of local background, and establishing a base in the community: The Swedish evaluation of the South African election monitoring, and that of Schmidt on the later mission in KwaZulu/Natal, both strongly emphasised this aspect: a comparable strength in contrast to the UN monitors in South Africa, but with impaired effectiveness due to insufficient local anchorage in some communities--the monitors being sent from some central office, leaving the local churches to deal with them. While the establishment of good contacts with all sides has been mentioned as an important factor in the success of ONUSAL in El Salvador, the TMG/PMG in Bougainville has been criticised by some Mission participants for not paying enough attention to this factor.

5. Non-partisanship or impartiality: it has been important for all the civilian missions to establish this position although some struggled with it, especially the South African NGO missions which, at least initially, were viewed as being close to the ANC--an image they managed overcome broadly but not completely. 335

Another problem was combining investigations into the reasons for political violence


333 Quote from Ambassador William Walker, "On-the-record-briefing on the Kosovo Verification Mission", Released by the Office of the Spokesman, January 8, 1999. There is also the observation that the Europeans did not believe in a possible success of the mission right from the beginning. (Loquai 2000:67)

334 The evaluation of the South African missions identifies a tension between two simultaneous and equally important objectives: to lessen or stop the on-going violence through acute effort and to work for longer-term conflict resolution through negotiation. However, the evaluation does not go into details. (Ewald/Thörn 1994)

with their image as an impartial observer or negotiator. \footnote{Ewald/Thörn 1994:20 p.} This tension could also be observed with the KVM. In Bougainville a problem arose with the participation of Australia which had been involved on one side of the war in the peacekeeping mission\footnote{Which was kept low-key, Australia mainly concentrating on logistics. (Böge 1999:13)}, although their leadership was eventually accepted since they could not be ignored as a regional power, and so had to be included a stakeholder in the peace process.

6. Length of stay of monitors: While simple monitoring seems possible for teams staying for only a few weeks, the evaluators of the Swedish contribution to EMPSA and NIM came to the conclusion that a minimum stay of six months is necessary to fulfil a broader mandate. \footnote{Ewald/Thörn 1994:31 p.} This was also the average length of stay of monitors in most other missions.

7. With regard to the constitution of the peace force, several aspects can be highlighted from the examples:

- **Language**: In South Africa in the Ecumenical Peacemakers Programme a minority of internationals worked together with a majority of locals on a ratio of 1:5 (3 internationals to 15 locals). The report of one international participant emphasizes that, while the internationals could speak in English with most people, local team members working in their mother tongue were crucial.

- **Cultural affinity**: The international monitors working with NIM felt it was important for them to show that not all whites are racists or persons who avoid the struggle against apartheid\footnote{Ewald/Thörn 1994:103 p.}. On the other side, the overall ‘white’ character of NIM and its observers was remarked upon negatively by others in South Africa. The inclusion of people from Fiji and Vanuatu was very important symbolically (Melanesians) as well as practically, since personnel from these countries shared a comparable cultural background. \footnote{Because of the same reasons, the New Zealand contingent included many Maoris. (Böge 1999:13)} People also reacted very positively to an Australian Aborigine woman with whom they felt a special affinity. \footnote{Minority: Major Luke Foster from the Australian Defence Force, Contribution to the Seminar Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, \url{http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/foster.htm}}

- **Gender**: In Bougainville one woman was included in each Mission patrol in recognition of the important role women play in Bougainvillean society (mostly matrilineal clans); men would not have been able to link effectively to the women. \footnote{This aspect is not mentioned in reports from the other missions although it is certain that women were included in all of them, and it may be assumed that their contacts varied from those of their male colleagues.}

8. Organisation and Deployment: The importance of available infrastructure and equipment has been the especial experience of peace monitors with NIM in South Africa and the KVM in Kosovo. The ad hoc organisation of missions has always resulted in a slow initial response. Perhaps even more important is the need for quick deployment of monitors in sufficient numbers. As mentioned above, this deficiency caused serious personnel problems for the KVM in particular. At the time of their withdrawal they had just reached 65% of targeted capacity. Their inability to cover the whole province has been mentioned as one of the contributing factors to their eventual failure. 343

343 All commentators agree on this problem, namely that the OSCE had enormous problems in finding a sufficient number of civilian verifiers on short notice. As a consequence, the REACT (Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams) program has been started in 2000/2001. REACT establishes a matrix of personnel requirements, unified recruitment procedures, and pre-mission training standards.
2.5 Military-based interventions

Christine Schweitzer

2.5.1 Introduction

This chapter will look at those missions carried out either by the United Nations or by members of the UN acting under a mandate from the UN, which involve some use of military personnel, and which are undertaken with the objective of "help[ing] maintain or restore international peace and security in areas of conflict". The character of these missions has changed drastically since 1989.

I will look first at what has come to be called classical peacekeeping or peacekeeping of the first generation, meaning those missions where lightly armed UN troops (blue helmets) are deployed to monitor a cease-fire.

After that, I will deal with the UN missions of the second and third generation, which are characterised by multiple tasks far beyond mere monitoring of a cease-fire ("2nd generation") and often by so-called "robust peacekeeping" ("3rd generation"). There are three important aspects of these missions: first, there are usually a greater number of civilians involved in these missions, being trusted with carrying out peacebuilding tasks. Secondly, there is the issue of division of labour between the armed forces and these civilians who are considered to be able to do their work because of the protection of the military. And thirdly, there is the issue of military forces assuming civilian tasks, such as the setting up of refugee camps and reconstruction work.

To end this chapter, a short glance shall be taken at the rather problematic term "peace enforcement."

Question related to the possibilities of replacing military personnel with civilian nonviolent forces will be discussed in an extra chapter, 2.5.

2.5.2 Classical peacekeeping and monitoring missions

2.5.2.1 Character and goals

Peacekeeping is usually considered to have emerged after World War II, although there were predecessors in the time of the League of Nations. As it is not mentioned

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344 The research was done by Peaceworkers as part of the research phase of Nonviolent Peaceforce with the support of USIP. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace.

345 Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:xi, quoting the official UN account of peacekeeping, "The Blue Helmets".


347 After World War I, multinational military bodies were used to establish and monitor the new European frontiers that had been agreed upon in peace treaties. Specifically, the international administration of the
explicitly in the Charter of the United Nations, peacekeeping, understood as the monitoring of cease-fires and buffer zones, has been described as being in the middle between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 missions (Dag Hammersköld termed it "Chapter Six and a Half") because it is said to have as much in common with peaceful settlement of disputes (Chapter 6) as with enforcement of UN decisions (Chapter 7). Peacekeeping troops were usually structured around light infantry battalions, not bringing heavy armour (e.g. usually no tanks or missiles), and consisted of up to a few thousand soldiers. Classical peacekeeping missions were governed by five principles:

1. Consent of the parties to the dispute for the establishment of the mission;
2. Non-use of force except in self-defence;
3. Voluntary contribution of troop contingents from smaller, neutral countries or middle powers;
4. Impartiality;
5. Day-to-day control of the operation by the Secretary-General.

The period of classical peace-keeping is considered to have lasted from 1948 or 1956 to 1987 with a gap between 1966 and 1973, when no new missions were deployed. Usually 13 peacekeeping missions are counted in that time; five of these missions are still operational: UNFICYP (since 1964) in Cyprus, UNTSO (since 1948), UNDOF (since 1974) and UNIFIL (since 1978) in the Middle East, and UNMOGIP (since 1949) in India/Pakistan. There were also a few new missions created in the second half of the 1990s, including UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone and MONUC in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Saar (Germany) between 1920 and 1935 is a clear analogy to peacekeeping missions after WW II. In the time of the preparation of a referendum to decide on the future political status of the region, British, Swedish, Italian and Dutch troops (3,300 men) were deployed to prevent violence (see Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:xi, Laurence 1999:5f).

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348 Hillen 1998:79
349 Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:xi, Daniel/Hayes 1999, Urquhart 1990, Fetherston 1994:13, Weiss 1993:179. These five principles were laid down by the then Secretary-General Hammarskjöld and Canadian diplomat Lester Pearson.
350 Hillen (1998:101) quotes a report that in the beginning of UNEF II (the mission which was to separate the Israeli and Egyptian armies in 1973) Finnish peacekeepers even used nonviolent methods to prevent advancing Israeli forces: They put down their guns, linked arms and challenged the forces to barrel through them. Other peacekeepers allegedly were involved in fistfights with soldiers.
351 States such as Canada, Sweden, Austria, Ireland, Norway, Denmark, Chile. See Hillen 1998:22
352 1948 the first (un-armed) UN observer mission UNTSO was deployed to the Middle East with 100 observers. But it was the 1956 Suez crisis which led to the deployment of the first real peace-keeping forces (UNEF I) with 6,000 soldiers. See Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999, Fetherston 1994, Weiss 1993, Kühne 1993, Kühne 2000 for the history of peacekeeping.
353 The reason was a deadlock in the Security Council after the Soviet Union had threatened to leave the UN during the Congo Mission. (Fetherston 1994:13f)
The overall objective of these missions has been to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment in which the dispute can be resolved.

In the 1990s there has been one preventive deployment of a peacekeeping mission - UNPROFOR III - which in March 1995 became UNPREDEP. Although in composition (presence of a US battalion) UNPREDEP belongs to later generations of peacekeeping, its mandate centred around monitoring the border between Yugoslavia and Macedonia, with the possibilities of Yugoslav troops attacking Macedonia and unrest within Macedonia in mind.\(^{355}\)

### 2.5.2.2 Activities

The principal operational military objectives of traditional peacekeeping centred on the creation and occupation of a buffer zone to separate the parties in conflict (Israel - Egypt, Cyprus, Lebanon). The peacekeepers usually monitor the voluntary withdrawal of the armies out of this buffer zone, then occupy and monitor it. The monitoring involves patrolling, passive monitoring by technical equipment (radar, etc), and sometimes the use of planes and Marines. In regard to these activities, they are much akin to observation missions.\(^ {356}\)

But classical peacekeeping missions usually entail more than just watching military movements: they include also:

1. Investigating ceasefire violations and other incidents;
2. Stabilising measures, such as brokering local commanders' agreements over demarcation of boundaries.
3. Defusing incidents by means such as brokering a ceasefire when firing has broken out;
4. Making possible communication between parties with no diplomatic relations\(^{15}\) and
5. engaging in peacebuilding activities. UNFICYP, on Cyprus, facilitates meetings of different groups from both sides (trade unions, media, women, youth, professionals) by providing them with space and protection to meet in a hotel at Nicosia, and even sets up TV-discussions of representatives from both sides in the hotel. UNFICYP facilitates contacts within the communities by regularly visiting enclaves on both sides\(^ {357}\), and helps the population maintain contact with their relatives on the other side by organising visits (in Cyprus between 90 and 1 700 persons participated in each of these visits). In addition, most classical peacekeeping missions include humanitarian activities: UNFICYP has engaged in the distribution of books to Greek Cypriots in the Northern area, presses Turkish Cypriots to allow burials of Greek residents in a certain area, supports the resumption of agricultural activities in the

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355 Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 1999; Moeller 1997
356 Hillen 1998:100f
357 There are 432 Greek Cypriots and 159 Maronites in the Northern area, and 310 Turkish Cypriots in the South. Source: Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period from 1 June to 27 November 2000; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period from 30 November 1999 to 31 May 2000; Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus for the period from 10 June to 27 November 1999. These and earlier reports can be found under: www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/.
buffer zone, provides emergency medical services, assists displaced persons, assists isolated communities in maintaining their supplies of water and electricity, and for a long time provided the only - and much used - phone connection between the sides.

6. In other peacekeeping mission UN peacekeepers have assisted in the exchange of prisoners of war, helped to repair local infrastructure and cleared minefields.358

2.5.2.3 Outcomes and impact

While the immediate outcomes (such as cases of violent demonstrations or other incidents in the Cyprus buffer zone which UNFICYP dissolved) are at least partly captured in the mission reports, the longer-term impact is more difficult to measure, and it seems that scientifically sound research on such missions is not overabundant.359 Often assumptions seem to replace proof: In the literature on peacekeeping the fact that a war has not broken out again is often attributed to the peacekeeping mission’s presence. But researchers dealing with political negotiations might attribute the same fact to other events, such as successful mediation or negotiations, or a change in the world political situation. A researcher with good knowledge of the situation on Cyprus told me when I asked him about his opinion on the peacekeeping mission there: "Well, you know, they are not really needed. The Cypriots are so divided, they would maintain the buffer zone by themselves." And there are conflicts where no peacekeeping troops are present but still a ceasefire agreement is being kept, as in the case of Nagorny Karabakh, a region disputed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, where a ceasefire has now held for almost 7 years with only a few Russian military observers present.

What must not be forgotten, however, is that the monitoring function of peacekeeping missions may have a de-escalating effect beyond the immediate situation on the ground. In the spring of 1995 the rumour started that Serb units were concentrated along the border with Macedonia. UNPREDEP was able to confirm, based on its observations, that this was not so, and thereby contributed to the de-escalation of the situation.360

Classical peacekeeping missions have never aimed at solving a conflict -- insofar as criticisms of classical peacekeeping argue that they "did not solve the conflict", such criticism is misleading because this has never been their intention. 361 The best that may

358 Hillen 1998:104f
359 What should the criteria for evaluating the impact of peacekeeping missions? From the criteria Weiss (1998:32f) has proposed for complex missions, reduction of number of casualties/fatalities is one. Another might be whether or not the fact that the number of violent incidents went down over the years of the presence of a peacekeeping force indicated that there was reduced willingness from the sides in conflict to use violence against each other, and whether this reduction was attributed by people in the conflict themselves to the presence of the peacekeepers. Another criterion could be if the politicians involved on both sides credited the peacekeeping mission with having been an important factor in the peace process.
360 Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 1999:150
361 Kühne (2000:1355) suggests that the reason is that during the Cold War the superpowers were only interested in freeing conflicts, not in solving them.
be expected of them is that they preserve the cease-fire in order to give time to politicians to work out a sustainable solution to the conflict.\textsuperscript{362}.

Still, the lack of an exit strategy and of potential for conflict transformation is an issue taken more and more seriously by the UN itself.\textsuperscript{363}

### 2.5.2.4 Conditions for successful peacekeeping

It seems that the four main conditions are:

1. Both parties in a dispute agree (even if reluctantly) to accept a cease-fire,
2. Both parties consent to the presence of the peacekeepers, and
3. Are willing to cooperate with them.\textsuperscript{364}
4. There is a clear physical separation of the parties in conflict (a condition difficult to meet in situations of internal war.)\textsuperscript{365}

5. Laurence (1999) lists additional conditions for success of peacekeeping missions:

6. Broad agreement within the Security Council is essential. The operation should be clearly UN commanded or sanctioned to avoid objections that states might have to foreign troops being stationed on their soil;
7. The peacekeepers must be seen to be impartial, and must be prepared to bring pressure to bear when either party violates an agreement\textsuperscript{366};
8. Any use of force must be based on principles of self-defence.\textsuperscript{367}

If these conditions are not met, the peacekeepers have little chance to fulfil their mandate. UNIFIL in Lebanon has never been able to prevent Israeli attacks in Lebanon, nor has UNFICYP in Cyprus prevented the occupation of Northern Cyprus by Turkey in 1974, nor was UNPROFOR I in Croatia able to stop the Croatian Army from forcefully reoccupying the UN Protected Zones (UNPA) in the Eastern parts of Croatia which was held by Serbian separatists from 1992 to 1995.

\textsuperscript{362} Laurence 99:18. In Cyprus, the UN Secretary-General is conducting mediation between the two sides, but there has been little improvement in the situation.

\textsuperscript{363} Brahimi Report, No 17

\textsuperscript{364} Laurence 99:18. John Mackinlay (1989:230) noted: “The important factor of success in a peacekeeping operation seems to be the effective nature of the political agreement which underpins the deployment and the task of the peacekeeping force itself. If this agreement fails to provide for a workable armistice, cease-fire, or discontinuation of hostilities, then, no matter how well conceived and excellently conducted the peace operations may be, the peace force on its own cannot forestall or improve upon the conditions which may lead to its failure.” (quoted after Hillen 1999:85)

\textsuperscript{365} The failure of UNPROFOR II in Bosnia to protect the safe zones in Eastern Bosnia (e.g. Srebenica) is explained as mainly a lack of the fourth condition plus the problems the peacekeepers had maintaining their neutrality. See Gordon 2001.

\textsuperscript{366} “Peacekeepers are instruments of diplomacy - not of war. They are part of an agreement between parties that have been in conflict and are protected by that agreement. They operate in the open as an expression of their international neutrality - this gives them acceptability and great strength. When they are used for enforcement, they lose their neutrality, are stripped of their political protection, and the wavering international support for whatever new objectives are chosen will make the command weak and vulnerable.”. (Sanderson 1994:24)

\textsuperscript{367} Self defence has been interpreted since 1964 to include use of force against armed persons who attempted to prevent peacekeepers from carrying out their mandate.
Among the defining criteria of classical peacekeeping (see above 2.5.2.1) there is one element which might need further consideration - the identity of the troop-contributing states. The argument that middle states with the economic capacity to mount peacekeeping but without strong political or economical interests in the region are better suited to peacekeeping because they find it easier to maintain their neutrality in the conflict in question, is persuasive at first glance. On the other hand, in the case of UNPROFOR III/UNPREDEP in Macedonia many people think the presence of a US battalion was important exactly because it signalled an American military and political interest. That means that there are contradictory experiences in regard to the identity of the peacekeepers: On the one hand the acceptance as non-partisan of classical peacekeeping missions seems to have derived at least partly from the fact that they came from countries which were not considered as having a stake in the conflict at hand. On the other hand, there are indications that the presence of powerful players may lend credibility to a peacekeeping mission, specifically when its function is more that of a symbolic deterrent than of an actual military power with a mandate of enforcement.

2.5.3 Complex missions

2.5.3.1 Character and goals

While classical peace-keeping missions are still being carried out, new types of peace-keeping missions have been developed since 1988. These newer types of mission are different in their function, in their application and in their composition, and they usually operate in an environment very different from those of classical peacekeeping missions, an environment of intrastate conflict where one or both sides are often hostile to the peacekeepers.

The main characteristics of these missions are:

1. Multidimensionality/complexity: In addition to control of violence (peacekeeping), peacebuilding tasks and sometimes even executive mandates to govern a country have been added to the missions.

2. Heavier armament of the peacekeeping force, and license to use these weapons not only in self-defence, but to make sure that the mission's mandate can be carried out (so-called robust peacekeeping).

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368 Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 1999:150
370 Hillen 1998:141
371 There have been multidimensional missions with no robust use of force, e.g. UNTAC in Cambodia. But today being multidimensional and robust usually are considered as going together: "UN military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission's mandate." (Brahimi-Report No 49). This does not automatically mean that Chapter VII of the UN Charter is invoked although in some of the cases of robust peace-keeping UN Security Council resolutions made use of Chapter VII: Northern Iraq 1991-1996 (resolution 678 and 688), Somalia 1992-95 (resolution 974 and 814), Bosnia-Herzegovina 1992-1995 (resolution 749 and 771), Rwanda 1994-95 (resolution 929), Haiti 1991-1996 (resolution 940) and Albania 1996. See Weiss 1999. These were the first Chapter VII-cases since Korea in 1950. The attack of the Allied Forces against Iraq in January 1991 were sanctioned by Chapter VII but
3. A new interpretation of impartiality as not meaning equi-distance between the parties in conflict. 
4. Participation in peacekeeping missions by powerful states (including the USA and the nuclear powers of Western Europe and Russia -- the se countries formerly were not asked to play a role because of their real and perceived interests related to the Cold War.
5. Military take-over of more and more humanitarian aid and peace-building tasks on the ground.

The reasons for these changes are mainly the new kinds of conflict the missions have to deal with: internal wars with, rather than two sides in conflict, a multitude of unconnected interested actors involved, more people on the ground profiting from the continuation of war (so-called spoilers), cease-fire agreements not holding, and in consequence of these a higher level of risks for humanitarian personnel as well as for the peace-keepers themselves.

It is further remarkable that two-thirds of UN peacekeeping missions have been established since 1991 (36 of 54). Accordingly, there is a much larger total number of peacekeeping personnel deployed to missions, both in regard to soldiers and to civilians. The number of soldiers involved in UN peacekeeping grew from 9,570 in 1988 to 73,393 in 1994. Over the same period, the number of civilian personnel increased from 1,516 to 2,260 and costs rose from 2,304 Million US$ to 3,610 Million US$. Recent missions include UNTAG in Namibia (1989-90), UNAVEM II and III and MONUA in Angola (1991 to date), ONUSAL in El Salvador (1991.-1995), UNTAC in Cambodia (1992-93), and UNPROFOR I and II in Croatia and Bosnia (1992-1995).

The debacles of the missions in Rwanda, Somalia and, specifically, Bosnia in 1995 when two of the UN-protected enclaves were overrun by Serb forces, led to a quick waning of the enthusiasm for UN peace missions which had been felt after the end of the Cold War. Since 1995 the numbers have declined sharply, but with four new larger missions beginning in 1999 and 2000 (UNMIK in Kosovo, UNTAET in East Timor, UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone and UNMEE in Ethiopia and Eritrea), these numbers are still much higher than the figures in the 1980s: as of March 2001 there are 15 operations in total, employing 38,905 military personnel and civilian police, 4048 international civilian certainly no peace-keeping mission, and the attack on Yugoslavia/Kosovo in 1999 was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council but decided on unilaterally by NATO.

372 Kühne 2000
373 Brahimi-Report no 18 ff.
374 Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:XIII
375 ONUC (in Congo 1960-64), UNTEA (in West Iran 1962-63) and UNIFICYP (on Cyprus since 1964) have had, compared to the other missions of that time, a larger civilian police and/or civilian specialists contingent. See Bardehle 1993
376 Miall et al 1999:196
377 This may be one of the reasons why the Western military alliance NATO decided to attack Yugoslavia in 1999 without a Security Council mandate. Some think, as does the OSCE diplomat Grabert, that the United Nations have been, 50 years after their foundation, almost divested of their task. (Grabert 1999:20). Weiss quotes Richard Holbrooke “The damage that Bosnia did to the U.N. was incalculable”. Source: NY Times 4.9.1996 (Weiss 1999:3)
personnel and 7587 local civilian personnel. The estimated cost of operations from July 1, 2000 to June 30, 2001 is between 2600 and 3000 Million US.

After a period of missions that were multidimensional and robust, there is now a different change of direction in peacekeeping missions. After the debacles of Somalia, Rwanda and UNPROFOR in Bosnia, the UN is now returning to its older maxim of never deploying peacekeeping missions without a prior ceasefire agreement in place, recognising that it "lacks the capacity for directing large-scale military enforcement operations."378 This does not mean that the idea of peace enforcement (see below) has necessarily been given up. In the future, member states of the UN or forces under other member-state alliances (NATO, CIS, etc.), will likely be charged with the military enforcement of a ceasefire, as has been done already in Haiti 1994 and Bosnia in summer 1995. NATO has taken over the role of monitoring the ceasefire afterwards in lieu of a UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Kosovo after the - unauthorised - bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999.379

2.5.3.2 Military activities

Because of the differences between peacekeeping missions since 1988, it is not so easy to generalise their activities as it is with classical missions. The former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, generalised the new tasks of peacekeeping as: "the supervision of cease-fires, the regroupment and demobilisation of forces, their reintegration into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the designing and implementation of de-mining programmes; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment of new police forces; the verification of respect for human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; the observation, supervision and even organisation and conduct of elections; and the co-ordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction"380. This is the mandate with which UNTAC in Cambodia (1992-93) was charged.

Other missions concentrated on humanitarian activities (Somalia, Bosnia, Albania), whether delivering or protecting humanitarian aid.

For a more detailed description, see two examples in the appendix to this chapter: UNTAC in Cambodia (1992-93) and UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia, to which I will refer in the following sections of this chapter.

The roles of civilians in these complex missions will be looked at in detail in the next subchapter. Here I summarise the roles the military takes in these kinds of missions as

379 Annan 1998. Annan mentions that there has even been some consideration of outsourcing military tasks to private firms.
380 Laurence 1999:31, 48. Doyle already observes: "Although the circumstances in Haiti are unique, the case suggests a pattern that may be replicated in the future: a contracted out enforcement action to end the violence followed by a consent-based UN operation to consolidate peace" (Doyle 1997:7) This is also the scenario the Brahimi-Report draws. Woodhouse/Ramsbotham on the contrary that "contracting out is unlikely to replace UN peacekeeping" (1999:xxiii)
peacekeeping and enforcement measures.\textsuperscript{381} At least according to theory, the primary task of peace-keeping troops in complex operations is to "maintain a secure local environment for peace-building", while it is the task of the (civilian) peace-builders is to "support the political, social and economic changes that create a secure environment which is self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, unless the international community is willing to have the peacekeepers stay for ever,\textsuperscript{382} or tolerate recurrence of conflict when such forces depart. History has taught that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations: while the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers' support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders' work."\textsuperscript{383} In detail, these tasks are:

1. Establish a UN presence by patrolling disputed areas and monitoring activity.
2. Observe, monitor and manage cease-fires, by means such as defusing incidents and investigating violations.
4. Disarm warring factions.\textsuperscript{384}
5. Regulate the disposition of forces.
6. Prevent infiltration.
7. Prevent civil war.
8. Verify security agreements.
10. Establish stabilisation measures, by means such as brokering agreements over demarcation of boundaries.
11. Communicate between parties in conflict who have no diplomatic relations.
12. Clear mines and other unexploded ordnance.
13. Training/re-forming military units.
14. Restoration of law and order.
15. Forcible separation of belligerent parties.
16. Establishment of safe areas.
17. Guarantee or denial of movement, e.g. blockade or no-fly zone enforcement.
18. Enforcement of sanctions.\textsuperscript{385}
19. Physical security of aid delivery and other humanitarian activity, e.g. by offering armed escorts, putting together escorted convoys, etc.

\textsuperscript{382} Quoted after Doyle et al 1997:2
\textsuperscript{383} Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:xviii, Laurence 1999:59f. While most of the points are basically quotations taken from Laurence I have put them in a different order, and sometimes added and changed elements.
\textsuperscript{384} Seiple 1996:56. He stresses that the military needs the NGOs working on aid and development in order for the military to be able to exit.
\textsuperscript{385} Brahimi-Report No 28
20. Physical security of refugee camps.
21. Carry out police functions, such as crowd control or arresting war criminals (examples: Bosnia, Kosovo).

Besides these more traditional military tasks, there are a number of activities and tasks centred around humanitarian support: UN forces provided humanitarian aid for Kurds in North Iraq, NATO soldiers built refugee camps in Macedonia, German UN soldiers dug wells in Somalia, and SFOR soldiers in Bosnia are involved in building schools. Typically, humanitarian tasks taken over by military include:

1. Provision of immediate humanitarian assistance, such as emergency food distribution, building of refugee accommodations, and provision of basic water and sanitation.\(^{386}\)
2. Alerting humanitarian agencies to pockets of need encountered during routine patrol activities.
3. Assistance to humanitarian agencies in longer-term relief and development projects.
4. Negotiations with warring factions to create the conditions in which agencies can operate freely and effectively.

Some of these activities might originate in a spontaneous initiative by soldiers on the ground rather than being part of the mandate,\(^{387}\) but in several cases humanitarian aid has been made part of the mandate.

The reasoning is that the military "often possess an abundance of precisely those resources that are in the shortest supply when disaster strikes: transport, fuel, communications, commodities, building equipment, medicines, and large stockpiles of off-the-shelf provisions".\(^{388}\) It could be the case that the military is the only one to do it, relief agencies are "not present in sufficient strength to cope with sudden demand due to the sudden onset of a crisis, or they are unable to operate due to the volatility of the security environment."\(^{389}\) Another, not negligible, aspect is the positive image that is created back home by the activities of the military sent abroad. Especially in countries where there is public debate on the role and costs of out-of-area deployments, politicians and military leaders have found it useful to publicise the humanitarian activities.\(^{390}\) Hansen has observed that in Kosovo "bilateral funding is provided to favoured KFOR contingents for humanitarian or reconstruction activity ... an extraneous

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\(^{386}\) Disarmament should include small arms since they are the major source of loss of life and destruction in intra-state conflicts. See Lessons-Learned Report of the Department for Peacekeeping Operations on UNTAES in East Slavonia, (www.un.org/Depts/dkpo/lessons/untaes.htm), No I.16

\(^{387}\) Laurence 99:59f

\(^{388}\) In Northern Iraq, for example 13.000 personnel moved 7.000 tons of supplies to 1,5 million Kurdish displaced; in Rwanda in 1994 the British set up a field hospital which treated more then 82,000 people within two months. (Flint 2001:235)

\(^{389}\) See Brahimi Report, and Wood 2000. Similar reports are often heard when meeting and discussing with higher officers in the field. In Lebanon, for example, certain battalions (Finnish, Norwegian) provided considerable funds for humanitarian and development assistance: food to destitute families, sewage systems, medicines, construction of Muslim Prayer shelters and Christian Churches (Uphoff Kato 1997:154 pp.)

\(^{390}\) Weiss 1999:17
political agenda, not need, and not an appreciation for local conditions, determines allotments to KFOR humanitarian activity, sometimes with serious negative consequences.  

Seiple points out that sometimes there are tactical reasons for the military to engage in humanitarian activities, in order to get acceptance from the local population.

The growing importance of civil-military co-operation as result of the complex nature of these missions is reflected in so-called CIMIC plans and in the use of troops specifically responsible for enhancing co-operation between the military and humanitarian activities at the tactical level as well as military involvement in building consent. In Bosnia, for example, the first focus of CIMIC was emergency humanitarian relief and prisoner release. Later it shifted to election and humanitarian support, reconstruction of infrastructure and longer-term programmes, and from there to a third phase of repatriation, reconstruction, capital investment, further election support and civil-institution buildings. CIMIC units have worked with NGOs, the World Bank, the United Nations mission in Bosnia, the OSCE and the Office of the High Representative.

2.5.3.3 Outcomes and impact

Neither of the two missions I have investigated in detail was very successful in regard to their military mandates. Neither has UNTAC in Cambodia managed to carry through with its mandate of disarmament and cantonment of the armies of all fractions, nor has UNPROFOR in Bosnia been able to provide the safe havens it has promised.

Have there been overall successful missions at all? Some authors name at least three cases between 1989 and 1995 when civil wars were brought to an end with the help of UN missions: Namibia, El Salvador and Mozambique. In three other cases the middle-term success was doubtful or the mission an outright failure: Rwanda, Angola and Cambodia. And the failure at implementation led to catastrophic results: Many more people died in Angola and Rwanda after the peace agreements failed than during the years of war before.

The humanitarian activities of the military deserve special discussion. While the logistical advantages of the military can hardly be doubted, it usually lacks specific knowledge about dealing with humanitarian crises. It can be inefficient (e.g. in Rwanda the US army set up a water purification system which was unable to provide the quantity of water needed), less effective (the German army dug wells in Somalia although Germany has a special state organisation (Technisches Hilfswerk) which not only has the equipment but the expertise to do so much more quickly and more efficiently), and it puts itself in direct competition with non-state actors which is contrary to the principle of subsidiarity upheld by many Western countries. It often does not fulfil the minimum standards in
humanitarian aid many organisations nowadays agree to\textsuperscript{397}, and the military authorities may potentially overlook the impact of the mission’s actions on the wider population.\textsuperscript{398} Another question raised is if armed protection makes humanitarian aid transports really more secure, or if it rather increases the risk by turning the aid agencies into legitimate targets. Specifically in Chapter VII-missions this may well be an issue as the experience in Somalia has shown. Alternatives tried by aid agencies include reducing the threat by gaining widespread acceptance for one’s work,\textsuperscript{399} privately organised security procedures and bribing - as mentioned above, some of them being problematic themselves.\textsuperscript{400}

\textbf{2.5.3.4 Conditions for successful peacekeeping in complex missions}

The question of conditions for successful complex peacekeeping missions, and lessons learned for nonviolent intervention will be dealt with more fully after I look into the civilian contribution to these missions. Still, both the UN itself and other experts on UN missions seem to agree on a number of lessons learned in regard to the military part of complex missions. These concern mainly issues of mandates ("clear, realistic and practicable and providing for the necessary means for implementation"), planning, co-ordination, training, logistics and so on.\textsuperscript{401} These issues will be dealt with in Chapter 5 of this study. Notable here might be the perceived need for "robust" peacekeeping: "Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence".\textsuperscript{402}

\textbf{2.5.4 The role of civilian personnel in complex missions}

\textbf{2.5.4.1 Character and goals}

While in first generation missions there were only a small number of civilians supporting the military component, number and tasks of civilians in complex missions have grown enormously. Civilians in the context of complex missions fall into two or three

\textsuperscript{397} Stedman/Rothchild 1996:17
\textsuperscript{398} Gass/van Dok 2000:53
\textsuperscript{399} Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response (2000). See Hansen 2000: "KFOR humanitarian work (is) often uncoordinated, inconstant, unsustainable, not strategic, and not being held to minimum standards."
\textsuperscript{400} Flint 2001:235
\textsuperscript{401} Van Brabant 2001:163
\textsuperscript{402} One example of a larger-scale project without military protection is the Operation Lifeline Sudan. This is an umbrella of NGOs with clear formal guidelines everyone has to sign. Its approach may be described as negotiated agreement. Operation Lifeline Sudan has an overall agreement with the Sudanese government, and has hired a private security company to negotiate local agreements with warring factions. (Laurence 1999:41)
categories**: First, those working directly for intergovernmental organisations - be it UN agencies like UNHCR or UNDP or regional organisations of the UN (OAU, OAS and OSCE). Secondly, those working as members of an international civilian police force. Thirdly, there is usually a large number of NGOs working in the same area, sometimes co-operating with the UN mission, sometimes keeping their independence - usually to the distress of the UN representatives who tend to complain about a lack of co-ordination with the NGOs in the field. In this chapter they will only be considered as far as they cooperate explicitly in the complex mission, serving as implementing partners for an UN agency.**

As part of UN missions, civilians usually come in with a double task: to help to prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation (this is mainly the job of the military, but civilians contribute in many ways), and to consolidate peace.

Civilians are people coming from very different personal and professional background. Only a minority of them, usually only the directors, are permanently employed with the UN or one of its organisations. The others are either recruited by UN members who use different recruiting mechanisms, or are UN volunteers. Some countries choose their contingent of civilian personnel mainly from the standing resource of civil servants (sometimes including the military); others have recruited more broadly.

### 2.5.4.2 Civilian activities

The list of civilian tasks begins with disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of soldiers, de-mining, return of refugees, organisation and carrying out of humanitarian aid, policing, preparation and monitoring of elections, monitoring of human rights, and in a few cases even carrying out an executive mandate to govern a country for a certain, limited time (UNTAC in Cambodia 1992-1993, UNMIB in Bosnia since December 1995, UNMIK in Kosovo from 1999 to date). In example 1 (UNTAC in Cambodia) some of these activities are described more in detail. They do not vary so much from activities in other complex missions such as the post-war phases in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, although the number of state actors is in the latter cases much greater. Therefore, I will limit the description here to a summary of tasks usually undertaken:

1. A democratisation process which is usually meant to lead up to national elections: assistance in the rehabilitation of existing political institutions, promotion of national reconciliation, monitoring and verification of all aspects and stages of an electoral process, co-ordination of technical assistance of the process, education

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404 Brahimi-Report No 55

405 Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999

406 The question of whether or not everyone engaged in a conflict area where a complex mission takes place is to some extent part of it, just by profiting - willingly or not willingly - from the presence of the others including the military protection, will be raised in 2.5.4.

407 In Germany, for example, two years ago, the Foreign Ministry started a roster of a reserve of civilian personnel for OSCE and UN missions, whom they train in a two-week basic course plus a one-week specialisation. In the future the training and administration of this personnel will be handed over to a private institution.
of the public about electoral processes, help to develop grassroots democratic institutions and NGOs, support of independent media.

2. Human rights: monitor human rights situation, investigate specific cases of alleged human rights violations, promote human rights/educate about human rights.\footnote{See Miall et al 1999:196. In both Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Kosovo the peace-keeping is done by NATO-led troops, not by the UN.}

3. Humanitarian tasks may include the delivery of humanitarian aid (food and other emergency relief supplies), implementation of refugee repatriation programs, resettlement of displaced persons, reintegration of ex-combatants.\footnote{Their tasks entail the creation or strengthening of national institutions, the monitoring of elections, the promotion of human rights, the provision of reintegration and rehabilitation programmes and the creation of conditions for resumed development. Secretary-General Annan, "UN Secretary-General's reform announcement: Part II measures and proposals, 16 July," in: Conflict Resolution Monitor, 2, Bradford: Centre for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies, 34-36, quotation after Miall et al 1999:194}

4. Civilian Police: An important component\footnote{A lesson learned during the UNTAES mission in Eastern Slavonia -- "in some peacekeeping operations, the monitoring of human rights can be enhanced by making full use of the experience and knowledge of local civic organisations and individuals." Lessons-Learned Report of the Department for Peacekeeping Operations on UNTAES in East Slavonia, (www.un.org/Depts/dkpo/lessons/untaes.htm), No II.2.} of complex missions is the Civilian Police (CIVPOL). Their task is not only to document or, ideally, to discourage by their presence, abusive or other unacceptable behaviour by local police officers, but to reform, train and restructure local police forces - a field of activities sometimes described with the acronym "SMART" for "support, monitor, advise, report, train". A sensitive issue is the perceived need for an international police with executive power in missions like Bosnia and Kosovo. Several solutions are being tried: trust the military with these tasks as KFOR in Kosovo does \textit{nolens volens}, or set up something that in Bosnia is called the "Multinational Special Unit" - a force of 400 men with paramilitary training (mainly Italian Carabinieri, which is a paramilitary police force). In order to have the capacity to respond effectively to civil disorder and for self-defence (Brahimi-report)\footnote{Reintegration of soldiers should be initiated together with disarmament and demobilisation programs, and be supplemented by long-term measures. There are examples when ex-soldiers got employment in de-mining programs that had the double advantage of giving them paid work, and using their knowledge of where the mines were laid. See Lessons-Learned Report of the Department for Peacekeeping Operations on UNTAES in East Slavonia, (www.un.org/Depts/dkpo/lessons/untaes.htm), No I.20 and I.23}, the police in the future would generally be armed (today they are only armed in perceived high-risk situations, as in Kosovo), and specifically trained for dealing with what is called civil disorder.\footnote{For example: UNMIK has made provision for about 4.700 police officers, UNTAET for 1.640 (military: 9.150). Source: United Nations Department of Public Information a.a.O.} At the moment, there are two missions consisting mainly of police: Civilian Police Support Group in Croatia and MIPONUH in Haiti.\footnote{For example: UNMIK has made provision for about 4.700 police officers, UNTAET for 1.640 (military: 9.150). Source: United Nations Department of Public Information a.a.O.}
2.5.2.3 Outcomes and impact

Weiss (1999) has tried in an ambitious effort to develop a framework of estimating military costs for the troop-contributing countries and civilian benefits for targeted countries in complex missions. As criteria for military costs he defined: costs in US$, casualties/fatalities, and political impact. As civilian benefits he chose displacement, suffering and state of the State before and after each intervention.

Here follows his summary of UNPROFOR in Bosnia (unfortunately, Weiss did not include Cambodia in his study). It shows an ambiguous picture (as do most of the other cases Weiss looked into). While there is clearly a positive impact, in the tonnes of food delivered, it is difficult to judge how the picture would have changed if there had been another kind of mission, or no UN mission at all. Also the question of how much good is enough good? is not answered.

Table 2.1: Bosnia and Herzegovina: Military costs and civilian benefits from intervention, 1992-1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Military costs of intervention for</th>
<th>$ Costs</th>
<th>Casualties/Fatalities</th>
<th>Political Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>troop-contributing countries</td>
<td>UNPROFOR: 2/92-9/95: $2.82 Billion UN humanitarian: $1,355 Billion</td>
<td>1992-1994: 90 peacekeepers killed and 900 wounded by 3/95: 167 killed</td>
<td>Sarajevo airlift; no-fly zone; sanctions and embargo enforcement; air strikes; UN protection of humanitarian convoys. Led to crisis in UN system, EC/EU and NATO and doubts about Western leadership in the post-Cold War world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civilian benefits of intervention for targeted countries</td>
<td>Displacement</td>
<td>Suffering</td>
<td>State of the State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>humanitarian challenge before intervention</td>
<td>Croatia: 250.000 Serbs, 100.000 Croats Bosnia: end of 1994: war victims and IDPs and refugees = 2.7 million</td>
<td></td>
<td>State Structures: ill-suited to the dynamics of integration across ethnic lines and the complications of national self-determination taken to logical extremes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Croatia: 1991 0,5 Million require assistance Yugoslavia early 1993: 4,359 Million in need Bosnia: Winter 1993-94: 2,7 Million in need Human Rights: Croatia 1991: 6-10.000 killed, 10.000 wounded; Bosnia: from 1992 on ethnic cleansing, expulsion, torture, rape. Early 1993: 230.000 killed or missing; 60.000 seriously wounded.; siege of Sarajevo (1992-94) killed 10.000 and wounded 60.000 Total: 250.000 killed, 35.000 wounded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In discussing the impact of complex missions, the criteria developed in the do-no-harm-approach as well as other critiques of these missions need to be considered. There are multiple issues at stake:

1. **What impact the invasion of thousands of internationals has on the economy of a country** and of its capacity to rebuild by its own strength:
   - the presence of well-paid foreigners causing inflation,
   - on the one hand many jobs are created which are desperately needed,
   - but on the other hand there is brain-drain: skilled people get hired away to work for internationals rather then taking lower-paid jobs to build up their own country.
   In Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo medical doctors work as interpreters and judges as drivers - just because they have a family to keep and cannot afford not to take the at least five times better paid job the internationals offer her or him. The same is reported from Cambodia.414

2. **Even if international missions are not called in after a war for a transitory government, they often cause a shift in the political balance in the country.** While this often is intended and welcome, sometimes it might also mean groups are strengthened which would not have been chosen either by the intervenors or by the people in the country. For example, in Lebanon UNIFIL insisted on working through recognised traditional political leaders, which brought the Mouktars and village mayors new resources, including prestige. But when the situation changed economically, these traditional leaders maintained power mainly because of UNIFIL support, and became rather a hindrance to development of the area.415

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413 Brahimi-Report No 39
414 Kühne 2000:1360
415 Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999
3. Giving special attention to the perceived needs of a minority may be counter-productive because it may fuel pre-existing resentments, competition over scarce resources, perceptions of bias etc.\textsuperscript{416}

4. One problem reported from different missions is the co-operation between internationals and local groups.\textsuperscript{417} There seems to be a wide-spread lack of willingness to co-operate (reported from UNTAC as well as from Bosnia and Kosovo), and to include the local groups in the planning process. In Kosovo the internationals founded their own independent media rather than supporting the ones already there, which are struggling for survival. In another place, co-ordination meetings between NGOs in the field were originally held without local NGOs because, the explanation went, "it takes so much more time with them".

5. In Cambodia there was a rise of ethnic tension as consequence of the international "cash injection": thousands of Vietnamese construction workers and prostitutes poured across border, which rekindled Khmer fears and triggered massacres\textsuperscript{418}

6. A very serious unintended outcome of UNTAC was the spread of AIDS. It was spread both directly and by encouraging the growth of sex industry wherever troops where stationed. There are reports that top UNTAC officials openly condoned promiscuity. Doctors estimate that at least 150 UNTAC staff will die of AIDS, and Cambodian deaths could, if the epidemic follows the same path as in Thailand, reach as high as 1 million.\textsuperscript{419}

7. Several missions report illegal activities by UN soldiers and police - other civilians have not been mentioned so often in this regard. In UNPROFOR Russian, Ukrainian and Nigerian units were censured for racketeering, illegal dealings in weapons and fuel, prostitution, drug dealing and other charges\textsuperscript{420} - I would add from my own knowledge that foreign nationals deployed at the Sarajevo airport were not above taking bribes of 2,000 DEM per person for transport out of Sarajevo. As mentioned in the appended example, CIVPOL in Cambodia quickly acquired bad name for harassment and mistreatment of the civil population. Soldiers in UNIFIL (Lebanon) have reportedly stolen and exported UN equipment.\textsuperscript{421}

\textsuperscript{416} In 1992 UNTAC spent over $200 million US -- equivalent to four times the total Cambodian exports for that year, or 10\% of GDP. For the entire mission it was over $403 million for the entire mission. UN per diems were $140, per capita income of Cambodians $200 per year. Although this influx of money was not the primary cause of inflation, it caused sharp price increases in some areas (skilled labour and housing), corruption, and shallow and unbalanced economic growth. There was no attempt to keep prices within limits or prevent brain drain, nor any concerted effort to discourage corruption (Uphoff Kato 1997:201f)

\textsuperscript{417} Flint 2001:236

\textsuperscript{418} Uphoff Kato 1997:151 pp.

\textsuperscript{419} This is a criticism Greg Hansen (2000) has made in regard to the special provisions made for the protection and support of the Serbian minority in Kosovo after the war.

\textsuperscript{420} Verbal Information from volunteers of the German CPS and of Roland Brunner from Medienhilfe Ex-Jugoslawien

\textsuperscript{421} Uphoff Kato 1997:202
8. The question of whether humanitarian aid given during a war might prolong that war,

9. The question of whether military escorts provide security or put the humanitarians at risk, especially if the military is seen as partial to one side in the conflict (as was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina) \(^{422}\). "In some cases, an international military presence has enabled NGOs to operate when they otherwise could not. Yet in others, as at times in Somalia, the level of violence caused partly by UN forces has made it difficult or impossible for NGOs to act. Military actions pose dangers which affect both the people with whom NGOs are working and NGOs' own programmes. In other situations, as happened at times in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NGOs' work has been threatened by the hostility of local civilians who perceive European NGOs as just another part of an international community which had betrayed them by failing to use military force." \(^{423}\)

### 2.5.4.4 Conditions for successful complex peacekeeping missions

Several authors emphasise that consensus of the warring parties remains an important condition for success in spite of robust peacekeeping and chapter VII mandates. The same goes for impartiality \(^{424}\). If there is no willingness to cooperate, then activities such as disarming the warring parties become impossible tasks, as UNTAC in Cambodia found out and KFOR in Kosovo is finding out \(^{425}\). In the worst case, the UN troops become just another party to war, as happened to UNOSOM II in Somalia 1993-1995, and to ONUC in Congo 1960-64, the first complex mission ever \(^{426}\).

Stedman/Rothchild emphasise that the role uncertainties inherent in peace agreements may create problems in implementation \(^{427}\). UN missions typically run into following problems with their missions: the presence of spoilers - those interested in war rather than in peace; incomplete, vague or expedient agreements, incomplete adherence to these agreements, poor co-ordination between mediating and implementing bodies, poor co-ordination between UN agencies and lack of follow-through. Stedman/Rothchild recommend a series of confidence-building measures in order to overcome those difficulties which are mainly caused by misperceptions and incomplete information on the other side: these include verification and monitoring by outsiders, political measures such as provisions for power-sharing and decentralisation, cultural measures such as the inclusion of traditional authorities in a peace agreement, and economic security building with measures which give people assurance that there are alternatives to earn a living other than soldiering and banditry.

\(^{422}\) Uphoff Kato 1997:202

\(^{423}\) Uphoff Kato 1997: 156

\(^{424}\) Heiberg 1990:161

\(^{425}\) Of course, not accepting military escort might as easily not be the better solution. Laurence (1999:33) points out correctly that some NGOs who refuse military escorts resort instead to bribes or hiring private security - both tactics high on the list of Do Nots in the Do-no-Harm-Approach.


The third condition that is usually mentioned nowadays is the perceived need for robust peacekeeping: "A safe and secure environment is sine qua non for a peacekeeping operation. This can only be achieved if there is a credible military force with robust rules of engagement." Whether this assumption need be accepted from a non-violent point of view remains to be seen, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

Several lessons have been learned by the UN in regard to national reconciliation, specifically that it is a long-term process which cannot be achieved quickly. Important elements include taking action against those who are charged with committing crimes against humanity, strengthening civil society, going beyond elections in the planning ("elections do not necessarily lead to national reconciliation"), taking issues such as the future of refugees and displaced, equal treatment in the areas of housing, and access to reconstruction grants into account.

2.5.5 Peace enforcement: Can the military end wars?

Peace enforcement is a rather vague term, and is used to describe different situations. I am not sure who invented this term; it is certain that Boutros-Ghali uses it in the second edition of his Agenda for Peace. The range of actions it describes varies, from all missions under chapter VII, thereby including what elsewhere is called robust peacekeeping - the use of force to carry out the mandate, to "war to end war" - missions to end a war and/or stop massive human rights violations -- the official legitimisation for the 2nd Iraq war in 1991, the NATO bombing in Bosnia 1995, and the Kosovo/Yugoslavia war carried out by NATO in 1999. An early example may be the Korean War (1950-53). There have also been several cases of individual states intervening in a neighbouring country in order to stop a civil war there and/or to overthrow a dictatorial regime. The trigger was usually larger-scale refugee movements rather than the fact of massive human rights violations by itself, but although they were unauthorised by UN, the international community has tended to accept these interventions as being the minor evil: examples include the intervention of India in East Pakistan 1971, of Vietnam in Cambodia in 1978 and of Tanzania in Uganda 1979.

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430 Stedman/Rothchild (1997:20 pp.) distinguish four sources of uncertainties inherent in implementation of peace accords: 1. preferences of the warring parties is not common knowledge - the signature might be mere tactics; 2. the pay-offs of implementing peace agreements are not common knowledge - nobody knows for certain the rewards and costs associated with peace, or returning to war; 3. it is unclear what the act of cheating means during implementation (e.g. one party might keep arms as a fail-safe move or because it wants to intimidate voters in the area, and 4. lack of organisational cohesiveness of parties may make it difficult to attribute an act of cheating to the leadership.


The essence of peace enforcement is not so much the use of force *per se*, but rather the lack of consent by one or all of the parties in conflict to some or all of the (UN) mandate of the intervenors. Perhaps surprisingly, there is very little attempt on the part of the specialists concerned to hide that peace enforcement means war:

"Enforcement action requires much stronger domestic and international consensus than peacekeeping. Peace enforcement is, after all, war by another name and there has to be an interest of severe magnitude at stake before the international consensus will reach the necessary fervour to provide the forces and funds, and possibly to accept casualties on a large scale."

According to theory, the difference between peace enforcement and war is that the peace enforcement mission takes an impartial stance. In reality this has been only true of those Chapter VII missions that were embedded in a broader peacekeeping mandate by the UN. The peace enforcement missions started with or without agreement of the UN Security Council in Korea, Iraq, Bosnia and Yugoslavia/Kosovo were directed at one side of the conflict that was defined as the aggressor. Enforcement in the sense of stopping a war meant taking sides - voluntarily in the case of Kuwait-Iraq, or involuntarily in the case of Bosnia and Kosovo. And this taking sides later created serious problems in the transition to an impartial peacekeeping force - again Kosovo is a good example. In many cases, the successes of peace enforcement missions are rather doubtful. Even if the war was stopped for the time being, the conflicts often either froze or have continued in another form. A problematic aspect in addition is that the threat of enforcement might encourage war, as happened in the case of Kosovo. One side to the conflict, the Kosovo-Albanians, wanted an international intervention because they saw it (and still do) as the route to independence. Therefore they had no intention of keeping the cease-fire agreed to in the autumn of 1998 but rather intentionally broke it in order to trigger military intervention by NATO.

### 2.5.6 Consequences for Nonviolent Peaceforce

1. The importance of a previous agreement by the parties in conflict to a ceasefire and to the presence of peacekeepers are lessons to be kept in mind for large-scale nonviolent intervention.

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433 Peace enforcement operations range from low-level military missions to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance, to full-fledged enforcement action to roll back aggression. Undertaken under chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, their defining characteristic is the lack of consent to some or all of the UN mandate. Militarily, these operations seek to deter, dissuade, or deny success to acts of aggressive force. By using collective force to preclude an outcome based on the use of force by the parties, the UN seeks to persuade the parties to settle the conflict by negotiation." (Doyle 1997:4)

434 According to Laurence (1999), that is the understanding of the Peacekeeping Manual of the British Army. Daniel/Hayes (1999) use the term "coercive inducement".

435 That war did not stop the violence in Kosovo but rather escalated it. And as with the Iraq war and in Korea, it was fought rather out off other than humanitarian motives. See Loquai 2000, Chomsky 1999 and others.
2. The strong limitations set on the use of violence in classical peacekeeping raises the question of whether monitoring buffer zones and cease-fires is not something unarmed civilians could be doing. This question, as well as the issue of replacing military tasks in general, will be considered further in 2.6.

3. So far it must be considered an open question if peacekeeping that does not rely on robust use of force can work in cases where there is no clear physical separation of the parties in conflict. The argument for robust peacekeeping is that the peacekeepers must not allow themselves to be stopped from carrying out their mission. It is worth discussing whether the same function could be reached by different means.

4. Some peace activists have proposed a strategy of gradually strengthening the civilian component of UN missions, for example by using the International Police more often, and/or advocating real co-operation between the UN and NGOs in order to civilise international interventions. The question is whether such a strategy has a chance of success given the division of labour in complex missions. The danger is that instead of non-violent civilians slowly taking over military roles, certain military roles will be strengthened and confirmed, especially the role of the military in providing protection for civilians.

5. Independent of the question of whether all actors want or condone it, the division of labour is there as soon as there is an international peacekeeping force on the ground which is taking care of providing a secure environment. It is not so much a question of actual co-operation: in spite of all complaints about the lack of co-ordination, the military usually is not really interested in the co-operation. But nonviolent intervenors need to accept the fact that they are part of a setting dominated by the overall strategy of the international mission, and find a way to deal with it. Depending on the overall approach and goals of the organisation, dealing with the presence of the military might simply mean finding symbols of independence from the international mission (such as not using armed escorts, driving different types of cars.) If the organisational goal is to provide an example of alternatives to military intervention, things become more complicated, and the only solution might be withdrawal from such a situation.

6. A chance to be needed: The Brahimi report criticises the lack of sufficient civilian personnel. The problem in their eyes is that experienced persons fade away after one or a few deployments because UN cannot offer them job or career opportunities. Therefore, they propose the institution of an intranet/internet roster of civilian candidates from which UN can draw personnel quickly if needed.

7. Peace enforcement actions often became de facto partisan missions, directed against one side. This taking sides created serious problems in the transition to an impartial peacekeeping that was tried in Kosovo. This is a lesson to keep in mind for nonviolent missions as well. Partisanship and non-partisanship do not

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436 see Annan 1998
438 See for example Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:XXIV
mix easily - especially if one tries to recapture a non-partisan position after having been seen in solidarity with one side.
2.6 Alternatives to military intervention:

What is done by the military that could be done better by civilians?

Christine Schweitzer

The goal of developing nonviolent, large-scale intervention as an alternative to military intervention\(^\text{439}\) is a recurrent subject. As has been described above, many peace services as well as at least a dozen short-term projects professed this goal.

In a broader sense, the search for alternatives to the military is one of two basic approaches in the pacifist debate: While one stresses resistance to unjust structures, accusing and making public what goes wrong and what the real interests behind are, the other always has accepted that there might be some functions which the military fulfils today which are necessary to fulfil and, consequently, need to be replaced in order to overcome war and organised violence. The most elaborate outcome of this approach so far has been the concept of civilian-based or social defence that aims at being an alternative to defence, one if not the basic function of the military. Of course, both approaches interact with each other and supplement each other, for example, when lessons learned in peoples' struggles became integrated elements of social defence.

The following section will discuss the question whether a comparable alternative concept could be developed for another function the military has today, the function of military intervention in conflicts\(^\text{440}\).

To issue a warning right at the beginning: There is of course a conceptual difference between the position that there are scenarios or tasks which civilians could do better than the military, and the more radical pacifist position that there are no circumstances under which military interventions are justified and needed, and that all could be replaced by concerted civilian action. I will come to this point in the end, but first develop my argument step by step.

1. The military has been fulfilling the following tasks/functions in the framework of military conflict interventions:

1.1. Deliver humanitarian aid and taking care of peacebuilding activities;

1.2. Provide communication and logistics in complex missions\(^\text{441}\)

1.3. Broker agreements, e. g. over demarcation lines or cease-fires

1.4. Monitoring and verification (in Monitoring and Peacekeeping missions of all generations);

1.5. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)

1.6. De-mining

\(^{439}\) In the Draft Proposal for an International Nonviolent Peace Force it says: "A major contribution of the GNPF will be to build international interest and support for nonviolent movements around the world that present the hope and reality of alternatives to armed intervention."

\(^{440}\) I do not talk here about other kinds of wars that might come under the pretext of protection of human rights but are basically motivated by other, economic and/or strategic interests. The Nato war in Kosovo/Yugoslavia was in my eyes an example of the latter.

\(^{441}\) See Seiple 1996:11
1.7. Peacekeeping of buffer zones and cease-fires, including prevention of infiltration;
1.8. Creating a safe environment for reconstruction and democracy building (in complex missions);
1.9. Protecting safe zones or safe havens
1.10. Protecting humanitarian aid and refugee camps
1.11. Assuming executive policing tasks, e.g. arresting war criminals or riot control.
1.12. Enforcing a cease-fire or peace agreement against the will of one or all of the parties including the forcible separation of warring parties and the guarantee or denial of movement (e.g. no-flight-zones).

2. The military has different inherent characteristics that need to be distinguished.

Of course, the picture drawn here is an ideal one based on the experience in Western countries of the Northern Hemisphere, and might not be true for all armies in all countries at all times.

- It has the material resources necessary for effective deployment – both the equipment (planes, ships, trucks, armoured cars etc.) and very good and easy access to money, almost unlimited in comparison to other governmental and non-governmental actors.
- It has good personnel resources (even without conscription) and training facilities.
- It is always available at short notice, being a standing force.
- There is a lot of special knowledge and special skills relevant to movement and security-conscious behaviour in war situations.
- The personnel serving in the military understand that their profession is a dangerous one, and generally accept the possibility of injury or death as a professional risk.
- It has weapons and people trained and ready to use them.
- It has a high grade of legitimacy and prestige in many countries of the world. Just the fact of being a soldier might make acceptance by other soldiers easier.

These are often the reasons why the United Nations or other international actors decide to send a military mission rather than a civilian one.

Of course, there are also other factors external to the mission that may be very influential to the decision such as:

- Politicians needing justification spending so much of the annual budget on the national military.
- Influence of important advocacy groups like the arms industry lobby. They have a need for the military being used because that creates new demands on weaponry.
- The deep-rooted conviction that military force is the only solution, and that civilians need protection by soldiers in war-prone situations.
• Expectations raised by public opinion ("something must be done"), and violence being the seemingly easy and clear-cut answer.

3. The military in peacekeeping missions also has certain inherent weaknesses:
   • It is a large and centralised bureaucracy, that means that decision-making is slow, individual initiative is often discouraged, that there is a lack of flexibility and also distortions in information flow.\(^4\) Often the formal chain of command gets disturbed by an informal one: Commanders of national contingents often preferring to what is called to phone home for orders rather than working within the international structure.
   • Its security provisions often prevent its members from making easy contacts on the ground and gaining trust
   • It is structured according to sending nations (national battalions instead of a "UN-army) which leads to local people perceiving them rather as reps of these nations, giving warring factions a chance to play on the perceived differences, becoming therefore a hindrance to co-ordination of the mission (because battalion commanders tend to ask for orders rather back home then from the commander of the mission)
   • The presence of military with a population that has been traumatised by soldiers before the arrival of the international mission might cause distrust and fear.
   • Its presence reinforces the implicit message of only the military can solve the conflict- civilians are helpless victims.\(^3\)

4. Some of the inherent characteristics listed under (3) could be transferred to a civilian body/organisation without any problems other than the political will to do so, while others cannot.

Easily transferable are:
   • Material resources,
   • Personnel resources,
   • Being a standing force,
   • The personnel having the knowledge and skills needed, and
   • Accepting the professional risks (as police and fire brigade personnel do).

There is no inherent reason why the tax money spent today for the military could not be used for an equivalent civilian organisation (or a number of such organisations). The equipment that would be useful could be transferred to these organisations, e.g. in form of a centrally administered pool available on request for everyone in need of

\(^{4}\) This is of course true for all large bureaucracies, not only of the military. But it seems that at least some armies suffer from these disadvantages much more then civilian bureaucracies because of their emphasis of giving and taking orders rather then team leadership.

\(^{3}\) See the Do-no-harm-approach of Mary B. Anderson (1998)
Volunteers could be recruited and trained in the skills necessary, and the necessary legal provisions made in order to allow a larger number of people to be able to leave their jobs at short notice in order for one or two years of deployment with a civilian force. Sufficient professional positions could be created in addition to have a small trained corps available at all times that then would only have to be filled up by the reserves.

There remain two very central characteristics of the military: Having means of physical protection and enforcement available (being armed), and the issue of prestige.

5. In the following points I will go through the tasks/functions of the military one by one and ask which of the characteristics of the military are relevant to each of these functions, and if/how they may be replaced.

5.1 Deliver humanitarian aid, taking care of peacebuilding activities, and
5.2 Provide communication and logistics

The arguments in favour of the military getting active in the fields of humanitarian aid and peacebuilding include some,- like having the equipment necessary, which easily could be transferred to a civilian body. In many cases even today it could be argued, and has been argued by humanitarian organisations, that the military is not capable of doing these tasks in a responsible and efficient manner, and should rather leave them to the organisations specialising in them.

5.3 Broker agreements

Cease-fires and other agreements are negotiated by those who are present in a conflict situation or have otherwise good access to the parties in conflict. Where there are no military peacekeeping missions, either influential leaders from within the society, international mediators, sometimes also NGOs, and in the case of international civilian missions these civilians have been fulfilling the same function. That means that this function is an outflow from having a specific role in a conflict, and has nothing to do with being the military or not.

5.4 Monitoring and verification

There is broad agreement in the literature that monitoring relies heavily on the acceptance and even support by the parties in conflict. If that condition is fulfilled, military observers in pure observation missions have often been sent to the field without carrying even side-arms for their protection. So again it can be argued that a civilian presence of a similar kind could fulfil the same function as long as the observers bring the technical and military knowledge necessary.

5.5 Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration

444 In some countries, humanitarian organisations already have started or at least are discussing establishing such a pool.
445 I am thinking of job guarantees (like maternal leave provisions) and insurance cover including pension provisions and life insurance.
While for soldiers disarmament and destruction of weapons is something they tend to do only hesitantly because these are their tools, the same act may be a cathartic action for civilians. Demobilisation often means cantonment - putting soldiers in prison camps, at least for a while. Having other soldiers as jailors has been proven to be not good - civilians are better at this job as well. The same is true for the task of re-integration which is a task anyway usually done by civilian agencies and NGOs.\textsuperscript{446}

\textbf{5.6 De-mining}

De-mining is even now often been taken care of by NGOs. Some NGOs have specialised on de-mining, others have a de-mining component. Experience teaches that these civilian teams (especially women teams) are better than soldiers, having a smaller rate of accidents and casualties.\textsuperscript{447}

\textbf{5.7 Peacekeeping in buffer zones and cease-fires,}
\textbf{5.8 Create a safe environment for reconstruction and democracy building,}
\textbf{5.9 Protect safe havens}
\textbf{5.10 Protect humanitarian aid and refugee camps}

Classical peacekeeping missions have not been based on the real capacity of the peacekeepers to enforce the separation of the parties. The peacekeepers were allowed to use armed force only for their self-protection. Even today, when the rules of engagement have changed, and robust peacekeeping is almost universally accepted, it is still\textsuperscript{448} considered to be an essential condition for both classical and complex missions that the parties previous to the deployment have agreed to the cease-fire, and to the presence of the peacekeeping mission. What has changed in regard to the use of weapons is that peacekeepers nowadays usually have leave to use force in order to make sure that they can carry out their mandate.

The question to be raised here is if the same results (or even better results) could be achieved by other means. Putting together lessons learned from military peacekeeping missions and from non-armed intercessionary\textsuperscript{449} peacekeeping as it is practised by nonviolent groups using the tactic of accompaniment, it seems that having physical means of enforcement available is only one of the tactics possible. Respect for the peacekeepers, and consequently refraining from use of violence, depends on many factors besides the peacekeepers being armed:

- Identity. Factors here might be age, gender, country of origin, religion and others.

\textsuperscript{446} This is based on information given by Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan at the Research Review Seminar of NP in July 2001.
\textsuperscript{447} This is based on information given by Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan at the Research Review Seminar of NP in July 2001.
\textsuperscript{448} It would be correct to say "again" because it is rather a return to this rule from the side of the United Nations, after a period in the 1990s when deployments in ongoing wars were tried.
\textsuperscript{449} Term used by Schirch 1995:26pp
• Role (peacekeeper), and whom you represent (e.g. the UN). This has become important in international missions when members of those missions would probably not have been respected because of their identity alone.

• Law and tradition (For example rules against harming unarmed opponents, rules of hospitality).

• Communication: making oneself known and trusted by creating personal relationships, using rational argument and moral appeal, or setting examples, by displaying a behaviour different from usual (e.g. working in teams whose members come from nations known as enemies of each other)

• Co-operation with all sides. Often it might be possible to identify issues where there are interests of let's say a paramilitary group that coincide with broader interests of everyone. For example, many such groups have taken up social welfare functions in territories they control. Or they might also be concerned with containing normal criminal acts. If the international missions manages to begin co-operation on such issues, they might succeed in winning trust and access to the leaders of such groups.

• Having leverage to apply pressure, e.g. by granting or withholding goods or privileges sought by the sides in conflict. That is a strategy that might work both with governments and with other armed groups (guerrilla, even criminal gangs) if it is possible to identify objects they are interested in (continuing to) obtain or to avoid losing.

• Being able to organise international pressure, both from international grassroots' and governmental levels. This seems to work in cases when the perpetrators are related to the government, and that government cares about international opinion. Activating the great chain of nonviolence (Johan Galtung) might work in such cases when no direct communication is possible between the parties in conflict.

• Having access to public opinion in the country. This is something that might work in countries with some degree of functioning society and state, when the government is dependent on voters, or at least of some general acceptance of what it does.

• Being both creative and stubborn when confronted with the threat of violence. Doing the unexpected, one of the rules taught in nonviolent self-defence classes, might also be a good rule for non-armed peacekeeping. There are many examples to be found in peoples' struggles and nonviolent resistance movements, as well as in the experience of Peace Brigades International.

This list is possibly incomplete. Still, it might serve as an argument that being an armed soldier is not the only way to gain respect in a peacekeeping situation, even in countries and situations where being a soldier at first glance seems to be essential for being respected. The rule of do not allow yourself to be stopped (see above in 2.5) can be

450 That is what Mahony/Eguren consider as "deterrence" in accompaniment (1997:84 pp.)

451 This is a tactic often referred to in civilian-based defence theory. See, for example, Mellon et al 1985:92
met by other means, because there should always be possibilities for gaining respect another way. But replacing the military in such settings is not a one-by-one exchange, having non-armed people doing the same as military peacekeepers do. Rather, in order to replace military peacekeeping, it would be necessary to combine un-armed peacekeeping with peacebuilding and peacemaking efforts.

It is important to point out that military peacekeeping missions also use these other tactics, and are rarely based on deterrence by arms alone. Both the work of armed missions and of unarmed groups shows that the elements of communication, of creating new relationships, of peacebuilding activities are also important factors in reducing violence. In many settings peacebuilding and peacekeeping activities and functions have been combined successfully.

Here is also the point where the mentioned structural weaknesses of the military come into play. Many of the tactics described above require a high degree of well-funded personal knowledge of the actors on the ground, and much flexibility in adopting to changing situations. Many of them work better if the belligerents fail to divide up the international mission into friends and enemies as they like to do with nationally structured UN missions.

Another argument for the use of armed peacekeepers usually is that they must have the means to defend themselves. But it has to be pointed out that wearing weapons for self-protection consists of two factors: One is deterrence of a potential aggressor, and the other is the actual use of the weapon in case deterrence did fail. Deterrence, or respect, as it has been argued above, can be reached by other methods then the threat to wound and kill. But if deterrence did not work, then the non-armed peacekeeper does not have the possibility of defending himself or herself. That is the risk nonviolent peacekeepers would have to take, as it is the risk that soldiers take if it turns out that their arms are of no use with the result they still might be killed.

5.11 Assume executive policing tasks

These are tasks that under normal circumstances are carried out by the police. As has been mentioned in 2.5, the discussion in the UN now considers different options, including strengthening international police. I think that at least for the time being the stance to be taken here is that this might be the right direction, rather than allocating these tasks to the military. If law and order break down in a state, there is certainly the need for an international police coming in invested with executive power. While some policing tasks might be in the range of what unarmed civilians could do (e.g. crowd control which nonviolent groups have quite a long history of experience with), others like a non-armed peacekeeper arresting war criminals seems to be something beyond her or his scope.

One thing needs to be considered in this context: Imagining an international mission where international police are sent in but otherwise only unarmed peacekeepers would

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452 And not being armed might even prove an advantage because it takes the temptation away to "test" the peacekeepers as has been described for example in the case of Lebanon. There every time the contingents changed over, the new ones where shot at from the nearby militaries just to greet them and to see how they reacted. (See Heiberg 1990) The un-armed peacekeepers of course would have to remember that they might be tested as well.
mean that the police are the only international institution armed. This situation might not only have repercussions to the activities of the peacekeepers, but also lead to falling back into older ways of thinking like "Oh, this is too dangerous now; this the police should do". Here a solution needs to be found, perhaps based on co-operation of International Police Task Force with local police if any exist, with them being the only ones carrying arms, or a strict limitation of the role of IPTF to classical police tasks.

5.12 Enforce a cease-fire or peace agreement against the will of one or all of the parties

As shortly mentioned in subchapter 2.5.5, peace enforcement might mean different things. There is certainly a difference between two or several parties are in conflict and none of them feels inclined to agree to a cease-fire, and when at least one party wants peace, or when the problem lies more with locally based groups not heeding the agreements made on a higher level. Surely, the mechanisms of non-armed peacekeeping as outlined above would work better when there is more agreement to stopping violence. If all sides in theory agree, then maintaining the ceasefire becomes a question of controlling the spoilers, a scenario which has been discussed in the paragraph above, and is a question of gaining respect and practising un-armed deterrence.

If the war in question is of high intensity, and neither side wants a ceasefire, it is very unlikely that an unarmed organisation would even find access to the area of conflict – an experience of many peace army attempts tried hitherto. Personally, I cannot imagine almost any scope for a nonviolent intervention under such circumstances. There have been individuals coming from a nonviolent background arguing in the case of Rwanda that if there had been a Civil Peace Service in place, these volunteers would not have left the country but stayed to prevent mass murder. But other people with knowledge of the situation in Rwanda strongly disagree.453 Judging from the experiences un-armed larger-scale missions and peace teams have made, I tend to agree with the latter position. There was no leverage for un-armed peacekeepers to make the perpetrators desist from violence. If a quick strengthening of the UN peacekeeping mission present, and giving them an enforcement mandate, would have changed things of course needs to remain open because of the wide-spread and decentralised nature of the violence. They would have had to be almost omnipresent in order to stop all violence.

Military enforcement actions seem only to have a chance to succeed if they are willing to take a risk and accept casualties on their own side, what the Western countries want to avoid at all costs. When Nato under the leadership of the USA decided against a ground war in the case of Kosovo/Yugoslavia in 1999 in order to minimise the risk to their own soldiers (no allied soldier died during the war), the bombing did not stop no matter what the Yugoslav troops and paramilitaries were doing in Kosovo. In fact: The systematic driving out of Kosovars on a mass scale only happened during the war, and it is only due

453 This refers to an unrecorded debate that took place at an early conference on Civil Peace Service in Berlin/Germany in 1994 or 1995.

454 In contrast to refugee movements due to fighting activity between the Yugoslav forces and the UCK. (Schweitzer 1999)
to a certain restriction from the Yugoslav side that it did not lead to genocide as many have feared.

Chances for a nonviolent peace enforcement project I can only see if the war in question is more of a protracted kind with a smaller number of actual fighting incidents involved. In such a case the chances of entering into the field, moving in the field, and influencing what happens might be higher.

If at least one side in the conflict is interested in achieving a cease-fire, the task of the international intervenors would be to create a situation in which the other sides (or side) see more advantages in peace than in continuing war. Here presence on the ground of practising peacekeeping functions of different types combined with peacemaking activities by different actors at all levels might not be hopeless. On the other hand, it would be a high-risk enterprise and chances for success probably depend on the conflict in question. are. In theory, nonviolent activists could

- Convincing all sides to lay down arms by means of mediation; by involving influential third parties; by engaging in peacebuilding activities that makes peace more attractive than war (e.g. economic aid programs), or
- Raise the costs of continuing the war by sanctions or boycotts; by creating unwelcome international publicity or by undermining the will of the individual soldiers to continue to fight (methods of civilian-based defence)

6. Summary

Most of the functions the military fulfils today in peacekeeping missions could be transferred to nonviolent peacekeepers. But there are two residues: One is the need for fulfilling some policing tasks in situations when law and order broke down in a country, or when local police is unwilling/unable to act in accordance with international law. Here is a need for some kind of international police.

The other residue is the question of intervening in on-going armed conflicts of high intensity. Perhaps some kind of Rapid Deployment Force under the auspices and control of the United Nations as a safeguard - such as police often maintain a heavily equipped anti-terror unit that is rarely if ever used - might satisfy the felt need for having an instrument ready to prevent mass murder and genocide in the worst case.455 If nonviolent peacekeeping on larger scale proves efficient, perhaps one day this rapid deployment force would be considered unnecessary and be abolished as the last remnant of what once was the military?

In order to reach this goal, civilian-based Defense would have to be introduced to replace the function of military defense, and international politics would have to undergo a radical re-orientation away from serving national interests to serving justice, meaning the interests of all world citizens.

455 This is what the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan (1998) has proposed.
Carl Stieren

In Sharpeville, South Africa in 1960, police opened fire on 5,000 unarmed Africans at a peaceful rally, killing 67 demonstrators. In Mississippi in 1964, three nonviolent civil rights workers were killed by a white Ku Klux Klan members and a local policeman. In Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Chinese People's Army opened fire on nonviolent protesters, killing between 300 and 1,700 people. At the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili, East Timor, in 1991, the Indonesian Army opened fire on a peaceful procession, killing 270 peaceful demonstrators.

But did these acts of violence mean the failure of nonviolence? The Sharpeville massacre was broadcast around the world, and both isolated South Africa and encouraged economic sanctions, though freedom was not to come for 33 years. The murders in Mississippi provided the spur to the U.S. Congress to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which helped gain voting rights for African-Americans in Mississippi and elsewhere in the U.S. South. In China, however, twelve years after the Tiananmen Massacre, none of the democratic reforms sought by the student demonstrators have been achieved. The Santa Cruz cemetery massacre in Dili also made news around the world, and was part of the pressure that led to the independence of East Timor, although at the high price of many civilian deaths from the pro-Indonesia militias.

Being nonviolent does not mean that you might not become a victim of violence. That risk is something all nonviolent activists have confronted and accepted. We do not define failure of nonviolence as the killing of nonviolent interveners or nonviolent movement participants, but we do consider as failures those cases in which such deaths stopped the nonviolent movement.

How does one define the failure of nonviolence?

Our working definition of failure in the face of direct violence – in the line of fire – includes

a) deaths of nonviolent activists in cases where those deaths stop the nonviolent movement

b) deaths of third party nonviolent accompaniers of the protesters in cases where those deaths stop the nonviolent movement

c) the abandonment of nonviolence by the social movement that was carrying on the struggle, or the eclipse of nonviolence by a rival violent movement

d) the fizzling out of a nonviolent intervention due to lack of a well-planned strategy to cope with many outcomes

None of the above definitions provide a precise measurement of failure. However, avoiding deaths of nonviolent human rights workers and of their accompaniers, and helping a nonviolent movement stay nonviolent, should be taken as our minimum definition of success for the Nonviolent Peaceforce.

Two types of nonviolent actions

Each case study for failure of nonviolence falls into one of two categories:
1) nonviolent movements
2) third party nonviolent intervention

Nonviolent movements that failed
There are a number of prominent failures of nonviolent movements, each of which involves the deaths of participants leading to the stopping of the nonviolent movement or the failure of the nonviolent movement to gain its goals:
1. The White Rose - the Nazi government’s killing of six German opponents to Hitler in 1943
2. Sharpeville Massacre - South African police killing 67 nonviolent protesters in 1960
3. Tiananmen Square - killing of between 300 and 1,700 protesters by the Chinese People’s Army in Beijing in 1989
4. Ibrahim Rugova vs. the KLA - nonviolence loses to the Kosovo Liberation Army, 1999.
5. Quebec City - a nonviolent movement against globalization at the FTAA summit loses support due to the acts of dissident groups that destroyed property and committed retaliatory violence

Nonviolent movements that succeeded despite significant deaths
There are a number of prominent successes of nonviolent movements, each of which involves the deaths of participants where these deaths did not stop of the nonviolent movement:
1. Timosoara Massacre - a costly victory for nonviolence - 97 were killed one week, and 160 the next week in Romania in 1989
2. Santa Cruz Massacre - another costly victory for nonviolence: 270 peaceful demonstrators were killed in Dili, East Timor, by the occupying Indonesian Army, 1991

The White Rose - a failure for nonviolence
Between June, 1942 and February, 1943, a small resistance group of students, soldiers and a professor, based in Munich, operated an underground resistance cell with the name "The White Rose". They succeeded in distributing six mimeographed leaflets in cities all across Germany in quantities of between 1,000 and 10,000. The leaflets called for Germans to abandon Hitler and his war. Their fifth leaflet contained the words: "A new war of liberation has begun! The better part of the people already fights on our side ... No pack of criminals can possibly achieve a German victory. Break with National Socialism while there’s still time."456

Their sixth leaflet, which was to be their last, echoed the news of the defeat of the Wehrmacht at the Battle of Stalingrad, a fact that had just been reported on the German radio in February, 1943. On February 18, 1943, Hans and Sophie Scholl were discovered throwing leaflets down a staircase at the University of Munich by a porter at the university who was an off-hours Storm Trooper. They and their friend

456 Hanser 1979:225
Christoph Probst were tried by the People’s Court and condemned to death. The plans of the local Gauleiter to stage a public hanging of the three were cut short by Heinrich Himmler, who, according to Hanser, wanted no martyrs and feared that public opinion would turn against them for such an act. Had there been public hangings, and had the public hangings resulted in a visible turning of the German people against the Nazi government, their deaths would have heralded the success of this nonviolent act. However, instead of facing a public hanging, the Nazi government guillotined the protesters behind prison walls. Alex Schmorell and Kurt Huber, the philosophy professor, were condemned and executed on July 13, 1943. The sentence pronounced by the judge, Roland Freisler, showed what the National Socialists were afraid of: "Alexander Schmorell, Kurt Huber, and Wilhelm Graf, have, in time of war, produced leaflets urging sabotage of the armaments industry and the overthrow of the National Socialist way of life; they have also spread defeatist ideas and vilified the Führer in the grossest manner; all of which aided and abetted the enemies of the Reich and undermined the fighting capacity of our nation. They are therefore condemned to death." The last of the six to die was Willi Graf, who was killed on October 12, 1943. The fact that their nonviolent movement, The White Rose, was stopped by the killings of its leaders (and almost all of its participants) is no discredit to those members, but it is a case where nonviolence failed. Could it have succeeded if, say, thousands of Germans were members of The White Rose and held a mass public demonstration? We shall never know.

**Sharpeville Massacre - a failure for nonviolence**

In South Africa, while the famous Treason Trial was taking place, the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), a rival of the African National Congress, had urged people to stay away from work on March 21, 1960. The PAC urged Africans to present themselves at police stations and to say "We do not have passes. We will not carry passes again. You had better arrest us all." According to Meredith "At 1:15 p.m., by which time nearly 300 police were facing a crowd of some 5,000 Africans, a scuffle broke out near one of the gates to the police compound. A police officer was pushed over. The crowd surged forward to see what was happening. According to police witnesses, stones were thrown at them. No order was given to shoot. No warning shots were fired. In a moment of panic, the police opened fire indiscriminately into the crowd. The crowd turned and fled, but still the firing continued. Sixty-seven Africans were killed and 1286 wounded. Most were shot in the back." The Sharpeville Massacre represented a failure for nonviolence which might possibly have been avoided if there had been training and discipline among the participants. It is not certain that police would have fired on the demonstrators if the police themselves had not felt both outnumbered and threatened. Despite the killings, the nonviolent movement might still have succeeded, but harsh actions by the government overtook it. Following the Sharpeville Massacre, the African National Congress and other opposition groups were banned. In December, 1961, the ANC decided to launch armed resistance to the Apartheid government. In 1964, Nelson Mandela, leader of the ANC, was sentenced to life imprisonment.

457 Hanser, 1979:295
458 Meredith 1997:173
The harsh repression by the government, including the banning of nonviolent organizations in South Africa took their toll. There were no democratic elections until 1994. All in all, the Sharpeville Massacre did represent a failure for nonviolence.

**Tiananmen Square - a failure for nonviolence**

The student demonstrations for democracy began in Tiananmen Square on April 17, 1989, when students from Beijing’s universities came to the square to lay wreaths in memory of Hu Yaobang, a previous General Secretary of the Communist Party who had tolerated student dissent, and who had just died. By April 27, more than 100,000 students, joined by 400,000 other Chinese citizens, marched on the square to protest the charge in the April 26 issue of *The People’s Daily* that the students had "a planned conspiracy".459

On June 3, 1989, between 300 and 1,700 protesters were killed by the Chinese People’s Army when the Army cleared Tiananmen Square. Ironically, many of the Beijing student groups had left before June 3 because of indications that the government would use force to clear the square. But student groups from elsewhere in China, who had come to Beijing to take part in hunger strikes and demonstrations, had not heard the news. These out-of-town students made up most of the groups in Tiananmen Square on June 3 when the army attacked.460

From the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 to date (September 2001) there has been no significant nonviolent movement for democracy in China. There have been a few small protests, mostly of individuals, including some self-immolations of members of the Falun Gong or Falun Dafa movement, founded in 1992 and called a sect by the Chinese government and a meditation practice by its followers. The Tiananmen Square massacre did stop the nonviolent movement in China for at least a dozen years afterward.

**Ibrahim Rugova vs. the KLA - a failure for nonviolence**

A powerful nonviolent movement among ethnic Albanians in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo, led by Ibrahim Rugova, lost out to the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA), ending in the Kosovo War of 1999. In that war, Kosovars of Albanian nationality were expelled by Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosovic, and NATO planes from the USA, Canada, Holland and Spain bombed cities in Kosovo and elsewhere in Yugoslavia.

David Hartsough of Peaceworkers, returning from a visit to Kosovo during which he was arrested and spent four days in a Yugoslav jail, warned of the danger of violence in Kosovo in an article in the *Sonoma County Peace Press* in July, 1998:

"Why has the international community so far refused to heed the Albanian people's urgent plea for an end to the repression in Kosovo? The people of Kosovo are increasingly considering taking up arms. At the same time, many of the people we talked with hoped that the international community will force an internationally mediated solution to the conflict as finally happened in Dayton, but before a war, rather than afterwards. President Clinton stated on his recent trip to Africa that it was

459 Ackerman and Duvall 2000:423

460 Thomas 1994:158
a tragedy that the international community had not acted quickly enough to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Isn't the time to act now in Kosovo?\(^{461}\) 

At a forum at Brandeis University in December, 2000, Justice Richard Goldstone of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, and Chair of the Independent International Commission on Kosovo, said that NATO's intervention did constitute a war. The situation escalated in Kosovo because the international community did not take necessary steps towards early prevention. A lack of international support led to the failure of nonviolence movements in Kosovo and the consequent rise in violence on part of the KLA.\(^{462}\) 

Howard Clark (p. 191-192, Civil Resistance in Kosovo, Pluto Press: London, 2000, 266 pp, ISBN 0-7453-1569-0), identified two major factors contributing to the failure of the nonviolent movement in Kosovo:

1) time for nonviolent methods to work: "In general, civil resistance is likely to be a slow-working strategy … Kosovo Albanians were deceived by the images of the ‘people’s power’ events of 1989 and by the speed with which four of the republics of Yugoslavia were granted independence."

2) the existence of a military option - "The Kosovo leadership always counselled patience, but popular acceptance of its strategy rested on illusions about the timeframe and the likelihood of Western intervention"

Quebec City - a failure for nonviolence

In Quebec City on April 20-21, 2001, there were large-scale protests against a planned globalization treaty that did not include protection for the environment and for labour. The Free Trade Area of the Americas treaty was the treaty being negotiated in Quebec City by 34 hemispheric heads of state from every country but Cuba.\(^{463}\) 

The confrontation culminated on April 20-21, 2001, when city police, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Sureté du Québec launched 4,700 canisters of tear gas and pepper spray against thousands of demonstrators. While more than 30,000 nonviolent protesters marched away from confrontation points on April 21, a few thousand demonstrators confronted police and tore down a section of the wall built to isolate the heads of state and the bureaucrats from the protesters. A few hundred demonstrators threw rocks and a there were unconfirmed reports of Molotov cocktails thrown at the police. The nonviolent marchers assembled on the morning of April 21 for a rally at the Peoples’ Summit, a counter-conference. The issues in the media and in popular opinion had been dictated by the People’s Summit until the date of the demonstrations. Things changed with images of black-masked demonstrators from the “Black Block” throwing stones and Molotov cocktails at the police, and public opinion shifted from 75 per cent in favour of the protesters to 25 per cent in favour. At the rally on the morning of April 21, two speakers who were leaders of the Council of Canadians, one of the nonviolent advocacy groups, gave mixed messages. The two, Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke, tried to support the demonstrators who would not disavow violence, and gave a mixed message about whether the wall should be

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\(^{462}\) Goldstone, Richard, Brandeis University website on the forum, "Intervention and Prevention: the Lessons of Kosovo": http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/events/kosovosummary.html

torn down by the protesters. Then, when the nonviolent march began, demonstrators were given a choice - either turn left and join the protesters at the wall, where tear gas and violence were much more likely, or continue on, to a march through an industrial area that ended with exhausted marchers at a parking lot. In the end, the nonviolent protesters lost ground that they could have maintained if the protests had been completely nonviolent. The refusal to disavow a few small groups, among them the Convergance des luttes anti-capitalistes (CLAC), cost the movement dearly.

The confrontation has since escalated between laissez-faire globalization and demonstrators urging ecological and social goals. The meeting of heads of state of the G8 countries in Genoa, Italy in July 2001 drew further protest and this, time the death of a demonstrator, shot by police as he raised a fire extinguisher to throw at a jeep full of police. Charges of torture and beatings by demonstrators who were jailed, and of police-state methods in Genoa accentuated the danger of such confrontations. Demonstrations were planned for the World Bank/IMF meetings in Washington, DC, USA, in September, 2001, and at the next G8 summit at Kananaskis Park, Alberta, Canada in June, 2002.

**Timosoara Massacre - a costly partial success for nonviolence**

On December 17, 1989, Romanian security forces killed 97 peaceful demonstrators in the town of Timosoara, people who were protesting the exile of a Protestant minister by the Communist government of Nicolae Ceausescu. Nine days later, the security forces and the army opened fire on a crowd of 100,000 in Timisoara, killing 160.

Romania had the only major violent conflicts in the Eastern European revolutions of 1989. Initial reports said that thousand were killed. Later estimates by Bernard Kouchner, France’s Minister of State for Humanitarian Action, were that 700 were killed, half of them in Bucharest, as of December 26, 1989.464

The killings happened largely because while the Army had defected to the side of the protesters, the Securitate troops were loyal to Ceausescu, who used them against the demonstrators. The Securitate shot to kill. Most of the violence ended after the Ceausescus were executed, on Christmas day, 1989. "The problem being faced—murderous sharp-shooting by desperate individuals—was one with which civil resistance was ill-equipped to cope".465

The nonviolent movement in this case was not stopped, and the killing of the Ceausescus and the killing of protesters and others by Securitate, did not prevent free elections and the installation of a democratic government.

The large number of deaths, and the failure to persuade the Securitate to negotiate or to surrender, made this a very costly victory for nonviolence. It was costly in more than lives. It is just this sort of outcome that the proponents of armed force could use in arguing, "Look, if the movement had used armed force, most of those killed would have been the oppressors, not the oppressed."

**Santa Cruz Massacre - a costly partial success for nonviolence**

464 Blétry 1990:39
465 Roberts 1991:6
On November 12, 1991, the Indonesian Army opened fire on a peaceful demonstration in the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili, East Timor, killing 270. Images of the Santa Cruz Cemetery Massacre were flashed across the world because a British photographer, Max Stahl, was there with his video camera. Two American reporters there were beaten by the Indonesian military - Amy Goodman, a reporter from Pacifica Radio, and Allan Nairn, a writer for The New Yorker. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on February 27, 1992, Nairn told what happened that day in Dili.466

"People were chanting and giving the "V" sign and talking among themselves. By the time it reached the cemetery the crowd had grown quite large. There were perhaps three thousand to five thousand people. Some filed in toward Sebastiao's grave, and many others remained outside, hemmed in on the street by cemetery walls. People were, at that point, standing around, talking excitedly among themselves, when, suddenly, someone noticed that one of the exit routes had been sealed off by an Indonesian troop truck.

"Then, looking to our right we saw, coming down the road, a long, slowly marching column of uniformed troops. They were dressed in dark brown, moving in disciplined formation, and they held M-16s before them as they marched. As the column kept advancing, seemingly without end, people gasped and began to shuffle back. I went with Amy Goodman of WBAI / Pacifica radio and stood on the corner between the soldiers and the Timorese. We thought that if the Indonesian force saw that foreigners were there, they would hold back and not attack the crowd.

"But as we stood there watching as the soldiers marched into our face, the inconceivable thing began to happen. The soldiers rounded the corner, never breaking stride, raised their rifles and fired in unison into the crowd. Timorese were backpedaling, gasping, trying to flee, but in seconds they were cut down by the hail of fire. People fell, stunned and shivering, bleeding in the road, and the Indonesian soldiers kept on shooting. I saw the soldiers aiming and shooting people in the back, leaping bodies to hunt down those who were still standing. They executed schoolgirls, young men, old Timorese, the street was wet with blood and the bodies were everywhere."

Nairn said that Indonesia later claimed that during the course of the march, a soldier was stabbed by a Timorese in front of the military district command base. Nairn said he saw a scuffle that lasted 45 seconds but could not see anyone stabbed. None of the Western reporters present reported seeing a soldier stabbed that day.

The world-wide publicity given this massacre of nonviolent protest had a significant effect. Together with East Timor solidarity networks, the message of this atrocity led to international pressure that eventually gave East Timor its freedom. Eight years later, on August 30, 1999, more than 98 per cent of all eligible voters in East Timor went to the polls to vote in a referendum on independence. More than 78 per cent voted for independence.

This protest was a success by a nonviolent movement, despite the deaths of protesters, because of the international publicity and support it generated.

**Third party nonviolent intervention that failed**

466 East Timor Action Network website, http://www.etan.org/timor/nairndili.htm
There are a few cases of prominent failures of third party nonviolent intervention involving either the deaths of more than one participant in those movements or the failure to achieve the protesters’ goals:

1. World Peace Brigade - its fading away after the threatened march on Northern Rhodesia, 1960
2. Mir Sada - the break-up a large-scale nonviolent intervention to Bosnia, 1993

Third party nonviolent intervention that succeeded

There are a few cases of prominent successes of third party nonviolent intervention involving either the deaths of more than one participant in those movements or the failure to achieve the protesters’ goals:

1. Mississippi Freedom Summer - killing of three civil rights workers, 1960

World Peace Brigade - a failure for nonviolent intervention

The fading away of the World Peace Brigade after the early 1960s was the reason that Peace Brigades International was organized in 1981. There were three failed or mixed-results campaigns before the WPB faded into inaction. The first was a planned march from the Tanzanian border into Northern Rhodesia in 1962 to protest the denial of rights to Africans by the settler regime. This march never took place because of changed political events. The second project was begun in 1963 by the Indian section to calm the conflict on the Indo-Chinese border. The march they organized from Delhi to Peking never got to the Chinese border, and was met with hostile reaction from both governments. The conclusions drawn, by those who met in 1981 to create PBI, were to begin small, encourage a lower, more sustainable level of activity, and not to risk everything at the beginning by organizing large-scale nonviolent intervention.

The fading out of the World Peace Brigade from Africa began after the international situation changed and the nonviolent march from Dar-es-Salaam to the Zambian border was cancelled due to Roy Welensky's failure to get more than 10 per cent of white settler support for his proposed unilateral declaration of independence. "Worst of all, it confirmed the African suspicion that non-violence was mainly talk and that in the hard realities of political action, non-violence was largely irrelevant." 467

Their second project was the voyage of the ship *Everyman III* in October, 1962 from London to Leningrad, where they were refused to be let ashore because the Cuban Missile Crisis had broken out. This voyage was undertaken "before the Brigade had organized its leadership, an effective mailing list for people interested in becoming members, or even a proper office," according to Devi Prasad. 468

Their third and last project was a Delhi to Peking peace march after the India-China border clash of October, 1962. It began on March 1, 1963 and fizzled out when the marchers were refused permission to enter China—after having been accused of being pro-Chinese in the Indian press.

Mir Sada - a failure for nonviolent intervention

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467 Weber 1996: 18-20
468 Weber 1996: 21
What would have been the largest third party nonviolent intervention across borders took place in 1993. Between 2,000 and 3,000 people from Italy, France, USA, Japan, Germany, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Poland, Greece, Sweden, Norway and the Czech Republic gathered in Split, Croatia, in December, 1992, for a caravan to Sarajevo. The action was called "Mir Sada", or "Peace Now".

Its appeal sounded majestic, but had no concrete explanation of how the group would achieve such goals as:

- To stop the war, starting with a ‘cease fire’ during the Mir Sada period
- To be in solidarity with each person suffering from this war, regardless of his/her ideology, sex, religion or ethnic origin
- To represent civilian interposition against violence
- To support and encourage a multi-ethnic population to live together in Bosnia
- To implement negotiations that will go beyond armed conquest and will impose both respect for, and the safeguard of, human rights under international law

This project was carried out by two organizations: Beati i costruttori di pace, and a French humanitarian organization, Equilibre. The group got as far as Prozor, beyond which there was fighting going on between Croatian and Bosnian ("Muslim") troops. "From our camp, we could watch, at short distance, grenades being shot towards the Bosnian-held area of Gornji Vakauf," wrote Christine Schweitzer, "This fighting finally caused the organizers at first to doubt the advisability of, and then to cancel, travel to Sarajevo."\(^{469}\)

In her analysis, Schweitzer lists the following as reasons for the failure of the project:

- imprecise goals
- uncertainty about political positions, such as whom to recognize and speak to
- uncertainty about whether to be neutral or in solidarity with a particular group
- insufficient preparation and training
- a flawed decision-making structure
- lack of equal relationships with peace groups on all sides of the conflict

**Mississippi Freedom Summer - a success for nonviolent intervention**

In 1964, the Student Nonviolent Co-ordinating Committee helped to organize Mississippi Freedom Summer, a project to bring hundreds of white northern youths to help Mississippi Blacks register to vote - an activity that up to that time could put a Mississippi Black in danger.

On June 21, 1964, three Mississippi Freedom Summer workers, who had been arrested earlier that day, were let out of jail at night. They were chased and captured by a gang of members of the Ku Klux Klan and by Deputy Sheriff Cecil Price and shot dead, their bodies buried in a local dam on private property belonging to one of the conspirators.

The theory held by the civil rights workers was that a large-scale voting rights registration campaign might succeed, and the presence of outsiders would deter violence that would otherwise be brought down on local Blacks. Their theory was wrong. White northerner "outside agitators" were detested by Southern whites. And if

\(^{469}\) Schweitzer 2000:270
the white northerner was Jewish, he was doubly hated. So it was for Michael Schwerner, a Jewish New York social worker who had helped establish a community centre in Meridian, Mississippi as part of Mississippi Freedom Summer. To let Schwerner to continue working unhindered would have been an unimaginable surrender by local white racists.

There was evidence that the killings had been ordered by a leader of the Klan. "Sam Bowers, the imperial Wizard of the White Knights (of the Ku Klux Klan), had personally approved (Schwerner’s) ‘elimination’ Schwerner’s death would send a message to all the northern civil rights workers who had no business meddling in the South’s affairs." Bowers was never convicted in the case, but in 1998, he was given a life sentence for a bombing he planned in 1966 that killed one person.

Deaths of U.S. nuns in El Salvador - a success for nonviolent intervention

On December 2, 1980, three nuns, Ita Ford, Maura Clarke, and Dorothy Kazel, and one lay missionary, Jean Donovan, were killed on the road from the international airport to San Salvador. Their bodies were found on December 3, 1980, in Santiago Nonualco, La Paz. Their killing followed the assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero, who was shot in the back on March 24, 1980 while he was performing mass. For the murder of the nuns, five National Guardsmen were eventually convicted in the case, the first known convictions of Salvadoran armed forces personnel for human rights violations. Unfortunately, higher-up involvement was not investigated. In 1989, six Jesuit priests were murdered by soldiers of the Salvadoran Army at the Central American University in San Salvador. In 199, two Salvadoran Army officers, Colonel Benavides and Lieutenant Mendoza, were convicted of killing the Jesuits.

The American citizenship of the nuns was not enough to protect them. Americas Watch reported 23 priests, nuns and ministers murdered or disappeared in El Salvador from 1972 to 1991. The four U.S. citizens made up 18 per cent of the total killed. Hatred of ministers, especially Catholic priests, was fostered by death squads in Central America. In Guatemala, there were at one time slogans painted on walls "Renew the country - kill a priest."

The killings did not stop those working for nonviolent change. The 1992 peace accords between the Salvadoran government and the FMLN (the armed rebel group), did officially end the guerrilla war in El Salvador, and the FMLN was transformed into a political party, which emerged as the second-largest political party in El Salvador. (Source: http://www.pbs.org/enemiesofwar/timeline2.html).

The bravery of the churchwomen, who went in unarmed to help the people of El Salvador, was an example for others. Their killings received worldwide publicity, and their martyrdom was a success rather than a failure of nonviolence.

470 Cagin and Dray 1988: 12
471 Americas Watch 1991
In the Doonesbury comic strip above by Gary Trudeau, June 26, 1986, U.S. Congresswoman Lacey Davenport confronts Contra Commander-Less-Than-Zero, who at first thinks Lacey is a nun-and therefore expendable. Members of the US Congress are not expendable, however!

**Conclusion**

When failure of nonviolence results in the deaths or injuries of protesters or accompaniers, there are two important questions to ask:

1) Were there rules of engagement that required the armed perpetrators to pull the triggers? If so, what were those rules?

2) Was there panic among the perpetrators of violence, or provocation by demonstrators, whether intentional or not?

In the cases above, there was perhaps one instance where nonviolence training and a disciplined movement may have prevented violence. Before the Sharpeville Massacre, the police felt threatened, with 300 of them surrounded by 5,000 demonstrators. One scuffle, followed by the crowd surging forward, was enough to cause the police to begin shooting, though no order to do so was given.

In the cases of the White Rose, the killing of the US nuns, the Santa Cruz massacre, and the Timisoara massacre, nonviolence training might not have prevented the killings. Because their rules of engagement called for killings, the perpetrators would not have been deterred, even by 100 per cent nonviolent behaviour by the demonstrators or protesters. In the Santa Cruz massacre, Allan Nairn shouted "America, America" and Amy Goodman showed of her U.S. passport. Those two acts may have saved the lives of the two journalists. But the presence of journalists from the West was not enough to deter the Indonesian troops from firing on the crowd.

For the third party nonviolent interventions, better training and organization would certainly have helped the World Peace Brigade, and possibly could have made Mir Sada a success. If the organizers had other witnesses - perhaps a convoy of large numbers of observers present - the killings of the US nuns and the three civil rights workers might have been prevented.
Such actions may well have helped. But in the end, there is no guarantee that saying the right words and taking just best action will always prevent violence.

What this means for the Nonviolent Peaceforce is that

1) Before any nonviolent intervention, there must be thorough evaluation of the likelihood of whether the rules of engagement of the armed parties requiring killings, even in the face of international opposition. If the rules approve killing in nonviolent situations, using nonviolent means to prevent killing will not work unless the intervenors - those in the crisis area and the group’s leaders - are willing to take a high risk of being killed, or possibly even to take that risk of being killed and send in more intervenors after the first group was slaughtered.

2) For any Nonviolent Peaceforce intervention to work, there must be thorough training by the local group of its members in nonviolent behaviour. The wrong signals sent to the army, the police, or militias by a crowd could panic those with guns and cause them to fire.

3) Individual members of a Nonviolent Peaceforce team must be carefully selected for success in nonviolence, and must have training that goes far beyond merely being an unarmed bodyguard. Karen Ridd’s experience in El Salvador, and that of the PBI team in Colombia, where armed police raided a human rights group and demanded passports and cell phones, are clear cases where skillful, persuasive, well-trained team members are required to prevent setbacks, and even to prevent killings.
2.8 Conclusions

Christine Schweitzer and Donna Howard

"No one can 'make', 'keep' or 'enforce' anyone else's peace. People and societies must create the conditions on which they base their own peace."  

2.8.1 Introduction

The motto on top of this page should be the starting point for all reflection on the possibilities on conflict intervention. All external parties can do is to support people in the search for peace, and all approaches and strategies considered below should be seen with this in mind. Only those who have the conflict are ultimately able to solve it. The mission statement of NP reflects this view, when it speaks of "creating space for local groups".

The goals of the Nonviolent Peaceforce are drafted as follows:

- To work with others, including existing peace team and peace service organisations to develop the theory and practice of third party nonviolent intervention, in order to significantly improve its effectiveness.
- To significantly increase the pool of people world-wide who are trained and available for third party nonviolent intervention.
- To build the support needed to create and maintain a standing force of at least 200 active members, 400 reserves and 500 supporters.
- To deploy large-scale third party nonviolent intervention teams in conflict situations.

In this chapter, different kinds of organisations mounting conflict interventions that have one thing in common, namely sending people to the conflict area in order to influence the course of the conflict, have been explored. Some of the organisations may be considered precedents for NP - peace teams, Civil Peace Services, larger-scale civilian missions, all sharing some if not all of the goals quoted above. For example, the first two goals are not stated by the other peace team organisations - if they are shared, it is by implication or is internal to the organisation. Civil Peace Services may share the first two goals, but has just started to build up its projects. Development services usually send only individuals, humanitarian aid organisations may send larger numbers but only for a short time. Larger-scale civilian missions may be the closest precedent but some of them were only short-term while others are probably closer to military missions then NP, which aims at being based on nonviolence, would like them to be. And civilians working within the framework of complex military-based missions have the protection of the armed peacekeepers which NP would probably reject as contradictory to its pacifist approach (?)

472 Mary B Anderson 1996:14
473 The research was done by Peaceworkers as part of the research phase of Nonviolent Peaceforce with the support of USIP. The opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in the publication are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace.
474 "A Proposal for a Nonviolent Peaceforce", March 26, 2001
2.8.2 There is a need

Looking at both the different peace team and civil peace service projects on the one side, and the use of civilian personnel in UN and other governmental missions on the other, it is clear that there is a need for a larger number of people being available to work in conflict areas. UN\textsuperscript{475} and OSCE both have problems recruiting and keeping qualified civilian personnel for their missions; representatives of peace teams and Civil Peace Service organisations state that they could set up many more projects if they had the resources available. The movement of Civil Peace Services in Europe, as well as the tendency of development and humanitarian aid organisations, to broaden the scope of their work for conflict transformation, also demonstrates this need.

2.8.3 A choice of peace strategies

The survey has clearly shown that there are different approaches and possibilities for large-scale third party nonviolent intervention teams in conflict situations. The two strategies we mainly found again and again in the examples are those of peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

We have distinguished different types of peacekeeping activities: Accompaniment, presence, monitoring, interpositioning, and advocacy with the International Community. Most of them are based on the threat of international pressure and/or other possible negative outcomes if the peace is not kept by the belligerents. But not all of them necessarily are, as the example of the Shanti Sena, who combined day-to-day presence and peacebuilding with interpositioning in the case of riots, shows. As has been argued in 2.6, nonviolent peacekeeping may rely on other factors and other sources of power than international pressure alone.

Peacekeeping missions have had different clients or target groups: local activists, a larger group or even a category (e.g. ethnic minority) of people, or a third power threatening to intervene.

Projects that base their strategy mostly on deterrence by international pressure (as many small-scale peace teams tend to do, need to consider the following two questions:

1. This threat only works usually if it relies heavily on Europeans and North Americans because these are the countries able to provide pressure. That means that the tactic is using existing power imbalances, neo-colonial dependencies and often also racist attitudes to provide protection.\textsuperscript{476} Is there a contradiction to the goal of overcoming these unjust structures?

2. International pressure may sometimes be a vague notion, but sometimes it may mean a very concrete threat like the one of military intervention (see KVM in Kosovo). What kind of pressure will be exercised is usually out of the hands of the nonviolent projects. Therefore, it is necessary before starting a project to assess

\textsuperscript{475} The Brahimi report (no 127 pp) criticises the lack of sufficient civilian personnel. The problem in their eyes is that experienced persons ‘fade away’ after one or a few deployments because the UN cannot offer them any job and career opportunities. Therefore, they propose the institution of an intranet/internet roster of civilian candidates from which UN can draw personnel quickly if needed.

\textsuperscript{476} Ed Kinane summarises this function in his description of “Cry for Justice”: “Cry for Justice, like PBI and other accompaniment groups, ran on WSP-white skin privilege. We volunteers were super-citizens. The vast majority of Haitian citizens were and are sub-citizens.” (Kinane 2000:214)
the possible character of that pressure, and decide if the benefits of the project planned are higher than the potential costs.

The issue of **interpositioning** deserves some extra consideration. There have been many small-scale cases of non-armed monitors actively preventing the outbreak of violence (see the examples of South Africa). Also classical peacekeeping is about preventing the renewed outbreak of war by mounting a presence and monitoring a buffer zone or cease-fire line, a case of interpositioning. That means that interpositioning per se is a valid tactic, and one - as has been argued in 2.6 - that can also be applied by nonviolent missions.

When Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber or Rigby maintain that interpositioning does not work, they speak of a special case of interpositioning: the attempts to stop a war by making oneself a buffer, the strategy of **peace enforcement**. Attempts to stop a war by putting ourselves between the frontlines have all failed so far. There is no case reported when this was achieved by a non-violent peace force, and the picture does not look much brighter when including military interventions here.\(^{477}\) It has also to be considered that there are almost no clear-cut front-lines anymore, and planes to fly over any which there still may be (and over the heads of the nonviolent protesters).

(There is an argument Maud Roydon, who tried to organise a peace army to intervene in the war between Japan and China, was faced with already in the 1930s.

In the opinion of Andrew Rigby\(^{478}\), interpositioning is such an extreme form of what might be called "sacrificial nonviolent action" that it can only be enacted by a minority of committed missionaries. It requires a degree of commitment and courage possessed by only a few true believers. If activists confine their efforts to physical intervention, they unintentionally contribute to the sense of helplessness felt by the bulk of concerned people who feel the need to do something but who cannot bring themselves to lay their bodies on the line in such a fashion. If many feel as Rigby does, the consequence of NP use of interpositioning as a tactic of peacekeeping would probably be to disempower many in the anti-war movement and frighten away volunteers.\(^{479}\)

Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber, summarising their examination of interpositioning, concede that gains have been made in getting volunteers closer to the interpositionary ideal, but that corresponding intellectual and analytical gains have not been made. They point out problems with finances, logistics, communications, the number and quality of volunteers, international credibility and unity of purpose within the teams, as well as unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved: "An assessment of the viability of nonviolent unarmed strategic large-scale interpositionary peacekeeping, based on an analysis of previous attempts, and measured in terms of physical effectiveness, seems to suggest that the concept is not a viable one. Analysis of experience indicates that the approach should be modified and that other variations on the theme, such as small-scale tactical intervention, especially in the form of nonviolent witness and accompaniment initiatives, should be developed more thoroughly."\(^{480}\)

\(^{477}\) Probably the most successful measures taken in this field are a combination of diplomatic means, perhaps some well-directed sanctions, and otherwise generally waiting for the moment a conflict is 'ripe' to be ended. (Zartman 1995)


\(^{479}\) Rigby, however, is not speaking of a massive and global intervention.

\(^{480}\) Moser/Weber 2000:324.
Interpositioning in the prominent kind of war today, civil war, would have to look very similar to what peace-keeping missions are doing - spreading all over the field. If the war in question is of high intensity, and neither side wants a ceasefire, it is very unlikely that an unarmed organisation would even find access to the area of conflict – an experience of many peace army attempts tried hitherto. There would probably be no scope for a nonviolent intervention under such circumstances.

Chances for a nonviolent peace enforcement project one of the authors of this chapter can see only if the war in question is more of a protracted kind with a smaller number of actual fighting incidents involved. In such a case the chances of entering into the field, moving in the field, and influencing what happens might be higher.

If at least one side in the conflict is interested in achieving a cease-fire, the task of the international intervenors would be to create a situation in which the other sides (or side) see more advantages in peace than in continuing war. Here presence on the ground of practising peacekeeping functions of different types combined with peacemaking activities by different actors at all levels might not be hopeless. On the other hand, it would be a high-risk enterprise and chances for success probably depend on the conflict in question. In theory, nonviolent activists could

- Convince all sides to lay down arms by means of mediation; by involving influential third parties; by engaging in peacebuilding activities that make peace more attractive than war (e.g. economic aid programs), or
- Raise the costs of continuing the war by sanctions or boycotts; by creating unwelcome international publicity or by undermining the will of the individual soldiers to continue to fight (methods of civilian-based defence).

In regard to what follows for NP, Donna Howard and Christine Schweitzer come to different conclusions. Christine Schweitzer recommends abandoning at least for the moment, the concept of peace enforcement by nonviolent means, and concentrate on those strategies with a clearer prospective of success, because of the high risk and the rather low chances of success. Donna Howard does not recommend abandonment of the idea of interventionary peacekeeping, for two reasons: 1. That it has not been tried and failed in the field, and 2. that it is an unwritten goal of the organisation to demonstrate an alternative to military peacekeeping.

**Peacemaking**: Civil intervention seems always to mean that there is a peacemaking component as well, both on the higher levels in order to create the framework and lead the peace process onward (El Salvador, Bougainville, South Africa), and on the ground to negotiate in the case of local/regional or sectoral occurrences. Peacemaking on the higher levels falls more or less out of this picture. It is mainly left to politicians, and to a few prominent individuals and groups specialised in unofficial mediation because it demands a high level of expertise, respectability and trust. For a project aimed at larger-scale intervention it is necessary to know about those which provide these kinds of services, but probably not something to undertake itself.

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481 Christine Schweitzer adds: My main argument for the 'low chances' are that military peacekeeping has returned to the position of deploying only after a cease-fire or the like is in place, because they found going in without such an agreement by all sides too risky. There is only one exception, at least on theoretical terms, to be made: I could imagine a preventive interpositioning to be successful in a case if four own governments decided to go to war, and a larger number of activists managed to station themselves there where the bombs would fall (not in the desert like GPT did.) There are no examples where this has been tried with success; still given the fact that most governments care a lot more about the life of their own citizens than for the life of the citizens of their opponent (whose death often becomes 'collateral damage'), I think this is a non-violent strategy yet to be tried.
Mediation and negotiation by NGOs takes mainly place on the local, regional or sectoral levels, and is mostly a by-product of the main activities and objectives the groups have set for themselves. This kind of peacemaking should be part of the mandate, be it peacebuilding or peacekeeping, namely to negotiate with the different actors, and sometimes mediate conflicts arising.

**Peacebuilding:** Our surveys have shown a very varied picture of different approaches and views. Typical activities by small-scale intervenors include: Multiethnic or multi-communal social work, supporting local groups and civil society development, training and education in conflict-related skills, psycho-social support, projects of "social reconstruction", emergency and rehabilitation aid, development aid, election monitoring, support of a judicial system including investigation into war crimes.

Larger-scale missions may undertake more complex tasks like monitoring and advising on a democratisation process as a whole which is usually meant to lead up to national elections: assist in the rehabilitation of existing political institutions, promote national reconciliation, monitor and verify all aspects and stages of an electoral process, co-ordinate technical assistance of the process, educate the public about electoral processes, help to develop grassroots democratic institutions and NGOs, support independent media; promote and educate about human rights; undertake humanitarian tasks like the delivery of humanitarian aid (food and other emergency relief supplies), implement refugee repatriation programs, resettle displaced persons, help to reintegrate excombatants; and contribute or conduct the training and support for restructuring of police forces, and sometimes also of the armed forces.

**Combining peace strategies:** One important lesson to remember is that all three strategies have to be used in any given conflict simultaneously. That "peacekeeping without peacemaking can end up being little more than a stunt"\(^ {482}\) is no doubt evident to all. The withdrawal of peacekeepers before the necessary aspects of peacemaking and peacebuilding are in place, would be irresponsibility with violence in its wake. But though they both need to go hand in hand, they need not being carried out by the same persons.

Only a few of the civilian projects have peace-keeping either by accompaniment or by monitoring as their only focus (PBI, Christian Peacemaker Teams, the South African missions), and a few more seem to settle for a combination of monitoring or accompaniment with peace-building activities. This is what Eguren calls an "expanded role of international observers" as an integrated tool for third party intervention.\(^ {483}\)

In regard to relief and development work, there is the argument that those forms of aid should be separate from peacebuilding. The reasons given are that it takes too much of a team’s time, that it is being done by many other organisations, that it does not directly reduce violence or challenge the so-called powers that be, and that it is a form of colonialism - Western outsiders invade region with their ideas of what local people should do in order to progress.\(^ {484}\) The contrary argument maintains that development and relief activities provide an entree into situations and increase an intervenor’s credibility:

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\(^ {482}\)Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber - 2000: 24

\(^ {483}\)Eguren 2000:22

\(^ {484}\)Schirch - 1995: 41-42
But the multiplicity of strategies and tactics must not be undertaken by any one organisation although it is possible as many examples have shown. Referring to the Mueller and Buettner study we propose that a well-networked group of organisations could undertake specialised roles. If NP focuses, for example, on peacekeeping (and a few of the tactics appropriate to that), then the consequence is that it must responsibly link with organisations that can fulfil other functions while it works at reduction of violence and after it withdraws.

2.8.4 When does a project have a likely chance to have impact on the conflict?

**Have a stake in peace:** One condition that seems to be sine qua non in peacekeeping missions set up after a cease-fire is that the parties to the conflict simply want peace, and want to keep the agreements made. As long as one party does not have a stake in peace, the means of influencing the behaviour of this party are limited.

**Susceptibility to international pressure:** If there is no cease-fire agreement, or if there are strong elements of spoilers, a condition for some success under such circumstances is that the parties in conflict have a stake in international support and retaining some minimum respectability. They need to care for international opinion, or be otherwise susceptible to influence. If this factor is given, then a peacekeeping mission may have a chance even if one of the parties is not interested in peace. This question becomes of special importance when violence is privatised - if it is closely linked to organised crime as in Columbia. But it is also is a problem when armed political movements or whole states are seemingly immune to international pressure, like Yugoslavia was for many years in the 1990s (see BPT’s experience in Kosovo and of the Peace Watch project in Chechnya)\(^{485}\), or the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka still are.

**Absence of others factors requiring the armed perpetrators to use violence:** Before any nonviolent intervention, there must be thorough evaluation of the likelihood of whether the rules of engagement of the armed parties require killings, even in the face of international opposition. If the rules approve killing in nonviolent situations, using nonviolent means to prevent killing is not going to work (See section 2.7, When Nonviolence failed).

**Types of conflict and level of escalation:** Looking at the projects in the survey, it seems that the majority of them have started only after a violent conflict was well under way. There are very few that started in the stage before escalation to a war, although of course those - and there are many - that began working after a cease-fire had been reached which may be considered to have a preventive function as well. Most of the projects active before violent escalation are probably undertaken by development agencies in the field of peace-building, and by governments in the fields of preventive diplomacy/peace making. In regard to governmental actors, the long-term missions of the OSCE fall under this category, and there has been one single case of preventive deployment of peace-keeping soldiers.

In the last decade such conflicts usually were internal conflicts.

\(^{485}\) At the beginning of the project in 1995 the team had to leave Kosovo, fearing for the safety of all their contacts as well as of the family of their landlord after the volunteers had been interviewed by the police, and contact addresses confiscated. See the monthly reports of that time.
We think that there is an urgent need to put more emphasis on projects in places where a violent escalation threatens but hasn't yet taken place.

What kind of projects are possible during the time of violent conflict seems to depend on the intensity of the conflict. Although the popular assumption is that "war is not the time for non-violence", a conviction which may often be heard, there have been some examples of projects taking place during wars. But usually these were conflicts where the fighting was either limited to certain areas (like in Sri Lanka where PBI has had an accompaniment project), or of no high intensity (like in Bosnia for most of the time where a few peace caravans/peace walks took place.)

**Cross-border intervention only?** The majority of the cases collected are cross-border interventions. But there is also a smaller number of cases where the intervenors became active inside their own country or region, and it is remarkable that their percentage of success has been rather high. Therefore, more attention should be given to local undertakings of this sort, and more effort perhaps given to identifying where it is possible to make the most impact. We think there is a lesson to be learned from the fact that Shanti Sena was not able to agree on the intervention in an international war, but very successfully dealt with a number of violent incidents within India.

2.8.5 Policy Decisions to be made

**Non-partisanship or solidarity:** Non-partisanship is the usual stance taken by nonviolent intervenors. But missions often have run into problems with this stance, and with getting accepted as an impartial broker. Some activities seem not to go well with non-partisanship, e.g. investigation of political violence or war crimes, and human rights work in general. In some cases just working for the implementation of a political agreement (e.g. elections in South Africa) put a mission initially on one side because the other side was fighting this very agreement. Yet, many projects have found ways to overcome these suspicions and win respect by all sides.

There have been some exceptions to non-partisan projects: Not all peace team organisations are non-partisan in character and by claim. Some of them like Christian Peacemaker Teams claim a form of non-partisanship while working in solidarity with those they see as victims and having a strong common link (religious base helping to communicate with devout Catholics of St Helene, and devout Muslims and Jews in Hebron)\(^{486}\) which is a major help for their work. The same goes for the identity/origin of the volunteers. Many nonviolent projects, basing their work on the threat of international pressure, have relied heavily on Europeans and North Americans because they were the only ones to provide this kind of threat.\(^{487}\)

In some other cases, the question may be discussed whether the claim of non-partisanship can be confirmed by looking on the work of the organisations from a more independent point of view. This question specifically has arisen again and again around accompaniment of local activists if that is the main activity of an organisation (like PBI). The decision of some CPS projects to rather forego the requirement of having a local partner because any partner would have positioned the project on one

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\(^{486}\) See Kern 2000.

\(^{487}\) The same could be observed in military mission: III/UNPREDEP In Macedonia many people think the presence of a US battalion was important, because it signaled an American military and political interest thus contributing to the success of UNPROFOR. (Woodhouse/Ramsbotham 1999:150)
side or the other of the perceived conflict, shows that there is a possible tension between having one local partner and non-partisanship. One way out might be to choose local partners on both sides of the conflict which welcome the nonviolent intervention, if the conflict situation allows it.

**Do no harm:** Though NP probably will not engage either in humanitarian emergency aid nor in development projects, it should carefully consider which of the lessons learned by these types of projects and organisations may be transferred to the future NP work. This goes especially for the warnings and recommendations developed by the Do-no-harm approach. Most of the implicit ethical messages are directly transferable, starting with use of resources and ending with evacuation provisions. But also issues concerning direct support of war have to be considered.

**Funders influence the shape and focus of projects.** Funders may fund only certain conflict areas they have a special interest in; they have their own ideas about how projects make sense. If they are governments or related to governments, they will prefer to fund missions in areas where they already have put resources - and that might often mean areas where military missions have been set up.

**Division of labour in complex missions:** Independent of the question whether all actors want or condone it, the division of labour is there as soon as there is an international peacekeeping force, which is taking care of providing a secure environment, on the ground. It is not so much a question of actual Cupertino: In spite of all complaints about the lack of co-ordination, the military usually is not really interested in the co-operation. But nonviolent intervenors need to accept the fact that they are part of a setting dominated by the overall strategy of the international mission and find a way to deal with it. Depending on the overall approach and goals of the organisation, dealing with the presence of the military might simply mean finding symbols of independence from the international mission (e.g. not using armed escorts, driving different types of cars etc.). If an organisational goal is to provide an example of being an alternative to military intervention, things get more complicated, and the only solution might be withdrawal from such a situation.

### 2.8.6 Implementation questions

**Communication with all sides:** All imaginable activities NP might decide to undertake - be it accompaniment, presence, observation and monitoring, interpositioning, or peacebuilding task, will be effective and safe depending upon the strength of its communication with both (or all) contending parties and with the international community. This aspect of the strategy must be in place before a team enters the field.

In addition, the teams in the field need to make a special effort to have good relationships with the people in the area they work in: All civilian missions have to rely on the local people for security, and therefore need to establish good contact and win trust and acceptance. Instead of just keeping people apart, civilian peacekeepers seem to have to bring them together, at least by making themselves the link between the parties. Knowing the local background, and having a base in the community has been proven to be a great advantage to missions.
Adequate timing, numbers and equipment: There have to be sufficient numbers of adequately trained people, and adequate equipment in place. As part of the CFJ witness in Haiti, Kathy Kelly has suggested that a larger presence, maybe 15-20 groups of foreigners scattered throughout Haiti, could have made a dramatic difference in restraining terrorism during the 34 months after the coup. The same has been said about many different wars. On the other hand the larger-scale missions have shown that it is possible to cover larger territories by deploying small teams all over the country, and that these numbers really make a difference. The examples, namely those of governmental missions deployed have also shown - often by default - the importance of quick deployment when a certain stage in a conflict, usually a ceasefire agreement, has been reached. Waiting too long has often meant that other powers re-organised themselves, and the cease-fires got broken again. Also the lack of adequate equipment has been shown to be a major hindrance to the fulfilment of the mandate - think of the example of the missing radio equipment in the South African case.

Manner of deployment in civil wars: All successful examples have deployed their personnel over a wider area, working together in small teams. The idea of a massive troop should be abandoned for such situations. Only if NP is aimed at replacing a military peacekeeping mission of the classical type, monitoring a ceasefire line/buffer zone, then the model of a military-like massive troop might have to be considered.

Length of the missions: Leaving aside election monitoring which by definition is a rather short-term task, most other missions found themselves having to stay for several years. Even if there were exit strategies, meaning a parallel progress on all fields leading to sustainable peace, even peacekeeping missions have needed to stay for several years (see El Salvador, Bougainville). A too fast withdrawal threatens to undo the positive effects reached so far.

Length of stay of the volunteers: While simple monitoring seems to be possible also for teams staying for only a few weeks, most missions found that for the fulfilment of a broader mandate a minimum stay of 6 months is necessary; many even consider one or two years the time necessary. That was also the average length of stay of the monitors in most other missions.

488 "There must be a clear connection between the mandate (the work tasks and their scope), the length of the assignment (that the length of time is sufficient to accomplish the mandate), recruitment (that the personnel has the capacity to accomplish the mandate), training (that the contents of the training and its length are suited to the mandate), organisation/equipment (that there is adequate organisation and equipment to back the peace monitors up in fulfilling the mandate)." (Ewald/Thörn 1994:24)

Appendices

Appendices to 2.2

1. Peace team organisations included in the sample

Donna Howard

Peace Brigades International (*1981)\(^{490}\)

The Board of Directors of the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) has nominated PBI for the 2001 Nobel Peace Prize. In its nomination letter, AFSC highlighted that Peace Brigades International’s “volunteer unarmed bodyguards from countries throughout the world provide protective accompaniment for human rights workers and others in regions of conflict. They offer international awareness and nonviolent protection to local workers for peace and human rights through independent observation and analysis of the conflict situation. PBI volunteers also conduct peace education training on request.”\(^{491}\)

Its specific approach is to offer accompaniment to human rights activists and groups who are threatened by death squads, and thereby protect them from violent, politically motivated attacks and encourage them to proceed with their activities.\(^{492}\)

There has also been accompaniment of refugees returning to their homes. The accompaniment is done by smaller teams (maximum might have been 25 people together at one time) of international long-term volunteers who are required to commit themselves for six months or a year, at least. Accompaniment goes hand in hand with documentation and world-wide distribution of information on the human rights situation - the international pressure being one of the main instruments by which PBI’s work proves effective. And as a third major activity, PBI teams are also involved in peace education (trainings and dialogue work).

PBI has had or still has projects in several American countries (the most important and stable projects are in Guatemala 1983-1999\(^{493}\), El Salvador 1987-1992, Sri Lanka 1989-1998, work with Mohawk Indians in North America (border region US/Canada) 1991-1999, Colombia (with four teams of about 35 volunteers all together) since 1994, Mexico and Chiapas (in Chiapas as part of the SIPAZ project) since 1999, Indonesia (West and East Timor) since 1999, and in Haiti since 1993/1995\(^{494}\). In addition, there have been some shorter-term missions: teams interpositioned themselves between Contra and Sandinista forces in Nicaragua in September 1983\(^{495}\), accompanied returning refugees in Honduras and Southern Mexico, and provided a presence in Israel/Palestine in 1989. PBI is or has been also the member of two coalitions: Balkan Peace Team (see below) and International Presence for Peace in Chiapas (SIPAZ).

Today PBI has more than 50 volunteers\(^{496}\) in place in four countries: Columbia, Haiti, Mexico (Chiapas), East Timor/Indonesia. They are supported by 14 country groups

\(^{490}\) Mahony/Eguren 1997, Schirch 1995, PBI-Website (www.igc.org/pbi/history.htm)

\(^{491}\) February 13, 2001 press release, Contact: John W. Haigis

\(^{492}\) See Mahony/Eguren 1997, p2

\(^{493}\) The project in Guatemala was closed in March, 1999 after 16 years of PBI accompaniment there. PBI/USA Report, Spring 1999, p. 1.

\(^{494}\) after a short-term presence as part of “Cry for Justice” in 1993

\(^{495}\) before WfP took this work over.

\(^{496}\) Eguren 2000, infomaterial distributed by PBI Britain (2000)
of members. For each project there is a Project Committee and a Project Office (usually outside the country where the projects take place). The highest decision-making body is the General Assembly (GA) which convenes once every three years. It elects an International Council which has decision-making power between GAs.

Witness for Peace (*1981)\(^{497}\)

Witness for Peace (WfP)\(^{498}\) was founded in 1983, in a passionate balance of opposition to the "low intensity warfare" waged by the U.S. against Nicaragua and compassion for Nicaragua's civilian population. Fifteen years later, Witness for Peace still maintains a permanent international team there but has also worked in Guatemala, Mexico (Chiapas), Colombia, Cuba, El Salvador, the mid-East and Haiti. And it continues to work against U.S. policies harmful to people in these countries.

"Over the years, Witness for Peace has established deep connections with the popular movements and civil societies in the region. These relationships enable Witness for Peace to better accompany our co-partners, and to better represent their interests to citizens and decision-makers in the United States."\(^{499}\) Combining a program of delegations with that of the long term teams in the field, WfP has been able to send over 7,000 US citizens to Central America, Cuba, Mexico (Chiapas) and Haiti to bear witness to the human cost of US foreign, economic and military policies in these regions.\(^{500}\)

WFP maintained active presence in war zones of Nicaragua, bringing US citizens there for short and long periods. Living and praying with Nicaraguan sisters and brothers suffering from war, then returning to tell stories & provide systematic documentation of violence.

Christian Peacemaker Teams (*1986)\(^{501}\)

Christian Peacemaker Teams (CPT)\(^{502}\) is a project of the Mennonite Churches, Church of the Brethren and Friends United Meeting and other Christians. CPT was conceived in the mid 1980s as a new way for these churches to express their faith. It has its root in one of the many proposals to start a "Peacemaking Army", made by the Mennonite, Ron Sider in 1984. (CPT) uses the phrase "getting in the way"\(^{503}\) to describe their faith-based nonviolent intervention.\(^{504}\) They use the word non-partisan even while standing in solidarity with people they see as victims of violence, because

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\(^{497}\) Schirch 1995

\(^{498}\) Witness for Peace, 110 Maryland Ave. NE, Suite 304, Washington DC 20002, tel +1 202 544 0781, fax +1 202 544 1187, witness@w4p.org, www.witnessforpeace.org/

\(^{500}\) ibid.


\(^{502}\) Christian Peacemaker Teams Corps Offices: Janice Kulp Long, CPC Coordinator, PO Box 135, Blacksburg VA, 24063-0135, Phone & fax 540/951-2788, E-mail cpt2@igc.org ; Head Office: GENE STOZSFUS, DIR., Box 6508, Chicago, IL 60680-6508, Tel. 312 455-1199, Fax. 312 432-1213, E-mail: cpt@igc.org; In Canada: Box 72063, 1562 Danforth Ave, Toronto, ON M4J 5C1, Tel. 416-421-7079, E-mail: cptcan@web.ca

\(^{504}\) A brochure written in 1993 states e.g. as "Focus": "Our peacemaking ministry is based on Christ's example... and as Mandate: "1. We believe the mandate to proclaim the Gospel of repentance, salvation and reconciliation includes a strengthened Biblical peace witness." (quoted by Kern 2000:176)
"they would do the same for anyone." Since, CPT has worked in Haiti, the Middle East, Bosnia, Chechnya, Colombia, Mexico, Canada, and the USA. In all locations, CPT responds to invitations from grassroots movements seeking to rectify injustice in nonviolent ways.

CPT places teams of four to six people trained in the skills of documentation, observation, nonviolent intervention, and various ministries of presence - including patience - sometimes in explosive situations where there is an imbalance of power. CPT workers try to emphasise or encourage nonviolent methods for redress and get in the way of violence when they can.505

Balkan Peace Team (*1993-2001)506

The Balkan Peace Team has been an international co-operation of about a dozen organisations - peace organisations like the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, War Resisters’ International and the German Federation for Social Defence, and volunteer organisations like Peace Brigades International, Brethren Service, Austrian Peace Services and Eirene. It dissolved in 2001. Its international office was based in Germany. Originally, BPT started out with the goal to place 100 volunteers in Kosovo to prevent a war there. In the course of the development of the project in 1993, this idea quickly became reduced - much under the influence of PBI - to a small-scale peace-team enterprise.

BPT’s basic areas of work have been dialogue, human rights advocacy and civil society building. Its teams in Croatia (1994-1999), in Serbia/Kosovo (1994-1999) and now in Kosovo (1999-today) have had very different mandates and activities. The work in Croatia has probably had most similarity with the work of PBI insofar as the team(s) allowed themselves to be led by the local groups, becoming active only when requested, e.g. by being a presence at court trials and when human rights violations are threatened. In Serbia-Kosovo before the war in 1998/99, BPT concentrated on initiating and furthering dialogue between Serbian and Albanian NGOs and students. Proposals to assume a protective role in Kosovo (accompaniment) were rejected by the project several times because, in its experience, foreigners were no protection but rather an additional risk to local activists threatened by the Serbian police.507

Today the team has concentrated on setting up a youth centre in a multi-ethnic community in south-east Kosovo, hoping to contribute to co-operation and eventual reconciliation between the groups.

International Service for Peace in Chiapas-SIPAZ (1995*)508

SIPAZ509 formed in 1995 as a coalition of North American, Latin American and European organisations, basing itself in California. In response to an invitation from peasants, it hoped to provide an international presence in the state of Chiapas to

505 ibid
506 Mainly written from my own knowledge of the project which I accompanied since its founding until well into 2000 very closely. As written sources I would like to refer to the (public) monthly reports written by the teams, and the study by Müller/Büttner finished in 1999 (not yet published).
507 At the beginning of the project in 1995 the team had to leave Kosovo, fearing for the safety of all their contacts as well as of the family of their landlord after the volunteers had been interviewed by the police, and contact addresses confiscated. See the monthly reports of that time.
508 SIPAZ-Website (www.sipaz.org), PBI-Website (www.igc.org/pbi/chiapas.htm)
509 Servicio Internacional Para La Paz, PO Box 2415, Santa Cruz CA 95063 USA, tel/fax +1 831 425 1257, formatl@igc.apc.org, admin@sipaz.org, www.sipaz.org/index.htm
benefit the peace process there. SIPAZ placed a team in Chiapas to "forestall or reduce violence and to protect and expand the precious political space in which dialogue [between the Zapatistas and the Mexican government] is possible."\textsuperscript{510} The team is politically independent, objective and neutral. It is committed to nonviolence, is rooted in a faith tradition, and is international in its composition. Its activities include opening and maintaining channels of communications between the Zapatistas and the Government; observation and reporting on the peace process and things which affect it; observation and monitoring of the human rights situation; and accompaniment and support of those whose lives may be endangered by their support of the peace process. SIPAZ combines violence reduction and peacebuilding strategies with efforts to inform and mobilise the international community.\textsuperscript{511}

An exploratory delegation visited Chiapas in February of 1995; the first staff arrived in Chiapas in November 1995. The coalition now includes more than 50 member groups, and the work has expanded to include eight staff based in three countries.

**Osijek Peace Teams (1998*)\textsuperscript{512}**

The Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights in Osijek was founded in 1992 by local peace and human rights activists who wanted to work for a multi-ethnic Croatian society, for non-violent conflict resolution and human rights and against war propaganda and hatred. In 1998, Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, the last part of Croatia which had been under Serbian control since 1991/1992 came back into Croatian control after three years of UN administration (UNTAES-mission).\textsuperscript{513} The Osijek Centre, supported by the Swedish Life and Peace Institute, created in 1998 what was called "Building a Democratic Society Based on the Culture of Nonviolence Pilot Project". Goals of the project are to contribute to the reduction of ethnic tensions in the former UNTAES-zone, organise humanitarian support for the needy, and conduct community-based and generated activities which would contribute to reconciliation. Since 1999, mixed Croatian-international teams have been sent to about seven places in the region.

\textsuperscript{511} ibid

\textsuperscript{512} Source: non-quotable

\textsuperscript{513} While the other parts of what was between 1992 and 1995 the "Serbian Republic of Krajina" were re-occupied by the Croatian forces in 1995 - an occupation vastly tolerated by the "international community", and which led to the flight of 200.000 people of Serb ethnicity.
2. Civil Peace Services in Europe

Christine Schweitzer

Germany

Germany was probably the first country in Europe where the concept of a Civil Peace Service took root. Nowadays, Civil Peace Service is a program funded by the German Ministry of Development. The main NGO organising Civil Peace Service is Forum CPS.

In Germany, the development of a Civil Peace Service ("Ziviler Friedensdienst") started in 1991 with a declaration\(^{514}\) and subsequent work of the Protestant Church of Berlin-Brandenburg\(^{515}\). A round of written interviews done by the church in early 1992 helped spread the idea of NGOs belonging to the peace movement. The Federation for Social Defence, an umbrella of peace organisations founded in 1989, took the concept and developed its own version of it. In 1994 there were two concepts of Civil Peace Service, one by the Protestant Church in Berlin-Brandenburg, the other by the Federation of Social Defence. They were very closely related. The main difference\(^{516}\) lay in the question of recruitment: While the Church wanted the CPS to be set up as part of the military conscription system\(^{517}\), the peace groups rejected that concept and demanded a pure volunteer system of recruitment\(^{518}\). But the political orientation, goals, fields of activities, emphasis on training and funding were practically the same, and therefore can be described together:

The Civil Peace Service as envisaged at that time, was characterised by the following elements::

- conflict intervention in crisis areas abroad (monitoring, mediation, being a presence, accompaniment of returning refugees, education/training, de-escalation of violence);
- prevention of criminal violence (with reference to the Neighbourhood Safety projects in the US), and of racist/right wing violence in Germany;
- providing the personal and logistical basis for Civilian-based Defence in Germany if needed.
- The Civil Peace Service was meant as a large-scale enterprise. The Federation for Social Defence spoke of a pool of 100,000 people within 20 years, the Church of a reserve of tenth of thousands within 4 years.


\(^{515}\) Explanation: In Germany there are only two major churches, the Roman-Catholic Church and the Protestant Church. The latter is organised in regional branches comparable, if not identical, to the political States. They are an important political factor, wielding considerable influence with the governments at all levels.

\(^{516}\) There are a few others as well, e.g. regarding the time allowed for setting up the CPS.

\(^{517}\) In Germany all men are subject to conscription. Whoever refuses military service out of ethical reasons (CO) is allowed to do an alternative Civil Service. (A term also in German sounding very similar to Civilian Peace Service.). The concept of the Church was that conscripts would be allowed to choose between military service and CPS, while the right to CO would continue to exist. Additionally, the CPS would be open to women and ‘other social groups’. (Civilian Peace Service. Operational Units for a Policy of Non-violent Means. Declaration by the Executive of the Evangelical Church in Berlin-Brandenburg of July 8, 1994, regarding a Civilian Peace Service. Concept translated from German by Hans Sinn.

\(^{518}\) Ziviler Friedensdienst. Ein Konzept des Bundes für Soziale Verteidigung, April 1994
• There was to be a one-year basic training for everyone, and the Federation for Social Defence developed a curriculum for it.
• The CPS was to be exclusively funded by the Federal State.
• The organisation of CPS was not clear. The peace groups stressed its subsidiary quality, meaning that it should be at least mainly NGOs implementing CPS, while the Church remained unclear in this regard.

In outline, the subsequent developments were the following: out of an open working group at the Federation for Social Defence, a new umbrella organisation was founded, the Forum Civil Peace Service. The Forum has existed since 1994, and became legally an NGO in 1996. The Protestant Church in Berlin-Brandenburg slowly stopped its engagement when the Bishop changed, and a prominent leader, Professor Theodor Ebert, left the Board of the Church.

The middle of the 90's saw, on the one hand, a strong concentration on the training aspect - up to the point when many supporters of the CPS considered CPS to be primarily a one-year training leaving possible work in the field to the side. On the other hand, there was a short time (actually some months between December 1995 and perhaps May 1996) when there seemed to be a political opening for getting support for CPS projects in the countries of former Yugoslavia. A joint initiative by Members of Parliament of all major parties in the CPS led to hectic discussions and planning among different organisations and groups. This initiative, known as Starting phase CPS (Startphase Ziviler Friedensdienst) failed in the end leaving only the experience of co-operation between the Forum CPS and the Protestant Umbrella of Peace Services in Germany (AGDF-Aktionsgemeinschaft Dienst für den Frieden). This experience lead to further co-operation in the later development of a training course.

Another outcome of this Startphase was the building of the Consortium Civilian Peace Service in which the Peace Services are were cooperating with the Development Organisations on behalf of civilian conflict resolution, and which proved an important factor when the Civil Peace Service was installed as an instrument of development work later.

Parallel to these developments, the Protestant peace service organisations in the umbrella "Aktionsgemeinschaft Dienst für den Frieden" started to discuss the future of their work, and came up with the definition of a Peace Expert Service (Friedensfachdienst in German) for qualified conflict work, distinguishing it from more participant-/volunteer-centered peace services.  

519 "Ausbildungsplan für die Freiwilligen des Zivilen Friedensdienstes (ZFD)", written by: Kurt Südmersen, Helga Tempel and Konrad Tempel, ed. ForumCPS, Minden 1996
520 The main reason for its failing was the lack of support by the Ministry of Development, then in the hands of Minister Spranger from the CSU-the more rightwing Bavarian sister party of the Christian Democrats. The Ministry argued that Development Services have dealt with conflicts all along, and that there was no need for a new type of service.
521 Usually three or four kinds of peace services are distinguished: "Social Peace Services" which mainly serve the personal growth of the - young - participants, and concentrate on social work; "Expert Peace Services" where the focus is on the conflict resolution work, not on the learning experience of the participants and where people usually are professionals not volunteers paid on a subsistence base, and Development Services concentrating on creating just structures. Sometimes a fourth group, so-called 'qualified volunteer services' are distinguished as something in between the first two.
Sources: Müller / Berndt 1998 and the paper "Friedensdienste und Friedensarbeit unterstützen und qualifizieren" written by a working group of the Protestant Church in Germany in 1996; Evers 1996; Ropers 1999.
The next step was marked by the interest of one German State, North-Rhine Westphalia, in supporting training for conflict resolution. Accepting the argument that civil conflict resolution in crisis areas (specifically in Yugoslavia where the State put in a lot of money) was important, and that it needed experts trained in conflict resolution to be effective in this field, it started to sponsor a four to five month training in non-violent conflict resolution for peace experts. The courses were run together by the Forum CPS and the mentioned AGDF with three of their member organisations: the Federation for Social Defence, the Ecumenical Service in the Conciliatory Process and the Kurve Wustrow, a long-established training organisation. Only Forum and the Federation for Social Defence considered these courses part of Civil Peace Service, the other three rejected that concept vehemently. Until now (Autumn, 2000) there have been six such courses, each with between 10 and 16 participants, partly people preparing to work in projects abroad, partly members of NGOs from other countries preparing for work at home. The international composition of the courses is an explicit objective of the organisers who strongly believe that the international character furthers the goals of the education. The courses consist of a basic curriculum of about 12 weeks, two one-week specialisations (e.g. in trauma work, civil society building and mediation), and - if needed - an intensive language course provided by a development organisation. The basic curriculum deals with issues like conflict analysis, working in a team, conflict resolution techniques, dealing with stress and trauma etc.

When in 1998 the conservative Christian-Democrat - Liberal coalition lost the elections and a new coalition of Social-Democrats and Green Party took over the Federal government, new avenues of political support opened up. The new government has started a program called Civil Peace Service which is based at the Ministry for Development, funding projects of conflict resolution abroad as well as preparation/training for such projects, and also becoming a co-founder of the North-Rhine-Westphalian course. Additionally, also the Foreign Ministry is funding projects on Conflict Prevention. The total budget in 1999 was 5 Mil DM, in 2000 17,5 Mil and in 2001 18,4 Mil DEM in the budget of the Ministry for Development. In 2000, there were additionally 28,6 Mio DEM for the training for OSCE personnel and Support for international activities in the fields of crisis prevention, maintaining peace and dealing with conflict. The Ministry of Development sees the CPS within the framework of development co-operation. The distinctive criteria is that the main objective of the CPS is to “support the non-violent dealing with conflict and conflict potentials”. Tasks of the CPS are defined as:

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522 This conflict had mainly to do with the old conflict about conscription and CPS - it took the CPS a long while to get rid of its flavour of being related to conscription or even a general compulsory service although it was mainly one person - the before-mentioned Theodor Ebert - holding up this element.

523 BMZ 2001:4

524 MdB Winfried Nachtwei, "Gewaltvorbeugung konkret: Unterstützung internationaler Maßnahmen der Krisenprävention und Friedenserhaltung durch die Bundesregierung", Berlin 16.10.00, source: www.muenster.org/gal/nachtwei. The other years, the budget has been similar.

525 There has been quite a discussion on the role of development services, and their relationship to conflict work. The starting points were that the development services hold the position that they had always dealt with conflict, while the CPS representatives assumed that the CPS had special goals and tasks that need specifically trained personnel and should be looked at as a new instrument of peace work. I think that without over-simplification it can be said that these two positions got much closer
• support of peace potentials, confidence building measures, education (on peace activities and reduction of prejudices);
• conflict mediation (between members of interest groups, ethnic groups and religions), human rights monitoring, democracy development;
• contributions to reconciliation and reconstruction (including reconstruction of administrative structures on the local level);

The activities are based on the criteria developed for development aid like subsidiarity, principle of the least intervention and "help to help yourself". Co-operation and acceptance with/by local partners are necessary to achieve sustainability. 526

Applications for projects may be submitted by the six recognised development services (see above) plus the Forum CPS and the umbrella of (Protestant) peace services (AGDF). But only the six development services may deploy people in the field, which leads to the strange situation that the members of Forum CPS and AGDF then have to get the co-operation of one of these six organisations in order to place their personnel. 527

The situation now is that there are projects funded under the program of CPS by the Ministry of Development, as well as other projects of CPS and/or conflict resolution that are called CPS without being financed by this Ministry. They usually are done under the umbrella of the Forum CPS and have a close connection to the training course, drawing their personnel from the course. There has been at least one project that was rejected - another training course, organised by the religious "Ecumenical Service". Another problem that is criticised by participating NGOs is that projects financed by the Ministry of Development have to be approved by the German Foreign Ministry. 528

The majority of the projects carried out by peace organisations (among them the Forum CPS, Pax Christi and IFOR German branch) take place in the countries of former Yugoslavia - which is not surprising given the attention these conflicts have found in Western Europe over the last ten years. There are usually between one and three persons working in a project, sometimes Germans, sometimes internationals who participated in the course and got funding for their own work via a German organisation, sometimes a mixture of both. The Forum CPS, as well as some of the other organisations, put great emphasis on creating international teams but really multi-national teams as, for example, Peace Brigades International and Balkan Peace Team have. are yet to be created. Gender parity in the teams is another goal, and one that seems easier to fulfil. The projects mainly deal with: resettlement of

when actual comparison of the work set in. See for example: "Entwicklungsdienst-Friedensdienst 1996 and Ropers 1999


527 Until now (November 2000) 45 projects with 78 staff persons have been granted. The majority of them are carried out by the traditional development services (Dienste in Übersee, Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst, Weltfriedensdienst). A few are carried out by EIRENE, and some others by the Forum CPS or its partner organisations using the Catholic "Arbeitsgemeinschaft Entwicklungshilfe-AGEH" as the formal project organisation. (There are only 6 recognised development services, and only these 6 may receive funds under the CPS program by the Ministry of Development. The Forum CPS is not one of them and therefore had to build a co-operation with the AGEH.) Source: internal information by the Ministry of Development.

528 BMZ 2000: 10
refugees to Bosnia\textsuperscript{529}, trauma work\textsuperscript{530}, community dialogue\textsuperscript{531}, youth work\textsuperscript{532} and conflict resolution training\textsuperscript{533}. They all either work on invitation of local partners, or at least have made it their policy to find local partners once they arrived in the field. (The strict rule in development work, only to operate with a local partner, seems sometimes difficult to fulfil.)

The projects financed by the Ministry of Development show a different regional distribution\textsuperscript{534}:

- Africa south of Sahara: 28 projects, 20 peace experts
- Southeast Europe: 21 projects, 18 peace experts
- Latin America: 20 projects, 15 peace experts
- Middle East: 7 projects, 5 peace experts
- Asia: 7 projects, 3 peace experts

The peace experts in the projects have contracts for two years, have all usual social insurances, and receive the same salary as other development workers do.

The before-mentioned training course that was started by North-Rhine-Westphalia is meant to continue into the future, but suffers from some structural weaknesses. The main weakness of the course is that finding participants is a constant problem. One of the conditions of the government for funding the course is that participants must already have a contract with a development or another project organisation.\textsuperscript{535} But most development services (with the exception of EIRENE) prefer to send their people to their own, well-established preparative courses, and the Foreign Ministry also has preferred to set up its own two-week course for "Civil Peace Personnel" as they call it.\textsuperscript{536} All argue that the longer course is not specific enough for their purpose, and/or that they only hire people who already bring the knowledge with them that is taught at the course. The other weakness is that, because of the kind of funding (every year the state decides anew whether to fund one or two courses), it has not yet been possible to hire permanent staff to do the training. Until 2000, each training was done by a different team of two trainers. Then two teams got employed part-time. This situation hopefully will continue in 2001 although, every year the two public sponsors decide at the last moment whether they will give money or not. More serious is that it becomes more and more difficult to find enough participants.

Originally, the Forum CPS had considered striving for a special CPS-law comparable to the law for development workers. (According to the law the volunteers receive

\textsuperscript{529} Pax Christi in Zenica/BiH and Benkovac/Croatia, IFOR in Bosanska Dubica/BiH. For this work as well as the following see: "Friedensfachdienst ist machbar!" (ca 1999)
\textsuperscript{530} Forum CPS in Kosovo
\textsuperscript{531} Forum CPS in Kosovo, Friedenskreis Halle in Jaice/BiH, Centre for Peace, Nonviolence and Human Rights Osijek which has deployed five multiethnic peace teams to communities in Eastern Slavonia
\textsuperscript{532} Friedenskreis Halle inJaice/BiH, Forum CPS in Kosovo
\textsuperscript{533} An initiative started by the Kurve Wustrow but now being independent in Sarajevo/BiH
\textsuperscript{534} BMZ 2001:6
\textsuperscript{535} If participation were open for individuals, probably no problem of finding participants would arise. There is enough interest in the course to fill it with people ready to pay for it themselves. Source: verbal information by the former Co-ordinator of the course, Martin Zint.
\textsuperscript{536} At the moment, these courses are directly organised by the Ministry. There is a plan to hand training and administration of this personnel over to a private organisation -which one has not yet been decided. (Source: verbal information by VLR Martin Fleischer at the annual meeting of the 'Plattform Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung', 23-24.11.00 in Iserlohn.)
social insurance, re-integration help and unemployment benefits and are paid on a
subsistence base.) On practical terms, this goal is not pursued very actively at the
moment. And there are now also voices counselling against such a law because it
might mean that the government would use the opportunity to reduce the social
provisions made for development workers.\textsuperscript{537}

To sum up: The political openings in regard to state support and funding, as well as
an accompanying intensive discussion about possibilities and limitations of peace
team work, led to reshaping the concept of the CPS. Without the former concepts
ever becoming formally void, the German CPS nowadays is something quite different
from the early concept \textsuperscript{538}. Instead of planning for large numbers of volunteers, it now
is a service of experts ("Friedensfachdienst"), the personnel being more comparable
to those working in development services than to volunteers in the traditional peace
services. In practical terms, it is also concentrating almost exclusively on conflict
intervention in other countries, because that is where funding is to be found.
(Although there is now also a Forum-initiative for an anti-violence project in Eastern
Germany.) The people sent abroad under the CPS-program of the Ministry of
Development are considered later to become a pool from which also OSCE and other
international organisations might draw personnel.\textsuperscript{539} (37)

\textbf{Switzerland}

In Switzerland a Coalition for a Civil Peace Service has been formed \textsuperscript{540} and which
has launched a referendum for the introduction of a Civil Peace Service. After the
collection of sufficient signatures, the referendum\textsuperscript{541} itself will take place at the end of
2001 or in 2002. \textsuperscript{542}

The concept of the Swiss CPS is modelled on the German one\textsuperscript{543}. The basic goal of
the CPS is to organise "unarmed, non-violent peace missions on request of non-
governmental organisations, state institutions or international organisations. It
thereby closely co-operates with the local organisations."\textsuperscript{544} The CPS is envisioned as

\textsuperscript{537} There are two possibilities of improving the situation of the Peace Experts Ð one is to have a new
law covering the special needs of these peace workers, and another is to get the Peace Services (i.e.
ForumCPS and AGDF) acknowledged as a special sort of Development Organisation, which would
mean that they could send out personnel on their own similar to the Development Services. Finding
out that the politicians don't want to get involved in such details, the Forum decided not to insist on
these alterations during the next two years of this present government.

\textsuperscript{538} But I think it would be a wrong picture to think that this development was caused only by external
pressure. It might be correct to say that the external pressure speeded up evaluations of present
peace team projects, discussions on length and quality of services, of skills needed to do conflict
resolution, and the need to pay personnel if qualified personnel was desired.

\textsuperscript{539} Rahmenkonzept of the BMZ, a.a.O.

\textsuperscript{540} Interessengemeinschaft Ziviler Friedensdienst, Berchtoldstr. 5, Ch-3012 Bern.

\textsuperscript{541} The Swiss referendum system works as follows: Within a certain time frame 100,000 signatures
are needed. After they are handed in, the State must organise a referendum - usually two to three
years later. Here more than 50 \% of the votes are necessary for the referendum to pass. The
government is then forced to make the decision of the referendum a law.

\textsuperscript{542} Members of the coalition are among others terre des hommes, Centre Martin Luther King, SCI,
Schweizerischer Friedensrat, Group for a Switzerland without an Army, several party - and other youth
organisations and the Schweizerisches Arbeiterhilfswerk.

\textsuperscript{543} "Argumentarium: Für einen freiwilligen Zivilen Friedensdienst", ed. GSoA, without date (ca. 1998)

\textsuperscript{544} Proposed new Art. 8bis, paragraph 6, according to the Text of the GSOA Initiative for a Civil Peace
Service. Source: internet (www.gsoa.ch/europe.solidarit.htm); Leitbild für einen freiwilligen Zivilen
Friedensdienst (ZFD), Arbeitspapier der IG ZFD, November 1999
a voluntary service of men and women of all ages, funded with public funds in the state budget. The implementation of the CPS, as well as a specific education and formation is to be handled by NGOs. A basic education in conflict transformation skills of 20 days (or 160 lessons) is intended to be free of charge and open for all people living in Switzerland. CPS deployments shall be possible both in Switzerland and abroad; people working for the CPS will have to undergo an additional preparation, and they are meant to be compensated for their work. There is no direct relationship to military service, but working with CPS should be recognised as an alternative to civilian or military service. Total annual costs for CPS are estimated as 90 Mil Francs (ca. 50 Mil US$)\(^{545}\).

There have been no real pilot projects until recently, but many groups in Switzerland have been involved in volunteer peace services and doing nonviolence trainings in general. In April 2001, two leading organisations in the Coalition, the Group for a Switzerland Without an Army (GSoA)\(^{546}\) and Service Civil International, have started a volunteer project in Kosovo which is modelled on the example of the earlier social reconstruction project in Pakrac/Croatia. (Which was much supported by GSoA.) Three long-term volunteers have been sent to Vushtrri to work with children and youth, specifically those who have been displaced\(^{547}\), to be joined later by more shorter-term volunteers. (38)

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545 For the basic education open for every person in Switzerland 35 Mio Francs and for the additional preparation for deployments 12 Mio (or estimated 1,200 participants per year); for 100 people deployed ca. 36 Mio Francs. 5 Mio are administration costs.

546 The GSoA was founded in 1982. It first became known by organising and winning astonishing support for a referendum on the abolition of the Swiss army. The referendum, which took place in 1989, got 35.6% agreement from Swiss voters. Almost ten years later, in 1997, GSoA, started a new double initiative: simultaneously, it collected signatures for the introduction of a Civil Peace Service and, again, for the abolition of the Swiss army. They managed to get about 110,000 signatures for each of them - the one for the CPS some 3,000 more than the other one (According to gsoa zitig No 83, source: www.gsoa.ch/zeitung/83/14.html).

**Netherlands**

On reception of the "Agenda for Peace" by the former UN General Secretary Boutros-Ghali in 1992, the National Council of Peace Organisations has developed an "Agenda for Peace Operations"\(^{548}\) to clarify the role NGOs could play in peace operations. This paper then gave the initiative to the foundation of "Burger Vredesteams" (BVTN) by the National Council of Peace Organisations (LBVO). BVTN does not have formal members, but is supported by most LBVO groups - mainly church-based peace groups, Women for Peace, PBI and others. Civil Peace Teams is now concentrating solely on training.\(^{549}\)

After a first consultation (with international guests) the discussion soon moved away from the deployment of actual teams, and towards organising training\(^{550}\), while lobbying continued. First, a one year course was developed in co-operation with a Dutch Vocational University. But, when the initiative started to negotiate with the government for funds for the course, they found that no one was interested enough in the idea to give it financial support. The Ministry of Defence indicated that they could use shorter courses of four to six weeks. This proposal strengthened support for the already existing idea to cut shorter modules out of the one-year curriculum. Eventually a first four-week course was conceived and held in November-December 2000\(^{551}\). This course with the title "Dealing with Conflict" took place with 15 participants. It was a co-operation of BVTN and a Christian Vocational University and was meant for adult people (over 23) who work or will be working in a conflict area abroad or in the Netherlands. Participants came partly from the military and partly from peace groups. BVTN did not manage to find participants from NGOs working in conflict areas.\(^{552}\) The third week was an internship with different groups in the Netherlands. The content of the course was: diagnosis and analysis of conflict, how to cope with emotions (in the conflict and one’s own), cultural differences and non-violent conflict handling.

**France**

The starting point for the French Civil Peace Service has been a volunteer law that was passed in 1995. Under this law, there is the possibility of sending "volunteers for international solidarity" work abroad.

The law\(^{553}\) - decree more exactly - makes provision for French or other EU citizens who want to work abroad with a French organisation (which needs to be recognised by the state as an organisation under this decree) to have some social security for the time of the service. Volunteers have to be between 18 and 30 years old, and go abroad for a time span between 1 and 6 years. The state pays social insurance (health, life, accident, maternity, professional illness for the volunteer and his/her dependants, as well as repatriation insurance in case of illness). The sending

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548 Dated October 1994
549 I have to thank Bart Horeman from BVTN for additions and corrections to an earlier draft of the description of the Dutch project.
550 The following description is taken from the "Third Quarterly Report about the Civil peace Teams the Netherlands (BVTN), 15.10.2000, Janne Poort-van Eeden.
552 Information from Bart Horeman (e-mail communication, 16.07.01)
organisations have to provide training, living expenses, travel and third-party insurance. In 1998, there were about 2,000 volunteers covered by this decree.\footnote{554 Compte rendu de la réunion du Comité de Gestion Service Civil de Paix du 21 Janvier 1998.}

Making use of this decree, several peace and development organisations\footnote{555 Signers of the Charta are: Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement (CCFD), Coordination de l’Action non-violent de l’Arche de Lanza del Vasto (CANVA), Délégation Catholique pour la Coopération (DCC), Institut de recherche sur la Résolution Non-violente des Conflits (IRNC), Mouvement pour une Alternative Non-Violente (MAN), Pax Christi and Les Verts. (Charte du service civil de paix).} came together to form a "Steering Committee Civil Peace Service" to advocate for the Civil Peace Service to be recognised under the law. After some lobbying, they eventually managed to achieve this goal, although the term peace does not appear in the official documents - "peace" is reserved for what the French army does...\footnote{Verbal information by Christian Brunier of MAN.}

The goal of the French CPS is to undertake missions of non-violent civil intervention, including activities like monitoring, information, interpositioning, mediation and cooperation with local groups\footnote{557 According to the Charta.}. It is meant to have a duration of 9-24 months including training. A developing reserve corps is envisaged for future deployments.

At the moment, there are two pilot projects\footnote{558 It still needs to be confirmed that there are only two.} under way: One in co-operation with Peace Brigades International in Haiti, the other with the Balkan Peace Team in Kosovo. For the latter, MAN, one of the constituents of the Charter, has founded an extra "French Balkan Peace Team" (EPB). When BPT dissolved at the beginning of 2001, EPB decided to go ahead by itself, and place perhaps three volunteers with different Kosovan organisations in the divided town of Mitrovica (Kosovo). The first volunteers have taken up work in autumn 2001. The pilot projects are both fighting with the problem of finances as well as with finding suitable volunteers.\footnote{559 See minutes of the Balkan Peace Team General Assembly, 18.-19.11.2000 in Bonn.}

One of the two elements of the CPS is a training that is organised by an organisation (IFMAN) close to MAN. Originally devised as a 30-day course (now reduced to 20 days) stretched over five months in order to allow participants to attend it while working. It is open for everyone interested; there is no prior selection procedure. Still the organisers had a lot of problems finding enough participants for the first course which had to be postponed once because of lack of interested trainees. At the first training,\footnote{560 The next training took place in Spring 2001.} in Spring, 2000 there were 12 participants.\footnote{None of whom, incidentally, was interested or suitable for work with Balkan Peace Team which was the reason why the deployment of a French BPT team had to be postponed for one year. Verbal information by Bertrand de Villeneuve and Christian Brunier of MAN.} Subjects of the training are: non-violence (4 days stretched over 3 meetings), non-violent conflict resolution (9 days in two meetings), handling difficult situations (3x3 days), political and cultural issues (5 days), evaluation skills (3 days).\footnote{*Interventions civiles non-violentes. Formation des volontaires. Projet (15 octobre 1998)*.} In 2001, another training of again three stages, of 1-2 weeks each, is under way.

**Austria**
The Austrian Peace Services are also a member of the European Network for Civil Peace Services. But, they are somewhat distinctive compared to the hitherto presented initiatives because they are, up to now, primarily staffed by young men who are COs and choose a peace service abroad instead of regular civil service.

Austrian Peace Services was founded as an association in 1993, with the Austrian FOR as one of its primary initiators. It offers voluntary and unpaid positions of usually 14 months in projects in the former Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia, Montenegro at the moment; there have also been projects in Albania and Slovenia). For men who are COs the 14 month service is recognised as an alternative to civilian service. Because of this, the majority of volunteers are COs. They have the additional advantage that their work is financed by the Austrian Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, the project tries to encourage women to become volunteers, although they have to be financed by other sources (donations, womens' groups, churches, Ministry for Environment, Youth and Family). Until the beginning of 2000 there had been 79 men and 16 women doing the service, 10 to 12 at the same time. At the moment (December 2000), there are eleven civil peace servants.

Austrian Peace Services distinguish four types of projects: human rights and peacebuilding; youth and social work; support of higher education (at the universities of Sarajevo and Podgorica); womens solidarity. The volunteers are placed with local projects that they support through their work. The volunteers are offered a four week training, including subjects like conflict, role of volunteers, psychological consequences of war, history and present situation in the Balkans and a few days of language training. The training is divided in two blocs and held in Croatia; in between, the volunteers do a one-week internship in their future project.

Recently, Austrian Peace Services has started to discuss broadening the spectrum of its projects, and to include a more qualified professional Peace Expert Service at the side of the existing projects where the learning experience of the volunteers themselves is the primary motive. The impulse for this discussion probably was as much a spill-over from the above described discussion in the German peace services as the assumption that conscription will be probably abolished in a few years. For both kinds of services the name "Civil Peace Service" is now used. As a "voluntary peace service" the service is meant to be about one year long. The emphasis is to rely on co-operation of the volunteer in existing projects and peace organisations. The participants are to attend a longer training that would enable them to work directly on conflict transformation. The CPS is expected to be supported by the state, but carried out by a plural number of NGOs. Austrian Peace Services proposes

563 Marion Thurswald, "Friedensdienst ist Frauenache", in: FriedensDienste Nr. 1/00, p. 3-5
565 Goals of the CPS are listed as: prevention of violence, search for possibilities for the ending of violent conflicts, and for sustainable solutions for all conflict parties; (re)constitution of peaceful situations (material and social reconstruction, a functioning community and society, reconciliation); support and co-operation with people and groups who work at the place of conflict for these goals.
566 For example again the Osijek Peace Teams where also German 'Peace Experts' have been placed.
568 Thurswald a.a.O.

Austrian Peace Services is going to offer an open training spread over several months in 2001.
institutionalisation as a foundation would take care of the funding, and demands a law on peace services.
Besides the projects abroad, Austrian Peace Services also aims at establishing an Austrian component (community, region or national).
At the moment, ÖFD suffers from the restrictive policy of the new Austrian government in regard to alternative service, which means that it faces serious funding problems for its future work. (40)

Italy
Two Italian organisations, the Associazione per la Pace and the Centro Studi Defesa Civile are members of the European Network for Civil Peace Services.
Since the reformed law of conscientious objection and civilian service in 1998 has recognised the possibility of a service abroad, there are several NGOs who make use of this provision to send missions to the Balkans, staffed by Conscientious Objectors doing their alternative service. Their work is mainly about technical and humanitarian aid, but there have been a few projects with some relationship to conflict transformation.
Some organisations, specifically both of those mentioned above, aim at the institutionalisation of White Helmets at the UN or OSCE, and also work for the creation of a Women Peace Corps which would supplement the work of the COs.
In regard to training, there is a lot going on in Italy. For example the Peace University at Rovereto offers basic courses in conflict transformation of one week, and international courses (in English) of two weeks. The Centro Studi Difesa Civile has developed a one-year curriculum for a masters' degree. The first course is meant to begin in autumn/winter, 2001. (42)

Britain
In Britain, the hitherto most recent initiative for a Civil Peace developed in 2001 when the European Coordinator for NP realised that a British project was needed in addition to seeking support for Nonviolent Peaceforce in Europe. Under the name of Peaceworkers UK, the goal of the organisation is to win support from government, private funders and the British peace movement for a British Civilian Peace Service. There are only bare outlines of the project yet, but it seems that Peaceworkers UK, like the Dutch coalition, might concentrate on providing training, hoping that the people trained would then find work abroad with international governmental or NGO missions.

European Civilian Peace Corps (initiative at European Parliament, 1995*)
Starting out as an initiative of the late South Tirolean politician and activist Alexander Langer, there was in the middle of the 1990s an attempt to find support for a European Civil Peace Corps at the European Parliament, co-ordinated by Ernest Gülcher, a former assistant to Alexander Langer.

570 Personal communication by Alberto l'Abate, Giovanni Scotto and by Birgitta Meier; Report: Seminario internazionale: Servizio civile, interventi di pace all'estero, corpi civili di pace, 4.11.2000; Centro Studi Difesa Civile "Civilian Defence and the White Helmets Project" 1998.
The idea was to establish a European Peace Corps for conflict interventions in crisis areas. It took up the so-called "Bourlanges/Martin-report" adopted by the European Parliament on May 17th, 1995 in Strasbourg that states: "a first step towards a contribution to conflict prevention could be the establishment of a European Civil Peace Corps (including conscientious objectors) with training of monitors, mediators and specialists in conflict resolution".572

The first proposal spoke of a standing force of 1,000 people (300-400 professionals and 600-700 volunteers) in the starting phase that could be expanded later. Its personnel would consist of specialists in peace, human rights and development cooperation work, humanitarian aid specialists, and people coming from administration, judicature and police. The ECPC is meant to be an official body, set up by the EU and functioning under the auspices of the EU. It would draw its legitimisation from a mandate by the United Nations or the OSCE. 573

Its tasks would be monitoring, prevention of violence, strengthening dialogue and confidence building, mediation, negotiation with local authorities, facilitation of the return of refugees and the like. 574

In 1995/1996 a task force group was set up which met several times and discussed pilot projects in Vukovar (Eastern Slavonia) and Kosovo among other things. Members of the Task Force included personalities like Arno Truger (Stadt Schlaining) and Alberto l’Abate besides representatives of the Quakers, EBCO, PBI and different members and assistants of the European Parliament.

Nothing came of the pilot projects, but the work in the European Parliament continued. In 1999, the European Parliament decided on a recommendation to the Council to establish an ECPC, and mandated the Commission to produce a pilot study. The political discussion of a new European Foreign and Security Policy including strengthened civilian participation overlapped the work on behalf of ECPC. At this point, it is not too clear whether the concept of the ECPC will be part of this political stream, or be drowned in the complexities of European administration, and whether it might correspond with the idea of Civil Peace Services as a clear instrument of NGOs.575 (43)

European Network for Civil Peace Services

The European Network for Civil Peace Services (EN.CPS) was formally founded in 1999, but there were meetings as early as 1997 and 1998. Participants in the Network (which does not have formal members) are at present: Oesterreichische Friedensdienste (Austrian Peace Services; Comité de Gestion du Service de Paix (France, an umbrella of several groups, among them Mouvement pour une alternative nonviolente); Independent Society Human Rights in Georgia (Georgia)576.

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572 Quoted after the "non-paper" "For a civilian United Nations' and European Union's Peacemcorps, some ideas, perhaps unrealistic" by the Green Group in the EP, July 1995.
574 "Non-paper" from 1995, a.a.O.
576 Georgia has not been included in the CPS list above because the report the Georgian organisation made to EN.CPS indicates that they are in the very first steps towards a CPS. They mention a seminar in January where "several organisations expressed their will on creating a joint network of Civil Peace Services in the region and launching co-ordinated activities." Otherwise, the organisation concentrates
several German groups: Forum Civil Peace Service (Germany), Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly\textsuperscript{577}, Living Without Armament (Ohne Rüstung Leben)\textsuperscript{578}, Foundation for Human Rights and Peace Education (Hungary), Associazione per la Pace and Centro Studi Difesa Civile (both Italy), Norwegian Peace Centre\textsuperscript{579}, Groupe for a Switzerland Without an Army (GSoA), Foundation Civil Peace Teams (Stichting Burger Vredes Teams, Netherlands) and as new members Peaceworkers UK. In addition, usually several guests participate. At the last meeting, there were e.g. a representative of Azione Noviolenza (Italy) and Bund für Soziale Verteidigung (Federation for Social Defence) Germany. The co-ordinator of the Network, Janne Poort van-Eeden, is a staff person at IFOR.

There is no budget for En.CPS and few agreed principles on which co-operation is based. The only joint project so far - besides annual meetings which are hosted by participating organisations in turn - has been participation in the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office, a lobbying office seated in Brussels, and run together by civil conflict transformation organisations. In the future, there might be co-operation between some organisations having staff in Kosovo, with the objective of placing a joint funding application with the European Commission.

The EN.CPS has a website managed by GSoA (www.4u2.ch). The addresses of the participants and associated groups can be found there.

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\textsuperscript{577} HCA Germany has organised a conference on European Civil Peace Services, but otherwise is not active in this field.

\textsuperscript{578} Living Without Armament has been sending a few volunteers to the former Yugoslavia and has funded local peaceworkers in these countries under the CPS scheme.

\textsuperscript{579} No information available on their work.
3. Other peace team organisations (in chronological order)  

Christine Schweitzer

Shanti Sena (1957*)

A description of peace team organisation always begins with the Indian Shanti Sena, probably not only the first but one of the if not the most successful project of this kind. The Shanti Sena ("Peace Army") was already proposed by Gandhi between the two World Wars, who in turn, was influenced by the example of the Red Shirts, a volunteer organisation founded by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in the area that later became Pakistan. Gandhi visited them first in 1938, soon before he concretised his idea of a peace brigade. But the Shanti Sena became reality only in 1957, being founded by the Gandhian Vinoba Bhave. At the beginning, they were part of the Sarvodaya-movement, all its members were part of that movement and committed themselves to its rules of behaviour and style of living. 2,500 persons signed the Pledge until 1962. Shanti Sena was meant to be an alternative to the military and the police. The members of Shanti Sena primarily worked where they lived, becoming so-called peace soldiers only when there was an emergency. They worked to de-escalate communal riots, helped to re-integrate members of criminal gangs into society and did humanitarian work during refugee crises (like the Bangladesh war in 1971) or natural disasters. In the middle of the 1970s, they were part of the resistance movement against the authoritarian government of Indira Gandhi. The resistance ended when Indira Gandhi proclaimed martial law and prohibited many political organisations. Shanti Sena was not dissolved but became active only again in the 1980s when there was another wave of communal riots.

Shanti Sena did not engage in international conflicts. The Gandhian movement split even over the question of the war between India and China 1962 where the majority led by Vinoba Bhave considered the military defence by India against the Chinese invasion as justified, while a minority led by Jayaprakash Narayan proposed to interposition Shanti Sena between the two warring parties in order to stop the war. In Vinoba Bhave's eyes, Shanti Sena should function primarily in a preventive way. Consequently, after the war he strengthened the Sarvodaya work in the border lands.

580 Main sources for the following description is Büttner 1995:43 ff. and Weber 2000. See also Shepard 1998
581 The objective of the 'Red Shirts' originally was social work to improve the living situation of the population on the country-side but assumed soon a more political role in the independence struggle in the 1930th.
582 As early as 1922, he proposed a volunteer corps. See Büttner 1995:24
583 The other two most important personalities involved with Shanti Sena were Jayaprakash Narayan (1902-1979) and Narayan Desai (*1924).
584 1962 the recruitment rules became more lax, Shanti Sena being opened also for non-members of the Sarvodaya movement and then even for members of political parties.
585 "For the establishment of a sarvodaya order of society, non-violent equivalents have to be found... We must make it possible to abolish the police and the army." V.Bhave, Shanti Sena, Varanasi, Sarva Seva Sangh 1963, p. 133-135, quoted after Büttner 1995:47
586 Usually riots between the Hindustan majority and the Muslim minority.
588 Büttner 1995:50
587 Büttner 1995:51 f
588 Büttner 1995:50
In terms of peace strategies, Shanti Sena used all three strategies: peace building (all of Sarvodaya work belongs to this strategy), peace-keeping in emergencies, and peace-making on the local level where riots occurred. The guidelines for Shanti Sena as formulated by Narayan Desai show clearly what importance the local long-term presence of the activists, cooperation with all influential groups and institutions (including police etc.) and the cooperation with local groups in case the Shanti Sena had none of their own in the place, played. In a crisis area Shanti Sena usually divided up in small groups.

**World Peace Brigade (1961- ca. 1963)**

The World Peace Brigade (WPB) was initiated by activists close to War Resisters' International, and founded at a meeting at the end of 1961 in Lebanon. It created three sections on a regional basis (Asia, America, Europe) - each section was to coordinate the formation of small brigades to be sent jointly to intervene in an international conflict. WPB wanted to emphasise that it saw different main political issues, and organised three actions of different approaches accordingly. To deal with the issue of colonialisation and liberation, it got involved in what was then Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and planned an international Freedom March. The March eventually was cancelled because of political changes which made the action unnecessary. To deal with the arms race, and to prove that there was as much criticism of Russia as there was of the West, a ship with the name Everyman III was sent to Russia in 1962 where it was forbidden to berth. The third action was organised by the Asian (Indian) section in 1963 in response to the Indian-Chinese conflict. A pilgrimage conducted by 19 marchers from Delhi to Beijing crossed India but was stopped at the border to China.

**Peaceworkers (1948/1978*)**

Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Thomas Weber both mention Peaceworkers in their overviews of non-violent intervention initiatives. According to Moser-Puangsuwan, the Peaceworkers has its roots when students and veterans began in 1948 by building a file of a few hundred volunteers to serve on a UN Peaceforce. When they found no support, they sent a team of four volunteers to Egypt shortly after the Suez crisis under the name "Volunteers for International Development". In 1979, the organisation changed its name to "Peaceworkers".

**A Quaker Action Group (1966-71)**

This US-based group conducted several small actions, among them 1966 in support of Puerto Rico activists protesting a new USA military target range, and send humanitarian aid to Vietnam.

**Pastors for Peace (1988*)**

589 Büttner 1995:51 f
591 Its closing date cannot be given since WPB just faded away and never was formally dissolved. It is clear that by the time of the Cyprus Resettlement Project where some members of WPB participated, WPB did not exist anymore.
592 Moser-Puangsuwan 1995
593 Moser-Puangsuwan 1995
Pastors for Peace (PfP) is a US organisation considering itself part of the Latin American solidarity movement. Its approach is to organise humanitarian aid caravans to places the US government either has put under embargo or otherwise is involved with on the side of anti-democratic forces. PfP has both sent aid to Nicaragua in the times when the US supported the Contras, and to Cuba where no US American is allowed to set foot on, much less send aid to. Now their focus is the organisation of visits in Latin America where US policy is causing suffering (mostly Colombia).

**Memorial Human Rights Observer Missions (1991*)**

Memorial is a human rights organisation founded when there still was a Soviet Union. Today it has sections not only in Russia but in several now independent countries. Since 1991 Memorial regularly sends observers to areas of conflict in the former Soviet Union in order to provide a non-partisan monitoring presence, and to make their findings public.

**Ecumenical Service in the Conciliatory Process - Shalom diaconate (*1993)**

This protestant-Christian German initiative trains people who want to commit themselves to peace-building work in a series of training week-ends and longer blocks of three months over a total period of about two years, and supports them in finding placements in projects abroad or in Germany. It is not a sending organisation but the people trained with the initiative usually keep in contact with the initiative, attend retreats and the like.

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594 Hayes 2000
595 Moser-Puangsuwan 1995
596 Voß 1994; leaflets and brochures by the Oekumenischer Dienst im Konzilaren Prozess
4. Peace army proposals

Dorothy Hollin's Women's Peace Expeditionary Force (1914)\textsuperscript{597}
Dorothy Hollin, an activist of Women's League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) proposed, at the beginning of the First World War, a Women's force to interpose itself between the fighting armies.

Harry Brinton's Peace Army (1934)\textsuperscript{598}
Harry Brinton, a follower of Maud Roydon published a booklet "The Peace Army" in 1934 in which he proposes a Peace Army which would be sent into a conflict area when a war threatened, interposition itself between the two warring parties thereby giving them time to cool down and reconsider their plans.

Henry Usborne's Peace Force (1956)\textsuperscript{599}
The growing tensions in the Middle East led the British MP Henry Usborne, a protagonist of world government, to propose a UN volunteer corps of 10,000 people to patrol and hold a two kilometre-wide demilitarised zone between Egypt and Israel. (Soon after, the UN sent one of the very first peace-keeping forces there which, of course, was armed).

Richard Acland's World Police Force (1958)\textsuperscript{600}
Two years after Usborne, another (former) British MP made a similar proposal to set up a world police force of 5,000-15,000 members recruited internationally. An unarmed component of that Force could be used as an observer corps going into crisis areas.

Ralph Bell's Active Non-Violent Resistance Army (1959)\textsuperscript{601}
The British Reverend Ralph Bell wrote a booklet in 1959, proposing to develop step by step an alternative to war. First small groups of pioneers would engage in active non-violent resistance, and when there were enough of them, an organisation could be formed. This organisation would combine what soon later was termed Civilian-based defence and non-violent intervention both for settling crises and overthrowing tyrannies.

Salvador de Madariaga/Jayaprakash Narayan's Peace Guard (1960/1971)\textsuperscript{602}
De Madariaga, a Spanish writer and pacifist, and J.P Narayan, one of the leading figures in Shanti Sena (see below) proposed to the Secretary General of the UN the creation of an unarmed international police force that would be an alternative to armed peace-keeping forces. Its purpose would be to intervene in conflict by

\textsuperscript{597} Weber 2000
\textsuperscript{598} Weber 2000
\textsuperscript{599} Weber 2000
\textsuperscript{600} Weber 2000
\textsuperscript{601} Bell 1959, Weber 2000
\textsuperscript{602} Weber 2000
interpositioning itself between advancing armies. As its predecessors, the proposal found no attention at the UN. P. Narayan repeated the proposal in 1971 in another letter to the UN Secretary-General.

**Raymond Magee's Peaceworkers (1978 onwards)**

Raymond Magee who already was involved in the American Peace Corps foundation gave the initiative for the foundation of "Peaceworkers" in 1978. According to Weber, Peaceworkers tried already back in 1978 to convince the UN to develop a "UN Volunteer Peaceworkers Service" based on the peace team model which would engage in interpositioning as well as mediation, reconciliation and relief work.

**Charles Walker's World Peace Guard (1981)**

Walker's proposal which he made public in a small book published in 1981 was based on the author's experience in Cyprus. Walker has been involved both in World Peace Brigade and later in Peace Brigades International whose Coordinator he was for some time. The World Peace Guard was meant to be an international standing force ("peacekeeping agency" Walker calls it) of trained volunteers who would stand ready for peace-keeping missions, either mandated by the parties in conflict or by the UN or others involved.

**Christian Peacemaking Army**

In 1984, the US Mennonite, Ron Sider, proposed that the Anabaptist Churches should together found a Christian Peacemaking Army of 100.000 persons to serve as an interpositionary force, ready to "die by the thousands". His proposal was initiative for the setting up of Christian Peacemaker Teams in 1986.

**German Civilian Peace Service**

The starting point for the debate on a Civil Peace Service in Germany was the idea to create a pool 100.000 people within 20 years, or a reserve of tens of thousands within 4 years. Its tasks would include: conflict intervention in crisis areas abroad; prevention of criminal and of racist/right wing violence in Germany; and the personal and logistical basis for Civilian-based Defence, if needed.

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603 Weber 2000  
605 Kern 2000  
606 Sider's speech to the Mennonite World Conference in 1984, quoted by Kern 2000:175  
607 see Appendix to 1.4.4, Civilian Peace Service-Germany for sources
5. Intervention projects undertaken by spontaneously formed groups

Christine Schweitzer

Maude Roydon's Peace Army (1932-1939)\(^\text{608}\)

In 1932, the British Anglican minister, Maude Roydon, proposed to organise a non-violent 'army' to intervene in the war between Japan and China. In 1931, China had occupied Manjuria, and the fighting threatened to start again in 1932. Royden was inspired by Gandhi whom she had met personally. Together with two supporters, Rev. H.R.L. Sheppard and Scottish minister, Dr. Herbert Gray, she published the proposal in the London Daily Express, and later presented it to the League of Nations which did not consider her idea. Because of lack of both recruits (instead of the numbers they hoped for they only found about 1,000 volunteers) and funds, the peace army proposal failed. The initiators continued to work for a few years on their idea, sending a team of volunteers to Palestine for a couple of years. The initiative eventually died with the beginning of World War II.

US Civil Rights Movement (1947, 1964)\(^\text{609}\)

Some of the early examples of non-violent accompaniment come from the US civil rights movement. In the "Journey of Reconciliation" in 1947, eight white people accompanied eight black activists who rode by bus through the upper South to test a 1946 Supreme Court decision outlawing segregated seating on interstate travel. 1964, nearly 1,000 white volunteers from the North joined black field workers in Mississippi in their struggle to register Blacks to vote. The organisers from SNCC (Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee) hoped that the presence of the white volunteers would deter violence.

Algeria \(^\text{610}\)

According to Schirch, thousands of Algerian civilians marched in between the French army and Algerian insurgents during the Algerian war of independence, (1958-1962) and prevented them from fighting.

China's Cultural Revolution (1968) \(^\text{611}\)

During the Cultural Revolution, 30,000 un-armed workers interpositioned themselves between fighting factions of the Ultra-Maoist Red Guard.

Nagaland Peace Mission (1964-1972)\(^\text{612}\)

Nagaland is a mountain region in north-east India whose population has strived for independence from the newly-founded Indian Union. When, in 1963, Nagaland became a Federal State of India, violence broke out. A mediation mission was organised by prominent members of Shanti Sena and some Christian Churches. In addition to those who engaged directly in mediation (on invitation of the Nagaland

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\(^{609}\) Coy 1994, Schirch 1995

\(^{610}\) Schirch 1995. Unfortunately, she does neither give dates nor a source for this information.

\(^{611}\) Schirch 1995. Unfortunately, she does neither give dates nor a source for this information.

\(^{612}\) Büttner 1995, Müller/Büttner 1998
Church Council), an "Observer Team" was created. When the mission had succeeded in negotiating a cease-fire, the Observer Team monitored it. Later, a Youth Peace Brigade was set up and regional peace centres founded. But the initiative did not manage to solve the conflict which is still virulent today.

**Non-Violent Action in Vietnam 1967**

This British-based initiative proposed to send hundreds of non-violent activists to North Vietnam to stop the bombing by the United States. Eventually, they sent about 20 people to the region, but without support from the North Vietnam government, the protesters were stopped at the border between Cambodia and Vietnam.

**Czechoslovakia Support Actions (1968)**

In reaction to the military occupation of the Warsaw Pact by which the Czechoslovakian democracy movement was suppressed, War Resisters' International sent four teams to leaflet in most Eastern European capitals. The goal was to "put into practice precisely those freedoms which the Czechoslovaks were attempting to defend".

**Northern Ireland Peace Force (1971)**

In 1971, the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) proposed an "Irish Peace Force" to monitor situations of violence, help the injured and calm emotions. The proposal found attention in pacifist circles but never became realised.

**Operation Omega (1971-1973)**

"Operation Omega" was an international initiative to organise the return of 50,000 displaced people to East India. Organisers were people from Shanti Sena, War Resisters' International and Quakers from Philadelphia. The proposed March was stopped by the beginning of the Indo-Pakistan war. Activists then organised relief work and protests against arms shipments to Pakistan.

**Cyprus Resettlement Project (1972-75)**

The project was set up by activists from different countries, among them former World Peace Brigade activists and Shanti Sena members. Its goals were to help to rebuild contact between the Greek and Turks, support the repatriation of refugees, and to help rebuilding houses. Several fact finding missions were organised between 1972 and 1973, eventually successfully getting permission from both the Turkish and Greek authorities to start the project. In November 1973, a first working team of 18 members arrived and stayed for three months, in April 1974, another team of five members took over. It also organised a workcamp with Turkish and Greek young people. When the Turkish half of the island was occupied by Turkish troops in

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614 Moser-Puangsuwan 1995
615 Weber 2000
616 Moser-Puangsuwan 1995
617 Müller/Büttner 1998, Hare 2000
618 The project had planned to set up mixed teams of Cypriots (from both sides) and international people. From the description in the sources available it remains unclear if they managed to do so.
September 1974, the team members successfully protected threatened villagers. The project was formally ended in early 1975.

**Refugee Escort Services (1989-1991)**\textsuperscript{619} , **Project Accompaniment**\textsuperscript{620} and **CAREA (1993)**\textsuperscript{621}

Under the name "Refugee Escort Services" several community based initiatives, independent from each other, provided accompaniment and monitoring for refugees returning from Honduras to El Salvador.

"Project Accompaniment" was a Canadian initiative to accompany refugees from Mexico returning back to Guatemala. After some fact finding missions, the initiative managed to form a coalition of groups offering accompaniment. The first group of refugees was accompanied in 1993. This project is otherwise known under the name of "Carea".

**Mid-East Witness (1990-1992)**\textsuperscript{622}

East Witness sent teams of volunteers to live with Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. According to Moser-Puangsuwan, the US-based organisation folded because of a lack of money and volunteers.

**Peace Mission to East Timor (1991-1992)**\textsuperscript{623}

This was a project initiated by Portuguese activists. They sent a ship with students from 21 nations to East Timor, in order to challenge Indonesian sovereignty claims. The ship got stopped by the Indonesian authorities shortly before arriving in East Timor.

**Gulf Peace Team and "Initiative Peace in the Gulf" (1991)**\textsuperscript{624}

The international Gulf Peace Team, and the related, German "Initiative Peace in the Gulf", tried to prevent the (UN-sanctioned) threatened attack of the Allied Forces against Iraq in early 1991. GPT tried to do so by interpositioning themselves on the border between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. "Peace in the Gulf" started out with a presence in Baghdad, and later joined GPT in the desert where GPT had set up a camp. About 250 people participated altogether in the initiative. Iraq evacuated the campers to Baghdad after ten days of the bombing. Some of the activists then started to engage in humanitarian relief work which they have continued until today in spite of the US embargo, regularly committing civil disobedience.

The project did not influence the Allied attack but probably had influence on the anti-war movement in the countries the activists came from.

**First International Walk for Peace and Justice in the Middle East (1991)**

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\textsuperscript{619} Moser-Puangsuwan 1995  
\textsuperscript{620} Abbott 2000  
\textsuperscript{621} Büttner 1995  
\textsuperscript{622} Moser-Puangsuwan 1995  
\textsuperscript{623} Moser-Puangsuwan 1995, McMillan 2000  
\textsuperscript{624} Schirch 1995, Büttner 1995
Walk for a Peaceful Future (1992)\textsuperscript{625}
These walks were follow-up project of the GPT. The first walk led from Jerusalem to Amman. Its goal was to draw attention to the on-going conflict in Israel-Palestine, convey solidarity with the Palestinian people\textsuperscript{626}, and propagate/support non-violent initiatives in the region. More then 70 people participated. The walk in 1992 commemorated the 25th anniversary of the six-day war in 1967.

Peace Caravan HCA (1991)\textsuperscript{627}
At the beginning of the war between Croatia and Serbia in autumn 1991, the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly organised a bus caravan through all republics in then-still-Yugoslavia. The group met with citizens' and anti-war groups in all republics, handed over donations collected at home, and discussed ways out of the crisis with the local activists.

Ecumenical Monitoring Programme for South Africa (EMPSA) 1992-94
EMPSA was organised by the World Council of Churches in order to accompany the transition process in South Africa. Church people and volunteers recruited all over the world visited South Africa, observed situations where violence threatened, including interpositioning themselves whenever possible, mediated in conflicts, observed gatherings and meetings and later monitored the first free elections. See Chapter 2.4 for a fuller description.

Solidarity for Peace in Sarajevo (1992)\textsuperscript{628}
About 500 people, mainly Italians with perhaps 30 internationals from other countries (US, Belgium, Germany) joined a bus caravan from Split (Croatia) to the isolated town of Sarajevo which was organised by the Catholic Italian organisation "Beati i costruttori di pace". The goals of the action were to express solidarity with the victims of the war on all sides and to demonstrate for a peaceful solution. The caravan did not attempt to stop the war, although one of its effects was a 24-hour cease-fire in Sarajevo because the Serbian forces stopped shelling the town for the time the caravan was in Sarajevo.

Mir Sada/We share one peace (1993)\textsuperscript{629}
This project was carried out together by Beati i costruttori di pace, and a French humanitarian organisation, Equilibre. Like in December before, there was to be a bus caravan to Sarajevo, with a smaller group of activists intending to stay some time in the Serbian-controlled territory. To the goals of "Solidarity for Peace" was added an element of trying to enforce a cease-fire by the presence of the caravan. About 2.000 people joined the four week project. But, because of several factors, among them disagreement on the goals as well as differences in the risk assessment, were two prominent ones, the action split right in the beginning, only a smaller group starting to

\textsuperscript{625} Schirch 1995
\textsuperscript{626} The second March rather spoke of "with all victims of the war"
\textsuperscript{627} Böttner 1995, personal knowledge
\textsuperscript{627} Müller/Böttner 1998
\textsuperscript{628} Schirch, personal Knowledge
go into Bosnia at all. This group turned around when Equilibre decided to quit the action. Only a small group travelled on on its own and eventually reached Sarajevo.

**Sjeme Mira (1993)**

Sjeme Mira was a follow-up project by US-American, Dutch and German participants of Mir Sada who, being dissatisfied with how Mir Sada had worked out, wanted to do a smaller action of their own. About 20 people, all experienced and trained non-violent activists, travelled for two weeks through southern Bosnia and Herzegovina, distributed leaflets and some humanitarian aid, and tried to make contacts with people open for peace.

**Cry for Justice (1993)**

Cry for Justice has been a coalition of groups, among them Pax Christi US, IFOR and PBI, which formed on the issue of the situation in Haiti in 1993 (return of President Aristide). It set up a presence of (short-term) volunteers who monitored the situation, did accompaniment work, expressed solidarity with the people and compiled reports on the human rights situation.

**Kurdistan (1994)**

A German delegation of representatives of peace and human rights NGOs visited Kurdistan at the time of Newroz and following local elections in April, 1994. The goal of the delegation was to monitor the situation and to help prevent violence. The first they did but if they played a role in preventing violence remains unclear. After their departure, two of their local interpreters were arrested by the police.

**Chechnya Watch (1995-1996)**

In 1995 and 1996, a coalition of War Resisters' International, International Fellowship of Reconciliation and International Peace Bureau came together to plan a Chechnya Peace Observers project. The feasibility report from 1995 recommends a presence of a few Russian-speaking foreigners but says "It is unlikely that a team of international peace observers in Chechnya could actually deter or stop violence from occurring as such", because of the war situation. The project eventually materialised in form of a "Chechnya Peace Watch" aiming at putting pressure on Russia to stop the war by mobilising people outside of Russia to lobby politicians and to realise public awareness, particularly at the time of debates concerning the Russian re-entry to the Council of Europe and approval of IMF loans to Russia. There were several short-term delegations, and a project to support local Chechens monitoring the situation from neighbouring Ingushetia together with the Russian organisation Memorial. But besides some material aid nothing much came out of these attempts, mainly because

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630 Schirch 1995; Müller/Büttner 1998; personal knowledge
631 Schirch 1995, Kinane 2000
632 Volunteers had to finance not only their own stay but to share in the overall costs of the project as well.
633 Büttner 1995
634 needs to be confirmed
the lines of communication between Grozny, Ingushetia, Moscow and the rest of the world were not good at the best of times. A project to support war orphaned children in Grozny, started and carried mainly by the Russian-based Quaker Chris Hunter, founded a house in Grozny that actually still exists. Two British volunteers recruited by Chris Hunter were kidnapped and spent over a year in captivity. In Chechnya, foreigners have been - and still are - especially vulnerable because of hostage-taking by local guerrilla groups.

**Gorleben International Peace Team (1997)**

Gorleben is a place in North Germany of almost symbolic value for its nonviolent resistance against a subterranean nuclear waste deposit. In 1997 the Kurve Wustrow, a nonviolence training centre based in the region, organised an ad-hoc international peace team to monitor the upcoming two week long phase of nonviolent protests. Its goals were to monitor the police activities to report on human rights violations, and to spread these reports world-wide using the international participants as vehicle.

The Kurve recruited six participants from the USA (3), Ecuador (2), Nigeria (1) and Macedonia (1), and prepared them in a five day training. The team watched the demonstrations side by side with a German human rights organisation that regularly monitors the demonstrations in Gorleben, and reported on what they saw. They did not succeed in getting a special status with the authorities, and although they marked themselves with a button as international observers, were treated as fellow protesters rather than as independent monitors.

In the evaluation report of the project written by the team itself, there is a very frank list of problems and shortcomings of this project, together with recommendations about how to improve if there was another GIPT (which has not been the case so far). The list starts with short-term recruitment, lack of experience and sufficient training, lack of a common language and enough German language skills in the team and ends with problems of co-ordination and equipment. In spite of these problems, it is one of the few examples of a peace monitoring project in an industrial country of the North, and therefore alone remarkable.

**Israel/Palestine (2001)**

While this feasibility study is being written, there are almost weekly reports of groups and projects trying to interposition themselves between Israel's armed forces and Palestinian civilians, trying to prevent houses from being demolished, towns from being shelled or the army from occupying a refugee camp. Because of the ongoing character of these activities, it has unfortunately not been possible to include them in the list here - this will be the task of later updates or later studies.

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Appendix to 2.5.3, Two examples of complex missions

Christine Schweitzer

Example 1: UNTAC in Cambodia (1992-93)

History and Military Activities\textsuperscript{637}

The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) had a duration of 18 months starting from February, 1992. A UN Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) in 1991-92 preceded it. UNAMIC was to prepare the deployment of the missions, and serve as a placeholder until the full mission arrived.\textsuperscript{638}

Cambodia, a former French colony, was ruled until 1970 by King/Prince Sihanouk. Involved in the Vietnam War, a first Vietnamese invasion (with strong US support) into Cambodia led to civil war that was won by the China-oriented Khmer Rouge in 1975. They ruled until 1979 when Vietnam invaded Cambodia and Pol Pot fled to Thailand. Cambodia remained until 1989 a de-facto protectorate of Vietnam. In 1991, after the end of Cold War, a Comprehensive Political Settlement Agreement was negotiated with the help of the great powers and France. The outcomes of the Agreement were the establishment of a Supreme National Council consisting of the so-called four factions\textsuperscript{639}, and the deployment of UNTAC to monitor disarmament and to prepare elections.

UNTAC consisted of seven components: the military (MILCOM), international police (CIVPOL), civil administration, human rights, elections, rehabilitation and repatriation. The effort cost 1,6 billion US$. There were 15,900 soldiers. 58 UNTAC staff lost their lives due to hostile fire, accidents or illness.

MILCOM's mandate was to:

- monitor and verify the ceasefire between the factions\textsuperscript{640};
- supervise, monitor, and verify the withdrawal of all foreign forces;
- regroup, contain and demobilise the four factional armies\textsuperscript{641};
- monitor the cessation of all outside military assistance to the Cambodian factions; locate and confiscate weapons;
- investigate alleged non-compliance with military arrangements;
- assist the mine-clearing and training process.\textsuperscript{642}


\textsuperscript{638} It consisted of 397 persons - civilian and military liaison staff, logistics and support personnel, mine awareness unit.

\textsuperscript{639} Each of the "4 factions" ruled Cambodia at one point in history: State of Cambodia (SOC or Peoples Republic of Kampuchea, Vietnamese-oriented government); Party of Democratic Kampuches (PDK.Khmer Rouge), United National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCPEC, Royalists, Prince Sihanouk), Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). Each possessed its own police force as extensions of the military. Only the State of Cambodia had a non-military police element.

\textsuperscript{640} Dealing with cease-fire violations: Sometimes it meant deploying troops, e.g. 200 soldiers were deployed to a place where an UNTAC helicopter had come under fire, with the result, that violations at that place diminished (Lee Kim/Metrikas 1997:116). Along the border, ten additional checkpoints were established. Strategic investigation teams were launched to investigate any alleged violations.

\textsuperscript{641} Estimated to have a total number of 200.000 men plus a further 250.000 militia.
But MILCOM failed to disarm all factions - namely the Khmer Rouge refused cooperation on the ground that UNTAC had allegedly not succeeded in removing all foreign military personnel (Vietnamese), and even prevented MILCOM from entering areas under its control. By September 10 there were only 52,292 troops cantoned and 50,000 weapons in custody. But because of ceasefire violations by Khmer Rouge some local troops of other factions were permitted to keep their weapons. By fall 1992, ceasefire violations by the Khmer Rouge grew stronger, skirmishes, number of attacks on UNTAC rose, and attacks on ethnic Vietnamese and politically motivated acts of violence against party officers and workers became more numerous.

In the end, the attempt at demobilisation was suspended and by the beginning of December, 1992 UNTAC was given a new mandate: to create a secure environment conducive to the preparations and the conduct of national elections. MILCOM accordingly was deployed in a different manner in order to spread the soldiers around the country. With violence growing, it also took over some tasks which originally had been performed by CIVPOL: It escorted returnee convoys and provided security at reception centres for returnees, mounted joined patrols and static guard duty at party offices which were assessed to be more vulnerable to attack during hours of darkness, and later helped CIVPOL to guarantee security at the polling sites by mounting guard at some stations.

In spite of the efforts, violence escalated in the first months of 1993. By April 1993, 20,000 ethnic Vietnamese had fled the country. But, although UNTAC was not able to guarantee a safe environment for the elections, the elections were held on time, with a participation turnout of about 90%. A new government was elected, so that UNTAC then could withdraw in autumn, 1993 with its mandate at least partly fulfilled.

Activities of the civilian components

As described above, UNTAC consisted of seven components of which six were of civilian nature.

CIVPOL's mandate was to contribute to a stable environment conducive to free and fair elections, and to provide security for Cambodian refugees and displaced persons undergoing resettlement. It also was to train local police and customs' officers at the border. Unlike MILCOM, CIVPOL officers were deployed on the ground, to work with the people directly. When violence grew again, the task of escorting convoys was handed over to MILCOM. To stop the wide-spread banditry (due to demobilised soldiers "on agricultural leave"), CIVPOL erected checkpoints and increased the monitoring of local police patrols. It also observed party offices that were under threat of attack.

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642 By August 1993 more then 4 milsquare metres were cleared, 37,000 mines removed and 2.330 Cambodians trained in mine-clearing - the majority of them working for INGOs like Halo Trust, Norwegian People's Aid, Mine Action Group, Handicap International (Lee Kim/Metrikas 1997:112)
643 16,000 soldiers were placed in 270 locations around the country.
644 No attacks were recorded while party offices were guarded by UNTAC.
645 Some observers think that if the Khmer Rouge had attacked in a more determined way or one more UNV had been killed in the time before the elections, the elections might not have taken place. (Doyle 1997:155f)
646 The total number of CIVPOL was 3,600. Originally 2 international police were posted with each of 1,500 police posts.
From the beginning of January 1993, CIVPOL and MILCOM got the power to arrest and detain suspects in cases involving serious human rights violations and UNTAC appointed its own special prosecutor. For that a Special Task Force of 45 police was established which carried out hundreds of investigations. But these efforts were hampered by excessive reliance on inadequate local public security structure and by absence of impartial judicial mechanisms, which led to prolonged detention of prisoners, in violation of international human rights conventions.

CIVPOL’s performance has been widely criticised. There were many instances of negligence towards duty or outright misconduct towards the civilian population, often in connection with sexual harassment of women that led to sometimes violent conflicts between police officers and enraged villagers. CIVPOLs failure to fulfil the mandate was caused by 5 interrelated deficiencies: unrealistic nature of mandate, lack of adequate preparation and planning, command and control issues, quality of personnel and absence of criminal justice infrastructure in Cambodia.

Civil Administration had five areas of responsibility: defence, public security, finance, information, and foreign affairs. It controlled their activities by obtaining documentation a posteriori (not governing Cambodia which makes their activity less than carrying out a protectorate). Among other things, it overhauled the visa and passport system, thereby ensuring that members of all factions had direct access to Phnom Penh. The Information Control Unit monitored more than 20 media institutions plus information activities in the provinces. It succeeded in having media guidelines signed by all four parties to the conflict. The Education Division also started to run its own "Radio UNTAC". Its main purpose was to communicate the meaning and importance of the elections to the Cambodian population. It reached people only because Japanese private donors donated 143,000 radios which were distributed pretty widely. "Radio UNTAC was instrumental in bringing many of the rank and file of the Khmer Rouge into the Cambodian mainstream. This alone would have justified its use." The Border Control Unit trained customs and immigration officers in establishing records and reporting on incidents of corruption or violations of moratorium. In most cases officers were willing to learn new skills - the new government was handed over a working system of customs and immigration records, better trained personnel and increased customs revenue.

The mandate of the human rights component was to foster an environment in which respect for human rights would be ensured, and prevent a return to the "policies and practices of the past", the development and implementation of a program of human rights education; provision for oversight of human rights; and the duty to engage in investigations, and, "where appropriate, corrective action". Perhaps partly due to the small number of personnel assigned to the component (originally only 10 officers, then between 20-30), the component failed in regard to action against human rights violations of Vietnamese immigrants and members of political parties. But it succeeded in convincing the Supreme National Council to adopt all major human rights covenants, corrected some of the worst abuses in the prisons, conducted an extensive education program both for UNTAC personnel and for Cambodians through schools and universities; and was instrumental in founding Cambodian human rights NGOs (by providing funds and training), which together mobilised a membership of over 100,000.

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647 Lee Kim/ Metrikas 1997:130ff
648 Sanderson 1994:21
649 An average increase of 45% between March and August for those Checkpoints monitored
The electoral component was one of the largest civilian components. In fulfilment of its mandate, it established a legal framework in consultation with the Supreme National Council, developed an info/education campaign to the general public in order to persuade the population of the importance and integrity of the ballot, organised and conducted the national registration of all voters and of political parties, and eventually conducted the elections in early summer, 1993.

On the ground, the component was staffed by 465\textsuperscript{650} UN Volunteers who prepared and organised the elections at district level. They were deployed as District Electoral Supervisors in 172 districts of the 18 provinces. For the elections, they recruited and trained 50,000 Cambodian helpers\textsuperscript{651}, plus local interpreters. Recruitment in itself was considered a useful exercise because it provided an opportunity to get to know young people, discover their assessments and expectations.\textsuperscript{652} Because of the worsening security situation, registration of voters did not go smoothly. In the Siem Reap district, a helicopter fired on and wounded one UNV; in the Svay Leau district, their office and house was shelled.\textsuperscript{653} The situation deteriorated so much that, a few months before the elections, the local staff became afraid and people turned hostile. Nevertheless, of the 465 UNVs only 60 decided in April not to continue their work, the others returned to the field, after a security workshop organised by UNTAC. But their freedom of movement was more restricted, in risky areas UNVs were told not to move around except with police or military escort.

UNVs also engaged in civil education in connection with the elections. They held sessions in co-ordination with commune chiefs, generally at Buddhist temples, where they showed pamphlets, posters, books, audio and video cassettes explaining in detail the election process. Two months before the elections, they organised mobile mediation teams to visit locations throughout the district carrying the message of peace. In the final weeks before the elections, UNVs travelled through the district to emphasise the secrecy of the ballot.

The activity of the UNVs is widely recognised as one of the most successful parts of the missions, and UNV received high praise for their activities.\textsuperscript{654} They were also the only unit in UNTAC that received on arrival a six week intensive training in Khmer culture and language.

The rehabilitation component’s mandate was to address immediate needs and lay groundwork for preparation of medium- and long-term reconstruction. The rehabilitation component was responsible for technical assistance for public administration issues related to the economy; control of national resources (natural and public property, e.g. it made a moratorium on log exportation to stop deforestation), macerconomic and fiscal management. UNTAC did not carry out

\textsuperscript{650} All together 674 UNV from 65 countries served with UNTAC. This figure includes those not working in the electoral component. (UNV 1993).

\textsuperscript{651} Srinivasan notes that thousands of candidates thronged to district offices seeking to be hired. Also soldiers and local policemen appeared at exams and passed them before they were discovered. Cambodians expressed disappointment and anger at UNV recruiting officials; several UNV received threatening messages.

\textsuperscript{652} Srinivasan 1996:19

\textsuperscript{653} In the first case registration was given up; in the second people transported to an adjoining district to register.

\textsuperscript{654} In the evaluation conducted by UNV itself it is said: "The UNVs who prepared the elections were widely recognized as having done exceptional and indispensable work. They illustrated the comparative advantage of UNVs in such UN operations: rapid availability, motivation and commitment to work in challenging environments, professional expertise and low cost." (UNV 1993:5)
reconstruction projects itself because of a lack of funds, but aimed at co-ordinating it through a Technical Advisory Committee of delegates from all four factions, chaired by the component's representative, and co-operating with UNHCR, UNDP and NGOs. A donor conference pledged 880 million US$, but by February, 1993 less then 100 mil was actually disbursed. The reason allegedly was that donors were looking for major projects but those were difficult to install due to limited absorption capacity - while small scale grassroots' or infrastructure projects would have been possible. On the whole, the existence of the rehabilitation component may have been a hindrance to co-ordination, since most UN agencies and int'l NGOs assumed that UNTAC would take a lead which it didn't. Other criticism is that Cambodian partners were bypassed and not informed in advance of important meetings.655

UNHCR was one of the main agencies working on reconstruction. It gave money and provided supervision. The projects were implemented by a range of 60 partner organisations: other UN agencies (e.g. UNDP), INGOS and local communities. 9,5 million US$ worth of quick impact projects focussed on rehabilitation of communities was spent, e.g. for the repair of roads, schools, clinics, small credit schemes, field preparation, wells and latrines - all intended as physical proof that the war was over. The World Food Program and ILO also ran their own programs (Food for Work and labour-based road building). And also UNMIK got active in rehabilitation work (see above).

MILCOM battalions also got active in rehabilitation work. Usually on their own initiative and sometimes even using their own money if not their governments gave them money, they built schools, cleaned temples, and taught villagers how to construct energy-efficient stoves. It seems that, in the case of UNTAC, these activities were not part of a political strategy as they were in later military missions.656

The repatriation component was charged with the repatriation of more then 360,000 refugees and displaced persons. Repatriation lay mainly in the hands of UNHCR in co-operation with UNDP. Originally UNHCR promised every family two hectares of land but was not able to keep its promise because the government did not provide land to UNHCR, and neither UNHCR nor UNTAC had enough power over the government to force it to do so.

**Success and Failures**

UNTAC is one of the best-analysed UN missions of the second generation - complex but very careful in regard to use of force. It has been neither a full success nor an outright failure. Many of the lessons learned in peacekeeping are based on the experiences in Cambodia - many of which were repeated in later missions as well. Where it certainly failed was in the fulfilment of its original mandate: It neither disarmed the factional armies nor established a neutral political environment. But because it was able to organise the elections as planned, and a viable government emerged as a result of the elections, the mission can not be called a total failure.

Problems were:

- co-operation specifically from the Khmer Rouge was lacking; and the lack of access to their territory undermined the impartial credibility of the control mandate. Because UNTAC negotiated with Khmer Rouge, it had to negotiate with SOC rather then controlling it.

655 Uphoff Kato 1997:191 ff
656 Uphoff Kato 1997:199
• delayed deployment because of inefficient UN bureaucracy: MILCOM reached its full size only 10 months after the Agreement, and also the deployment for the other components was usually much behind.

• negotiations failed to create clear action plan in case one party would not comply with the Agreement.

• Structural/organisational problems. For example, several countries put conditions on the use of the battalions they sent (certain tasks, certain areas of deployment), so that only 9000 out of 15,900 could be deployed in a flexible manner; the communication between field-headquarters was bad; planning ahead was insufficient; lack of language skills in all components (English-French-Thai).

Specifically the Khmer Rouge tried to break unity by defining some contingents as "good UNTAC" and others as "bad". This breaking up of international missions into its national components by one - or all - sides is a phenomenon which is reported again and again also in other missions, and obviously something which is very hard to overcome;

international interference, for example, US diplomats threatening loss of US aid if leaders of Khmer Rouge became members of the new Cambodian government.

Many observers argue that UNTAC should have resorted to robust peacekeeping. But the Commander of the mission, Sanderson, argues that it was a question of choice between enforcement and having the elections.

That, in spite of all these problems, UNTAC was no complete failure is probably due in large part to the fact that the population of Cambodian was tired of war and wanted a return to normal. There are many reports of courageous engagement by Cambodian citizens supporting e.g. the elections in spite of the threats by Khmer Rouge.

In regard to UNTAC, it seems that specifically those activities were successful which did not require the positive co-operation of the four factions to be effective, or when the UN had the power to impose its will, like issuing new passports (passports gain utility through international recognition).

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657 Lee Kim/Metrikas 1997:123
658 e.g. Doyle 1997:156
659 Sanderson 1994
The United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR)\textsuperscript{660} originally was deployed to guarantee the cease-fire between Croatia and Yugoslavia in early 1992. But when war in Bosnia-Herzegovina started in April 1992, it soon was charged with humanitarian support in Bosnia. And a third part, UNPROFOR III, was sent to monitor the border between Yugoslavia and Macedonia (see above; here I concentrate on UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Croatia). UNPROFOR’s mandate was changed and enlarged several times between 1992 and 1995. Successively it became responsible for:

- peacekeeping functions in protected areas (UNPA zones which were more or less identical to the self-proclaimed political entity Serbian Republic Krajina) and monitoring functions in Pink Areas in Croatia;
- performance of immigration and customs functions on Croatia's borders;
- security and functioning of the Sarajevo airport; including the delivery of humanitarian aid through the airport;
- delivery of humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina and protection of UNHCR and other convoys performing such missions;\textsuperscript{661}
- monitoring of military withdrawals, heavy equipment removal, and demilitarisation of the Prevlaka peninsula;
- passive monitoring of a flight ban over Bosnia-Herzegovina (its active enforcement was later given as a mandate to NATO)\textsuperscript{662}
- successive establishment of Srebenica, Sarajevo, then 4 other Bosnian towns as safe areas. The fate of these safe areas for which the name of Srebenica stands is well-known and need not to be described here..
- authorisation to NATO to use active airpower to protect these safe areas\textsuperscript{663}

All together, there were about 60,000 soldiers, 3,500 police and 5000 civilians with the UN in former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{664}

Compared with UNTAC, there were several obvious differences between UNTAC and UNPROFOR:

- UNTAC was deployed as part of a cease-fire agreement, UNPROFOR entered Bosnia in the early stages of war without any agreement in sight;
- The military component in UNTAC was primarily responsible for demilitarisation; later it was charged with protection of returnees and those involved in the preparation of the election process. UNPROFOR was responsible for the protection of the delivery of humanitarian aid (alone in 1993 it escorted almost 5,000 UNHCR convoys), and of UN-proclaimed safe areas or zones - both never recognised by all parties to the conflict, and were not demilitarised.


\textsuperscript{661} Over 150 NGOs operated in Bosnia-Hercegovina of which 41 co-ordinated their efforts regularly with UNPROFOR.

\textsuperscript{662} The passive monitoring did not have a deterring effect: In the first six months since October 1992 when the air ban was declared, the 75 military observers places at airfields around Bosnia reported over 540 violations.

\textsuperscript{663} Hillen 1998:169

\textsuperscript{664} Venturini 1999:251ff
They both had in common that they did not display robust\textsuperscript{665} peace-keeping. But while, in Cambodia, it was eventually de-facto accepted that one party to the conflict kept their arms and tried to continue the civil war, in the case of Bosnia, NATO was called in with a mandate first of monitoring the air ban (AWACS), then of enforcement of the air ban and protection of UN peacekeepers by air, until after a severe grenade attack on Sarajevo. NATO started the action Deliberate Force to bomb the Bosnian Serbs into submission.

Hillen \textsuperscript{666} identifies three reasons for the failure of UNPROFOR:

- co-operation of belligerents was missing. Not surprising, because safe area missions tended to cast UNPROFOR in partisan light. Impartiality was further damaged when used by Bosnian Muslim forces to shield their own military operations;
- too limited in number to form deterrent presence around the areas (difficult terrain). Not able to build up buffer zones because of lack of mandate and forces. Clear separation would have been necessary;
- force structure, modus operandi and resources did not support the use of active force.

The successor mission to UNPROFOR established as part of the Dayton agreement was no longer a UN mission but a NATO force (IFOR, later SFOR). Its mandate is to provide a secure environment, ensure freedom of movement between the entities, maintain the separation of forces and monitor the cease-fire. IFOR/SFOR is allowed "robust" use of force, which for example means that they remove road-blocks when they come across them. They are the armed arm of the total international regime Bosnia was put under - with UN, OSCE and EU sharing responsibilities of reconstruction, return, democratisation, disarmament and so on.

\textsuperscript{665} What this might mean: For example, that UN troops stop shooting immediately when those who fired upon them stopped.

\textsuperscript{666} Hillen 1998:195f
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