Nonviolent Peaceforce
Feasibility Study

1. Putting Nonviolent Peaceforce in the Picture

by Christine Schweitzer

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1.1 Clarification of some concepts - nonviolence, conflict and conflict intervention

1.1.1 Nonviolence

Nonviolence is not a very exact term. It not only describes a whole class of activities, but also describes attitudes and life-style. The debate among nonviolent activists is whether the latter are preconditions to the first, or whether nonviolence is a principle or a technique. Both approaches hold nonviolence as an efficient instrument and an ethical means for dealing with conflict and political strife because it tries to minimise damages and casualties. Both also agree that nonviolence might be used for reformist or for revolutionary purposes, and that it may be used to promote social change (nonviolent action, nonviolent uprisings etc.) and to prevent unwelcome changes (social defence or civilian-based defense). The biggest differences between the two approaches lie in the nature of commitment, the assumed relationship between means and ends, the approach to conflict in general, the attitude towards the opponent with the assumed way of how nonviolence "works", and the mentioned issue of nonviolence as a way of life.

Table 1.1: The pragmatic-principled dimension

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criterion</th>
<th>pragmatic nonviolence</th>
<th>principled nonviolence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nature of commitment</td>
<td>most effective</td>
<td>ethically best</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>means and end</td>
<td>separate: ends justify means, but also: nonviolent means may be used for unjust ends (Goss-Mayr)</td>
<td>indivisible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approach to conflict</td>
<td>incompatible interests</td>
<td>shared problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>approach to opponent</td>
<td>gain victory over him, if necessary by coercion</td>
<td>convince him, if necessary by accepting own suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nonviolence as way of life?</td>
<td>not necessarily</td>
<td>probably</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Burrowes 1996:100, modified by the author.

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1 See Burrowes 1996:98 pp. for an overview of a debate with too many contributions to quote them all. The best-known protagonist of the 'pragmatic' approach is perhaps Gene Sharp.

2 Burrowes 1996:100f

3 A standard book on the latter is Theodor Eberts "Nonviolent Uprising" (Gewaltfreier Aufstand, 1981) which, unfortunately, to my knowledge has never been translated to English.

4 The probably best-known protagonists of social or civilian-based defence are Gene Sharp, Adam Roberts, Brian Martin, Robert Burrowes, Jean-Marie Muller and Theodor Ebert.

5 Many protagonists of principled non-violence maintain that commitment has to have a religious base (see Nagler 1999).
It is certainly possible that the difference between both approaches might be an ideological rather than an empirical question. On the one hand, elements of coercing the opponent can be found in campaigns of principled nonviolent leaders like Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Any action has an impact on the opponent. The effect of this action, whether coercive or persuasive, may depend on the opponent’s perception and the cost he is willing to incur. For example: Gandhi's death fast in 1948 made his opponents give in, not because they were convinced, but because they felt that the political costs of Gandhi's death would be too high. This same action carried out by unknown and widely despised Kurdish prisoners in Turkey led to more than twenty deaths (May 2001). On the other hand, many defenders of the pragmatic approach might profess an ethical foundation for themselves, but believe that they should not impose their convictions on others, and that they might better win support by using rational-pragmatic arguments. Certainly, if the activists manage to convey to their opponent that they do not hate him, that they are concerned about his well being, and that they are ready to consider his interests, this might produce a positive dynamic in the conflict situation, which could not have happened otherwise. However, there might still be an element of coercion involved: "Clearly, life is not a choice between violence and no violence. It is a choice between violence and less violence; the latter sometimes expressed through the medium of nonviolence."

1.1.2 Social conflicts

1.1.2.1 Some definitions

There are many definitions of social conflict, and this study is not the place to investigate the theory of conflict in depth. Friedrich Glasl’s definition has been chosen because it has the advantage of being broad and neutral enough to allow an all-encompassing view of social conflict. Friedrich Glasl’s (1994) handbook on conflict resolution will play a role again later on when talking about conflict stages. He says: "Social conflict is an interaction between actors (individuals, groups, organisations and so on), where at least one actor sees incompatibilities in the thinking/ imagination/ perception, and/ or feeling, and/or wanting with another actor (other actors) in a way, that in the realisation there is impairment by another actor (the other actors)."

Conflicts may be categorised according to:
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- Different objects (e.g. strategic conflicts, issue conflicts). For the international field, Kumar Rupesinghe distinguishes resource-based conflicts, conflicts over governance and authority, ideological conflicts and identity conflicts.\(^\text{12}\)

- Visibility (latent-manifest conflicts)

- Characteristics of the conflict parties, their position and relationship to each other (e.g. individuals-groups, rulers-ruled),

- Level of escalation (see below)

- Means used to carry the conflict out.

1.1.2.2 Violent conflicts

Conflicts become a special issue for attention when and if they are carried out by violent means. Peace researchers have reserved the term "war" for violent conflicts that fulfil certain criteria. Usually there has to be a minimum number of casualties (1000 per year or per conflict), and some kind of regular army and central organisation on one side of the conflict at least.\(^\text{13}\) Violent conflicts that do not fulfil these criteria are called armed conflicts.

Since World War II there have been about 200 wars. The number of wars taking place each year has increased every year to a total of 51 wars in 1992. The decline in the following years to 29 wars in 1997 has again been reversed, and the number of wars has risen to 34 in 1999. Almost 75% of them have taken place in Africa (14) and Asia (11). Others were in the Middle East (6), Latin America (2) and Europe (1). In 1999 alone seven new wars started.\(^\text{14}\)

Today the majority of wars are internal wars - the number of international wars has been falling drastically to almost zero in recent years. (In 1999 AKUF counted 3, with three more wars with a strong international component.\(^\text{16}\)) But while this is certainly reason enough to concentrate on internal wars when dealing with the issue of conflict.


\(^\text{13}\) See Miall et al 1999:23 for an overview of different categorisations. Major organisations carrying out annual statistics include the PLOOM program at the University of Leiden/Netherlands, Wallensteen et. al. at Uppsala University, the "Military Balance" of the International Institute of Strategic Studies and the German AKUF based in Hamburg.


There are other organisations coming to similar if not identical figures depending on the categories used to define war.

\(^\text{15}\) The disastrous conditions created by these conflicts have become labelled as 'complex emergencies'-meaning a major humanitarian crisis of a multi-causal nature that requires a system-wide response. (Adams/Bradbury 1995:9)

\(^\text{16}\) AKUF 2000:17. Smith (2000) considers ten armed conflicts between 1990 and 1999 as inter-state conflicts, five as 'wars of independence', and 100 as 'internal conflicts'.


intervention, it would be too soon to conclude that the danger of new major international wars has been eliminated\(^\text{17}\).

There are many different ways to categorise armed conflicts\(^\text{18}\). For the purpose of this study it is sufficient to find categories that are meaningful for conflict intervention. As a working conflict typology, the one proposed by Miall et. al. (1999)\(^\text{19}\) will be freely combined with the one used by AKUF. If in the course of the research, further distinction will prove useful, the typology might be refined.\(^\text{20}\) It is based on a combination of actors and issues:

1. International/interstate conflicts
2. Internal conflicts
   2.1 anti-regime (Miall et al: "revolution/ideology") conflicts/wars
   2.2 autonomy and secession (Miall et al: "identity/secession") conflicts
   2.3 factional conflicts (AKUF: "other internal wars" or "unrests" depending on if there is central organisation of the fighting on both sides, regular forces at least on one side involved, and some continuity of the fighting\(^\text{21}\))
   2.4 decolonising wars\(^\text{22}\).

Further distinctive categories are:

1. If at least on one side the fighting is done by regular forces (military, police, paramilitary units) of the government\(^\text{23}\) or not (distinction probably only relevant in internal conflicts).
2. If there is violence carried out only by one side, and the other side is using only nonviolent means\(^\text{24}\) (distinction at least theoretical both applicable for international and internal conflicts),
3. If there is direct military involvement by an external party (military intervention)

The fact that civil wars are the predominant kind of organised violence today has had a significant impact on the problems faced by those who deal with them. Often there are many actors, and just as often across the boundaries of one state - with very different interests. Recently, the category of those who profit from the continuation of a war has gained special attention (the recent UN report on peacekeeping\(^\text{25}\) calls them simply

\(^\text{17}\) Mitchell 1995:25. For example, the recent war between in Kashmir with a clear involvement of Pakistani troops has special potential for escalation because of the nuclear arsenal of both countries involved. (AKUF 2000:46f)

\(^\text{18}\) See Miall et al 1999:31, AKUF 2000:60

\(^\text{19}\) Their typology is mainly based on Singer (1996) and Holsti (1996)

\(^\text{20}\) Miall et al do this in spite of the comment: "There are as many typologies as analysts, and the criteria employed not only vary, but are often mutually incompatible." (2000:29)

\(^\text{21}\) These are the criteria with which AKUF distinguishes "war" from other kinds of "armed conflicts" (2000:59)

\(^\text{22}\) This category is put in brackets by AKUF because this kind of war is considered more or less extinct.

\(^\text{23}\) This is part of the definition of war as given by AKUF 2000:60

\(^\text{24}\) This is a category I have not found in the literature on war typologies. The only related case considered are cases when "violence doesn't meet with organised resistance" (AKUF 60)

\(^\text{25}\) Brahimi-Report 2000
"spoilers"); Mary Anderson distinguishes "thugs", "irreconcilables", "arms merchants and other profiteers".\(^{26}\) The wars are highly privatised, fought with small weapons, and civilians easily might become part-time warriors, extinguishing the clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants. International Humanitarian Law is heeded less and less. Civilians and those trying to help have often been made the target of violent attacks, as are civilian installations such as hospitals, schools, refugee centres and cultural sites.\(^{27}\)

1.1.2.3 Causes of (armed) conflict

The research on causes of armed conflict so far has not produced a consistent theory acceptable to most scholars working in the field. However, It is very likely that there is one consensus: that conflict cannot be reduced to a single cause, or a single explanation. It is obvious that there are "very few necessary conditions" which need to be fulfilled in order for a war to develop, and "very many sufficient conditions, of which only a few of these may apply, in any single conflict. War is possible as soon as weapons are available with which to fight it and as long as there is a dispute between two or more parties. What makes war probable, however, is a far more complicated question.\(^{28}\)

There are different categories of explanations: genetic and evolutionary/biologist theories (aggression as a genetic function, maximisation of survival chances), behaviourist theories (war as learned behaviour), cost-benefit theories (maximisation of benefit), ecological (war for scarce resources), social/cultural theories (ethnicity and/or religion as conflict causes), and cognitive (attitudes) explanations.\(^{29}\)

Before the early 1990s most scholars concentrated on international war. Only recently have the causes for internal conflict come into consideration. These are: the role of power imbalances (a concept known since Roman domination), of economic growth and free trade, of relative deprivation (difference between expected and real access to well-being and power), of deterioration of the environment, of the state as such and the ideology of nationalism, of specific forms of political organisation (democracy, authoritarian regimes, transitional regimes), of the existence of a monopoly of power, and of the connection between internal cohesion and external aggression. Remarkably there are theories that say that an existing monopoly of power and internal cohesion are supportive for peace, and theories that say the opposite\(^{30}\). Clearly the state of the research on conflict causes is inconclusive.

The role of ethnic diversity is controversial as well. In the eyes of many researchers about conflict, it is not a cause per se although parties in conflict do tend to identify themselves ethnically. Ethnicity is a powerful factor in mobilising people against each other because ethnicity is easy to ascribe, touches upon fundamental values, and

\(^{26}\) Anderson 1996. She names "aid workers' as a fourth category of those profiting from war.

\(^{27}\) Such description may be found in almost all books on conflict and conflict resolution produced in the last five years. For an example, see Miall et al 1999:128 f

\(^{28}\) Smith 2000:4

\(^{29}\) Orywal 1996

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seems to be non negotiable. Still, it should be regarded as an instrument, and an ideological base, rather than as a cause.

The different, and often popular, psychological and biological theories try to explain why people are willing to support and participate in war, but they cannot give a sufficient explanation of why there is modern war. Individual aggression cannot explain armament, arms industry and the modern military.

Agreement seems to exist on these three important factors for the development of war:\footnote{Smith 2000:5}

- Bad economic conditions seem to be a main cause for internal conflicts.
- Repressive political systems, especially if they are in a state of transition, are war-prone
- Degradation of renewable resources (erosion, deforestation, scarcity of water) may contribute to the possibility of armed conflict.

On the other hand, empirically, it seems that democratic states do not go to war against each other. This observation has led to much comment, and is the rationale for many conflict interventions, specifically the democratisation programs undertaken by OSCE, UN and others.\footnote{Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 1997, Senghaas 1994}

Proponents of nonviolent action tend to emphasize individualistic theories of conflict as well, probably because most of the supporters are rooted in individualistic Western culture. Special mention needs to be made of the human needs approach which has been propagated by John Burton\footnote{Burton 1990} and others. It is the theoretical basis of many conflict resolution projects, and specifically, so-called conflict-solving workshops. Burton sees three types of human motivation: needs, values and interests. The basic needs are "universal and primordial", and they are about avoiding three primary emotions (fear, anger and depression) in order to permit the fourth emotion, the positive emotional state of satisfaction/happiness. Because human beings are being driven by these emotions, humans have a corresponding set of needs for conditions of life that give them satisfaction. There is no general agreement on what these secondary needs might be; most often mentioned are identity, freedom, recognition, stimulation, distributive justice, participation, rationality, and control.\footnote{See Burrowes 1996:126 for a summary} Because these basic needs absolutely must be fulfilled, people are ready to go to war for them, or so the argument goes. But this theory does not take into account structural or cultural factors that allow some groups to satisfy their secondary needs at the expense of other groups, over a long time, and without being challenged.

Perhaps much of the more fruitless parts of the discussion could be avoided if there was agreement on Smith's proposal to distinguish four types of causes\footnote{He refers to David Dressler 1990. See Smith 2000.} of conflict:

- Background causes (basic elements of social and political structure, e.g. that certain groups are excluded from power, or that there are regional economic differences);
• Mobilisation Strategies (objectives of key political actors and the way they go about fulfilling these objectives);
• Triggers (factors that affect the timing of the onset of the armed conflict);
• Catalysts (factors that influence the intensity and duration of a conflict, including external factors like an international intervention).

1.1.3 About conflict escalation and de-escalation

1.1.3.1 Conflict stages
Conflicts may be either latent or manifest, and tend to escalate if not dealt with in time. Usually escalation means that communication between the parties breaks down, and the readiness to use violence (first usually verbal, then physical) grows. Many social scientists have attempted to define this development by describing typical stages of conflict escalation.

Friedrich Glasl deals mainly with conflict in business, but his set of nine stages can easily be used for political large-scale conflicts.

Glasl shows how parties in conflict lose the ability to co-operate in a constructive manner as their successive and mutual experiences are break down. He identifies several "points of no return" which contribute decisively to the escalation.\textsuperscript{36} In stage 1\textsuperscript{37}, there is a hardening of the positions. It is the content of the conflict that is the centre of attention, and the parties trust that it will be possible to solve the problem. In the second stage, polarisation and debate take place. The conflicted parties unite within themselves (cohesion), and stereotypes develop. When they reach the point where they feel that talking to one another is not productive, they "create facts" (stage 3: "deeds instead of words"). From there the relationship to the opposing party becomes a central part of the content of the conflict itself. "There's no use in talking to them," is the experience, "now we have to act!" From now on behaviour towards one another becomes more clearly negative, as do the notions the opponents have of each other. As the conflict constellation deteriorates, the parties slide into a situation where each feels threatened and endangered by the actions of the other (stages 4-6). In stage 4 the relationship becomes the problem. Stereotypes, and "win-lose" situations arise. In stage 5 direct attacks on the position of the opponent begin, and each party seeks to "expose" the "true character" of its opponent causing him to lose face. In stage 6 the threatening begins, and isolated violent acts might happen.

The next decisive threshold is crossed when threats and ultimatums are superseded by (still limited) actions directed against the power base of the organisation or group concerned (stage 7). From this moment on the parties no longer see each other in human terms but see only objects that they want to be rid of (stages 7-9). From now on the violence directed toward each other becomes the predominant issue of the conflict. In stage 8 the basis of power and existence of the opponent are targets, and mutual destruction takes place. In the 9th and final stage there is total confrontation even at the price of one's own destruction. The only goal is to eliminate the opponent.

\textsuperscript{36} Glasl 1990:211 pp.
\textsuperscript{37} Glasl misses the factor of latency in his model.
Ronald J. Fisher\textsuperscript{38} has transferred Glasl's model from its original context of social conflicts, mostly in or between organisations, to the context of political conflicts. He simplifies Glasl's nine stages to four: stage 1: communication, stage 2: polarisation, stage 3: segregation, stage 4: destruction.\textsuperscript{39}

All models of conflict that describe stages are of course a gross simplification of any given real-life conflict, as Leatherman et al.\textsuperscript{40} point out. Conflict processes are usually multidimensional, and unfold in a disjunctive manner. There are usually multiple levels in each conflict (e.g. the individual, the intra-societal, the international), as well as multiple issues. Escalation may take place, both vertically (behaviours, choice of means) and horizontally (expansion of issues, goals, actors, geographical scope).\textsuperscript{41}

### Table 1.2: Stages of Conflict Escalation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Hardening</td>
<td>Fisher 1993: Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Polarisation and debate</td>
<td>Fisher 1993: Polarisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Deeds instead of words</td>
<td>Fisher 1993: Segregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Image and coalition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Loss of face</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Threat strategies</td>
<td>Fisher 1993: Segregation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Limited acts of destruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Dissolution</td>
<td>Fisher 1993: Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mutual destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{38} Fisher 1993: 253 pp.
\textsuperscript{39} For a comparison of different authors, see also Müller/Büttner 1998:16f
\textsuperscript{40} Leatherman et al 1999:43 pp.
\textsuperscript{41} Leatherman et al 1999:75
\textsuperscript{42} The number is further reduced because a major part of these studies deal with civilian-based or social defence. Since their considerations start already at the highest possible stage of conflict - war - they usually make only passing reference on what to do before a war starts, or deal with it only in terms of deterrence (see Sharp 1985:85 pp. for example)
articulation of protest. To end the static situation, protest needs to be organised and articulated. When this has happens, counter power may develop. A new distribution of power is both a condition for clarifying the conflict issues, and an expression of a new relationship between the conflict parties in conflict. Lederach emphasises that conflict transformation is a long-term process taking 20 years or more, and must not be confused with short-term crisis intervention alone, which is the most immediate activity in the process of transformation.  

The contribution of nonviolent action to this transformation is obvious: it makes the conflict visible, and tries to change the balance of power by using nonviolent means of protest and resistance.

Theodor Ebert has defined three stages of escalation in nonviolent action; each stage has both subversive and constructive elements:

1. Protest as subversive action and 'functional demonstrations' as constructive action;
2. Legal non-cooperation and legal innovation of roles;
3. Civil disobedience and civil usurpation;  

Generally speaking, escalation is achieved by:

- Broadening the scope of the activities (geographically or time-wise);
- Growth of the number of the activists;
- Increased actions of civil disobedience and other direct actions.

Hildegard Goss-Mayr puts the analysis of the conflict at the beginning of her discussion. Then groups are formed and trained in nonviolence. As they come in contact with each other they start to cooperate, chose tactics and begin their activities to weaken and eventually neutralise the pillars that support the injustice. The more pillars of injustice are uprooted, and the more institutions and other important actors change sides, the closer the moment comes when the status quo can no longer be maintained. This is the moment to develop alternatives and to create a new distribution of power. Everyone, including the former opponents, is part of this process.

### 1.1.3.3 Taking a closer look at conflict transformation

Conflict resolution, conflict settlement, conflict handling, conflict management, conflict regulation or conflict transformation are terms which are often used indiscriminately although there are certain nuances of meanings. Conflict resolution implies that "the deep-routed sources of conflict are addressed, and resolved". Conflict settlement refers to the "reaching of an agreement between the parties which enables them to end an armed conflict. It puts to an end the violent stage of conflict behaviour." Conflict

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43 Lederach 1997  
44 Ebert 1981b:37  
45 Müller/Schweitzer 2000:91  
regulation and conflict management are "sometimes used as a generic term to cover the whole gamut of positive conflict handling".47

Conflict transformation puts an emphasis on the process of dealing with conflict, and is therefore, in my eyes, preferable to the other terms. It touches all three corners of the famous conflict triangle that Johan Galtung has defined. The process of dealing with the conflict then moves around the triangle.48

At this point it should be very clearly pointed out that conflict transformation is not synonymous with what external parties do, nor is it synonymous with conflict intervention. The importance of local peace builders, of peace constituencies and of local zones of peace has gained more and more recognition in the last few years49.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.3: The conflict triangle</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><img src="image" alt="Conflict Triangle Diagram" /></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Müller/Büttner50 (1998) have proposed making the triangle a pyramid in order to include the dimension of conflict escalation. They argue that in the first three stages of Glasl's conflict escalation scheme the content is in the centre of the conflict. Then the attitudes of the opponents become the major factor, and as soon as the conflict becomes violent, the behaviour itself is the main problem.

A pyramid diagram would look like this:

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47 Miall et al 1999:21
48 See Galtung 1982 and 1996
50 Müller/Büttner 1998
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Table 1.4: Conflict pyramid and escalation track

Müller/Büttner 1998:19

De-escalation of a conflict then may be seen as the reversal of this process. First the emphasis would be on the behaviour. That is, stopping the violence through a cease-fire, and then monitoring the cease-fire. Now work on attitudes can begin. Only when attitudes change for the better will it be possible to deal with the original conflict and to attempt to find a solution. (Then it would be time to work on attitudes, and probably only when there is a change for the better in these, there is a chance to deal with the original conflict and its content, and to attempt finding a solution for it.) While most experts would agree with the first assumption, the order of the second and the third might be questionable. In fact, very often there is some peace agreement (conflict settlement in the meaning defined above) before any substantial work on the relationship of the actors has been done. The chapter on Peace Strategies will argue that all three dimensions need to be tackled simultaneously.

1.1.4 Conflict intervention

The conflict intervention discussion is a rather recent phenomenon, which rapidly grew after the end of the East-West-confrontation in 1989, though of course intervention in conflict is something that has always taken place. Intervention is "Any influencing of a

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52 What is new in the last ten or fifteen years is a heightened awareness of the need of conflict resolution/conflict transformation and the different means available to contribute to them. Special attention has been given to military "humanitarian" intervention on the one hand, and to the methods of civil conflict transformation (mediation, multi-track diplomacy, sending peace teams etc.) on the other hand.
system of rule from the outside, no matter if the influencing is done by nonviolent or by violent means.\(^\text{53}\)

The term ‘conflict intervention’ will be used for such involvements that are undertaken to influence a conflict in another ‘system of rule’. This definition leaves the means (military, diplomacy etc.), the type of conflict, the interveners (states, international state organisations, NGOs etc.) and the purpose/objectives of the intervention open.

### 1.1.4.1 Objectives and motives of conflict intervention

There are at least 13 categories of objectives or motives for conflict intervention.\(^\text{54}\) Often more than one is at work in any given case at any given time. With a few exceptions, most objectives and motives can be found in both state and non-state situations. The examples of objectives and motives given here are arbitrarily chosen.

- Change the attitude and/or the behaviour of one or all of the conflict parties (e.g. by conflict resolution workshops or by sanctions against a government);
- Change the distribution of power within one conflict party (e.g. by sanctions meant to build up so much pressure against the government that it gets overthrown);
- Support one conflict party with the goal to help it win the conflict (e.g. the Latin American solidarity movement);
- Change the means by which the conflict is carried out (e.g. by giving training in nonviolent resistance techniques);
- Protect human rights (e.g. by building international public pressure like Amnesty International does);
- Help the victims of violence and war (shelter, medicine, clothing);
- Guarantee agreements made (e.g. by sending peacekeeping troops);
- Support civil society (many international NGOs concentrate on that field while it is a rather recent discovery with governments);
- Influence powerful external parties so that they change their behaviour, and/or intervene in the conflict (social movements and NGOs);
- Protect one’s own citizens (governments only, e.g. by evacuating their own citizens when a violent conflict flares up);
- Defend own strategic or economic interests;
- Find supporters/members for the own cause, promote own cause (e.g. missionaries);
- Facilitate social or economic change (e.g. development aid).

These are only motives and objectives as they relate to the conflict for the interveners usually have many organisational motives of their own. For example, to satisfy lobbyists

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\(^{53}\) “Unter Intervention ist jede Beeinflussung eines Herrschaftssystems von außen zu verstehen, egal ob sie gewaltfrei oder gewaltsam vorgenommen wird.” (Czempiel 1994:402)

\(^{54}\) see Schweitzer 1998 a
and voters who expect certain behaviour from a government, to win public credibility by sponsoring a popular project, and to get new funds from sponsors and so on.

1.1.4.2 Actors
There are a multitude of possible interveners. The well-established differentiation between governments on the one side and all the others (to be found under track 2 diplomacy) does not give an adequate picture of what is actually going on in conflict transformation by external parties. Louise Diamond and Ambassador John McDonald have therefore introduced the concept of Multi-track Diplomacy which distinguishes 9 tracks: governmental; professional conflict resolution; business; private citizen; research, training and education; activism; religious; funding; and public opinion. Building on their concept, I would like to propose that there are two main types of actors with several subtypes each:

a. States/governments with two broad categories:
   - individual states
   - international organisations and interest-based coalitions (UN and its bodies and regional organisations, e.g. the OSCE or the OAS, other regional governmental organisations; World bank, NATO etc.

b. Non-state actors with four broad categories:
   - NGOs, social movements, and
   - political parties
   - religious bodies.

55 I prefer the term 'external party' to 'third party' because, as Galtung has pointed out, there are usually more than two parties to a conflict. (Galtung 1994)
56 Their commitment varies quite a lot. One of the most powerful regional organisation, the European Union, is concentrating primarily on building up its own military capacities. A Rapid Reaction Force of 50 to 60 thousand soldiers who can be deployed within 60 days is meant to be in place by 2003. The EU announced that it wanted to develop civil instruments of crisis prevention parallel with this, but there is very little co-ordination between the single member states (some of them are doing quite a lot on conflict resolution), as well as an imbalance in the distribution of funds, and the development of the usual EU bureaucracy. See Debiel/Fischer 2000, Schweitzer 2000
57 Funders (Track 8) do not easily fit into this categorisation because they might be governments, NGOs or business. Therefore I omitted them in spite of the doubtless importance they have in conflict resolution work.
58 Under NGOs, I have include the groups distinguished by Diamond/McDonald in their original Multi-Track Diplomacy concept from 1993: professional conflict proponents (track 2), private citizens (track 4), research/training/education (track 5)
59 Called ‘activism’ (track 6) in the Multi-Track approach.
60 Weiss considers political parties as members of civil society (Weiss 99:227). This might be typical for the Western understanding of civil society. Civil society is a term that comes from Eastern Europe (Konrad, Havel and others), and they certainly excluded political parties as they knew them, considering them part of the state system. To discuss the status of parties in the Western democratic system would detract too much from the issue here; therefore, I would just like to mark the role of parties as a contentious issue. A dotted line marks this connection in the table above.
• corporate sector (business)\textsuperscript{62}
• media\textsuperscript{63}

This is an ideal picture; in reality many non-state actors have very clear connections and even dependencies to the state in which they live and work. In the table below, this relationship is only marked for two of them (media and parties) because the relationship is especially remarkable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.5 Actors in conflict intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>States/governments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-state actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\textbf{1.1.4.3 Tactics/means}

It is probably impossible to draw up a complete list of means and tactics of conflict intervention\textsuperscript{64} (such as attempted by Gene Sharp)\textsuperscript{65} for the broad field of nonviolent

\textsuperscript{61} Track 7. Of course, it may be argued that religious communities are part of civil society (see Weiss 99:207); however, in many countries they are a power on their own, and often have close links to the government that I think it better to make them a category of their own, but still marking them (in the diagram below) as part of civil society.

\textsuperscript{62} Track 3.

\textsuperscript{63} Track 9. Media in many countries belong mainly or exclusively the State. Therefore a dotted line describes the connection between media and state in the table above.

\textsuperscript{64} I once made an attempt (Schweitzer 1998 a) but the list of about 70 items presented there does not properly distinguish between means (e.g. economic sanctions) and strategies (e.g. "peace enforcement").

\textsuperscript{65} Sharp 1973
action. Sharp distinguishes psychological, physical, social, economic and political tactics.

### 1.1.4.4 Civil Intervention and nonviolent intervention

If the main criteria which distinguishes different forms of conflict intervention is whether direct deadly violence is being used or not, then the distinction between military and civil interventions becomes meaningful.

Consequently civil interventions are all those interventions which are being carried out by civilians (in opposition to military personnel), and which refrain from the use of personal deadly violence.

But there is another way to distinguish between conflict interventions: those using coercive means and those that do not. There are coercive means included in the category of civil interventions, e.g. economic sanctions or mediation with muscle. Some of them might actually cause a high rate of casualties - the economic sanctions against Iraq have, according to official figures by the UN, cost the lives of almost 600,000 children alone between 1991 and 1996, which is an outcome as bad or worse than those of many military actions.

Therefore I agree with those authors who find it necessary to distinguish between civil interventions and nonviolent interventions, the latter being a sub-category of the first. I would like to propose the following definition of nonviolent intervention:

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66 Sharp distinguishes three types of methods of nonviolent action: methods of protest and persuasion, methods of social, economic and political non-cooperation and methods of nonviolent intervention. By intervention he means those tactics which target the opponent directly where he works, e.g. by using go-ins, sit-ins or strikes. (Sharp 1973). Theodor Ebert (1981 b:37) has elaborated on these putting them in a table of three escalation stages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>stage of escalation</th>
<th>subversive action</th>
<th>constructive action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>protest</td>
<td>functional demonstrations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>legal non-cooperation</td>
<td>legal innovation of roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>civil disobedience</td>
<td>civil usurpation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

67 Sharp 1973:371, 416

68 Muller 1995, Muller 1999, Ropers 1995 and others. Muller defines civil intervention as follows: "an un-armed intervention on the territory of a local conflict, by external missions, mandated by an inter-governmental, governmental or non-governmental organisation, coming to accomplish activities of observation, information, interpositioning, mediation and cooperation with the goal of preventing or stopping violence, to monitor respect of human rights, further the values of democracy and civil society, and to create conditions for a political solution of the conflict which acknowledges and guarantees the fundamental rights of each party present, and allows them to define the rules of a peaceful co-existence." (Muller 1999:p5, translated by CS. This is also one sentence in the original.)

Some other authors restrict the term of 'civil intervention' to those interventions being carried out by NGOs (e.g. Müller-Büttner 1998)

69 Lewer/Ramsbotham 1993, Burrowes 2000:45f

70 e.g. Cremer 1995 and Weiss 1996:61

71 Skidelsky/Mortimer 1996:173

72 Müller/Büttner write: "Nonviolent interventions do not wish to make use of a forceful 'power intervention' to separate the conflict parties." (1998:25). Burrowes writes that nonviolent intervention should be
Conflict intervention can be called nonviolent, when
1. the objective is conflict transformation, and the when the intervener, (either as a non-
partisan external party taking the interests of all conflict parties into consideration, or as
a partisan party supporting one side in the conflict), engages in conflict transformation
and/or human rights and justice, and when
2. there is no use of direct or indirect deadly violence\(^74\).

This definition has two consequences that might be controversial:
First, it is nonviolent intervention may take place either at home of the interveners or at
the home of those people where the conflict takes place.
Second, nonviolent intervention may be partisan\(^75\). This topic has already been touched
upon in the paragraph on nonviolent conflict escalation above. The argument goes like this: If there is a strong imbalance of power between the parties in conflict, (perhaps
even to the degree that structural violence is so high that the conflict is latent and the
underdog hasn’t even started to organise himself), then nonviolent intervention must
mean strengthening the underdog. This is not a new argument. Johan Galtung made it
early in the 1980s\(^76\). But still in the bulk of the literature on conflict intervention the non-
partisan character is automatically, and by definition, assumed.

1.1.5 Scope of conflict interventions

Up to now, conflict interventions have been categorised according to different aspects:
objectives, actors, methods and strategy. Three more aspects that are very relevant

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\(^73\) First in Schweitzer 1998 b

\(^74\) See the well-known distinction made by Johan Galtung of the different kinds of violence: Galtung
1996:30 f. Speaking of "indirect" violence I am mainly thinking of possible consequences of embargoes
which usually are counted as "civil" means but which, as the case of the embargo against Iraq has shown,
may cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

\(^75\) see Burrowes 2000. This concept derives from George Lakey’s definition of Third Party Nonviolent
Intervention (TPNI). Lakey distinguishes nonviolent action for change, for defence and TPNI, the latter
being a nonpartisan use of nonviolent struggle with the intention of reducing the level of violence.

\(^76\) Galtung 1982: 59
when either planning or evaluating a nonviolent intervention has yet to be introduced: time, horizontal geographical scope and the level of society the intervention addresses.

1.1.5.1 Time
Everybody distinguishes short, middle and long-term goals and activities. But it should not be taken for granted that any two persons mean the same thing when they use these terms. Orienting ourselves to the time dimension proposed by John Paul Lederach will be beneficial here. The proposal has the advantage of not being guided by funding directives that describe every project that is longer than one year as long-term just because funds are dispersed annually.

Lederach distinguishes
- immediate action (2-6 months) as crisis intervention;
- short-range planning (1-2 years) mainly used for preparation and training (capacity building);
- the middle-range decade thinking (5-10 years) for developing a design of social change; and
- the long-range generational vision (20+ years) for developing a "vision of what we are trying to achieve in order to build toward and reach that vision".77

1.1.5.2 Levels of society
John Paul Lederach's goes on to distinguishes between three levels of society (top, middle and grassroots), and attributes certain approaches to peace building78 to each of them.

Most authors dealing with the levels of society in relationship to conflict intervention agree that it is of paramount importance for interveners to reach all three levels. This does not mean that it is necessary for each intervener to have contact with all levels, but intervention needs to reach all of them. An agreement made between top leaders is likely to fail if it does not have the support of the masses - the grassroots level. And vice versa, small grassroots initiatives might find themselves run over by violence, outlawed or simply pushed to the side if the top leaders are not reached as well. Therefore, the middle-range actors play a special role. They may co-ordinate top-level decisions with grassroots realities79.

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77 Lederach 1997:76 f, referring to Elise Boulding for the generational vision.
78 What Lederach subsumes under 'building peace' in this text later will be distinguished into 'peacemaking' and 'peacebuilding'.
79 Schirch 1995:1, citing an unpublished manuscript by Lederach.
1.1.5.3 Geographical scope

It is known that some projects will only reach one local community or even only one part of that community, others will have an impact on the whole country and/or on the conflict as a whole.

In recent years more and more notice has been given to the development of local peace zones. These are single communities or a number of communities where violence does not take root, which remain peaceful in a violent surrounding, sometimes against all odds. There is little knowledge about what is needed in order to have a local project impact on the conflict as a whole.

Not all interventions involve going to the place where the conflict is. As has been mentioned before, influencing other external parties to get involved, or working on unjust structures might well take place far away from the actual conflict (in the powerful countries\textsuperscript{80}).

\textsuperscript{80} Think of the anti-war movement against the Vietnam war in the US which eventually played a major role in bringing the government round to withdraw from Vietnam (Boulding 2000:78)
1.1.6 Peace strategies

1.1.6.1 Some definitions

Terms like "strategy" and "tactics" have spilled over from the military jargon not only to common language, but also to thinkers about nonviolence. Because there are different, sometimes contradictory usages of these terms, it is necessary to define what they mean. I will follow Burrowes' (1996) example and first go back to the military terminology as developed by Clausewitz and Liddell Hart (1967). Liddell Hart defined strategy as "the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy," policy being what "governs the object of war". Military means can also be called tactics — activities taken within the framework of a strategy. Gene Sharp defines grand strategy, strategy and tactics without referring to its military origin:

"Grand strategy is the broader conception which serves to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of the struggle group toward the attainment of the objectives of the conflict. Strategy, a more narrow term, is the broad plan of action for the overall struggle, including the development of an advantageous situation, the decision of when to fight, and the broad plan for utilizing various specific actions in the general conflict. Tactics refers to plans for more limited conflicts within the selected strategic plan." 84

Jean-Marie Muller puts it more simply:

"Strategy concerns the conception and execution which regulates and co-ordinates the different activities of an intervention; tactics concerns the conception and execution of each of these activities." 85

In this paper the terms "strategy" and "tactics" will be used as Sharp and Muller defined them.

1.1.6.2 Strategies of conflict intervention

Since the Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros Ghali, published the Agenda for Peace, the terms peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding have become well known. But it wasn't Boutros-Ghali who invented them, nor were they originally meant to function in a strict sequential order as Boutros-Ghali puts them. Johan Galtung - who called them "approaches to peace" 20 years before Boutros-Ghali, first described these three peace strategies. Since then these terms have been refined by other authors such as the social anthropologist Stephen Ryan (1995). When referred to in this study, they are used within the broad civilian tradition, and not in the tradition of reserved for the UN. Together, these three strategies (or rather "grand strategies") formulate a general theory of maintaining peace: "keeping the opponents apart.

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81 The most recent examples are possibly Burrowes 1996 and Muller 1999
82 For example. Ropers call "strategies of conflict resolution" things like "directive mediation", "non-directive mediation" and so on (Ropers 1995:46f). These would in my terminology be tactics.
83 Liddell Hart 1967: 321f, quoted from Burrowes 1996:29
84 Sharp 1973:493
85 Muller 1999 p.4, translated by CS
86 Boutros-Ghali 1992
87 Reprinted in Galtung 1982
negotiating a political solution and finally, tying the adversaries into something that one could call a peace system.\textsuperscript{88}

Johan Galtung defines \textit{peacekeeping} as (to): "control the actors so that they at least stop destroying things, others, and themselves".\textsuperscript{89}

\textbf{Peacemaking} "is concerned with the search for a negotiated resolution of the perceived conflicts of interests between the parties".\textsuperscript{90} Activities shall be called peacemaking activities if they bring together groups or individuals in dialogue about possible resolution of the conflict. Contrary to Ryan’s notion, this can occur at the diplomatic level or between ordinary citizens that are caught in the conflict.

\textbf{Peacebuilding} "is the strategy which most directly tries to reverse those destructive processes that accompany violence".\textsuperscript{91}

These strategies must not be confused with certain activities. For example: "dialogue" might be used both to find a solution to the conflict and to foster understanding between two groups in conflict. The former usage puts it in the realm of peacemaking, and the later in the realm of peacebuilding. This shows that many activities include aspects of at least two, if not all three strategies. Nevertheless, I believe that it makes sense to distinguish between them because they highlight different functions and problems.

The three strategies need to be applied at the same time.\textsuperscript{92} Peacekeeping without peacemaking and peacebuilding would be very difficult because the violence might overwhelm the process, and any group wishing to sabotage a peace initiative would find it easy to provoke armed clashes. If peacebuilding is ineffective, the decision-makers might lose the support of their communities, and if peacemaking is ineffective, the perceived disagreement that caused the conflict will remain unresolved, and the probability that violence would start again soon is high.\textsuperscript{93}

The three strategies are not per se nonviolent strategies. As has been shown before, they may include coercion - like mediation with muscle or military peacekeeping. But on the other side, all nonviolent tactics/methods can easily be related to one, or sometimes to more then one of the strategies\textsuperscript{94}.

The peace strategies are usually presented as strategies to be used after a conflict has escalated to violence. Ryan and Galtung as well as Butros-Gali seem to assume this although the first two reject the idea of a sequential order for their application.

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\textsuperscript{88} Galtung 1982:8, quoted after Müller/Büttner 1998:8
\textsuperscript{89} Galtung 1996:103. His original definition: Peacekeeping aims to "halt and reduce the manifest violence of the conflict through the intervention of military forces in an interpositioning role" (Galtung 1975:282-304, quoted after Miall et al 1999:186 f. This is the original English version of the article otherwise quoted here as Galtung 1982.
\textsuperscript{90} Ryan 1995:106. Galtung 1975 a.a.O. describes peacemaking as being 'directed at reconciling political and strategic attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation'
\textsuperscript{91} Ryan 1995:129. Galtung 1975 a.a.O.: Peacebuilding addresses 'the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development'.
\textsuperscript{92} Lederach, who acknowledges the need for a comprehensive approach in order to achieve conflict transformation, uses the term 'peacebuilding' for all three of them. (Lederach 1994:14). In order to avoid confusion, I prefer the more narrow definition.
\textsuperscript{93} Ryan 1995:117f
\textsuperscript{94} see Müller-Büttner 1998
It shall be argued here that the same strategies are also used before the violence takes place. They are usually covered by the term prevention, but looking closely at what activities (tactics) fall under prevention, it is obvious that they are broadly the same. Therefore, although prevention is an important concept when looking at any given conflict, the peace strategies used are the same no matter if the conflict is pre-violent or post-violent, only some of the tactics (means) used might differ. The difference is that prevention deals with the formation of the conflict while the three peace strategies deal with violent conflict, conflict transformation and social change.\footnote{Miall et al 1999:16} Prevention includes what otherwise is called peacemaking such as diplomacy and peacemaking efforts by local actors. There has been preventive peacekeeping (UN peacekeeping mission in Macedonia, for example\footnote{Moeller in: Matthies (ed) 1997:278-304}). The most sustainable tactics of prevention have to do with socio-economic change, good governance and the like.\footnote{Miall et al 1999:111 pp. distinguish ‘light’ prevention (diplomacy) and ‘deep’ prevention (promoting good governance).}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Problem</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Character</th>
<th>target group of governments</th>
<th>Typical activities</th>
<th>target groups of NGOs</th>
<th>Typical activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>violent behaviour</td>
<td>control, prevention, reduction of violence</td>
<td>primary; dissociative secondary: associative</td>
<td>military, belligerents</td>
<td>military peacekeeping, civil or military monitoring missions</td>
<td>groups and individuals liable to commit violence, e.g. death squadrons, also police, military</td>
<td>monitoring, interpositioning, keeping a presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacemaking</td>
<td>perceived incompatibility of interests</td>
<td>dealing with interests, positions in a conflict</td>
<td>associative</td>
<td>govern-ments, political leaders</td>
<td>mediation, facilitation of all types</td>
<td>people in the ‘second rank behind politicians, middle level, local authorities, NGOs/ citizens</td>
<td>‘Conflict-solving workshops’, dialogue meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Negative attitudes</td>
<td>Influencing attitudes</td>
<td>associative</td>
<td>all citizens</td>
<td>educational programs (e.g. on democracy)</td>
<td>usually specific groups/com munities are targeted</td>
<td>conflict transformation trainings, trauma healing, work in schools, with women etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>socio-economic structures</td>
<td>working on structural causes of the conflict</td>
<td>working on root causes</td>
<td>all citizens, welfare system, business</td>
<td>economic aid pro-grams, structural aid (e.g. setting up democratic institutions, reform of security forces</td>
<td>usually regionally limited, more specific target groups</td>
<td>development cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.1.6.3 Looking at the peace strategies in detail

Peacekeeping is a primarily dissociative approach. Galtung points out that the idea of keeping the opponents apart is also the underlying philosophy of the politics of balance of power. Peacekeeping, "is often the most urgent and necessary of all peace strategies because it is the only one which deals directly with the warriors on all sides who are engaged in mutual destruction." It is traditionally considered a task of the military and perhaps the police. The practice developed by the UN of sending peacekeeping troops, so-called blue helmets, gave the strategy of peacekeeping a classical instrument; strategy and instrument often are considered synonymous. There is no logical reason why unarmed civilians could not carry out the same task, and there have been some cases of larger-scale civilian peacekeeping actions (see 2.4).

Authors who are mainly interested in nonviolent intervention have broadened the concept of peacekeeping to include other, smaller-scale activities like (unarmed) accompaniment of activists threatened by death squads. Since these activities are also about control of violence by using a dissociative approach, it makes sense to include them in the peacekeeping strategy, only with a more limited scope than the violence of a conflict as a whole. Lisa Schirch describes four approaches of separating the parties involved in a conflict:

- Buffer zones ("demilitarised and unpatrolled areas")
- Peace zones ("civilian-occupied spaces where no fighting takes place")
- Interposition peacekeeping ("peacekeepers placing themselves physically between groups engaged in violent conflict in an impartial stance to all parties")
- Antirecessionary peacekeeping (which "maintains unequal distance between the parties" and is used when the parties in conflict are not easily separated)

Generally, two main tactics of peacekeeping can be distinguished: accompaniment of individuals and groups, and monitoring of situations.

Ryan distinguishes three methods of peacemaking as the imposition of a solution through either:

1. Violence and power
2. Law
3. Negotiation (classical mediation or second-track diplomacy)

Much of the literature on conflict resolution deals with negotiation and related methods. In fact, often conflict resolution is used interchangeably with peacemaking, because peacemaking is the strategy that deals with the contents of a conflict. Many different

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98 In Chapter 2 of this study it will be argued that peacekeeping has also to do with bringing parties together.
99 Galtung 1982:53
100 Ryan 1995:106
101 Schirch 1995, Mahony/Eguren 1997
103 See Ropers 1995
tactics and methods have been proposed. Again, the terminology varies widely among
the different authors. I would like to make mention of two issues in this context:

First, there is usually a continuum defined between third-party negotiators who use
considerable pressure to bring the parties in conflict to an agreement (examples: the
Dayton agreement after the NATO bombing in Bosnia 1995, and the Rambouillet
negotiations carried out under the threat of military intervention in 1999), and third-party
negotiators who act as facilitators helping the parties in conflict to find their own solution.
How these different negotiating techniques are named, differs. Perhaps the major
confusion stems from the fact that in international politics mediation is often used for the
more coercive forms of negotiation, while in the intra-societal projects (family mediation,
community mediation) mediation means exactly the opposite viz. not making one’s own
proposals.

Kumar Rupesinghe proposes some rather fundamental differences between state
versus non-state diplomacy.\textsuperscript{104} State-based diplomacy is, he says, based on perceived
self-interests, state-to-state relations, the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in
internal affairs. It relies on UN, international organisations and bilateral governmental
relations, and is a short-term approach. Non-state diplomacy, in contrast, is based on
people-to-people relations, concentrates on trust building, networking and solidarity, has
a long-term commitment, is flexible and creative and is low-profile foundation building.

Finally, Peacebuilding, more than peacekeeping and peace making, is the grand
strategy because the ordinary people are included in the peace process. There are
many examples of peace processes that have failed because there was no
peacebuilding. The recent escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a good example
of this problem.

Peacebuilding activities include many very different tasks.

One major sector of peacebuilding is those tactics, which concentrate on encounter
between the opponents, having as a goal the removal of distrust and hatred, and making
it possible for former enemies to live together. Ryan emphasises that encounters per se
are usually not helpful because interaction alone might not reduce prejudice and
tension. He distinguishes seven sub-strategies of peacebuilding that combine contact
with something else\textsuperscript{105}:

1. Contact plus forgiveness is the religious approach of Gandhi, Martin Luther King and
others. The question is, is it pragmatic enough to reach a sufficient number of persons?
2. Contact plus the pursuit of superordinate goals (joint sports, inclusion in a state
umbrella like the EU etc);
3. Contact plus economic development, as soon as there is subjective economic justice
for both sides;
4. Contact plus confidence building (e.g. law reforms);
5. Contact plus education for mutual understanding (e.g. multi-ethnic schools);
6. Prejudice reduction;
7. Exploring cultures.

\textsuperscript{104} Rupesinghe1998:111
\textsuperscript{105} Ryan 1995:134 pp.
There are other psycho/social tactics as well, for example, psychological aid for traumatised people.

Peacebuilding activities in the social/economic field include resettlement of refugees, development co-operation, rebuilding of infrastructure and the revitalisation of the economy etc.

Among political measures are the organisation of elections, establishment of democratic rules and rule of law, development of civil society, free media, respect for human rights and the like.106

1.1.6.4 On dissociative and associative characteristics

At the end of the day, all non-violent conflict transformation is about bringing the parties in conflict together in a new relationship, and probably in a new context. This is what the nonviolent approach distinguishes from other approaches: Nonviolence always is searching for a future for all parties to the conflict, while other approaches might be content to have pacified and silenced one side, or in the extreme case even aim at their extinction.

The peace strategies described above have been characterised either as associative or as dissociative, with peacekeeping being the strategy that is considered primarily dissociative. This means that it is mostly intended to keep the parties in conflict apart, by being a buffer that cannot be passed over without sanctions (blue helmets monitoring ceasefire lines and buffer zones, civilian peace monitors interpositioning themselves between demonstrators and the police etc.). It is what Mahony/Eguren107 call a strategy of deterrence where the potential aggressor is kept from attacking because he fears the consequences. These can be anything from international pressure and sanctions to losing face or relapse into general war. But behind this dissociative character there is an eventual associative element, even if it is an indirect one. Peacekeeping or creating the precondition necessary for allowing other work of bringing the parties together, fighting for justice and for political change is the reason why a dissociative strategy has a place in conflict transformation.

Two aspect regarding association need to be mentioned as well:

The first is that association may be easier for some social groups than for others. A primary example is the experience of women who often find it easier to relate to each other than to men. Because women are not as involved in direct fighting as men and because women are politically low-key having and no public leadership roles in most societies, and because they may find it easier to identify with each other across conflict lines since they share many common life experiences and interests. This fact has even been recognised by the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Women108, and

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106 See Miall et al 1999:203 (but attention: they define peacebuilding more broadly than it is defined here), Ropers 1995, and chapter 1.3 in this text.


108 Security Council resolution 1325 (S/RES/1325) of 31 October 2000 urged an enhanced role for women in preventing conflict, promoting peace, and assisting in post-conflict reconstruction and the incorporation of a gender perspective into United Nations operations. For the first time in the history of the United Nations

Furthermore, in other conflicts young people and seniors may be exploited for peacebuilding efforts (see the activities of different Civil Peace Services in Bosnia).

The second is what Johan Galtung has named the "Great Chain of Nonviolence"\textsuperscript{109}, where at first the association is at least an indirect one. There are conflicts where the two sides are socio-psychologically so distant from each other, one side having de-humanised the other, that no direct communication is possible. In that case external parties may step in and create an indirect link. One example is the occupation of the American continent by the Europeans in the 15th century. At the beginning, the occupiers denied any humanity to the Indians, believing them to be mere animals. Only when some courageous members of the Catholic Church intervened was this view changed. These church representatives clearly belonged to one of the parties in the conflict - the party of the occupiers. But exactly because they did, they managed to get a hearing. Another example is the event in Berlin, Germany 1944 where the Jewish husbands of German-Arian women were arrested and were to be deported to concentration camps, the women protested in front of the police headquarters, and eventually achieved the release of their husbands.\textsuperscript{110}

Sometimes more than one intermediary might be needed; some intermediaries will share social characteristics with the oppressed, others will be socially closer to the oppressors.\textsuperscript{111}

Nations, the Security Council devoted an entire session to a debate on women’s experiences in conflict and post-conflict situations and their contributions to peace.

\textsuperscript{110} Jochheim 1993
\textsuperscript{111} Galtung 1996:118
1.2 When is conflict intervention legitimate?

1.2.1 Introduction

The question of if and when conflict intervention is legitimate has been discussed rather intensively over the last ten years. But the debate usually mixes questions of the general right to intervene with the question of the legitimisation of the use of force. Without denying that the use of deadly force deserves special treatment in any discussion, it nevertheless is necessary to put the question of legitimisation of intervention much more generally. What right does anyone have to involve himself/herself in someone else’s conflict? There are two approaches to this question: a legal one, referring to international law, and an ethical one \(^\text{112}\) referring to different issues which are of a purely ethical and political nature.

1.2.2 Intervention and international law

International law, as it has been developed specially after World War II, and codified in the UN Charter and the different Covenants drafted and ratified since then, are mainly concerned with the relationship between states. Important in the context of conflict intervention are the still up-held principle of the sovereignty of all states, and the consequent rule of non-interference into the affairs of another state (chapter I, article 2/7 of the UN Charter). To see a state as an individual actor that is considering it to be a legitimate person, in international relations, is an old tradition in international relations, often tracked back to Jean Bodin and Alberico Gentili in the 16th century, \(^\text{113}\) and put into practice from the time of the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the 30-year-war. New for the time after WW II are the general prohibition of war (chapter I, article 2/4 of the UN Charter) \(^\text{114}\), and the prescription of peaceful procedures of settling disputes (Chapter VI of the UN Charter). \(^\text{115}\) There are two generally accepted exceptions to this prohibition: \(^\text{116}\)

1. Self-defence against an attack is considered allowed as long as the UN does not take measures (Art 51 of UN Charter); \(^\text{117}\)
2. If there is a threat to international peace or security, the UN Security Council may decide to use "all means necessary" including force (Chapter VII; specially article 39 and 42). It may delegate the implementation of its decision to some of its individual members

\(^{112}\) Although in the end, all justifications of intervention, even pure self-interest, are based on ethical principles as the sociologist Dieter Senghaas points out. (Senghaas 1993:418). See also Lewer/Ramsbotham 1993:53
\(^{113}\) See Lewer/Ramsbotham 1993:66
\(^{114}\) This prohibition is much stricter then what the Briand-Kellog-Covenant said in the time of the League of Nations. Delbrück 1993:103
\(^{115}\) In six articles, it outlines the UN's role in negotiation, inquiry and investigation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and other procedures.
\(^{117}\) This rule of self-defence sometimes is considered as including protection of their own citizens even if they are in another country. This is the legitimisation for military evacuations of citizens from crises areas without asking permission from the state the citizens are evacuated from. (Kühne 1993:35)
Putting NP in the picture

1.2 Legitimacy

(article 48) as it did in the case of Rwanda in 1994 (France and the US), to a military alliance (NATO in Bosnia 1992-5 and Yugoslavia 1999), or have the decision carried out by a UN-led mission (like Somalia 1993).\(^{118}\)

The possibilities of the UN to enforce its decisions against the will of the member concerned, and to persecute breaches of international law, are limited. If diplomacy fails, its means are sanctions, setting up intervention operations (usually with a strong military element) if the five permanent members of the Security Council agree, and in the future hopefully a War Crimes Court which has been designed on the model of the two War Crimes Tribunals on Yugoslavia and Rwanda, but which is not yet ratified by a sufficient number of states.\(^ {119}\) Not having a police of its own, the UN is reliant on its member states to provide the means, be it civil police to arrest a war criminal or military troops to intervene in a conflict.

After the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, a new dynamic entered hitherto frozen international relations. The so-called realist school of international law and politics, which emphasises the sovereignty of states as the best guaranty of international peace, lost ground to the so-called idealistic school that aims at world governance with a monopoly of violence of the United Nations.\(^ {120}\) Certain decisions of the UN Security Council, specifically Resolutions 687 and 688 from the 5.4.1991 on North Iraq and Resolution 794 from 3.12.1992 on Somalia, are considered examples of the UN going beyond the non-interference rule.\(^ {121}\) Generally new is that the UN after 1989 has concerned itself with internal wars in a measure it usually was not able to do before 1989 because the veto has been used more sparingly in the Security Council recently than in the years of the Cold War.\(^ {122}\) In a recent resolution (1296/2000) the Security Council established that the targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations affected by war themselves constitute threats to international peace and security, and thus can be triggers for Security Action Council.\(^ {123}\)

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\(^{118}\) This is actually already alluded to in Article 1 of the Charter: "To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace."

\(^{119}\) Decision from 1998 with a big majority in the UN Plenary. But USA, China, Israel are among those who at first did not agree - the US with the explicit explanation that they are afraid that their own soldiers might be brought to trial when they are involved in missions abroad. The USA and Israel eventually ratified the contract on the 31st of December 2000, 9 hours before the deadline ran out. The Court will be responsible for genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 'war of aggression' which still need to be defined. The Resolution will become valid when 60 states have ratified it. (See Greve 1998) At the moment 139 states signed the contract, 27 states ratified it. It is expected that the sufficient number will be reached in about 2003. (FR 2.1.01, "USA unterstützen UN-Strafgericht", p. 1)


\(^{121}\) Kühne 1993:29. In the case of Somalia, the suffering of the victims in an internal war was interpreted as a threat to international peace and security, and thereby legitimised according to the UN Charter (Eikenberg 1993:185).

\(^{122}\) That does not mean that there weren't cases of what could be considered military 'humanitarian' intervention by individual states before that time. Lewer/Ramsbotham mention among others the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea to end Pol Pot's reign of terror (1978/9) and the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda in response to Idi Amin's massacres in 1979. (Lewer/Ramsbotham 1973:68)

\(^{123}\) Report of the Brahimi-Commission (2000), paragraph 50
Another important development in this context is the growing realisation that many problems, specifically ecological ones, can only be solved on a global basis. The creation of International Environmental Law and international agreements in this and other fields, often made at or in connection with World Conferences (Rio, Beijing), is sometimes seen as a positive sign for globalisation of responsibility.¹²⁴

But it seems that the tendency to strengthen the rule of international law is facing a counter-move, at least in regard to the respect of the UN and its Security Council as the only body being able to establish a threat to international peace. The new NATO Alliance's Strategic Concept adopted on April 24, 1999¹²⁵ does not say so explicitly, but may be interpreted as mandating NATO to get active with the UN Security Council if possible, and without it if necessary,¹²⁶ claiming to have to play "an indispensable role...in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges".¹²⁷ The NATO attack on Yugoslavia in winter/spring 1999, which was not mandated by the UN, is the first example of the so-called "New World Order" - what some observers have considered a relapse into the time even before the League of Nation Treaty - a time when the powerful states decided by themselves when to go to war.¹²⁸

The second important aspect of international law important for conflict intervention is the definition of human rights as formulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and further developed in the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (both from 1966) and other later declarations. Unlike the regulations considered so far, human rights are rights an individual has against his (or her) own state.¹²⁹ In the preamble of the mentioned Covenants it is said explicitly that every individual does not only have the right, but also the responsibility for ensuring the promotion of human rights. This right and responsibility is not limited to activity within an individual's own state. A certain right to intervene on behalf of human rights anywhere could be deducted from this responsibility. Of course, this interpretation¹³⁰ until now would not be accepted by most governments in the world, and there is as yet no way to legally enforce it. On practical terms, human rights activists getting involved in human rights affairs outside their own country, depend on the protection of the laws of the country they work in gives them, plus the means they have available to alert international pressure and support from their embassies. In 1998,
the UN Commission on Human Rights has presented a draft for a declaration on the protection of human right defenders. The draft asserts the right of any individual to work, alone or in co-operation with others, for the protection and the realisation of human rights in a national and international framework.\footnote{Heintze 1998} If this declaration is ever passed and ratified, it would give individuals and NGOs a much better standing in regard to international activities.

As a third factor the International Humanitarian Law needs to be named which governs the protection of non-combatants in war. The work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies deserves special mention here because the ICRC has status which resembles more that of an official organisation than a NGO in regard to its rights to be active in zones of war.\footnote{90% of the ICRC annual budget is funded by governments, and it is designated the custodian of International Humanitarian law. (see Weiss 1999:12, Lewer/Ramsbotham 1993:71)}

To sum up: Any conflict intervention implemented by states or international governmental organisations against the will of all or one of the parties in conflict,\footnote{The 'classical' peacekeeping operations of the UN as many other, civilian missions, always have had the agreement of the parties in the conflict.} is strictly limited by the UN Charter. Enforcement of decisions of the UN Security Council is only allowed in cases when international peace and security are threatened, a rule which has been open to some interpretation lately. This provision is equally valid for an un-armed intervention force as it is for military forces.

These provisions are not valid for NGO interventions. NGOs may intervene whenever they want to without breaking international law. On the other hand, they are not per se (yet) protected by international law, and therefore depend on the acceptance of the government of the country in which they get active.

### 1.2.3 The ethical side

The ethical issue is even more complex than the question of international law, since it is inseparable from political issues. I would like to distinguish five strands of arguments: the argumentation derived from the Christian principles of "Just War"\footnote{Based on the teachings of Augustine, they only became systemised in the Middle Ages, first to justify the crusades. See Engelhardt 1980:80 pp.}, the argument of at least doing no harm\footnote{Mary Anderson's project put into the core of its work, political arguments around hegemonialism and neo-colonialism (whose interests, whose values?), ethical considerations proposed by principled nonviolent theoreticians and practitioners, and last not least the customary right to action in solidarity as defended by actors of civil society all over the world. Most of these strands combine the basic question of the conditions under which intervention is permitted (if at all) with the questions of the how. In fact, since the first is often seen to depend on the second (like in the teaching of Just War), these two are very difficult to separate.}
It has often been pointed out that the principles of Just War (bellum iustum) that specify the conditions to be met if a war is counted as a just war, have been used rather to justify war, not to limit it. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the criteria of bellum iustum are very much alive still, in spite of being said to be out of date in the time of assured mutual destruction by nuclear weapons. Not only politicians, philosophers and political scientists refer to them again and again when discussing war and humanitarian interventions, also much of the pacifist debate refers to criteria like "not all other means have been tested" / "there would have been alternatives to military intervention" (principle of last resort), "you are fighting only for your preserve your own" (principle of just cause), or "look at what atrocities you have committed/how you have escalated the conflict and not done any good" (principles of just means).

The British political scientists Lewer and Ramsbotham have proposed ten framework principles for humanitarian intervention drawing both from the bellum iustum criteria and several codes of conducts developed by humanitarian aid agencies. They mean these principles to be of equal validity for military and non-military interventions:

1. The Principle of Minimum Humanitarian Standards (Just Cause)
'Where there is unacceptable denial or violation of human rights, actual or threatened, the international community has a duty to attempt redress and a prima facie right to intervene, subject to the condition laid down in principle nine.'

2. The Principle of Human Flourishing (Just Ends)
'The aim of such intervention should be the impartial promotion of sustained human flourishing throughout the affected region'.

3. The Principle of Appropriate Means
'The means employed should be appropriate - that is, they should be a) necessary, b) sufficient, c) proportional, and d) legitimate.'

4. The Principle of Local Enablement
'The intervention should be conducted in terms understood and accepted within the region and in such a way as to strengthen and support those working locally to resolve conflict and build peace.'

5. The Principle of Consistency
'Intervention should be consistent across different conflict situations and relevant experience should be cumulatively transferred.'

6. The Principle of Reflexivity
'Interveners' motives and previous behaviour should be compatible with the professed purpose of their intervention.'

7. The Principle of Complementarity
'Interveners actions should be mutually complementary.'

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135 Lewer/Ramsbotham 1993:55. The seven conditions of just war that are usually recognised are: just cause, just/peaceful end, proper authority, right intent, ultimo ratio, proportionality and discrimination (between combatants and non-combatants).

136 Engelhardt 1980

137 Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 1996:200 pp., Fuchs 1995

138 Unpublished study the author has been doing on the pacifist-bellicist debate in 1995.

8. The Principle of Accountability
'Interveners should hold themselves accountable to the international community for their intervention, since it is from the international community that they derive the authority to intervene.'

9. The Principle of Contingency and Graduated Response
'Where possible, intervention should be preventive, nonviolent and with the consent of all parties. Where this is not possible, additional criteria should be met as appropriate at the relevant decision-points, without prejudice as to the outcome.'

10. The Principle of Universality
'The principles which govern just humanitarian intervention should be endorsed by the international community.'

Having the question of the right to intervene as a starting point, these criteria also include proposed rules on the how an intervention should be carried out in order to be legitimate. This how may be found in many codes of conducts and other publications on NGO interventions. Specifically, principles of becoming active only on invitation, of putting local actors first, and of being guided by the principles of international human rights may be considered as consensus in the conflict intervention community today. There is the growing acknowledgement of the fact that only those who have the conflict are can solve it, and that the role of international intervention is to support the local actors in finding this solution.

More unassuming in comparison to these codes, as proposed by Lewer/Ramsbotham and others, is the doing no harm approach of Mary Anderson's Local Capacities for Peace Project proposes. What she outlines for humanitarian and development aid, may be translated directly to conflict intervention in general: Anderson argues that the minimum objective should be what medical doctors pledge: "First, do no harm." Given the fact of how much harm such projects may do (the case studies commissioned by Anderson's project give ample examples), this rule should not be taken lightly. Often it is not so easy to do no harm, and it is much less easy to speak of positive outcomes and attempted effects.

On the other side there is what has been called the "Droit d'ingérence" as the ultimate legitimating of humanitarian action: "Humanitarian action is by definition universal. Humanitarian responsibility has no frontiers. Wherever in the world there is manifest distress, the humanitarian, by vocation, must respond." The "duty to intervene" is considered an ethic, and it has its consequences, for example at least in the eyes of Doctors Without Borders the abandonment of neutrality if necessary.

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140 Lewer/Ramsbotham 1993: "p. 98
141 International Alert 1998, several articles in Evers (ed) 2000
142 Mary B Anderson: "No one can 'make', 'keep' or 'enforce' anyone else's peace. People and societies must create the conditions on which they base their own peace." (1996:14)
144 Dr. James Orbinski, President of the MSF International Council, at his Nobel Peace Price speech in Norway on 10 November 1999 (www.msf.org/)
The fourth line of arguments around the legitimacy of conflict intervention concentrates on political interests the interveners might have. There is the term peace colonialism and the accusation not to deal with the real causes of conflict that lie in our (Western/Northern) societies with which advocates of nonviolent intervention find themselves confronted. Specifically anti-imperialist analysts and activists argue that those who then intervene in them first cause most interventions in war. Therefore, legitimate activity against such wars should rather take place in the hegemonies of Northern countries, and targeted against the governments and international business.

It is true that the majority of nonviolent interventions took place in settings of immense international publicity and interest. Lacking statistics it has to remain an unproven assumption that there is a direct relationship between NGO projects of conflict intervention, and the attention the conflict finds in the international media, and on the level of governments/international community. But the connection jumps to the mind if you compare cases like Yugoslavia and let’s say Liberia or Congo - one with immense attention and one with only limited, regional attention. The reason why some cases find more official attention has of course as much to do with the influence of mass media as of political interests. As long as nonviolent conflict interveners set their priorities the same way, they leave themselves open to the accusation of being led by mass media rather then by serious analysis.

On the other side there are the political goals of nonviolent interveners that have to be taken into consideration making a decision on when and if to intervene. I am referring to the issue of co-operation or non-cooperation with military intervention forces. While this is not a problem for the majority of NGOs being involved in what is coming to be called complex peace operations (see Chapter 2.5), it is a problem for those groups and organisations with an explicit nonviolent approach. For those who reject all use of force, and whose goal it is to abolish war and the military, it may present an ethical dilemma to find themselves working hand in hand with military peace-keepers, accepting their protection, joining in the task to rebuilding after war. There are three views: One is that strengthening the civil part of such operations might eventually lead to making the military unnecessary at all. The other is that co-operation legitimises the military and the use of force, and therefore must be avoided. The German Forum Civil Peace Service has taken a third stance in that debate: It simply refuses to compare Civil Peace Service to the military, because civil conflict resolution in their eyes follows another logic, and cannot be compared to military operations. Any comparison with military interventions would only lead to the legitimisation of the military.

A fifth element to look at when discussing ethical implications of conflict intervention is what principled Gandhians have to say. The debate on international (military)
interventions often went along the lines "We have to do something", and the accusation directed at pacifists that they preferred to "do nothing", being interested only in keeping their own hands clean instead of assuming responsibility for the whole.\textsuperscript{150} The answer from Gandhi\textsuperscript{151} and those influenced by him always has been that non-violence is a third way beyond the choice between violence and doing nothing. That is nothing else than an ethical justification for acting, and therefore also for nonviolent intervention. Nevertheless, there has been, specifically from the side of Gandhians, strong criticism of interventionism. Weber mentions Vinoba Bhave who believed that "the citizens of a country which maintains an army have no right to conduct satyagraha in another country".\textsuperscript{152} This is a radical statement, but in my eyes one which should not be dismissed too easily as being irrelevant. There is at least the issue of credibility at stake when NGOs concentrate rather on problems far away from their own country than trying to do something about those problems they are closest to, and therefore might have the most possibilities to influence.\textsuperscript{153}

As sixth and last point in this discussion I would like to mention something which in my observation has often been referred to, but to my knowledge has not made entry into any more theoretical works yet: It is what I would like to call the customary right to action in solidarity as defended by actors of civil society all over the world. For example, in the discussions the Council and Triennial Conferences of War Resisters' International\textsuperscript{154} has had over the last eight or nine years on conflict intervention, very often intervention was contrasted with solidarity.\textsuperscript{155} The role of nonviolent activists, so runs this argument, would be to support those groups and individuals having the same goals in other places, and fight together for justice and peace. In if not identical but similar wordings these are the objectives of most activists' networks around the world, or, in other words, to be asked as the basic legitimisation for doing something. The right of citizens to work together over borders for the same objectives, and often in spite of their governments who do not want them to do so, is something rarely questioned by the activists themselves, and which may be one of the fundamental principles of international true democracy.

Where do these different arguments leave us in terms of ethical legitimisation of conflict intervention? I think the first thing which has become clear is that there is no easy, ready-available recipe, because while some of the thoughts outlined above fit together, others do not: To start with those which have some consistency: There is, as a minimum, the rule of doing no harm. Then there are different criteria that might have to be fulfilled in order to decide if an intervention is appropriate at all. Lewer/Rambotham

\textsuperscript{150} This refers to the famous distinction the sociologist Max Weber made between 'ethic of conviction' and 'ethic of responsibility'. To adhere to an absolute ethic is to take actions (or non-action) in keeping with that ethic without regard for their consequences. See Dougherty/Pfaltzgraff 1996:64
\textsuperscript{151} Harijan, 9.2.1947, found in: My Life Is My Message, 1988
\textsuperscript{153} This argument plays a part in the debate on the European Civilian Peace Services, some of them wanting to develop internal projects side by side to international ones because of this. See below Chapter 2 and its appendix for references.
\textsuperscript{154} See the Minutes of the WRI Councils and Triennials from 1993 to 2000.
\textsuperscript{155} See also Simon 2000
tried to phrase these criteria into ten principles based on the principles of bellum iustum. Some of these principles define criteria about the how of an intervention, as do several codes of conducts, which have been developed by humanitarian and conflict resolution organisations. The political question if an intervention undertaken by nonviolent activists might in fact support the political, strategic or economic vested interests their country (countries) have in a conflict, could be seen as an elaboration of the principles of just cause and ends.

But the two last points raised above are rather thorns in the flesh of this picture: Neither Vinoba Bhave’s statement about having the right to work somewhere else, nor the question of actions in solidarity are easily dealt with in the framework of general criteria. The outcome of the weighing of these different arguments is something beyond research. Only those sharing common values will be able to agree on any ethical statement. Being asked certainly should be considered a necessary but not sufficient condition for intervention, because given the diverse interests of civil society (and state) actors in any country of the world, it is usually easy to find someone to invite you. But this alone does not exclude that the intervention might be harmful, unjust or just useless.
1.3 Looking back to two hundred years of history

A comprehensive history of nonviolent conflict interventions covering more than just projects of peacekeeping has yet to be written.156 It would probably be a history beginning with the last century, pointing out some earlier activities and events - like mediation undertaken by Quakers between colonialists and Indians in the 17th and 18th century157 - as their prehistory. There would have to be mention of the conceptualisation of peace by international law as it started in the period of enlightenment with philosophical studies158 like the probably best known and most influential oeuvre, Immanuel Kant's "Perpetual Peace", written in 1795. These thoughts survived more than one hundred years of realpolitics and war as a legitimate means of politics, influencing not only the peace movements of the outgoing 19th century, but also directly or indirectly the founders of the League of Nations and the United Nations with its Charter, the different Covenants on civil and human, and of course its peacekeeping missions.

A major role in such a comprehensive history the rise of pacifism159 would play, the growth of nonviolent action160 and nonviolent (social) defence161, and of peoples' struggles162 around the world, many of them fought with nonviolent or mostly nonviolent means - all predominantly developments of the by-gone, 20th century.

The goal to establish a standing peace army - a goal that is basically shared by NP - may be rightly called, as Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber do, a "recurrent vision". It seems that between World War I and today there have been at least about one dozen of proposals of that sort that made their way into the literature on nonviolent intervention.163 Personally, I am convinced that there have been at least twice as many that have been

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156 There are some overviews on projects and organisations whose approach centred on peacekeeping. See below 1.3.2
158 like Erasmus of Rotterdam, Pierre Dubois, Eméric Crucé, Maximilien de Sully, William Penn, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Friedrich von Gentz. See for example Dougherty/ Pfaltzgraff 1997, p.190
159 The term 'pacifism' has been coined 1901 by the French activist E. Arnaud. But radical rejection of all war is much older, and can be found as a commandment not to use violence in many religions and philosophies. As sources of modern pacifism as it developed in the 20th century in Europe and North America, usually the following three are named:
- the various peace churches and other religious minority communities forming itself since the Enlightenment (e.g. Mennonites, Quakers)
- the institutional approach expecting peace from the yet-to-be made binding rule of international law as it has been pursued by the bourgeois peace societies at the end of the 19th century, forming themselves under the impression of the first instances of modern war (American Civil War, German-French War)
- the socialist and anarchist antimilitarism as developing since the last three decades of the 19th century
See: Brock/Young 1999, Holl 1988
162 See for example Ackerman/Duvall 2000 and Martin 1991
163 See the appendix to chapter 2.
overlooked so far.\textsuperscript{164} The better-known proposals have - with one or two exceptions each - two things in common: They emphasise the role of peacekeeping and/or even peace enforcement by interpositioning, and they seek to place the new instrument under the auspices of the United Nations or another international organisation. The proposals never found much if any attention with the bodies the proposals were directed to.

As a third element in common, most of the proposals (not all) had a strong connection to projects. In some cases, the proposal to create a peace army came after a project idea to intervene in a specific case. For example, after Maud Roydenvs concrete proposal to intervene in the Chinese-Japanese conflict, she and her followers developed a general proposal to the League of Nations. In other cases the peace army proposals were developed on a more abstract level, preceding projects that then were often seen at the beginning as pilot or exemplary projects (Christian Peacemakers, German Civil Peace Service). In this latter case, the organisations have tended to soon abandon the larger vision as unpractical or even no longer desirable.

Not all of these proposals remained at an abstract level. There has been a larger number of spontaneously formed groups and projects in order to protest or stop violence, or to contribute to peacebuilding.\textsuperscript{165} There are a few overviews compiled on such projects.\textsuperscript{166} But to start with a remark on what is not to be found here: Some nonviolent activities that are found in some of the standard overviews I am leaving out, because in my eyes they do not belong to the realm of nonviolent intervention. So there is neither mention of the Sahara Protest Action\textsuperscript{167} when an international group including Africans protested against the first French nuclear weapons testing 1959-1960, nor of the different peace walks\textsuperscript{168} and peace ships sent to protest against the nuclear arms race\textsuperscript{169}, nor of peoples' struggles and cases of nonviolent resistance/social defence like the Kapp' Putsch, the Indian liberation struggle, Prague 1968, Philippines 1986 and so on. In all these cases the nonviolent activists did not intervene in a conflict not their own but made themselves one of the conflict parties. Though a lot about the functioning of nonviolent action can be learned from studying these examples, including them here would have broadened at this point the subject beyond recognition.

There are projects where it is difficult to decide if the activists did intervene as externals or are fighting their own struggle. The problem arises especially when peace teams or

\textsuperscript{164} For example, just from my personal knowledge: In the middle of the 1990s there was a small, informal group of nonviolent activists in Germany, including myself, who tried to find people to create a 'peace army' as we called it to prepare for nonviolent resistance against future NATO wars ('interventions'). This initiative never made it beyond the production of a leaflet, and a few discussions at different meetings, and is - as far as I know - nowhere documented. I assume that similar things have been happening again and again in many countries.

\textsuperscript{165} See appendix to chapter 2.


\textsuperscript{167} e.g. Moser-Puangsuwan 1995

\textsuperscript{168} Like the San Francisco to Moscow Walk in 1960-61, see Moser-Puangsuwan 1995

\textsuperscript{169} One exception is made for the World Peace Brigade because such an action has been one of three of their activities which otherwise were interventionist enterprises.
the like become active locally, e.g. trying to mediate or to accompany threatened people in racist or ethnic conflicts taking place in their own country. On the whole, I tend to consider these projects rather as nonviolent interventions as long as the interveners do not belong to one of the primarily and directly concerned groups. For example, a Croatian citizen who intervenes in an area where members of the Serb minority are threatened by Croatian extremists, is rather an external party no matter if she or he is an ethnic Croat or Serb.

Some of the projects undertaken by groups and coalitions formed spontaneously, under the impact of a specific conflict or war they wanted to influence, have been larger-scale. It starts with the often-quoted attempt of the British pastor Maud Roydon to set up a peace army in order to stop the war between Japan and China in 1932. There was another wave of such actions from the middle of the 1960s to middle of 1970s - Cyprus, Vietnam, India, the Middle East and Northern Ireland being the conflicts around which such actions were conceived and carried out. A third wave of such spontaneous activities started in the 1990s first with the second Gulf War (Gulf Peace Team) and then different actions around the war in Bosnia/former Yugoslavia in general. Latin America became another focus.

It is interesting to notice that there has been an obvious relationship between the different actions just because probably often the same people were involved in them, and also a clear relationship between spontaneous actions to the foundation of more stable groups and organisations. In the case of the 1970s this was more a delayed then a simultaneous reaction: While in the first half of the 1960s only one more influential organisation, the World Peace Brigade, was founded (and incidentally dissolved rather soon) - activists involved in such actions and in World Peace Brigade later were involved in leading positions in the founding e.g. of Peace Brigades International, Witness for Peace, Christian Peacemaker Teams and so forth. In the 1990s things moved far more quicker: Several new organisations formed almost at the same time as spontaneous actions were carried out - Balkan Peace Team, Civil Peace Services in several European countries and so on.

The goals and activities of these kinds of projects are not as easily described as it might seem. They are not all about stopping or controlling group violence by interpositioning international activists between the warring parties, although that has been the objective of the majority of them. Some of them just aimed at making the issue public and expressing solidarity to the victims of the war (e.g. protest actions after the suppression of the Prague Spring by Warsaw Pact troops in 1968, two Walks for Peace in the Middle East and one or two of the peace caravans/marches taking place in the 1990s in Bosnia. There are a few projects listed in this category which are exceptional insofar as they concentrate on accompaniment of refugees back to their home (e.g. the Latin American ones), or monitoring of the human rights situation and accompaniment of threatened individuals like in "Cry for Justice", a project carried out by an umbrella of different groups in 1993... Although these are no stable organisations but rather projects carried out by a number of groups together, and therefore belong in this chapter, the approach and tactics of these projects are rather comparable to that of peace team organisations described in the next chapter, and some are taken up there as examples again.

The number of participants (or prospective participants since some of the actions never took place in the end) has a rather large range. “Mir Sada”, a peace caravan to Bosnia
putting NP in the picture

1.3. History

planned by an Italian and a French organisation in 1993 gathered the probably largest group of about 2,000 people. The smallest had perhaps 20 participants. But as impressive as the larger numbers are, considering the risk the participants took willingly (most actions made it quite clear to all prospective volunteers that they might get killed in the course of the action), it must not be forgotten that all of these projects were of a short-term character. The own experience of the author is that it is far more difficult to find persons to commit themselves for a longer time like one or two years without offering proper compensation (salary) what of course none of the projects described here did.

In regard to the effects/goals reached by the projects setting out to stop or prevent a war, it seems to be correct what Weber says in his summary: "Most of the early major initiatives stalled at the proposal stage primarily because of a lack of money and the absence of international organisational and logistical support". Others at least arrived in the field, but none of them reached the goals they had set out for themselves, which was to stop a war.

Nevertheless, it needs to be pointed out that most of these initiatives took place in an environment of international or quasi-international war with clear geographical borders between the warring parties. Only very few of them (the ones in Yugoslavia) were set in what is today the predominant kind of conflict, civil war between mixed ethnic (or religious) groups. Perhaps - this shall be left open at the moment - interpositioning there failed because the method used - a massive body of activists being at one place together, for a short time only, and without any footage in the communities, was inappropriate. Therefore, the seeming impossibility of interpositioning projects should not to quickly be assumed for such civil wars where there are no clear boundaries between the opponents, and the weaponry used rather falls into the category of small arms. This goes at least for projects falling into the realm of peacekeeping that is in situation when there is some agreement on a cease-fire between the parties in conflict.

Since the mandate of this research is to identify needs and possibilities for large-scale nonviolent intervention, some very important approaches to conflict transformation will have to be neglected, especially those developed and undertaken by professional "unofficial" conflict resolution workers because what they do can only be done by a small number of people. Professional conflict resolution workers may either come originally out of the Track One system (e.g. elderly statesmen like Jimmy Carter), or from religious or

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170 Maud Roydon and her fellows had found about 1,000 volunteers what they considered an insufficient number.
171 Though it might sound contradictory, it seems that it is possible to find people to risk their lives - as long as the action is over in a few weeks and people may then return to their daily life of work or study. This comment will be further researched and duly documented in later stages of the research on NP.
172 Weber 2000:16
173 Those with more modest goals, like giving protection to returning refugees, had much more chances to succeed.
174 Here I disagree with Weber who uses the same argument - most wars not having clearly defined front lines - as an additional argument against the impossibility of larger-scale peace-keeping. My argument is that the alternative is not necessarily small-scale accompaniment and humanitarian assistance) (as Weber seems to assume) but that there are other kinds of large-scale intervention practised more recently by civilian international (state) interventions. See below.
professional backgrounds.\footnote{Diamond/McDonald 1993:42} In contrast to peace teams and peace services, people of this category work mainly in the field of peacemaking. They may offer unofficial good services and mediation (e.g. the Quakers who entertain a house in Geneva for this purpose)\footnote{see Burton/Dukes 1990}, which is often a preparation for more official negotiations taking place later. Another activity is Conflict Solving Workshops\footnote{see Hill 1982, Walton 1970, Ropers 1995}. This is a special method developed and carried out by a smaller number of international conflict resolution organisations like International Alert (based in London), Nonviolence International (Washington), Berghof Centre for Conflict Resolution (Berlin) or Simon Fisher and his team of the Harvard School. Their purpose is to get people together who are not first Track themselves, but who have good access to the power holders of their society.

The number of institutions and NGOs concentrating purely on peace making activities is rather small. This is probably due to the fact that it is not easy to get access to the top-level leadership in almost any given conflict. All reports agree that it needs a long time to build up the trust necessary to have a standing in this field. And so although this kind of peacemaking would probably be a very important component of any conflict transformation effort in the field, it would probably be undertaken either by other actors in the field, or by a small group (leadership?) of NP as part of the overall mission.

On the other hand also the very broad category of citizens' initiatives will be excluded. These are all those initiatives - be it NGOs or more informal groups - that get involved in international work on a very grassroots level, seeking a person-to-person contact and either trying either to help people/groups in another country, or building networks on issues of mutual concern.\footnote{see Diamond/McDonald 1993:65 pp. on "track 4: private citizens".} Examples for the first kind of activity would be all those grassroots groups which form themselves to collect money for social projects or refugees in conflict areas, be it street children in Brazil, orphans in Chechnya or a church community somewhere in Africa. They usually work in a area of conflict but with a predominantly humanitarian approach, and unlike the professional aid organisations often have little awareness of the impact their work might have on conflict. Examples for the second kind of activity are those citizens' networks, which have formed either around a specific issue/conflict or on a regional base. One of the better known is the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly\footnote{see 'hca Quarterly' produced by the HCA headquarters at Prague.}, which was founded in 1990 as a citizens' mirror to what was then still the CSCE. The HCA has organised regularly conferences of representatives of country groups from all CSCE/OSCE countries, and in addition got involved in some conflicts in the area on a more concrete basis. One of their most successful projects were conducted by two women from Armenia and Azerbaijan who managed to negotiate an exchange of war prisoners in the 1990, and won international recognition by doing so. And though not citizens-only, the twinning projects between towns and schools as they flourish in Europe should also be mentioned here. Many of them are supported by an active group of citizens who regularly visit each other, and organise support in cases of crisis as for example when the war in Yugoslavia broke out.
All these activities of course fall under the category of peacebuilding. But although they often involve the exchange of people, they can hardly be considered models for what Nonviolent Peaceforce aims at becoming, and therefore - and only because of that - are neglected in the further chapters of this study.
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